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ABSTRACT 
        This dissertation examines the relationship between economic interdependence and 
peace, an important research topic in the field of international relations, by conducting a 
case study of China-Taiwan relations. The key question addressed in the dissertation is 
whether and how the growth of China-Taiwan economic ties in the period from 1990 to 
2007 played a role in the emergence of significantly less confrontational China-Taiwan 
relations in 2008. By taking into account the interaction between international and 
domestic political economy, it finds that (1) the relationship between economic 
interdependence and peace does exist in the case of China-Taiwan relations; and (2) it is 
Taiwan’s domestic politics, as it relates to the domestic conflicts between opposing 
political coalitions in Taiwan over the political relations and economic ties across the 
Taiwan Strait, that plays an important role as an intervening variable in such a 
relationship. 
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Introduction 
 
        The Taiwan Strait is one of the flashpoints of today’s world. The current rivalry 
between China and Taiwan
1
 originally began in 1949 when Chiang Kai-shek and his 
followers fled to Taiwan after their defeat by the Chinese communists in the Chinese civil 
war which erupted immediately after the end of the Second World War.
2
 Three “Taiwan 
Strait Crises” have occurred since then, and the Taiwan issue, as both China’s domestic 
concern and an international problem, has not been officially resolved so far. However, 
while it seems that there will be no ultimate solution to the problem concerning so called 
“cross-strait relations” in the foreseeable future, two developments across the Taiwan 
Strait caught people’s attention: (1) the dramatic growth of China-Taiwan economic ties 
since the late 1980s; and (2) the emergence of the relatively less confrontational China-
Taiwan relations after the 2008 Taiwanese presidential election which vividly contrasted 
with the very confrontational relations between them over the previous decade before the 
election.  
        The main purpose of my dissertation is to explain these developments, examining 
whether and how the economic ties across the Taiwan Strait played a role in the 
emergence of the relatively less confrontational China-Taiwan relations in 2008. As some 
scholars of international relations argue, the growth of economic ties between two 
                                                 
1
 “China” refers to the Chinese mainland and the islands that are ruled by the government of the People’s 
Republic of China (P.R.C.) in Beijing, and “Taiwan” refers to the island of Taiwan and other islands around 
it that are ruled by the government of the Republic of China (R.O.C.) in Taipei; also, the “Chinese 
government” refers to the P.R.C. government while the “Taiwanese government” refers to the R.O.C. 
government. 
2
 For more discussions about the origin of China-Taiwan rivalry, see Charney & Prescott 2000. 
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countries should decrease the likelihood of militarized conflicts between them. On the 
basis of their arguments, can we say that the growth of the economic ties across the 
Taiwan Strait beginning in the late 1980s finally reversed the confrontational nature of 
China-Taiwan relations, resulting in fewer cross-strait conflicts in 2008? Specifically, did 
the growth of cross-strait economic ties in the period from 1990 to 2007 play a role in the 
emergence of the relatively less confrontational relations between China and Taiwan after 
the 2008 presidential election? More importantly, if it did play a role, how did cross-strait 
economic ties affect China-Taiwan relations? These are the questions I address in my 
dissertation. 
        As my research reveals, the relationship between economic ties and peace does exist 
in the case of China-Taiwan relations. Crucially, however, it is Taiwan’s domestic 
politics that plays a key role as an intervening variable in this relationship. More 
specifically, focusing on the period from 1990 to 2008, I find that, first of all, China-
Taiwan economic ties brought about a political cleavage between the Taiwanese who 
benefited from the ties (the economic winners) and those who were harmed by them (the 
economic losers). Second, both pro-independence and anti-independence Taiwanese 
politicians (the “Pan-Green” and the “Pan-Blue” politicians, respectively) exploited that 
cleavage to their own political advantages, with the Pan-Green forming an anti-openness 
coalition with the economic losers in opposition to a pro-openness coalition between the 
Pan-Blue and the economic winners. Third, in the ensuing domestic conflict over China-
Taiwan economic ties, the Taiwanese general public was convinced that those ties would 
benefit Taiwan’s economy in general and therefore became supportive of the ties, a 
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development that politically benefited the pro-openness coalition and eventually led to 
the election of an anti-independence Taiwanese president. Finally, the emergence of an 
anti-independence Taiwanese government significantly decreased the level of 
confrontation between China and Taiwan. 
        Here, several developments since the early 1990s in Taiwan’s domestic politics, 
which have combined to make Taiwan’s domestic politics a key that links cross-strait 
economic ties to China-Taiwan relations, are worth noting. First and foremost, identity 
politics, which has emerged as a major issue in Taiwan’s domestic politics since the early 
1990s, has become one of the most important factors that affect China-Taiwan relations. 
The growth of Taiwanese identity and the spread of anti-unification or even pro-
independence positions in the Taiwanese society have made the Taiwanese people as well 
as their government no longer interested in the unification of China and Taiwan, a very 
unfortunate development for China which regards the unification as a sacred national 
mission that it has to accomplish no matter what. As a result, many of the conflicts across 
the Taiwan Strait since the early 1990s had resulted from China’s aggressive responses to 
what it believed was Taiwan’s “separatist” behavior. It was not until 2008 when there 
was a Taiwanese government explicitly anti-independence that China-Taiwan relations 
became significantly less confrontational. 
        At the same time, the disputes over identity that occurred in Taiwan also led to the 
formation of two confronting political camps in Taiwan’s domestic politics in the early 
2000s: the pro-independence “Pan-Green” and the anti-independence “Pan-Blue.” 
Following the emergence of the political conflict between the Pan-Green and the Pan-
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Blue, Taiwan’s domestic politics started to play a significant role in mediating the 
economic ties and the political relations across the Taiwan Strait when the issues of 
cross-strait economic ties were politicized by these two political camps. Starting in the 
early 2000s, the Pan-Green and the Pan-Blue began to mobilize and work with the 
economic losers and winners who articulated their demands for fewer and more cross-
strait economic ties, respectively. This development in turn resulted in the combination of 
pro-independence and anti-openness forces on the one side and the blending of anti-
independence and pro-openness forces on the other, leading to the emergence of two big 
political coalitions in Taiwan’s domestic politics with regard to cross-strait economic ties. 
Eventually, the Chinese government was also involved in this new political landscape in 
Taiwan when it began to work with the pro-openness coalition between the Pan-Blue and 
the economic winners in the mid-2000s to strengthen cross-strait economic ties and 
advocate the economic benefits of these ties to Taiwan, hoping its effort could help the 
anti-independence Pan-Blue win the Taiwanese presidency that was controlled by the 
pro-independence Pan-Green at that time. Its effort did finally pay off when the Pan-Blue 
candidate, Ma Yin-jeou, won the presidential election in 2008. 
        Taiwan’s democratization throughout the 1990s is another development that matters. 
Democratization opened up the political market in Taiwan, which used to be dominated 
by the authoritarian government, liberating the Taiwanese society from official ideologies 
and making the circulation and exchange of different ideas about China-Taiwan relations 
possible for the first time. For one thing, it has allowed the Taiwanese general public to 
freely express their opinions about the issues of unification and independence.  For 
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another thing, it has encouraged the Taiwanese people, especially the economic winners 
and losers, to articulate their opinions about cross-strait economic ties. Facing the 
looming democratic atmosphere and competing with each other in the unprecedentedly 
free political market, Taiwanese politicians from both of the ruling and opposition parties 
all began to mobilize and appeal to various groups of people to their own political 
advantages, trying to win as many votes as possible in elections. This newly established 
democratic system, as a result, paved the way to the emergence of the coalition between 
the Pan-Green and the economic losers and the coalition between the Pan-Blue and the 
economic winners that I just mentioned. Most importantly, through elections especially 
the presidential ones where candidates provide different platforms on China-Taiwan 
relations, the democratic system has gradually enabled the Taiwanese general public to 
have the final say on what policies they want their government to make and implement 
on China-Taiwan relations and cross-strait economic ties, a development that has 
increasingly encouraged the Chinese government to keep “placing hope (about 
unification) on the Taiwanese people.” After the 2008 Taiwanese presidential election, 
part, if not all, of this hope the Chinese government had placed on the Taiwanese people 
was finally realized when the result of that election revealed that the Taiwanese public 
was anti-independence, wanted Taiwan to get along with China, and preferred to have 
more cross-strait economic ties. 
        These findings of my dissertation are both academically and practically important. 
Academically, whether economic ties among countries lead to peace is a question that has 
been of interest to many scholars for a long time. Given the long rivalry between China 
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and Taiwan that has lasted for more than sixty years and the high intensity of their rivalry 
that concerns disputes over sovereignty and identity, the case of China-Taiwan relations 
is one of the best for the aforementioned research topic: as a case involving a divided 
country, the case of China-Taiwan relations constitutes a “least-likely” case (i.e. a case 
that is very unlikely to validate a certain theory)
3
 for the study of the relationship between 
economic interdependence and peace. 
        Also, my case study that takes “Taiwan’s domestic politics” into account can 
contribute to the general literature on the relationship between economic interdependence 
and international relations by providing an in-depth analysis of the “causal mechanism” 
of the relationship among economic interdependence, domestic politics, and international 
relations that many large-N studies which try to generalize the “causal effect” of 
economic interdependence on peace could not deal with.
4
 In addition, although the 
findings of my single-case study might not necessarily be generalizable, I believe, as 
Arend Lijphart argues about case studies, it can provide valuable information for theory-
building (e.g. the interaction between domestic and international political economy) and 
improve the quality of current theories (e.g. the effect of economic interdependence on 
peace).
5
 Given the fact that the case of China-Taiwan relations, as I have mentioned, is a 
“least-likely” case for the study of the relationship between economic interdependence 
and peace, its value for the second purpose is particularly important (i.e. improving the 
quality of the theory about the effect of economic interdependence on peace). 
                                                 
3
 Eckstein 1975; George 1979, 53; King, Keohane & Verba 1994, 209-210; and Gerring 2007, 115-119, and 
213. 
4
 Gerring 2007, 43-48. 
5
 Lijphart 1971, 691-693.  
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        Finally, my study is also practically important. As Cal Clark argues, “Taiwan is 
probably the only issue that could seriously threaten to destabilize Sino-American 
relations.”6 Therefore, an answer to why and how the level of cross-strait confrontation 
increases and decreases is very important because it can help policymakers of the 
countries that have interests in cross-strait relations (i.e. China, Taiwan, and the United 
States) better manage the situation and make right decisions to prevent a war in the 
Taiwan Strait that might involve two of the biggest powers in our international system, i.e. 
China and the U.S.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Clark 2002b, 753. For more discussions about the tangled interests that China and the U.S. have in 
Taiwan, see Bernstein & Munro 1997, 30; Tucker 2002, 24; White 2004, 319-320; and Kennedy 2007. 
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Chapter One 
The Literature Review, Arguments, and Research Design 
 
        Since 1949, the confrontation between China and Taiwan has generally resulted 
from the Chinese and the Taiwanese unilateral announcements and behavior about their 
relations that were regarded by the other side as provocative. Yet, in the first half of the 
1990s, after four decades of zero-sum rivalry, China and Taiwan, though still taking 
unilateral provocative actions against each other, tried for the first time to formally 
communicate with each other and resolve the common political and non-political 
problems they faced in a bilateral way through a series of meetings between China’s 
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (A.R.A.T.S.) and Taiwan’s Straits 
Exchange Foundation (S.E.F.). However, this is not a unidirectional shift. Starting in the 
mid-1990s, this prospect of China and Taiwan bilaterally resolving the cross-strait 
problems began to fade away when the intensity of China’s and Taiwan’s provocative 
unilateral actions against each other significantly grew. As a result, the formal contact 
between China’s A.R.A.T.S. and Taiwan’s S.E.F. became irregular in the second half of 
the 1990s and was completely suspended in the period from 2000 to 2007.  
        Interestingly, the aforementioned period of confrontation suddenly ended after the 
Taiwanese presidential election in March 2008, and the prospect of China and Taiwan 
bilaterally resolving the cross-strait problems immediately emerged again after the new 
Taiwanese leader, Ma Ying-jeou, took office. One month after the new Taiwanese 
president was inaugurated, in June 2008, the contact between China’s A.R.A.T.S. and 
9 
 
Taiwan’s S.E.F. was resumed, nine years after it was ceased. Simply speaking, the level 
of confrontation after the 2008 Taiwanese presidential election is much lower than that 
before the election: while there were various provocative unilateral actions and relatively 
few conciliatory bilateral interactions in the period from 1990 to 2007, both sides’ 
willingness to resolve common problems in a bilateral way rapidly grew and the number 
of unilateral provocative actions against each other significantly decreased after the 2008 
Taiwanese presidential election. 
        Among many developments in the period from 1990 to 2007, that could explain why 
China-Taiwan relations became relatively less confrontational in 2008 after a decade of 
highly intense confrontation between them, one that has particularly interested scholars 
who observe cross-strait relations closely is the growth of the economic ties between 
China and Taiwan in the aforementioned period. This is also the main focus of my 
dissertation. More specifically, the purpose of this dissertation is to examine whether and 
how the growth of cross-strait economic ties in the period from 1990 to 2007 played a 
role in the emergence of relatively less conformational China-Taiwan relations in 2008.  
        By taking into account (1) the variable of “domestic politics” (as it relates to the 
domestic conflicts between opposing political coalitions over the issues about 
international relations and international economic ties) and (2) the interaction between 
domestic politics and international relations (as well as the interaction between domestic 
and international political economy), this dissertation demonstrates that, in the period 
from 1990 to 2008, China-Taiwan economic ties did eventually reduce the level of 
10 
 
confrontation in the Taiwan Strait; and most importantly, it is “Taiwan’s domestic 
politics” serving as an intervening variable that made this happen. 
 
Literature review: the effect of economic interdependence on international relations 
The effect of economic interdependence among countries on these countries’ 
relations is a popular topic in the field of international relations. However, findings 
concerning this topic vary. According to liberals, economic ties between countries lead to 
peace. This liberal argument about the linkage between economic interdependence and 
peace appeared very early. Norman Angell argued in the early 20
th
 century that the 
growing economic ties among the countries in Europe made a certain European country’s 
waging a war against its neighbors to destroy or confiscate their wealth worthless or even 
an economic suicide because, according to him, a European country’s national wealth 
largely depended on the cross-border economic activities between it and its neighbors.
1
 
Among the contemporary liberal theories with regard to the relationship between 
economic ties and peace, Bruce Russett and John Oneal’s theory of “triangulating peace,” 
which is derived from Immanuel Kant’s idea of “perpetual peace,” is one of the best 
known.
2
 According to Russett and Oneal, there are three factors that, independently or 
aggregately, lead to peace: (1) democracy, which is related to Kant’s argument that, to 
achieve international peace, the constitution of each country should be republican; (2) 
international organization, which concerns Kant’s idea of establishing international 
federalism of free countries; and (3) economic interdependence, which originates in 
                                                 
1
 Angell 1909. 
2
 Oneal et al. 1996; Oneal & Russett 1999; Russett & Oneal 2001; and Kant 1795. 
11 
 
Kant’s idea of creating a cosmopolitan law of world citizenship that can facilitate, among 
other things, commerce and free trade worldwide.
3
 In terms of economic ties, they 
statistically find that the likelihood of militarized conflicts between two countries 
significantly decreases when the levels of their economic interdependence (measured by 
the ratio of bilateral trade to G.D.P.) and/or their economic openness to the global 
economy (measured by the ratio of total trade to G.D.P.) increase.
4
 Generally speaking, 
liberals including the aforementioned scholars make three broad arguments.
5
 First, the 
costs of waging a war against your economic partner are very high. Simply speaking, if 
you wage a war against a country with which you trade and in which you invest, you 
actually fight against yourself because a war between you and that country must have a 
negative effect on your own economy. Second, economic ties change countries’ 
preferences. When the economic ties between two countries grow, and these two 
countries become economically interdependent or even integrated, economic interests – 
compared with other national interests such as military buildup – become the most 
important in the relations between them. Third, strong economic ties make non-military 
threats such as economic sanctions credible; therefore, when there is a conflict between 
two countries that have strong economic ties, non-military threats are very likely to be the 
ways used by them to deal with each other.  
        There are realists disagreeing with the liberal view mentioned above. Many realists 
criticized the liberals like Woodrow Wilson who, in the post-WWI era, argued that 
                                                 
3
 Russett & Oneal 2001, 29. 
4
 Ibid., 154-155. 
5
 Kastner 2006a, 320. 
12 
 
international organizations such as the League of Nations and free trade among countries 
would lead to peace for being utopians. Among those realists, Edward Hallett Carr was 
one of the most famous.
6
 According to him, the liberal idea about peace in the post-WWI 
era was nothing but utopian on the basis of the facts that (1) the League of Nations did 
not prevent Japan from invading Manchuria and Italy from occupying Abyssinia, and (2) 
many developing countries like Germany and Japan adopted economic protectionism to 
develop their economy in order to economically compete with other advanced countries 
like Britain. Based on these observations, he concluded that countries were selfish and 
always tried to increase their military, economic, and ideological power to protect and 
pursue their national interests, and therefore we should give up utopianism and focus on 
power politics when dealing with issues about international relations. Albert Hirschman 
also argues that countries, especially large ones, tend to exploit international trade to 
expand their national power.
7
 He argues that trade relations between two countries would 
become relationships of dependence, influence, or even domination if one of them cannot 
afford losing such trade relations. There are three empirical phenomena demonstrating 
that large trading countries do try to use international trade as a weapon to create power 
disequilibrium against small trading countries: (1) a large country tends to direct its trade 
to smaller trading countries which, compared with larger trading countries, have more 
difficulties in stopping the trade with it and thus are more likely to become economically 
dependent on it; (2) a large country may try to make a small country economically 
dependent on it by changing the economic structure of the latter and therefore making the 
                                                 
6
 Carr 1964. 
7
 Hirschman 1945. 
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latter’s economy exclusively complementary to its economy; and (3) because of the two 
aforementioned points, a small country seeks to distribute its trade among many different 
countries in order to prevent itself from being economically dependent on a single large 
country.  
        The relative gains theory is another realist theory that contradicts the liberal view on 
the relationship between economic ties and peace.
8
 According to this theory, the 
collective action problem embedded in the cooperation between two countries concerns 
not only cheating but also relative gains. Specifically, a country that knows its partner is 
not cheating in their cooperative relationship might still want to stop such a relationship if 
it finds that its partner gains relatively more than it does from the cooperation. It is 
because, given that your partner today might become your enemy tomorrow in an 
anarchical international system, allowing your current partner to achieve relatively more 
gains than you do would probably make it a formidable enemy in the future when your 
relationship turns from partnership into rivalry. Therefore, on the basis of this theory, it 
can be argued that for a country that is asymmetrically dependent on another country, the 
fact that it gains relatively less while its partner gains relatively more would make it feel 
insecure, and thus, to such a country, national security would be more important than 
economic benefits. From this point of view, economic interdependence does not 
necessarily lead to peace.  
        A study of trade between Japan and the United States by Robert Gilpin also appears 
to rebut the liberal view on the relationship between economic interdependence and 
                                                 
8
 Grieco 1998. 
14 
 
peace.
9
 According to him, economic interdependence may actually be a source of conflict 
rather than peace: Japan’s large trade surplus against the U.S., resulting from Japan’s 
unique trade pattern which focuses on “inter-industry” rather than “intra-industry” trade, 
has been the major source of economic conflict between the two countries. Specifically, 
while Japan exports many manufactured products (e.g. motor vehicles, electronics, high-
tech products, etc.), it imports primarily commodities (e.g. food, raw materials, fuels, etc.) 
but disproportionately few manufactured products it produces; the conflict thus emerges 
when the U.S. accuses the Japanese government of intentionally pursuing this unequal 
trade pattern while the Japanese government insists on keeping this pattern in order to 
protect and develop its indigenous industries. 
There are also studies showing that the relationship between economic 
interdependence and peace is actually more complicated than both liberals and realists 
think. For example, according to Katherine Barbieri, the relationship is not linear but 
curvilinear: while a low to moderate level of interdependence may lead to peace, a high 
level of interdependence increases the likelihood of conflict.
10
 The theory of trade 
expectations also demonstrates that the expectations about future trade have an effect on 
the relationship between interdependence and peace.
11
 More specifically, if highly 
interdependent countries expect that the level of their trade will remain high in the future, 
interdependence brings about peace; in contrast, if they expect that the level will become 
low, interdependence may lead to conflicts because, under this circumstance, the 
                                                 
9
 Gilpin 2003. 
10
 Barbieri 1996. 
11
 Copeland 1996. 
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countries that are relatively more dependent on others might initiate war against those 
they are dependent on due to a fear of being cut off and thus losing national wealth as 
well as long-term national security. 
An emerging pattern of China-Taiwan relations which simultaneously involves 
“economic interdependence” and “political divergence” makes scholars studying China-
Taiwan relations become more and more interested in the effect of cross-strait economic 
ties on China-Taiwan relations.
12
 However, like the general debate over the relationship 
between economic ties and peace, there is no consensus on whether the growth of the 
economic ties between China and Taiwan is leading or will lead to peace in the Taiwan 
Strait. On the basis of the liberal view, it is argued that when the economic ties between 
China and Taiwan become stronger, war in the Taiwan Strait becomes highly unlikely. 
More specifically, if there are strong cross-strait economic ties, any war between China 
and Taiwan would be highly costly to both sides given the huge damage it might cause to 
their economy; in addition, economic ties enhance common economic interests between 
China and Taiwan and therefore make political conciliation possible. As Karen Sutter 
argues, the deepening cross-strait economic cooperation will one day lead to peaceful 
China-Taiwan relations because stability, which is very important to both China’s and 
Taiwan’s economic interests, is now becoming a common value shared by both sides and 
a pragmatic alternative to independence or unification.
13
 There are also scholars who, 
while admitting that the economic ties between China and Taiwan are not sufficient to 
resolve the whole cross-strait political and military conflicts, believe that those ties do 
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have an ability to ease the cross-strait tension to a significant degree. For example, Greg 
Mastel argues that cross-strait economic ties are “strong countervailing forces” that can 
change at least some of China’s and Taiwan’s bellicose attitudes toward each other.14 
Paul J. Bolt also believes that, although cross-strait economic ties might not be able to 
completely prevent China and Taiwan from taking disruptive political actions against 
each other, the ties do play a growing role in stabilizing China-Taiwan relations because 
they are making the aforementioned political actions become more and more costly to 
each side of the Taiwan Strait.
15
 Cal Clark makes a similar argument as well.
16
 According 
to him, despite the fact that the core problem at the level of “high politics” in cross-strait 
relations (i.e. the problem about sovereignty) will hardly be resolved in the foreseeable 
future, the growing economic transactions between China and Taiwan at the level of “low 
politics” are attenuating the political hostility that we see at the level of “high politics” 
when China and Taiwan make efforts to moderate the cross-strait tension to a 
manageable degree in order to preserve the economic ties between them.   
There are those who doubt that economic ties across the Taiwan Strait will lead to 
peace. It is argued by some people like George T. Crane and Chien-min Chao that the 
economic integration between China and Taiwan will not decrease the likelihood of 
cross-strait conflict because the main problems that trigger the China-Taiwan rivalry are 
highly politicized ones (i.e. the issues of identity and sovereignty), and it is hard to 
imagine that either China or Taiwan will compromise on these issues despite the growth 
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of the economic ties between them.
17
 Phillip C. Saunders makes a similar point, arguing 
that even though cross-strait economic ties might increase the costs of conflict and 
provide incentives for moderate behavior, they would never completely get rid of the 
possibility of cross-strait conflict.
18
 Scott Kastner also finds that the evidence supporting 
the liberal view on the relationship between economic ties and peace is ambiguous in the 
case of China-Taiwan relations.
19
 According to him, in the period from the early 1990s to 
the mid-2000s, although the cross-strait economic ties grew, each side seemed to have no 
intention to treat the other side well: while the Chinese leaders continued to threaten 
Taiwan verbally and at times militarily, the Taiwanese leaders continued to provoke 
China. He further argues that the economic ties between China and Taiwan could keep 
growing even under the circumstance of confrontational cross-strait relations because, 
according to him, Taiwanese economic internationalists (i.e. the Taiwanese who benefit 
from and therefore support cross-strait economic ties) are powerful in Taiwan’s political 
system, and the Taiwanese political leaders are accountable to them.
20
 
Ping Deng employs the relative gains theory to explain the Taiwanese government’s 
effort to impose restriction on cross-strait economic ties during the 1990s.
21
 According to 
him, the restriction was imposed largely due to Taiwanese political leaders’ worry that 
Taiwan’s economic interdependence with its rival, China, was actually giving the latter 
huge economic and political benefits at the expense of Taiwan’s national security; in 
other words, they were worried that cross-strait economic ties would strengthen China’s 
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economic power which might be transformed into military and political threats to Taiwan 
in the future. Some Taiwanese politicians also believe that the economic interdependence 
between China and Taiwan is asymmetrical because there is an excess of capital and job 
outflows from Taiwan to China; and, due to such asymmetrical interdependence, they are 
worried that Taiwan is too economically dependent on China and is gradually being 
economically “hollowed out” by China.22 Furthermore, China’s alleged use of cross-strait 
economic ties as political tools to influence Taiwan’s China policy also concerns them.23 
Specifically, following Hirschman’s argument that I have discussed, they believe that 
China is trying to make Taiwan economically dependent on China in order to not only 
hollow out Taiwan’s economy but also use the Taiwanese business people who have 
economic interests in China to influence the Taiwanese government’s China policy-
making. Because of the aforementioned concerns, these Taiwanese politicians demand 
more restriction on cross-strait economic ties, arguing that national security is more 
important than economic benefits.
24
 
 
Argument: domestic politics matters 
Three observations derived from the literature reviewed in the previous section are 
worth pointing out, based on which I will propose my answer to the research question of 
this dissertation (i.e. whether, and more importantly, how the growing economic ties in 
the period from 1990 to 2007 played a role in the emergence of the relatively less 
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confrontational cross-strait relations after the 2008 presidential election) in the second 
half of this section. 
First, most of the scholars, especially those who try to generalize the relationship 
between economic interdependence and international relations in a large-N study like 
Barbieri as well as Russett and Oneal, tend to treat countries that are economically 
interdependent as the units of analysis in their research.
25
 The way I see it, while it is 
reasonable to see a country as an independent actor in the international system because it 
has its own preferences and behaves rationally based on these preferences, it is also 
undeniable that a country’s preferences or foreign policies are formed through a decision-
making process embedded in domestic politics. I believe that we would benefit from 
taking this perspective into account when examining the relationship between economic 
ties and peace among countries.  
Second, when it comes to the case of cross-strait relations, there are some studies 
taking domestic politics into account. For example, scholars like Crane and Chao remind 
us that we should explore the Taiwanese domestic concern about the issues of 
sovereignty and identity when examining China-Taiwan political and economic 
relations.
26
 Also, Kastner tells us that the power of economic internationalists in Taiwan’s 
domestic politics has an effect on the making of Taiwan’s economic policy toward 
China.
27
 However, as I see it, although there are studies arguing well that Taiwan’s 
domestic politics matters, there has been no study systematically examining the broad 
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causal relationship among cross-strait economic ties, Taiwan’s domestic politics, and 
China-Taiwan relations: while some focus on the first two variables, others concentrate 
on the last two variables. 
Third, based on the two aforementioned points, I think a theoretical approach that 
takes both domestic and international levels into account and combines international 
economy, domestic politics, and international relations would be useful for answering the 
research question of this dissertation. Specifically, I will argue that the growth of the 
economic ties between China and Taiwan in the period from 1990 to 2007 did play a role 
in the emergence of the relatively less confrontational China-Taiwan relations in 2008, 
and, most importantly, Taiwan’s domestic politics is the intervening factor that links the 
former to the latter. 
        Here, before discussing my arguments in more detail, it is necessary to probe how 
international economy influences domestic politics and how domestic politics affects 
international relations. 
        International economy does have an effect on domestic politics. According to 
Ronald Rogowski, (1) people who benefit from economic openness will try to purse more 
openness, while those who do not benefit from or are harmed by openness will try to stop 
it; (2) people who enjoy a sudden increase in wealth because of openness will be able to 
expand their political influence (although, according to Rogowski, they might still lose) 
while those who are harmed by openness might be politically weakened; and (3) people 
who are in favor of openness and those who are against it will try to have their voices 
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heard in the domestic political arena.
28
 Similarly, Jeffry Frieden and Ronald Rogowski 
jointly argue that an increase in the level of a certain country’s economic openness to the 
global economy would strengthen the effect of international economic trends on the 
domestic economy of that country and lead to a domestic conflict in that country between 
the people who economically benefit from openness and those who are economically 
harmed by it.
29
 Moreover, economic openness might make a government more likely to 
change its economic policy in accordance with the changes in international economy. 
According to Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, in a country that is economically open to 
the outside world, changes in international economy may bring about changes in the 
preferences and the power of domestic political and economic actors, which in turn lead 
to political pressure that forces the government of that country to change the existing 
policies or institutions in order to reflect the new domestic political and economic 
situations.
30
 
As for the relationship between domestic politics and international relations, as 
Robert Putnam reminds us, they are mutually affected.
31
 Here, in terms of the effect of 
the former on the latter, he finds that, in order to make a deal in an international 
negotiation, the leader of a country should think of not only the preferences of his or her 
international counterparts but also the preferences of the domestic political actors back 
home. Barbara Farnham also makes a similar point and goes so far as to argue that 
foreign policy makers not only take domestic politics into account but also think about it 
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first.
32
 China’s foreign policy-making and international behavior are good examples of 
how domestic politics affects international relations. It is argued by many scholars (e.g. 
Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen, Peter Hays Gries, and Susan Shirk) that, when 
making the foreign policy with regard to a certain country, the Chinese government has 
to take into account the Chinese public opinions (i.e. Chinese nationalism) about that 
country; from this point of view, it can be argued that Chinese people’s nationalistic 
emotion toward the U.S. and Japan is one of the reasons why China usually has a hostile 
and uncompromising attitude toward these two countries.
33
 In the case of the effect of 
Taiwan’s domestic politics on China-Taiwan relations, in addition to the works I have 
discussed, Yun-han Chu’s study of Taiwan’s national identity shows that Taiwanese 
people’s identity and their attitudes toward unification and independence, which are 
among the major sources of political controversies in Taiwan’s domestic politics, have a 
great effect on the prospect of cross-strait relations.
34
 According to him, the “open-
minded rationalists” in Taiwan (i.e. the Taiwanese in favor of neither unification nor 
independence), who constitute a relative majority of the whole population, have the 
potential in the long run to shift the current cross-strait political equilibrium in the 
direction of either unification or independence if their attitudes change for any reason in 
the future. 
After demonstrating that (1) international economy does have an effect on domestic 
politics and (2) domestic politics does have an impact on international relations, it is time 
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to introduce my own arguments. My arguments, which concern the relationship among 
cross-strait economic ties, Taiwan’s domestic politics, and China-Taiwan relations in the 
period from 1990 to 2008, consist of the four major arguments as follows. 
 
1. The first argument (Argument 1):  
The growth of cross-strait economic ties led to a political cleavage between the 
Taiwanese who benefited from the ties (i.e. the economic winners, most of whom were 
China-based Taiwanese business people) and those who did not (i.e. the economic losers, 
most of whom were unskilled or low-skilled Taiwanese workers).  
 
2. The second argument (Argument 2):  
Starting in 2001, Taiwanese politicians began to exploit the aforementioned cleavage to 
their political advantages: while the politicians who were anti-Taiwanese independence 
(i.e. the anti-independence politicians) formed a pro-openness coalition with the 
economic winners, the politicians who were pro-independence (i.e. the pro-independence 
politicians) formed an anti-openness coalition with the economic losers; and, from 2001 
to 2008, the two coalitions conflicted with each other and tried to influence the 
Taiwanese government’s policy-making on the issues of cross-strait economic ties.  
 
3. The third argument (Argument 3):  
By 2008, the pro-openness coalition’s position eventually became more politically 
attractive to the Taiwanese general public than the anti-openness coalition’s position. 
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More specifically, from 2005 to 2008, the Taiwanese public, who believed that the ties 
would have a positive effect on Taiwan’s economy in general, became significantly 
supportive of the pro-openness coalition’s position when the pro-independence 
Taiwanese government revealed an unequivocal anti-openness tendency due to the 
pressure from the anti-openness coalition. This development in turn destabilized the anti-
openness coalition in the 2008 presidential election when its candidate tried to appeal to 
the pro-openness general public by revealing an election-driven pro-openness tendency. 
At the end, the general public’s pro-openness attitude and the contradiction between the 
anti-openness coalition and its candidate led to the victory of the pro-openness coalition 
in the 2008 presidential election. 
 
4. The fourth argument (Argument 4):  
The emergence of an anti-independence Taiwanese president in 2008 as a result of the 
victory of the pro-openness coalition in the 2008 presidential election, who was one of 
the anti-independence politicians and whose attitude toward China was much more 
reconciliatory compared with his predecessors who could be categorized as pro-
independence politicians, led to relatively less confrontational China-Taiwan relations. 
 
        Here, I want to make three clarifications about the aforementioned arguments. First, 
while I only focus on “Taiwan’s domestic politics” in this dissertation as an intervening 
variable in the relationship between cross-strait economic ties and China-Taiwan 
relations, I have no intention to say that other variables including China’s domestic 
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politics do not matter. That being said, it is undeniable that the variable of Taiwan’s 
domestic politics is an important variable that can never be ignored when we study the 
cross-strait issues, especially those in and after the 1990s. Before the 1990s, Taiwan, with 
the U.S. help, was largely a responder to China’s threat to use force against the island to 
achieve its goal of “reunification.” However, since the 1990s when Taiwan began to 
challenge the idea of “one-China” it used to uphold and stopped pursuing the goal of 
“reunification” it used to regard as a national mission, its role as a responder to cross-
strait tension has dramatically changed. More specifically, as Taiwan began to move 
away from the aforementioned idea and goal in the 1990s, it became, either voluntarily or 
involuntarily, an initiator of cross-strait conflict in which China’s role was turned into a 
responder to what it perceived as Taiwan’s “separatist” behavior. Because of this new 
situation, as Chas W. Freeman argues well, starting in the 1990s, the Taiwanese 
government’s decisions with regard to China-Taiwan relations, for the first time since the 
1950s, could have a decisive impact on the stability across the Taiwan Strait: while it was 
the Chinese government’s military threat that posed real danger to peace before the 1990s, 
it has been the Taiwanese government’s political decisions that have an ability to pose 
such danger since the 1990s.
35
 From this point of view, Taiwan’s domestic politics, 
which has a great effect on the Taiwanese government’s political decisions about China, 
is undoubtedly one of the most important variables we have to take into account when 
studying China-Taiwan relations.  
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        Second, while I try to argue in this dissertation that the economic factor played a 
role in the outcome of the 2008 Taiwanese presidential election, which in turn had a 
profound impact on China-Taiwan relations, I have no intention to say that other factors 
were not important. Actually, in the 2008 election, like the previous Taiwanese 
presidential elections, in addition to the issues of cross-strait economic ties, the issues 
about unification and independence were also very important.         
        It is worth noting that both of the candidates associated with the pro-openness and 
anti-openness coalitions in that election knew very well what the majority of the 
Taiwanese public wanted on the aforementioned issues: the Taiwanese public preferred 
(1) neither unification nor independence and (2) less restriction on cross-strait economic 
ties. On the issues about unification and independence, while Taiwanese nationalism had 
significantly grown since the early 1990s, most of the Taiwanese by the 2008 presidential 
election, though opposing unification, actually did not support Taiwan’s de jure 
independence, either. According to Chu, this pro-status quo attitude among the 
Taiwanese public could be partially attributed to the growth of cross-strait economic 
ties.
36
 More specifically, Taiwanese people did not want to see any radical independence 
movement destabilize China-Taiwan relations and, in turn, cause damage to cross-strait 
economic ties that they thought would benefit Taiwan’s economy. Due to this pro-status 
quo attitude revealed by the Taiwanese public, both candidates tried to move away from 
the extremes of the unification vs. independence spectrum and toward the middle, and 
they ended up being in a position that supported neither unification nor independence, 
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which to some extent alienated their supporters on the extremes (i.e. the diehard 
advocates of independence or unification).  
        As for the issues of cross-strait economic ties, both of the candidates proposed to lift 
the restriction on the economic ties. However, as I will argue in this dissertation, their 
pro-openness positions put them in two different political situations during the campaign 
period, which in turn brought them two different political fates at the end of the 2008 
election. The pro-openness position of the candidate associated with the pro-openness 
coalition (nominated by the opposition party) successfully attracted the general public 
and satisfied his political allies, i.e. the economic winners and anti-independence 
politicians. By contrast, the pro-openness position of the candidate associated with the 
anti-openness coalition (nominated by the ruling party) was not only unattractive to the 
general public and the economic winners, who were suspicious about his election-driven 
pro-openness attitude and wanted to punish the incumbent’s party due to the incumbent’s 
anti-openness policy, but also opposed by his political allies, i.e. the economic losers and 
pro-independence politicians. 
        The third clarification that I want to make is that, while I try to argue in this 
dissertation that the growth of cross-strait economic ties in the period from 1990 to 2007 
resulted in the relatively less confrontational China-Taiwan relations in 2008, I have no 
intension to say that the relatively low level of tension between China and Taiwan since 
2008 is irreversible. First of all, in the post-2008 era, the level of tension might increase 
again in spite of the existence of an anti-independence Taiwanese president if (1) the anti-
independence president is unwilling to pursue unification due to the pro-status quo 
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attitude among the Taiwanese public, and (2) his or her election-driven unwillingness to 
pursue unification is perceived, either correctly or mistakenly, by China, whose ultimate 
goal is to achieve unification, as an anti-unification tendency. Secondly, a pro-
independence presidential candidate might be electable again in the post-2008 era in spite 
of the growth of cross-strait economic ties and the Taiwanese public’s support for those 
ties if (1) the anti-independence candidate, though supporting economic openness, is 
perceived, either correctly or mistakenly, by the pro-status quo Taiwanese public as not 
only anti-independence but also pro-unification, and (2) the pro-independence candidate 
convinces, either sincerely or deceptively, the Taiwanese public that he or she is more 
interested in maintaining the status quo than pursuing de jure independence and that he or 
she does accept some degree of economic openness instead of completely opposing it. 
Here, it can be well argued that the reemergence of a pro-independence Taiwanese 
president (or the emergence of a Taiwanese president who is potentially pro-
independence) under this circumstance would lead to confrontational China-Taiwan 
relations again because this kind of Taiwanese president, compared with an anti-
independence president, is more inclined to adopt an uncompromising approach to China-
Taiwan relations. 
 
Research design 
        To prove that my arguments (i.e. the growth of cross-strait economic ties in the 
period from 1990 to 2007 led to the election of an anti-independence Taiwanese president 
in 2008 which in turn resulted in relatively less confrontational China-Taiwan relations 
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afterwards) are valid, I do the following three-stage research. The first stage of my 
research deals with the core dependent variable examined in this dissertation (i.e. the 
relatively less confrontational China-Taiwan relations after the 2008 presidential 
election). At this stage of research, I use extensive analysis of newspaper articles to 
demonstrate the ebb and flow of cross-strait relations in the period from 1990 to 2008. 
Then, at the second and the third stages of my research, I build the causal mechanism 
among the three core variables: (1) the growing cross-strait economic ties in the period 
from 1990 to 2007 (i.e. the core independent variable); (2) Taiwan’s domestic politics in 
the period from 1990 to 2008 (i.e. the core intervening variable); and (3) the relatively 
less confrontational China-Taiwan relations after the 2008 election (i.e. the core 
dependent variable). Specifically, the second stage of the research examines the 
relationship between the second and the third variables, and the third stage of the research 
explores the relationship between the first and the second variables. In general, I conduct 
a series of qualitative analyses to examine the relationship among the three 
aforementioned variables by exploring the relevant statistical data, public polls, political 
and economic events, as well as public statements and announcements made by the 
political and economic actors involved (i.e. the Taiwanese government, the Chinese 
government, Taiwanese politicians, Taiwanese business people, Taiwanese workers, etc.). 
 
Stage One: identifying the core dependent variable  
        At the first stage of my research, I examine the level of confrontation between China 
and Taiwan after the 2008 presidential election by probing the cross-strait relations 
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before and after the Taiwanese presidential inauguration in May 2008. Three points about 
this stage of research are worth noting. 
        First, the “confrontation” between China and Taiwan is defined as follows: China-
Taiwan relations are highly confrontational when there are many unilateral provocative 
actions against each other but few bilateral efforts to resolve the common problems 
facing them; by contrast, the relations are less confrontational when there are relatively 
more bilateral efforts but fewer unilateral actions.   
        Second, to demonstrate that China-Taiwan relations were confrontational before 
May 2008, I examine the events concerning the cross-strait relations from 1990 to 2008, 
especially focusing on the formal meetings between China’s A.R.A.T.S. and Taiwan’s 
S.E.F. The purpose here is to reveal that although a prospect of China and Taiwan 
bilaterally resolving the common problems they faced emerged in the period from 1992 
to 1993, this prospect diminished from 1994 to 1999 and completely disappeared from 
2000 to 2007 due to many of China’s and Taiwan’s provocative unilateral actions against 
each other. 
        Third, to demonstrate that cross-strait relations became relatively less 
confrontational from May 2008 to December 2008 after a decade of confrontation, I 
examine the events concerning cross-strait relations as well as the resumption of the 
formal contact between the A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F. in the aforementioned period. The 
purpose is to reveal that the prospect of China and Taiwan bilaterally resolving the 
common problems they faced did emerge again after May 2008.  
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Stage Two: building the relationship between Taiwan’s domestic politics and cross-
strait relations (examining Argument 4) 
        At the second stage of my research, I examine Argument 4, trying to answer the 
question of whether the emergence of an anti-independence Taiwanese president in May 
2008 reversed the confrontational nature of cross-strait relations over the previous decade. 
More specifically, I investigate whether Taiwanese presidents’ positions on China-
Taiwan relations really matter when it comes to the level of confrontation across the 
Taiwan Strait. Three points about this stage of research are worth noting. 
        First, the independent variable at this stage of research is the Taiwanese presidents’ 
positions on cross-strait relations from 1990 to 2008, and the dependent variable is the 
China-Taiwan relations examined at the first stage of research. The major purpose of this 
stage of research is to find evidence supporting the argument that, in the period from 
1990 to 2008, while the relations between China and Taiwan were highly confrontational 
when there was a pro-independence Taiwanese president (i.e. Lee Teng-hui in the period 
from 1990 to 2000 and Chen Shui-bian in the period from 2000 to 2008), the relations 
were relatively less confrontational when there was an anti-independence president (i.e. 
Ma Ying-jeou in 2008). 
        Second, at this stage of research, I also examine the growth of Taiwanese 
nationalism in the period from 1990 to 2008, during which people in Taiwan, at both the 
elite and mass levels, began to develop a Taiwanese identity and have a debate over the 
nature of cross-strait conflict (i.e. a debate on whether the conflict is a “domestic” or an 
“international” one). Here, I especially focus on (1) the emergence of the pro-
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independence political coalition (i.e. the Pan-Green coalition) and the anti-independence 
political coalition (i.e. the Pan-Blue coalition) in Taiwan’s domestic politics in 2001, and 
(2) the political conflict between them in the period from 2001 to 2008 as well as its 
effect on China-Taiwan relations. 
        Third, it is worth pointing out here that, after demonstrating at this stage of research 
that (1) Taiwanese presidents’ stances on cross-strait relations did have an effect on 
China-Taiwan relations and (2) the relatively less conformational China-Taiwan relations 
in 2008 were closely associated with the election of an anti-independence Taiwanese 
president, in order to prove that my argument about the relationship between cross-strait 
economic ties and China-Taiwan relations is valid, the next step is to find evidence 
showing that it is the growth of cross-strait economic ties that led to his election, which is 
the objective of the third stage of my research. 
 
Stage Three: building the relationship between cross-strait economic ties and 
Taiwan’s domestic politics (examining Arguments 1, 2, and 3) 
        At the third stage of my research, I examine the other three arguments I made (i.e. 
Arguments 1, 2, and 3). The ways I explore these three arguments are described as 
follows. 
 
Examining Argument 1: 
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        The question I address here is whether growing cross-strait economic ties led to a 
political cleavage between the Taiwanese who benefited from the ties and those who did 
not. Two points with regard to this part of research are worth noting. 
        First, the independent variable here is the growth of cross-strait economic ties in the 
period from 1990 to 2008, measured by the statistical data about the amount of cross-
strait trade as well as Taiwanese investment in China, and the dependent variable is the 
political cleavage between the Taiwanese who benefited from the ties (i.e. the economic 
winners, most of whom were China-based Taiwanese business people) and those who did 
not (i.e. the economic losers, most of whom were unskilled or low-skilled Taiwanese 
workers) in the same period, measured by the number of Taiwanese business associations 
in China, the capital outflow from Taiwan to China, the job opportunities moved from 
Taiwan to China, as well as the economic winners’ and losers’ positions on cross-strait 
economic ties. 
        Second, the major purpose of doing this part of research is to find evidence proving 
the argument that, from 1990 to 2008, the growth of cross-strait economic ties led to a 
political cleavage between the economic winners and losers. In addition, I examine the 
effect of the Taiwanese government’s anti-openness attitude toward cross-strait economic 
ties in the period from 1990 to 1999 on the emergence of the pro-openness consciousness 
among the economic winners as well as the effect of the change in such an attitude in 
2000 on the emergence of the anti-openness consciousness among the economic losers. 
 
Examining Argument 2: 
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        The question I address here is whether the pro-independence and anti-independence 
politicians exploited the aforementioned political cleavage by forming the pro-openness 
coalition with the economic winners and the anti-openness coalition with the economic 
losers, respectively. Two points with regard to this part of research are worth noting. 
        First, to demonstrate that the pro-independence and anti-independence politicians 
did exploit the cleavage between the economic winners and losers, I examine and 
compare (1) the pro-independence and anti-independence politicians’ positions on cross-
strait economic ties in the period from 2001 to 2008, during which there was a severe 
conflict between the anti-independence Pan-Blue and the pro-independence Pan-Green in 
Taiwan’s domestic politics, and (2) the economic winners’ and losers’ opinions about 
cross-strait economic ties in the same period. The comparison is made here to see if the 
pro-independence politicians and the economic losers on the one side and the anti-
independence politicians and the economic winners on the other side chose the similar 
priorities and sounded the similar themes on the issues of cross-strait economic ties.     
        Second, the major purpose of doing this part of research is to find evidence with 
which to evaluate the following arguments: (1) the aforementioned coalitions emerged in 
2001 when the political conflict between the Pan-Green and the Pan-Blue began; (2) from 
2001 to 2008, the two coalitions conflicted with each other and tried to influence the 
Taiwanese government’s policy-making on the issues of cross-strait economic ties; and 
(3) the two coalitions were the major political actors in the 2004 and 2008 Taiwanese 
presidential elections. 
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Examining Argument 3: 
        The question I address here is whether, in the period from 2001 to 2008, the pro-
openness coalition’s position eventually became more politically attractive to the 
Taiwanese general public than the anti-openness coalition’s, which in turn led to the 
victory of the pro-openness coalition in the 2008 presidential election and, as a result, the 
emergence of an anti-independence Taiwanese president. Two points with regard to this 
part of research are worth noting. 
        First, to demonstrate that the pro-openness coalition’s position eventually became 
more attractive to the Taiwanese general public in the period from 2001 to 2008, I 
examine the support rate for cross-strait economic ties among the Taiwanese general 
public in the same period. The purpose is to prove that (1) from 2005 to 2008, the support 
rate for cross-strait economic ties among the Taiwanese public did significantly grow, 
and (2) the growth of the rate was a result of the public dissatisfaction with the Taiwanese 
government’s obvious anti-openness tendency revealed in and after 2005.  
        Second, to demonstrate that the growth of the support rate for cross-strait economic 
ties among the Taiwanese public did have an effect on the outcome of the 2008 
presidential election, I find evidence proving that (1) the Pan-Green presidential 
candidate associated with the anti-openness coalition for the 2008 election, due to the 
popular support for cross-strait economic ties, proposed a pro-openness policy during the 
campaign period; (2) the Pan-Green candidate’s election-driven pro-openness tendency 
led to a conflict between him and the pro-independence politicians as well as the 
economic losers; and (3) the popular support for cross-strait economic ties and the anti-
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openness coalition’s conflict with the Pan-Green candidate played a role in the victory of 
the pro-openness coalition in the 2008 election and, as a result, the election of an anti-
independence Taiwanese president. 
 
Mapping out the dissertation 
        On the basis of the research design discussed in the previous section, I divide this 
dissertation into three parts. The first part of the dissertation, which is largely descriptive, 
provides a broad historical picture of the political and economic dimensions of the China-
Taiwan relations in the period from 1990 to 2008. As for the second and the third parts of 
the dissertation, which are analytical, they deal with the role played by Taiwan’s 
domestic politics in the relationship between cross-strait economic ties and China-Taiwan 
relations in the aforementioned period. Each part is introduced in more detail as follows. 
        In the first part of the dissertation (Chapters Two and Three), I conduct a historical 
review of China-Taiwan relations from 1990 to 2008, demonstrating the findings of the 
first stage of my research; in addition, I conduct another historical review particularly 
about the economic dimension of cross-strait relations in the same period of time. These 
two historical reviews combined will provide the readers with a clear picture of the 
research question this dissertation tries to address, which is about the relationship 
between cross-strait economic ties and China-Taiwan relations. 
        In the second part of the dissertation (Chapters Four and Five), the findings of the 
second stage of the research are presented, which will provide the readers with the 
empirical evidence for the relationship between Taiwan’s domestic politics and China-
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Taiwan relations in the period from 1990 to 2008. As the evidence shows, the existence 
of a pro-independence Taiwanese president tended to bring about confrontational China-
Taiwan relations while the existence of an anti-independence Taiwanese president was 
likely to make China-Taiwan relations less confrontational. In other words, the reason 
why China-Taiwan relations became relatively less confrontational in 2008 had a lot to 
do with the emergence of an anti-independence Taiwanese president after the 2008 
Taiwanese presidential election. 
       In the last part of the dissertation (Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight), the findings of 
the third stage of the research are presented, which will provide the readers with the 
empirical evidence for the relationship between cross-strait economic ties and Taiwan’s 
domestic politics in the period from 1990 to 2008. As the evidence shows, the growth of 
cross-strait economic ties did play a role in the election of the anti-independence 
Taiwanese president mentioned in the second part of the dissertation. More specifically, 
(1) the growth of cross-strait economic ties led to a political cleavage and eventually a 
conflict between the economic winners and losers in 2000; (2) starting in 2001, pro-
independence and anti-independence politicians began to exploit the cleavage by forming 
the anti-openness coalition with the economic losers and the pro-openness coalition with 
the winners, respectively; and (3) from 2005 to 2008, when the public support for cross-
strait economic ties significantly grew, the pro-openness coalition became more 
politically stronger than the anti-openness coalition and eventually won the 2008 
presidential election, which as a result led to the emergence of an anti-independence 
Taiwanese president.   
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Chapter Two 
A Historical Review of China-Taiwan Relations, 1990-2008 
 
        In this chapter, I conduct, from Taiwan’s perspective, a historical review of China-
Taiwan relations in the period from 1990 to 2008. The review reveals the following 
patterns of China-Taiwan relations in the aforementioned period: (1) the level of cross-
strait confrontation significantly decreased from 1990 to 1993 but began to gradually 
increase from 1994 to 1999; (2) from 2000 to 2007, China-Taiwan relations were highly 
confrontational; and (3) the level of confrontation drastically and suddenly decreased 
again in 2008.  
 
2-1: A review of cross-strait relations from Taiwan’s perspective, 1990-2008 
 
1990 
        The unification of East and West Germany on October 3
rd
, 1990, was one of the 
biggest events of that year for the whole world. It was especially an important issue for 
the people in Taiwan who were concerned with the prospects of the unification of China 
and Taiwan which, by then, had been rivals for more than 40 years since 1949 when the 
central government of the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) was established in Beijing 
by the leader of the Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.), Mao Zedong, and the central 
government of the Republic of China (R.O.C.) was moved to Taipei by the leader of 
Kuomintang (K.M.T.), Chiang Kai-shek, as a result of the Chinese civil war that erupted 
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immediately after the end of the Second World War in 1945. The final process of German 
unification that lasted from November 1989, when the Berlin Wall was torn down, to 
October 1990, when a new unified Germany officially emerged, was closely examined by 
the Taiwanese government. Ma Ying-jeou, the current Taiwanese president who was the 
head of Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission of Taiwan’s Executive 
Yuan back then, was among the many officials assigned to study the process. He visited 
Berlin in September 1990 to learn how two German states achieved the goal of 
unification. Based on the German experience he observed there, he believed that 
increasing the social, cultural, and economic exchanges between the two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait was a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the unification of China and 
Taiwan in the future although he at the same time thought that the way two German states 
were unified with each other was not necessarily applicable to the case of China and 
Taiwan.
1
  
        The German unification did influence the Taiwanese government to change the way 
it dealt with the issue about the unification of China and Taiwan. Although the Taiwanese 
government, on the basis of the observations made by people like Ma who examined at 
first hand the German unification, did not expect that China and Taiwan would follow 
suit in the near future, the unification of two German states did make it, either voluntarily 
or involuntarily, begin to think about making concrete and serious policies to deal with 
the issue of unification rather than just doing what it had been doing for decades, i.e. 
                                                          
1
 “Ma Ying-jeou: The German way of unification is not necessarily applicable to the case of China,” 
Central Daily News, September 25, 1990; and “Building a structure of communication is a necessary 
condition for the unification of China,” Independent Evening News, October 2, 1990. 
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paying lip service. Three days after the two German states were officially unified, on 
October 7
th
, 1990, the National Unification Council (N.U.C.) was officially established 
by the Taiwanese government, whose major mission was to pursue the goal of unification 
across the Taiwan Strait. 
 
1991  
        In addition to the N.U.C., the Taiwanese government prepared itself for the future 
formal or informal negotiations with the Chinese government it expected by founding on 
February 8
th
, 1991, a quasi-governmental organization, Straits Exchange Foundation 
(S.E.F.), which would serve as a “private” (i.e. non-official) negotiation agent for the 
Taiwanese government before both sides of the Taiwan Strait were ready for a formal 
government-to-government contact.
2
 Furthermore, in order to have an official grand 
strategy for the unification of China and Taiwan, in its third meeting on February 23
rd
, 
the N.U.C. officially issued the Guidelines for National Unification (G.N.U.) which 
proposed to achieve the goal of unification on the basis of a three-stage process: the stage 
of exchange, the stage of cooperation, and the stage of unification.
3
 The Taiwanese 
government’s effort so far to pave the way for negotiation with the Chinese government 
                                                          
2
 See the following webpage of S.E.F.: 
<http://www.sef.org.tw/ct.asp?xItem=3962&CtNode=3803&mp=19>. Taiwan’s Red Cross Society had 
ever served as a “private” negotiation agent for the Taiwanese government once before the S.E.F. was 
founded. On September 12
th, 1990, it signed an agreement with China’s Red Cross Society to deal with the 
“repatriation of individuals, criminals, and suspects who illegally enter the territory of the other.” For more 
details about the agreement which is called the Kinmen Accord, see the following two webpages of 
Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council: 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=67746&ctNode=6605&mp=3> and 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Data/042314182971.pdf>. 
3
 “The draft of G.N.U. and the articles passed,” United Daily News, February 24, 1991. For more 
discussions about the G.N.U., see Chu 1997, 237; Zhao 1997, 190; and deLisle 2010, 513 and 518. 
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by establishing the N.U.C., founding the S.E.F., and issuing the G.N.U. did pay off. 
While the Chinese government was still suspicious of the motivation behind the 
aforementioned actions taken by the Taiwanese government,
4
 on March 25
th
, the Chinese 
premier, Li Peng, said in public that the Chinese government welcomed the issuance of 
G.N.U. and hoped there would be negotiations between the C.C.P. and the K.M.T. very 
soon.
5
 
        On April 9
th
, Taiwan’s Executive Yuan officially authorize the S.E.F. to negotiate 
with China on the issues concerning China-Taiwan relations on behalf of the Taiwanese 
government, and the governmental agency that was assigned to closely work with the 
S.E.F. as its official supervisor was the Mainland Affairs Council under the Executive 
Yuan.
6
 On April 22
nd, Taiwan’s National Assembly, one of the two legislative organs in 
Taiwan then,
7
 abolished the “Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of 
Communist Rebellion” which was made in 1948 as a temporary replacement of the 
Constitution and gave the president extreme power to deal with the communist rebellion. 
The abolishment of the Temporary Provisions had a profound implication for China-
Taiwan relations: the Chinese civil war was unilaterally stopped by the R.O.C. 
government in Taiwan, and the P.R.C. government in Beijing was no longer regarded by 
                                                          
4
 For example, there was a concern about the Taiwanese government’s pursuit of “two Chinas” because of 
the idea of “one country, two governments” raised by Taiwanese president, Lee Teng-hui, in mid-1990. For 
Lee’s idea, see Lee 1991, 192 and 196. 
5
 “Li Peng: We welcome G.N.U. and hope for negotiations between the K.M.T. and the C.C.P.,” United 
Daily News, March 25, 1991. 
6
 See the following webpage of S.E.F.: 
<http://www.sef.org.tw/ct.asp?xItem=3962&CtNode=3803&mp=19>. For more details about the 
relationship between Mainland Affairs Council and the S.E.F., see Chu 1997, 237; and Dent 2001, 14. 
7
 The other one is the Legislative Yuan. The power of Legislative Yuan significantly increased in 2000 
when an amendment of the R.O.C. Constitution left the National Assembly almost powerless. The former 
finally became the only legislative organ in 2005 when the latter was officially abolished. 
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it as a rebellious group.
8
 Although the abolishment of the Temporary Provision would 
presumably make it easier for the two rivals to conduct constructive and peaceful 
dialogues, the Chinese government felt dubious about the abolishment because it could 
also be interpreted as an action by the R.O.C. government to break up with its Chinese 
origin.
9
 That being said, the abolishment of the Temporary Provisions combined with the 
other actions taken by the Taiwanese government that have been mentioned above did 
lead to some positive interactions between China and Taiwan. On April 27
th
, the Chinese 
military terminated its political broadcasting, a kind of psychological warfare, toward 
Kinmen, a small but strategically important archipelago off the southeastern coast of the 
Chinese mainland, which had been controlled by the R.O.C. government since 1949.
10
 In 
addition, from April 28
th
 to May 4
th, Taiwan’s S.E.F. paid its first visit to China and 
informally exchanged ideas about future cross-strait interactions with the Chinese 
officials from the State Council of the P.R.C.
11
 Then, on July 5
th
, the general secretary of 
C.C.P., Jiang Zemin, ordered the Chinese government to promote cultural exchanges 
across the Taiwan Strait.
12
  
        While the prospect of future, if not immediate, unification of China and Taiwan 
seemed to slowly but steadily increase due to the goodwill revealed by both sides since 
late 1990, the movement of Taiwan’s independence led by the opposition party in Taiwan, 
                                                          
8
 Chao & Myers 1994, 226. 
9
 “The statement made by Mainland about the abolishment of ‘The Temporary Provisions Effective During 
the Period of Communist Rebellion’,” China Times, June 8, 1991. 
10
 “Mainland terminated its political broadcasting toward Kinmen,” United Daily News, April 27, 1991. 
11
 See the following webpage of S.E.F.: 
<http://www.sef.org.tw/ct.asp?xItem=3962&CtNode=3803&mp=19>. 
12
 “Jiang Zemin ordered the related departments to promote cultural exchanges,” United Daily News, July 5, 
1991. 
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the Democratic Progressive Party (D.P.P.), gradually gained its momentum as well. The 
movement reached a whole new level in October 1991 when the D.P.P. members began 
to have a debate with one another about whether to incorporate the idea of Taiwan’s 
independence into the official political guidelines of their party. Both of the Taiwanese 
and Chinese governments which vowed to pursue unification and had been seeing a 
prospect of it looming were very concerned about the growing momentum and popularity 
of Taiwan’s independence in Taiwan. The criticism by the Chinese government against 
Taiwan’s independence was especially severe. On October 10th, the Chinese president, 
Yang Shangkun, warned that “the Chinese government will never allow anybody to 
separate Taiwan from China” and that “the separatists’ future will definitely be 
doomed.”13 To his disappointment, in a meeting held from October 12th to 13th, the party 
congress of D.P.P. added a new provision to the D.P.P.’s political guidelines, which 
stated that establishing an independent sovereign state in Taiwan, whose name would be 
the “Republic of Taiwan,” was a political goal that the D.P.P. would try very hard to 
achieve.
14
  
        The new provision of Taiwan’s independence in the D.P.P.’s political guidelines 
nevertheless did not significantly affect the growing atmosphere of reconciliation 
between the Chinese and Taiwanese governments. From November 4
th
 to 7
th
, the S.E.F. 
                                                          
13
 “Yang Shangkun: China will never allow Taiwan to be separated from China,” China Times, October 10, 
1991. 
14
 According to Clark (2002a, 20), it resulted from a compromise between two large opposing factions 
within the D.P.P. More specifically, the moderate Formosa faction accepted the pro-independence demand 
made by the radical New Tide faction; in exchange, the latter agreed not to establish a new party and 
supported the former’s bid for the D.P.P. chairmanship. The full text of the guidelines can be accessed at 
<http://www.dpp.org.tw/upload/history/20100604120114_link.pdf>. For more discussions about the 
guidelines, see Zhao 1997, 179. 
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visited China again to formally negotiate on behalf of the Taiwanese government with the 
Chinese officials about a joint effort to prevent maritime criminal activities in the Taiwan 
Strait,
15
 and on December 16
th
, a quasi-governmental agency, Association for Relations 
Across the Taiwan Straits (A.R.A.T.S.), was founded by the Chinese government to serve 
as its negotiation agent and a counterpart of Taiwan’s S.E.F.16 Like Taiwan’s S.E.F. 
which was supervised by Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, China’s A.R.A.T.S. was 
under the supervision of the Chinese governmental agency dealing with the issues about 
Taiwan, i.e. the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. 
 
1992 
        Expecting an unprecedented increase in the interactions across the Taiwan Strait at 
both the quasi-official and non-official levels, both sides began to try to shape the 
direction of the development of China-Taiwan relations in their own ways and to their 
own political advantages. Starting in early 1992, China, which had been promoting its 
“One-China Principle” for decades in the international society when it came to the issues 
about Taiwan, began to emphasize that this principle was the one and only precondition 
for any cross-strait negotiations including those “non-political” ones.17 Taiwan, on the 
                                                          
15
 See the following webpages of S.E.F.: 
<http://www.sef.org.tw/ct.asp?xItem=3962&CtNode=3803&mp=19>; and 
<http://www.sef.org.tw/lp.asp?CtNode=4382&CtUnit=2567&BaseDSD=21&mp=300&nowPage=2&pages
ize=30>. 
16
 Chao 2003, 286. More details can be found in the following newspaper article: “A.R.A.T.S. is officially 
in full operation today,” China Times, December 17, 1991. 
17
 China’s One-China Principle is as follows: (1) there is only one China in the world; (2) Taiwan is part of 
China; and (3) the P.R.C. government is the only legitimate government of China. For more discussions 
about China’s One-China Principle, see Leng 1998, 496; and for more details about China’s urging Taiwan 
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other hand, tried very hard to, first, rebut China’s One-China Principle and emphasize the 
reality of the de facto, if not de jure, separation of China and Taiwan,
18
 and second, put 
aside the political issues and focus only on the non-political and non-official side of the 
cross-strait interactions. In June, Ma Ying-jeou, the deputy head and the spokesperson of 
Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, stated that “one-China” referred to “the China in 
which there are two political entities, each of which is controlling part of that China and 
pursuing the goal of unification,” 19  and on July 31st, the Taiwanese government 
promulgated the “Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and 
the Mainland Area” whose purpose was to regulate the interactions between the “people” 
on each side of the Taiwan Strait “before national unification.” 20  In August, the 
Taiwanese government issued an official document called The Meaning of One-China, 
which explicitly said that the R.O.C. and the P.R.C. were two equal political entities.
21
 
        In spite of the emerging conflict over “one-China” mentioned above, throughout 
1992, each side still believed that the other side was willing to work with it to bilaterally 
resolve the common problems and promote constructive interactions across the Taiwan 
Strait. From March 22
nd
 to 27
th, China’s A.R.A.T.S. and Taiwan’s S.E.F. negotiated with 
each other for the first time after their foundation, talking about the issues concerning 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to accept the principle, see “Mainland strategically made ‘one-China’ a prerequisite for cross-strait 
negotiations,” China Times, April 26, 1992. 
18
 Zhao 1997, 188-190. 
19
 “Ma Ying-jeou defines ‘one-China’ in the U.S.,” China Times, Evening Edition, June 20, 1992. 
20
 “President Lee signs ‘Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland 
Area’,” Central Daily News, August 1, 1992. For the full text of the act, see 
<http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=Q0010001>. 
21
 Leng 1998, 498; and Kan 2009, 43. 
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“certificates of authentication” and “registered mail.”22 On August 4th, the chairman of 
A.R.A.T.S., Wang Daohan, formally invited the chairman of S.E.F., Koo Chen-fu, to 
have a person-to-person talk in “any place available” about the economic development of 
China and Taiwan as well as the operations of their organizations.
23
  
        In their second meeting about “certificates of authentication” and “registered mail” 
that was held from October 26
th
 to 29
th
, the Chinese representatives from the A.R.A.T.S. 
raised the sensitive issue of “one-China” that the Taiwanese representatives from the 
S.E.F. were not interested in discussing. After a severe debate, although both sides 
expressed their willingness to accept the principle of “one-China” and pursue the goal of 
unification, they could not reach a consensus on the meaning of “one-China.” While the 
Chinese representatives insisted that the meaning of “one-China” be associated with 
China’s One-China Principle, the Taiwanese representatives emphasized that, although 
both sides agreed that there was only one China, two sides actually had different 
interpretations of the meaning of “one-China.”24  However, in mid-November, after a 
series of exchanges of ideas, each side informally agreed to settle the dispute by allowing 
the other side to “orally express” its own interpretation of the meaning of “one-China.”25 
                                                          
22
 See the following webpage of S.E.F.: 
<http://www.sef.org.tw/lp.asp?CtNode=4382&CtUnit=2567&BaseDSD=21&mp=300&nowPage=2&pages
ize=30>. 
23
 See the following webpage of S.E.F.: 
<http://www.sef.org.tw/ct.asp?xItem=3962&CtNode=3803&mp=19>. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid. For more details, see Chao 2003, 286; “‘One China, respective interpretations’: Mainland and 
Taiwan tolerating differences and pursuing concords,” United Daily News, November 18, 1992; and 
“Mainland and Taiwan agree to allow each other to orally express its own interpretation of ‘one-China’,” 
China Times, November 18, 1992. 
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This informal agreement to disagree on the meaning of “one-China” constituted the basis 
of what was called the “1992 Consensus.”26 
 
1993 
        Starting in early 1993, Taiwan began to put concrete effort in its bid for the 
membership of the United Nations (U.N.), and in February 1993, President Lee Teng-hui 
of Taiwan announced that Taiwan would “return” to the U.N. by applying for the 
membership in the name of R.O.C. which used to be a founding member as well as the 
official representative of China.
27
 At the same time, the Taiwanese government, while 
emphasizing its “unwavering anti-independence attitude,” began to promote, both 
domestically and internationally, the idea of China as a divided state.
28
 
        Taiwan’s growing interest in being a U.N. member and depicting China as a divided 
state was followed by China’s criticism. On March 23rd, China’s foreign minister, Qian 
Qichen, openly objected to Taiwan’s bid for the U.N. membership, saying that “the issue 
of Taiwan’s returning to the U.N. does not exist essentially.”29 The D.P.P.’s growing pro-
independence attitude during that time also made China uneasy: many D.P.P. politicians 
                                                          
26
 The consensus is based on the following message sent to Taiwan’s S.E.F. by China’s A.R.A.T.S.: “The 
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits ‘respects and accepts’ the Straits Exchange 
Foundation’s proposal that each side ‘verbally states’ its respective principle on ‘one China’.” For more 
details, see Kan 2009, 44. At a later point, Taiwan termed the informal consensus “one China, respective 
interpretations” while China emphasized the consensus showed nothing but the fact that both sides agreed 
there was only one China in this world. However, it is worth mentioning that they did not explicitly conflict 
over their different interpretations of the informal consensus back in 1992 when it was reached. 
27
 “President Lee: It’s more feasible to return to the U.N. with the name of R.O.C.,” China Times, February 
10, 1993. For more discussions about Taiwan’s bid for the U.N. membership, see Chu 1997, 250-251; Chu 
2004, 499; and White 2004, 307. 
28
 “Chiu Cheyne: President Lee has a ‘Chinese heart’,” China Times, March 21, 1993; and “Mainland and 
Taiwan should face together the fact of China as a divided state,” China Times, March 24, 1993. 
29
 “Mainland’s foreign minister takes a tough stance, saying that the issue of Taiwan’s returning to the U.N. 
does not exist essentially,” China Times, March 24, 1993. 
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and their political allies also supported Taiwan’s bid for the U.N. membership, and some 
of them even began to advocate the abolishment of the N.U.C. and the G.N.U.
30
  
        In spite of the growing tension between China and Taiwan on the aforementioned 
issues, the quasi-official negotiation between China’s A.R.A.T.S. and Taiwan’s S.E.F. 
continued. In the meeting from March 25
th
 to 28
th
, the A.R.A.T.S. and S.E.F. finally 
reached a consensus on the issues about “certificates of authentication” and “registered 
mail.”31 From April 7th to 11th, in a preparatory meeting for the formal talk between the 
chairmen of the S.E.F. and the A.R.A.T.S. that was scheduled for late April, which was 
called the “Koo-Wong Talk,” the A.R.A.T.S. and S.E.F. settled several issues about the 
preparation for that talk, as well as signing the preliminary agreements on authentication 
and mail that they had been discussing since March 1992.
32
 In their second preparatory 
meeting held from April 23
rd
 to 26
th
, the A.R.A.T.S. and S.E.F. talked about the joint 
documents associated with the forthcoming Koo-Wang Talk; in addition, the two sides 
exchange views on several issues such as establishing a systematic way of contact 
between the two organizations and increasing economic, cultural, educational and 
technological exchanges across the Taiwan Strait.
33
 
                                                          
30
 Chu 1997, 251. More details about the D.P.P.’s positions on Taiwan’s bid for the U.N. membership and 
the abolishment of the N.U.C. and G.N.U. can be found in the following newspaper articles: “The whole 
world knows that Taiwan is being treated unfairly,” United Daily News, April 1, 1993; and “D.P.P. 
considers launching a movement to abolish G.N.U. and N.U.C.,” United Daily News, April 9, 1993. 
31
 See the following webpage of S.E.F.: 
<http://www.sef.org.tw/lp.asp?CtNode=4382&CtUnit=2567&BaseDSD=21&mp=300&nowPage=2&pages
ize=30>. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Ibid. 
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        The long-awaited Koo-Wong Talk was eventually held in Singapore from April 27
th
 
to 29
th
.
34
 At the end of the talk, the chairmen of the A.R.A.T.S. and S.E.F. signed four 
formal agreements: (1) the Agreement on the Use and Verification of Certificates of 
Authentication Across the Taiwan Straits; (2) the Agreement on Matters Concerning 
Inquiry and Compensation for Lost Registered Mail Across the Taiwan Straits; (3) the 
Agreement on the System for Contacts and Meetings between S.E.F. and A.R.A.T.S.; and 
(4) the Joint Agreement of the Koo-Wang Talk.
35
 In the fourth agreement, two sides 
agreed to focus on the following five issues in the year of 1994:  first, “repatriation of 
people who enter the area of the other side in violation of related regulations”; second, 
“questions concerning joint efforts to suppress the criminal activities of marine 
smuggling and robbery”; third, “handling of marine fishing disputes between the two 
sides”; fourth, “protection of intellectual property of the two sides”; and fifth, “mutual 
assistance between the judicial organs of the two sides.”36 In addition, they agreed to put 
effort in promoting cross-strait economic, cultural, educational, scientific, and 
technological exchanges as well as exchanges in energy and resources. 
        The Koo-Wong Talk, which was regarded by both sides as constructive and 
successful, however did not dampen Taiwan’s effort to join the U.N. based on its idea of 
                                                          
34
 Chao 2003, 286; and “The speech made by Chairman Koo Chen-fu of S.E.F. in the Koo-Wong Talk,” 
United Daily News, April 28, 1993. 
35
 See the following webpages of S.E.F.: 
<http://www.sef.org.tw/ct.asp?xItem=3962&CtNode=3803&mp=19> and 
<http://www.sef.org.tw/lp.asp?CtNode=4382&CtUnit=2567&BaseDSD=21&mp=300&nowPage=2&pages
ize=30>. 
36
 For the full text of the agreement, see 
<http://www.sef.org.tw/ct.asp?xItem=48908&ctNode=4384&mp=300>. 
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China as a divided state and China’s effort to stop it on the basis of the One-China 
Principle.    
        On August 31
st
, China published a white paper about Taiwan, The Taiwan Question 
and Reunification of China, which emphasized that it would not accept any arrangement 
of China-Taiwan relations other than “reunification” on the basis of its One-China 
Principle.
37
 Responding to the inquiry about China’s purpose of publishing the white 
paper, the officials from China’s Taiwan Affairs Office explicitly said that the target of 
the white paper was Taiwan’s bid for the U.N. membership as well as the “current 
political situation in Taiwan” (i.e. the Taiwanese government’s effort to promote the idea 
of divided China); however, they at the same time admitted that the interactions between 
the A.R.A.T.S. and S.E.F. since 1991 did really bring about a decent China-Taiwan 
relationship and emphasized that China had no intention to stop the interactions and cool 
the relationship down.
38
 
        From August 28
th
 to September 3
rd
, the A.R.A.T.S. and S.E.F. held a follow-up 
meeting on the Koo-Wong Talk to discuss how to deal with the issues mentioned in the 
Joint Agreement of the Koo-Wong Talk. No consensus was reached this time because the 
S.E.F. wanted to focus solely on the five issues mentioned in the agreement while the 
A.R.A.T.S. insisted on dealing with the economic issues first, saying that they would 
only take a “listen” to what the Taiwanese representatives tried to say about those five 
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issues instead of “talking” about the issues with them.39 Nevertheless, in their second 
follow-up meeting held from November 2
nd
 to 7
th
, the A.R.A.T.S. conceded and began to 
negotiate with the S.E.F. over the following four issues: first, “illegal Chinese immigrants 
in Taiwan”; second, “Chinese hijackers”; third, “fishery disputes”; and fourth, “measures 
on facilitating the entry and exit of the S.E.F. and A.R.A.T.S. personnel travelling across 
the Taiwan Strait.”40 
        It is worth mentioning that China’s white paper published in August did not 
successfully reverse the “political situation in Taiwan” that China did not like. In the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (A.P.E.C.) meeting held in Seattle on November 20
th
, 
the Taiwanese representative, Chiang Pin-kung who was Taiwan’s Minister of Economic 
Affairs during that time, used the term “People’s Republic of China” instead of 
“Mainland China” when he mentioned China and stated that there were two Chinas 
“temporarily” until the formal unification of China and Taiwan could be achieved.41 
        Chiang’s words, which constituted what was called the policy of “temporary two 
Chinas,” forced China to repeat its One-China Principle and its opposition to “two 
Chinas.” 42  They also made China more suspicious of Taiwan’s real intention about 
China-Taiwan relations as well as its position on unification, and China’s growing 
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distrust of Taiwan arguably began to have a negative effect on the negotiation between 
them. From December 18
th
 to 22
nd
, the A.R.A.T.S and the S.E.F. held the third follow-up 
meeting in which they continued to talk about the issues they discussed in November and 
began to exchange their ideas about four other issues (i.e. “joint crime-fighting,” “judicial 
assistance,” “intellectual property rights,” and “protection for mainland-based Taiwanese 
business people”). The meeting led to nowhere at the end because the Chinese 
representatives did not want to recognize Taiwan’s legal jurisdiction associated with 
many of the aforementioned issues they debated.
43
  
 
1994  
        To facilitate the negotiation that had been tainted by the growing conflict between 
China and Taiwan over the issue of “one-China,” the A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F. decided 
to hold a meeting at a higher level. From January 31
st
 to February 5
th
, 1994, a meeting 
between the vice chairmen of the S.E.F. and the A.R.A.T.S. (i.e. Chiao Jen-ho and Tang 
Shubei, respectively), which was called the “Chiao-Tang Talk,” was held to deal with the 
lagging progress on the follow-up negotiation after the Koo-Wong Talk.
44
 After 
discussing how to implement the Joint Agreement of the Koo-Wang Talk, they finalized 
the “Measures on Facilitating the Entry and Exit of S.E.F. and A.R.A.T.S. Personnel” on 
which their organizations had been negotiating since November 1993 and issued the 
“Joint Press Release by Mr. Chiao Jen-ho and Mr. Tang Shubei” which said “both sides 
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will continue to implement the agreements signed in the Koo-Wong Talk, keep the 
channel for the contacts and meetings between the two organizations clear, and create 
conditions that will pave the way for the second Koo-Wong Talk.”45 
        The Chiao-Tang Talk which looked successful at first glance however did not 
facilitate the negotiation that followed. In the fourth and fifth follow-up meetings, which 
were held from March 24
th
 to 31
st
 and from July 30
th
 to August 3
rd
, respectively, the 
A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F. continued to negotiate over the issues of “illegal Chinese 
immigrants in Taiwan,” “Chinese hijackers,” and “fishery disputes” but did not reach any 
agreement in both cases.
46
 Meanwhile, two events occurring between these two follow-up 
meetings arguably further increased the tension between China and Taiwan. 
        On March 31
st
, 24 Taiwanese tourists were robbed and then murdered on their boat 
in the Qiandao Lake Scenic Area located in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province of China.
47
 
The way China dealt with this event, which was called the “Qiandao Lake Incident,” 
extremely angered Taiwan. To avoid making any impression on Taiwan as well other 
countries that Taiwan had legal jurisdiction over the incident, China rejected the S.E.F.’s 
request for allowing Taiwanese representatives to participate in the investigation to the 
case.
48
 In addition, Taiwan felt that China was playing the political card on the event 
when the vice governor of Zhejiang said that the bodies of the victims could not be 
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shipped back to Taiwan because there was no direct transport link between China and 
Taiwan, which China had been demanding.
49
 
        To protest what it saw as an inappropriate handling of the incident, Taiwan held an 
international press conference on April 9
th
 in which it criticized China for blocking the 
circulation of information on the incident. Many criticisms and threats made by the 
Taiwanese officials followed. President Lee of Taiwan angrily said that China was a 
“thug” who “killed a lot of our compatriots,”50 and officials from Taiwan’s Mainland 
Affairs Council announced that the cultural and economic exchanges would be suspended 
indefinitely until China changed the way it dealt with the incident.
51
 In its response to 
Taiwan’s protest, China, though complaining that Taiwan was politicizing the incident, 
did try to appease angry Taiwanese. On April 18
th
, the Chinese premier, Li Peng, gave an 
official talk about the incident and said that China was taking it very seriously.
52
 A few 
days later, China invited the representatives of Taiwan’s S.E.F. to visit Hangzhou where 
they, though still not allowed to take part in the investigation, were briefed about the 
latest information on the case in early May.
53
 
        Another event that increased the tension between China and Taiwan was the 
publication of Taiwan’s white paper about China-Taiwan relations on July 5th, which was 
                                                          
49
 “The words said by the vice governor of Zhejiang extremely dissatisfied victims’ families,” China Times, 
April 6, 1994. 
50
 “President Lee condemns Mainland,” Liberty Times, April 11, 1994. 
51
 “The cross-strait cultural and educational exchanges are suspended,” China Times, April 13, 1994; and 
“The Mainland Affairs Council: The cross-strait cultural and economic exchanges are suspended, not 
terminated,” China Times, April 16, 1994. 
52
 “Kao Koong-lian: Jiang Zemin’s and Li Peng’s talks are just a beginning,” Liberty Times, April 20, 1994; 
and “Mainland accuses Taiwan of inciting people to oppose Mainland by exploiting the Qiandao Lake 
Incident,” Liberty Times, May 8, 1994. 
53
 “Mainland invites S.E.F. to Hangzhou,” Central Daily News, April 21, 1994. 
55 
 
 
 
titled Relations Across the Taiwan Straits. In the paper, Taiwan, while vowing to pursue 
the unification of China and Taiwan, advocated the idea of China as a divided state and 
argued for its bid for the U.N. membership.
54
  
        It is worth noting that, despite the aforementioned tension between China and 
Taiwan as well as the lack of progress on the meetings between China’s A.R.A.T.S. and 
Taiwan’s S.E.F., the contact between the two organizations however continued. Chiao 
and Tang met again in Taipei from August 4
th
 to 7
th
 in the second Chiao-Tang Talk to 
discuss the operations of and the interactions between their organizations and, at the end 
of their meeting, issued the “Joint Press Release on the S.E.F. and A.R.A.T.S. Taipei 
Talk.”55 In the sixth A.R.A.T.S.-S.E.F follow-up meeting held from November 21st to 
28
th
, in addition to the three issues discussed in the fifth meeting (i.e. illegal immigrants, 
hijackers, and fishery disputes), the two organizations dealt with two new issues 
including “expanding the types of mailed certificate of authentication duplicates” and 
“express mail.” At the end of the meeting, although they had no consensus on the three 
old issues as well as the new issue of “express mail,” they reached an agreement to 
expand the types of “mailed certificate of authentication duplicates” to include “tax 
affairs, medical history, work experience and professional certifications.”56 
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1995 
        The tension between China and Taiwan that built up in 1994 seemed to gradually 
decrease in the first half of 1995. From January 21
st
 to 28
th
, 1995, the third Chiao-Tang 
Talk was held in Taipei, and the two people shared with each other their views on the 
operations of and the interactions between their organizations again as well as cross-strait 
non-political exchanges in general; at the same time, from January 23
rd
 to 25
th
, the 
seventh follow-up meeting was held in Beijing where the issues of “illegal Chinese 
immigrants in Taiwan,” “Chinese hijackers,” “fishery disputes,” and “express mail” were 
discussed again.
57
  
        On January 30
th
, the Chinese president, Jiang Zemin, announced his eight-point 
suggestion about the issue of Taiwan, which was known as “Jiang’s Eight Points.”58 
While Jiang unequivocally said the idea of “two Chinas” would never be acceptable, he, 
in very reconciliatory rhetoric, emphasized that China would sincerely try its very best to 
pursue unification in a peaceful way.
59
 President Lee of Taiwan responded to Jiang’s 
Eight Points on April 8
th
 by announcing his 6-point suggestion.
60
 Obviously, China was 
not satisfied with Lee’s suggestion which still emphasized the division of China; 61 
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however, it did not criticize Lee’s suggestion in a very harsh way.62 In addition, from 
May 27
th
 to 29
th, Chiao and Tang met again to discuss the “procedural issues” concerning 
the second Koo-Wang Talk and then issued the “Consensus on the First Preparatory 
Meeting for the second Koo-Wang Talk” which indicated that the Talk was scheduled to 
be held in Beijing on July 20
th
 and the second preparatory meeting would be held on June 
27
th
.
63
 
        However, in mid-1995, the tension drastically increased and the looming prospect of 
the second Koo-Wang Talk suddenly disappeared. On May 22
nd
, the United States (U.S.) 
Department of State announced that it would grant a U.S. visa to President Lee of Taiwan 
for his “private” and “personal” visit to the U.S.,64 for which the Taiwanese government 
and the pro-Taiwan U.S. congressmen and women had been jointly pushing very hard 
since mid-1994.
65
 Amid China’s severe criticism and protest against what it called an act 
of “playing with fire” and an effort to “move China’s ‘family affairs’ into the 
international arena,” Lee visited the U.S. from June 7th to 12th and gave a speech in his 
alma mater, Cornell University.
66
 The speech, which was about Taiwan’s economic 
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development and democratization, was regarded as provocative by China and further 
triggered another series of China’s responses.67 
        On June 16
th
, the A.R.A.T.S. informed the S.E.F. that the second preparatory 
meeting for the second Koo-Wang Talk as well as the Talk itself would be postponed 
indefinitely,
68
 and from July to November, China conducted a series of military 
maneuvers and missile tests against Taiwan.
69
 The maneuvers however did not 
effectively stop what China saw as Taiwan’s separatist activity. On September 8th, 
Taiwan published the White Paper on the R.O.C. and the U.N. which explained Taiwan’s 
effort to become a U.N. member and reemphasized that, first, China was divided and, 
second, the R.O.C. and the P.R.C. were two different and equal political entities.
70
 
 
1996 
        To deter what it believed was Taiwan’s separatist momentum from growing and 
protest what it regarded as the U.S. support for this momentum, which was revealed by, 
among other things, the dispatch of a U.S. aircraft carrier to the region during the 1995 
military threat, China conducted another series of military exercises against Taiwan from 
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March 8
th
 to 25
th
, 1996.
71
 Like the unsuccessful military threat in the second half of 1995, 
the one in 1996 did not bring about the outcome that China wanted. During the period of 
China’s military exercises, the U.S. dispatched again two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan 
Strait. Moreover, on March 20
th
, to China’s disappointment, Lee was reelected Taiwan’s 
president, winning 54% of the votes, and became the first popularly elected president in 
Taiwan.
72
 
        After the election, both China and Taiwan did show a certain degree of willingness 
to resume the negotiation between the A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F. that had been stopped 
for 10 months; however, the distrust between them prevented either side from making 
any concession. While, three days after the election, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council 
said that it hoped the contact and negotiation between the A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F. 
could be resumed as soon as possible, it emphasized that any concrete progress on China-
Taiwan relations would not be achieved unless China accepted the fact that China was 
divided as well as the idea of “one China, respective interpretations” to which Taiwan 
believed both sides agreed in late 1992.
73
 As for China, while it did not rule out the 
option of resuming the A.R.A.T.S.-S.E.F. negotiation, it constantly insisted that Taiwan 
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had to renounce its pursuit of what China regarded as Taiwan’s de jure independence and 
accept China’s One-China Principle before any negotiation could be resumed.74 
        By mid-1996, there was still no sign for reconciliation when both sides kept blaming 
each other for not doing enough to resume the A.R.A.T.S.-S.E.F. negotiation. While Su 
Chi, the deputy head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, stated on June 6th that cross-
strait relations would never improve if China did not make a change to its “one-China 
framework,” Shen Guofang, the spokesman of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said 
on June 11
th
 that “the obstacle to improving cross-strait relations is unilaterally imposed 
by Taiwan.”75 The finger-pointing game continued throughout the second half of 1996. 
On September 4
th, Koo, the chairman of Taiwan’s S.E.F., made an official announcement 
in response to China’s accusation of Taiwan’s reluctance to resume the A.R.A.T.S.-S.E.F. 
negotiation, saying that the reason why the negotiation could not be resumed was because 
China unilaterally boycotted the negotiation.
76
 On October 10
th
, Shen, the spokesman of 
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, openly stated that China felt “Taiwan has not shown 
enough sincerity so far” on resuming the negotiation.77 
        In December, the joint conclusion about China-Taiwan relations made by the 
participants of Taiwan’s National Development Conference, an extra-political system 
conference in which the Taiwanese ruling and opposition elites debated policies on 
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economic and political development, arguably made China more suspicious of Taiwan’s 
“sincerity.” At the end of the conference, the participants showed their support for the 
Taiwanese government’s claim that China and Taiwan were two equal political entities 
and expressed their unwavering objection to China’s “one country, two systems” formula 
on unification.
78
 In response, Shen from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, commented, 
“Taiwan is nothing but an economic entity at best.”79  
 
1997 
        Spending the whole year of 1996 on pointing fingers and doing lip service without 
making any concrete step toward the resumption of the A.R.A.T.S.-S.E.F. negotiation, 
China and Taiwan tried to make the year of 1997 a different one. On the first day of 1997, 
Wang, the chairman of China’s A.R.A.T.S., said he wished to see the second Koo-Wang 
Talk held in 1997.
80
 In response, Koo, the chairman of Taiwan’s S.E.F., said that he 
hoped the contact and negotiation between the two organizations could be resumed as 
early as the first half of 1997.
81
 At the same time, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council 
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announced that resuming the A.R.A.T.S-S.E.F. negotiation was its priority for the year of 
1997.
82
 
        Both sides did make some sort of concession this time after they expressed their 
willingness to resume the negotiation. Starting in February, Taiwan began to tackle the 
issue of “one-China,” that China had been pushing Taiwan to talk about but Taiwan had 
been unwilling to touch on over the past few years, in a relatively conciliatory tone. On 
March 7
th
, Su Chi, the spokesman of the R.O.C. government, stated that Taiwan did 
always unwaveringly support the idea of “one-China” although it did not agree to the 
definition of “one-China” made by China on the basis of the One-China Principle; he 
further explained that “one-China,” as Taiwan saw it, referred to the one and only China 
that was currently divided.
83
 Similarly, Lien Chan, Taiwan’s Vice President, said in an 
interview on March 12
th
 that Taiwan had always been sticking to the idea of “one-China” 
but would never agree that “one-China” referred to the P.R.C. only.84  On July 27th, 
Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council claimed that China and Taiwan shared the 
sovereignty of what was called “one-China” although each of them had its own 
jurisdiction.
85
 On August 8
th
, Kao Koong-lian, one of the deputy heads of Taiwan’s 
Mainland Affairs Council, said that “one-China” consisted of two political entities: 
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Taiwan and the Chinese mainland.
86
 On September 23
rd
, Wu Chia-an, another deputy 
head of Mainland Affairs Council, claimed that there was only one China although that 
one and only China involved two equal political entities, and he added that Taiwan was 
ready to talk about all kinds of issues with China, including the issue about “one-
China.”87   
        China also made some sort of concession. On July 8
th
, Tang, the vice chairman of 
China’s A.R.A.T.S., implicitly admitted that China was divided to some extent when he 
said that “although China has not been unified yet, its sovereignty has never been 
divided”;88 and on August 16th, Chinese officials were quoted as saying, “We did notice 
the goodwill (about the issue of “one-China”) revealed by Taiwan recently.”89 On August 
26
th
, the C.C.P. unprecedentedly sent the K.M.T. a telegram to congratulate the latter for 
the success of its 15th Party Congress.
90
 Finally, on November 6
th, China’s A.R.A.T.S., 
to Taiwan’s surprise, invited the vice chairman of Taiwan’s S.E.F., Chiao, to visit 
China.
91
 Although Chiao did not accept the invitation because of China’s rejection to the 
S.E.F.’s suggestion that the A.R.A.T.S. invite the chairman of S.E.F. instead, the formal 
contact between the two organizations was eventually resumed to some extent because of 
the exchanges of ideas between them about the invitation. 
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1998 
        On February 23
rd, 1998, China’s A.R.A.T.S. sent an official message to Taiwan’s 
S.E.F., inviting Koo to visit China at “appropriate time.”92 The S.E.F. responded to the 
message on March 5
th
, saying it was ready to resume the formal contact and negotiation 
with the A.R.A.T.S.
93
 One week later, on March 12
th
, the A.R.A.T.S. replied that it was 
ready, too, and invited the S.E.F. to exchange ideas about Koo’s visit to China.94 
        The formal contact and negotiation between the A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F were fully 
resumed in April, two years and nine months after they were suspended in July 1995. The 
proposed second formal talk between Koo and Wang was officially named the “Koo-
Wang Meeting,” and the first preparatory meeting for it was held by the A.R.A.T.S. and 
the S.E.F. from April 22
nd
 to 24
th
 to discuss the itinerary of Koo’s visit to China as well 
as the agenda for his meeting with Wang.
95
  
        Nevertheless, resuming the formal contact and negotiation is one thing, and reaching 
a consensus in the resumed negotiation is another. In their second preparatory meeting for 
the Koo-Wang Meeting held on July 26
th
 to discuss the details of the itinerary and the 
agenda they talked about in the first meeting, both sides could not reach any consensus 
due to a conflict over the essence of the second meeting between Koo and Wang: while 
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the Chinese representatives insisted on the informality of the meeting, the Taiwanese 
representatives argued that the meeting should involve a formal negotiation.
96
 
        Believing that having a talk is better than no talk, Taiwan eventually agreed that the 
Koo-Wang Meeting would be deemed as an informal one, and from September 22
nd
 to 
24
th
, the secretary-generals of the A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F. (i.e. Zhang Jincheng and Shi 
Hwei-you, respectively) met with each other in Beijing to finalize the agenda for the 
meeting.
97
 
        Koo finally visited China from October 14
th
 to 18
th
 and had a meeting with Wang 
there.
98
 In their meeting, they reached four consensuses: (1) the A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F. 
agreed to strengthen their dialogues in order to promote future negotiations; (2) they 
agreed to enhance the contact between their personnel at all levels; (3) they agreed to 
work together to resolve the issues involving the rights and interests of the people on 
each side of the Taiwan Strait; and (4) Wang accepted Taiwan’s invitation and agreed to 
pay a visit to Taiwan at “appropriate time.”99 In addition to Wang, Koo had informal 
conversations with Chen Yunlin (i.e. the director of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office), Qian 
Qichen (i.e. China’s Vice Premier), and Jiang Zemin (the Chinese president and the 
general secretary of C.C.P.) during his stay in China. 
 
1999 
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        After the Koo-Wang Meeting, China and Taiwan began to negotiate over the 
proposed third meeting between Koo and Wang which was schedule to be held in Taiwan. 
From March 17
th
 to 19
th
, 1999, the A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F held the first preparatory 
meeting on Wang’s visit to Taiwan, in which the two sides discussed the four 
consensuses made in the Koo-Wang Meeting and reached a preliminary agreement that 
Wang would visit Taiwan in the autumn of 1999 and stay there for about five to six 
days.
100
  
        The successful preparatory meeting along with the interactions between China and 
Taiwan over the past year showed that China-Taiwan relations, though still not very good, 
were improving. In addition, the D.P.P.’s attitude toward Taiwan’s independence seemed 
to become less radical at the same time although it was still not acceptable to China as 
well as the Taiwanese government. In a meeting held from May 8
th
 to 9
th
, the D.P.P. 
Party Congress passed the Resolution on Taiwan’s Future. Rather than saying that the 
D.P.P. would fight for Taiwan’s independence, the resolution argued that Taiwan had 
already been an independent state whose current name was the R.O.C. and that any 
change to the status quo, defined by the D.P.P. as Taiwan’s independence, could not be 
made without Taiwanese people’s permission.101 
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        From June 27
th
 to 29
th
, the A.R.A.T.S and the S.E.F. held the second preparatory 
meeting to continue the discussion about the itinerary of Wang’s visit to Taiwan.102 At 
the end of the meeting, the two sides decided in principle that Wang would be scheduled 
to visit Taiwan in either September or October.
103
 
        However, as soon as Wang’s visit to Taiwan was going to become a done deal, the 
tension between China and Taiwan suddenly increased. On July 9
th
, President Lee of 
Taiwan stated in an interview that the relations between China and Taiwan were “special 
state-to-state relations.”104 Lee’s statement which was called the “two-state theory” was 
followed by a series of verbal conflicts between the Chinese and Taiwanese officials. Su 
Chi, the head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, said that the new idea would help 
normalize cross-strait relations and emphasized that Taiwan’s policy toward China did 
not essentially change.
105
 In response, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office stated that the two-
state theory was causing damage to cross-strait relations and warned Taiwan “not to play 
with fire.”106 In addition, while Taiwan’s foreign minister, Hu Chih-chiang, argued that 
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Lee was doing nothing but telling the truth, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
reprimanded Taiwan for “making a dangerous step on its way toward separation.”107 
        The two-state theory also brought about tensions between China’s A.R.A.T.S. and 
Taiwan’s S.E.F. when the former criticized the theory for violating the One-China 
Principle.
108
 The A.R.A.T.S was especially unsatisfied with Koo’s support for the theory 
when the latter explained in his defense of the two-state theory that China and Taiwan 
were two equal “political entities” which also meant “states.”109 On July 12th, Wang 
openly urged Koo to clarify his words about the two-state theory, and on July 15
th
, the 
deputy secretary-general of the A.R.A.T.S. said that Wang probably could not visit 
Taiwan as scheduled.
110
 Two weeks later, Koo gave a formal talk about cross-strait 
relations which, to Wang’s disappointment, showed no sign of reversing his support for 
the two-state theory.
111
 In response, the A.R.A.T.S. openly criticized Koo for supporting 
the two-state theory and claimed that Taiwan’s separatist position had already destroyed 
the foundation for the interaction between the A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F.; on August 12
th
, 
China formally cancelled Wang’s visit to Taiwan.112 
        On September 21
st
, a huge earthquake hit Taiwan. In addition to the loss of human 
lives and properties, it caused damage to China-Taiwan relations that had already been 
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very tense because of the two-state theory. Taiwan was extremely angry about China 
when the latter expressed its willingness to ask for international aids on behalf of the 
former while allegedly trying to prevent other countries that wanted to offer help from 
contacting Taiwan directly.
113
 As the Taiwanese government as well as the general public 
saw it, China played politics again on a non-political issue like what it did for the 
Qiandao Lake Incident five years ago. 
 
2000 
        Feeling an urgent necessity to stop Taiwan’s growing separatist tendency, on 
February 20
th
, 2000, China published another white paper on Taiwan, One China 
Principle and the Taiwan Problem, which said, “If Taiwan indefinitely rejects to 
negotiate with China on the issues about reunification, China will be forced to use any 
means, including the military force, to resolve the Taiwan problem.”114 On March 15th, 
Zhu Rongji, the Chinese premier, openly said that the aforementioned white paper was 
published in response to Taiwan’s two-state theory, and, when talking about the 
upcoming Taiwanese presidential election that would be held three days later, warned 
that Taiwan’s independence would definitely lead to a very bad outcome.115  
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       To China’s disappointment, Chen Shui-bian, the D.P.P.’s presidential candidate who 
was an advocate of Taiwan’s independence, won the election on March 18th. After 
Chen’s election, China began to urge Chen to accept China’s One-China Principle. On 
March 20
th
, President Jiang of China said the negotiation between China’s A.R.A.T.S. 
and Taiwan’s S.E.F. could be resumed and Chen would be invited to visit China as long 
as Taiwan accepted the One-China Principle.
116
 Some people in Taiwan, like Koo and 
Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou, also suggested that Chen accept the idea of “one-China” in 
principle based on the proposition of “one China, respective interpretations.”117 
        Chen and his party, the D.P.P., which had been unwilling to accept any idea of “one-
China” before, did try to show a certain degree of what they believed was goodwill about 
the issue of “one-China” by not ruling it out as one of the debatable issues that they 
would be willing to talk about with China in the future.
118
 Their new attitude toward the 
issue of “one-China,” that they thought was reconciliatory, was well reflected by Chen’s 
words one month before his inauguration that “discussions about establishing a federation 
or confederation consisting of both China and Taiwan would be possible as long as ‘one-
China’ was not a precondition (but a debatable issue) for such discussions.”119 
        On May 20
th
, in his inauguration speech, President Chen of Taiwan announced his 
“five no’s” policy which involved “no Taiwan’s independence,” “no change of the 
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national title of R.O.C.,” “no inclusion of the ‘two-state theory’ in Taiwan’s constitution,” 
“no referendum concerning independence or unification,” and “no abolishment of the 
N.U.C. and the G.N.U.”120  Unsatisfied with Taiwan’s new policy toward cross-strait 
relations which did not recognize any idea of “one-China” not to mention China’s One-
China Principle, China criticized that Chen’s speech involved an idea of Taiwan’s 
independence with “sophisticated decoration” on it.121 
        Throughout the second half of 2000, China and Taiwan constantly conflicted over 
the issue of “one-China.” While the former kept urging the latter to openly announce that 
Taiwan was part of “one-China,”122 the latter insisted that the issue of “one-China” was 
not a precondition for negotiations but just a debatable issue.
123
 In addition, starting in 
late May, while emphasizing that the issue of “one-China” was a debatable one, the Chen 
Administration began to claim that there was no such thing as the “1992 Consensus” let 
alone the agreement on “one China, respective interpretations” that the former Taiwanese 
government thought existed.
124
 Unsatisfied with Taiwan’s denial of the “1992 Consensus” 
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that China believed involved Taiwan’s agreeing to at least some sort of “one-China,” 
Tang, the vice chairman of China’s A.R.A.T.S., criticized on June 1st that any negotiation 
between China and Taiwan would never be possible if the two sides had no consensus on 
“one-China.”125 
         After denying the “1992 Consensus,” Taiwan tried to come up with some new ideas 
about “one-China” that it hoped China would be willing to discuss with it. On June 17th, 
Chen Ming-tung, the deputy head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council who was also a 
very important political advisor of President Chen’s, suggested that the two sides discuss 
the idea of “one-China in the future.”126 On July 7th, Tsai Ing-wen, the head of Mainland 
Affairs Council, while not accepting the idea of “one China, respective interpretations,” 
said each side should allow the other side to make its own interpretation of “one-China” 
with “one-China” not being a precondition for negotiations.127 On July 31st, President 
Chen of Taiwan in a press conference stated that the two sides should resume the 
negotiation on the basis of the “1992 Spirit” which, according to him, was a spirit of 
“dialogue, exchange, and shelving disputes.”128  On the last day of 2000, Chen, avoiding 
the word “unification” on purpose, raised the idea of “integration,” saying he was willing 
to promote the economic, cultural, and even political integration of China and 
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Taiwan.”129 Obviously, China, which insisted on “one-China” as a precondition for any 
cross-strait negotiation, was not interested in any of the aforementioned ideas including 
the idea of “integration,” all of which regarded “one-China” as a debatable issue instead 
of a precondition for a debate. 
 
2001 
        Taiwan, frustrated about China’s objection to any of its ideas raised in 2000, decided 
to stop showing what it regarded as goodwill toward China until China had a response 
that it thought was positive. On February 21
st
, 2001, Taiwan’s presidential office 
announced that Taiwan had already done everything it could do to improve China-
Taiwan relations and the ball was in China’s court now.130 To Taiwan’s disappointment, 
China was still unwilling to make any concession. For example, China’s A.R.A.T.S. still 
emphasized that it would not contact Taiwan’s S.E.F. until Taiwan accepted the One-
China Principle, and Wang, in response to Koo’s invitation for a visit to Taiwan, said that 
nothing would be possible until Taiwan accepted the “1992 Consensus.”131 Similarly, 
China’s Taiwan Affairs Office kept saying that Taiwan’s unequivocal acceptance of the 
One-China Principle was the precondition for any possible China-Taiwan negotiation.
132
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        The conflict between China and Taiwan over the issue of “one-China” finally 
reached a point of no return in late October. On October 22
nd
, getting no response from 
China that he thought was satisfactory, President Chen of Taiwan said in hostile rhetoric 
that he would no longer consider to take the “1992 Consensus” as well as any idea of 
“one-China” seriously because China had been treating the Taiwanese government as one 
of its local governments since he was inaugurated.
133
 On November 5
th, Taiwan’s 
presidential office announced that the “1992 Consensus” never existed and the idea of 
“one-China, respective interpretations” was invalid because there was no official 
document associated with them.
134
 Taiwan’s unequivocal objection to any possibility of 
“one-China” extremely angered China. On November 12th, China’s foreign minister, 
Tang Jiaxuan, openly said “I look down upon him” when he talked about President Chen 
of Taiwan.
135
 On December 17
th
, the chairman of China’s A.R.A.T.S., Wang, commented 
that Taiwan had no sincerity in improving cross-strait relations because of its denial of 
the “1992 Consensus.”136  
 
2002 
        In the year of 2002, the conflict between China and Taiwan continued when Taiwan 
did more and more what China called separatist activities on the one side and China 
severely criticized those activities with a growing hostile tone on the other. 
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        On January 13
th
, President Chen of Taiwan officially announced that he had 
approved a new version of Taiwan passport with the phrase “Issued in Taiwan” on its 
front cover. Although the Taiwanese premier, Chang Chun-hsiun, emphasized that the 
decision had nothing to do with Taiwan’s independence, it was followed by China’s 
severe criticisms.
137
 For example, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, when commenting on 
the issue, stated that Taiwan was pursuing the goal of independence in an “incremental” 
fashion and that the decision about new passports was a catalyst for that goal and 
therefore would destabilize cross-strait relations.
138
 The new passports, however, were 
not issued because there was no consensus between the ruling and opposition parties on 
the issue, and in mid-July, the Taiwanese government decided not to put the phrase 
“Issued in Taiwan” on the passports until a consensus could be reached.139 
        As soon as the controversy over the new version of Taiwan passport seemed to fade 
away, another confrontation between China and Taiwan appeared. On July 21
st
, before 
Chen was scheduled to assume the chairmanship of D.P.P., China, to Chen’s surprise, 
announced it had built a formal diplomatic tie with Nauru, one of Taiwan’s very few 
diplomatic allies.
140
 Feeling angry and humiliated, Chen criticized China for “buying” 
allies and said that “Taiwan will go its own way,” implying that Taiwan was no longer 
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interested in unification.
141
 On August 3
rd
, Taiwan came up with a new interpretation of 
China-Taiwan relations when Chen stated that there was “one country on each side” of 
the Taiwan Strait.
142
 Regarding Taiwan’s new statement as obviously separatist, China 
unequivocally criticized it in very hostile rhetoric, saying that Taiwan’s independence 
would never be tolerated and warning Taiwan not to “play with fire.”143 Meanwhile, 
while China had been very careful not to officially label Chen as a separatist since his 
inauguration, China finally decided to call him a “stubborn separatist” after his talk about 
“one country on each side.”144 On August 5th, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office officially 
associated Chen with Taiwan’s independence. 145  On August 7th, China’s A.R.A.T.S. 
criticized Chen for “essentially promoting Taiwan’s independence.”146  On September 
30
th
, the Chinese government announced that the period of “listening to Chen’s words 
and watching his deeds” was officially over, which meant that China would no longer 
trust Chen about his intention toward  China no matter how reconciliatory his words or 
actions in the future might be.
147
 
 
2003 
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        Starting in mid-February 2003, the number of the cases of Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (S.A.R.S.), a lethal disease originating in China’s Guangdong Province, began 
to increase in Taiwan.
148
 When S.A.R.S. became a global pandemic disease in late March, 
the World Health Organization (W.H.O.) worked very hard to deal with it with all of the 
affected countries except Taiwan because Taiwan was not a member of the W.H.O. 
whose membership was only granted to an internationally recognized sovereign state. 
Hoping to receive direct aids and latest information about the disease from the W.H.O., 
Taiwan urged other countries to support its bid for the W.H.O. membership and requested 
the W.H.O. to send representatives to Taiwan to help control the spread of the disease.
149
 
Taiwan’s request brought about a series of conflicts between China and Taiwan when 
each side accused the other side of playing politics on an important issue of public health. 
While China expressed its willingness to help Taiwan deal with the disease, it criticized 
Taiwan for politically exploited the disease and added that it would agree to let Taiwan 
join the W.H.O. as a “health entity” only if Taiwan accepted the One-China Principle.150 
As for Taiwan, while it emphasized that the issue about its bid for the W.H.O. 
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membership was a non-political one, it insisted that Taiwan was not a province of China 
and therefore China had no say on this issue.
151
 
        As Taiwan and China conflicted over the issues of S.A.R.S. and W.H.O., other 
controversial issues emerged as well. In mid-April, Taiwan’s presidential office 
announced that President Chen would begin to push for the “referendum law,” to which 
China objected because it was worried that the law would be used as a tool for legally 
justifying Taiwan’s independence. 152  In addition, on June 12th, Taiwan’s ruling and 
opposition parties finally reached a consensus on the issue of new Taiwan passports when 
the latter reversed their objection to the new version of passport due to the high support 
rate for it among the Taiwanese public. On September 1
st
, passports with the word 
“Taiwan” on their covers were officially issued.153 Following the issuance of new Taiwan 
passports, President Chen further announced on September 28
th
 that he was considering 
making a new Taiwanese constitution through a referendum in 2006.
154
 
        The aforementioned decisions and acts, which were regarded by China as separatist 
ones, resulted in a series of verbal threats and criticisms from China. Immediately after 
Chen talked about the new constitution, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office criticized Chen 
for putting Taiwanese people in danger for his own personal interests and warned that 
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Taiwan’s independence would definitely lead to a huge disaster.155 On October 26th, Hu 
Jintao, the new Chinese president who was inaugurated in March 2003, said Taiwan’s 
independence would never be tolerated although he at the same time emphasized that 
China would try its very best to resolve the Taiwan problem in a peaceful way.
156
 China’s 
suspicion about Taiwan’s intention toward China-Taiwan relations reached another high 
level when China’s Taiwan Affairs Office openly stated on November 2nd that China no 
longer believed that Taiwan was still keeping its promises about the “five no’s.”157     
 
2004 
        On March 20
th
, 2004, Chen was reelected the Taiwanese president. To prevent 
Taiwan from moving closer to de jure independence, China made an official 
announcement about Taiwan on May 17
th
, which was called the 517 Announcement.
158
 
The announcement talked about Taiwan’s “separatist” activities over the past two years, 
criticized Chen for not keeping his promises about the “five no’s,” and warned that 
“Taiwan’s independence will never lead to peace and separatist activities will never lead 
to stability.”159 
        Worrying that the conflict between China and Taiwan would turn unmanageable, 
Taiwan, in the second half of 2004, began to make some concessions. However, because 
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Taiwan was still unwilling to accept any idea of “one-China,” any concession made by 
Taiwan was regarded by China as nothing but an act of hypocrisy. For example, on May 
20
th
, in his inauguration speech, Chen said he decided not to make a new constitution 
through a referendum and would only try to amend the current constitution instead; 
furthermore, he promised that any amendment would not involve the issues of 
sovereignty, territory, unification, and independence.
160
 In response, China’s Taiwan 
Affairs Office commented that Chen was just employing a “delaying tacit” and it was 
obvious that his goal remained Taiwan’s independence.161   
        On October 10
th
, Chen suggested the two sides resume formal conversation “on the 
foundation created by the 1992 meeting,” and one month later, in Taiwan’s National 
Security Council, he ordered the officials in the council to “alleviate” the tension between 
China and Taiwan in his ten-point suggestion.
162
 Nevertheless, Chen’s words about the 
1992 meeting and the alleviation of cross-strait tension did not trigger any positive reply 
from China. On November 4
th, China’s A.R.A.T.S. emphasized that the foundation 
created by the 1992 meeting was nothing but “one-China” and said that the cross-strait 
conversation could be resumed only if Taiwan accepted that foundation and gave up 
pursuing Taiwan’s independence.163 Similarly, on November 7th, China’s Taiwan Affairs 
Office, in response to Chen’s ten-point suggestion, criticized that the suggestion was part 
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of Taiwan’s dual strategy for Taiwan’s independence and warned that China would do 
whatever it took to stop any separatist activity.
164
 
        China’s anxiety about Taiwan’s independence drastically increased again in 
December when Taiwan revealed its attempt to replace the term “R.O.C.” with the word 
“Taiwan” in the names of all of its state-owned enterprises.165 Worrying that Taiwan 
would really declare independence if it did not take any concrete action other than verbal 
threats, starting in mid-December, China began to work on the so called “Anti-Secession 
Law” that it hoped could prevent Taiwan from crossing the “red line” (i.e. the declaration 
of Taiwan’s de jure independence).166 
 
2005 
        On March 4
th
, 2005, China decided to fight back against what it regarded as 
Taiwan’s separatist activities with both hard and soft strategies based on the four-point 
statement about China-Taiwan relations made by President Hu of China, which was 
called “Hu’s Four Points.”167 The statement said that China would unwaveringly stick to 
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its One-China Principle, try its very best to resolve the Taiwan problem in a peaceful way, 
place hope on Taiwanese people, and unequivocally object to Taiwan’s independence.  
        Ten days later, on March 14
th, China’s National People’s Congress passed the Anti-
Secession Law which said, among other things, China would use a non-peaceful means to 
deal with activities of Taiwan’s independence if necessary.168 In addition to the hard 
strategy against Taiwan’s independence which was reflected by the passage of the Anti-
Secession Law, China applied a soft strategy that involved holding meetings with the 
K.M.T., which, since 2000, had already moved away from Lee Teng-hui’s implicit, if not 
explicit, pro-independence stance and gone back to its conventional anti-independence 
position, to show the people in Taiwan that China was willing to have constructive 
conversation with anyone except those who advocated Taiwan’s independence. 
        On March 28
th
, Chiang Pin-kung, the vice chairman of K.M.T., visited China to 
arrange a meeting between Hu and the K.M.T. Chairman, Lien Chan.
169
 On the same day, 
Lien said in Taiwan that the K.M.T. was firmly opposed to Taiwan’s independence and 
suggested that China should not use force against Taiwan if Taiwan did not declare 
independence.
170
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        Three days later, Jia Qinglin, the chairman of the national committee of China’s 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, invited Lien to visit China and added 
that leaders of any “anti-independence” political parties in Taiwan were very welcome to 
visit China as well.
171
 On April 4
th
, Lien announced that he accepted China’s 
invitation,
172
 and on April 18
th
, Soong Chu-yu, the chairman of People First Party (P.F.P.) 
which was a political ally of K.M.T.’s in Taiwan, also announced that he was ready to 
visit China.
173
 
        On April 29
th
, Hu and Lien held a meeting in China where Hu said in his opening 
speech that “the spring of cross-strait relations is coming.”174 After the meeting, they 
made a joint announcement which pointed out, among other things, that both the C.C.P. 
and the K.M.T. stuck to the “1992 Consensus” and objected to Taiwan’s independence.175 
On May 12
th
, Hu met with Soong in China and reached a six-point consensus with him, 
which said, among other things, that they both hoped China and Taiwan could resume 
their negotiation as soon as possible on the basis of the “1992 Consensus” and that they 
both unwaveringly opposed Taiwan’s independence.176 In addition, they agreed that the 
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“1992 Consensus” involved an idea that “the two sides of the Taiwan Strait combine to 
constitute the so called ‘one-China.’”177 
        Yu Mu-ming, the chairman of New Party (N.P.) which was the most pro-unification 
political party in Taiwan, also met with Hu in China on July 12
th
. In the meeting, Yu 
suggested the Taiwan issue should be resolved based on the formula of “one China, two 
systems” that he created when Hu repeated his opposition to Taiwan’s independence and 
said “the reunification of the two sides will lead to mutual benefits while the separation 
will only cause damage to both sides.”178    
 
2006 
        When the Taiwanese opposition parties did what the advocates of Taiwan’s 
independence called “acts of selling out Taiwan with the communists,”179 President Chen 
of Taiwan decided to keep going “Taiwan’s own way.” On the first day of 2006, Chen 
talked about making a new constitution through a referendum again, and in late January, 
he revealed that he was thinking to abolish the N.U.C. and the G.N.U., the two important 
institutions showing Taiwan’s symbolic, if not actual, commitment to unification.180 
        Taiwan’s intention to abolish the N.U.C. and the G.N.U., which obviously violated 
one of its own promises made in 2000, extremely angered China. In response to China’s 
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rage, Taiwan explained that (1) there was actually a precondition for the promises of 
“five no’s,” which was China’s stopping its military threats to Taiwan, and (2) the 
precondition was not satisfied because of the deployment of Chinese missiles pointing to 
Taiwan and the making of the Anti-Secession Law.
181
 Thinking that Taiwan was just 
making an excuse for its separatist act, China blamed Taiwan for being a “troublemaker” 
that was ruining the peace in the Taiwan Strait.
182
      
        On February 27
th
, Taiwan officially broke its promise about the N.U.C. and the 
G.N.U.; nevertheless, due to the pressure from the U.S. that was worried the controversy 
over the issue would lead to an unmanageable response from China, Taiwan emphasized 
that the N.U.C. and the G.N.U. would just “cease to function” rather than being 
“abolished.”183 Despite the change of word, China still criticized Taiwan’s decision in an 
extremely hostile tone. The next day after the N.U.C. and the G.N.U. “ceased to function,” 
China’s Taiwan Affairs Office stated that China would do its very best to stop any of 
Taiwan’s attempts to pursue de jure independence.184 On March 4th, Jia, the chairman of 
the national committee of China’s Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, 
said that China would never tolerate and compromise on any separatist act and that China 
had the resolve as well as the ability to stop it.
185
 On March 14
th
, in an international press 
                                                          
181
 Dumbaugh 2006, 7; and Dumbaugh 2008, 2 and 6-7. More details about Taiwan’s response can be 
found in the following newspaper article: “Office of the President: There is a precondition for ‘five no’s’,” 
United Daily News, February 1, 2006. 
182
 “Mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Office: Chen is a troublemaker,” United Daily News, February 9, 2006. 
183
 “N.U.C. ‘ceases to function’,” United Daily News, February 27, 2006. 
184
 For more discussions about the Taiwanese government’s decision-making on the issue, see Dumbaugh 
2008, 4-5. More details can also be found in the following newspaper article: “Mainland makes a statement 
to reprimand Chen,” China Times, March 1, 2006. 
185
 “Jia Qinglin: We will never tolerate and compromise on any separatist act and have the determination 
and ability to stop it,” Central Daily News, March 5, 2006. 
86 
 
 
 
conference, Wen Jiabao, the Chinese premier, criticized President Chen of Taiwan for 
“betraying his Chinese ancestors.” 186  Obviously, China’s criticisms and threats were 
ignored by Taiwan. In late September, Chen raised the issue of new constitution again 
and, in early October, he said the new constitution would serve as the constitution for the 
“second republic” of Taiwan.187 
        It is worth mentioning that, in spite of the aforementioned conflict between China 
and Taiwan over the issues of the N.U.C., the G.N.U., and Taiwan’s new constitution, 
China kept adopting the soft strategy by continuing its conversation with the anti-
independence political force in Taiwan. On April 16
th
, Lien and Hu met again in China. 
In the meeting, they reemphasized that both of them insisted on the “1992 Consensus” 
and said that they were willing to “work together on the things they could agree on (e.g. 
‘one-China’) while agreeing to disagree on some other issues (e.g. the interpretation of 
that ‘one-China’).”188  
 
2007 
        On March 4
th
, 2007, Taiwan almost crossed the “red line” set by China’s Anti-
Secession Law (i.e. the declaration of Taiwan’s de jure independence) when President 
Chen of Taiwan said “Taiwan wants independence, the rectification of its name, and a 
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new constitution” in his “Four Wants and One No” statement.189 In response, China’s 
Taiwan Affairs Office criticized Chen for “making another dangerous step,” and the 
Chinese foreign minister, Li Zhaoxing, warned that the Anti-Secession Law did have real 
teeth against any separatist act.
190
  
        On April 12
th
, Taiwan, for the first time, applied for the W.H.O. membership in the 
name of “Taiwan” (rather than the R.O.C. or Chinese Taipei), and its application was 
eventually rejected by the majority of the W.H.O. members.
191
 Amid the controversy 
over Taiwan’s bid for the W.H.O. membership, the third meeting between Hu and Lien 
was held in China on April 28
th
, in which Lien criticized Chen for launching a “culture 
revolution” to get rid of anything “Chinese” in Taiwan.192 The “culture revolution” in 
Taiwan that Lien talked about reached another high level when the party congress of 
Taiwan’s ruling party, the D.P.P., passed the Resolution of Normal State on September 
30
th
, which stated that the ruling party would work very hard to (1) rectify Taiwan’s 
official name from the R.O.C. to Taiwan, (2) abolish the R.O.C. Constitution and 
introduce a new Taiwanese constitution, and (3) make Taiwan a new U.N. member.
193
    
        The third thing mentioned above in the Resolution of Normal State (i.e. Taiwan’s 
bid for the U.N. membership) became a very hot issue over which China and Taiwan 
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severely conflicted in the second half of 2007. Starting in June, both the D.P.P. and the 
K.M.T. began to make efforts to come up with their own proposals for Taiwan’s U.N. 
membership: while the D.P.P. proposed a referendum which involved a question of 
whether Taiwan should become a new member of the U.N. in the name of “Taiwan,”194 
the K.M.T., trying to find a balance between the high support rate for Taiwan’s bid for 
the U.N. membership among the Taiwanese public and a concern about Taiwan’s 
independence associated with the bid, pushed for another referendum with a different 
question involved, i.e. the question of whether Taiwan should “return” to the U.N. as the 
Republic of China which was one of the founding members of the U.N.
195
 Amid the 
conflict between the D.P.P. and the K.M.T. over whose proposal was better, on July 20
th
, 
Taiwan applied for the U.N. membership in the name of Taiwan, and its application was 
sent back by the U.N. without being processed.
196
 
        It is worth noting that, although China liked neither the D.P.P.’s nor the K.M.T.’s 
proposal, its criticisms against the former were disproportionately harsher than those 
against the latter. On September 6
th
, when meeting with the U.S. President George W. 
Bush, Hu criticized that Taiwan’s intention to be a new member of the U.N. was an 
intention to pursue independence.
197
 On September 29
th
, when addressing the General 
Assembly of the U.N., the Chinese foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, said that “the One-
China Principle cannot be challenged” and that “holding a referendum about Taiwan’s 
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bid for being a new U.N. member is a serious step toward Taiwan’s de jure 
independence.”198 Similarly, on October 4th, Chen Yunlin, the director of China’s Taiwan 
Affairs Office, stated that the referendum proposed by the D.P.P. was a “referendum 
about Taiwan’s de jure independence.”199  
        Sensing that the momentum of Taiwan independence movement was getting 
stronger and stronger over the past few years, on October 12
th
, the 17
th
 National Congress 
of C.C.P. officially announced that, when it came to the issue of Taiwan, “fighting 
Taiwan’s independence is more important than promoting national reunification.”200  
 
2008 
        The Taiwanese presidential election on March 20
th
, 2008, like the three previous 
elections (i.e. the elections in 1996, 2000, and 2004), was regarded by China as one of the 
most important battle fields for the war on Taiwan’s independence. This time, China 
finally got the outcome it preferred. The winning of the K.M.T. candidate, Ma Yin-jeou 
who openly supported the idea of “one-China” on the basis of the “1992 Consensus” 
which was interpreted by him as “one China, respective interpretations,” arguably 
reduced China’s anxiety about Taiwan’s independence over the past decade to a great 
deal.   
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        One week after Ma was elected the Taiwanese president, President Hu of China told 
President Bush of the U.S. by phone that China was willing to resume the formal contact 
and negotiation with Taiwan, which had been stopped since June 1999, on the basis of 
the “1992 Consensus.”201 On March 30th, Wen, the Chinese premier, also expressed that 
the cross-strait negotiation could be resumed on the basis of the “1992 Consensus.”202 In 
addition, on April 12
th
, the would-be Taiwanese vice president, Siew Wan-chang, 
attended the Boao Forum for Asia as the chairman of the Cross-Strait Common Market 
Foundation and had a meeting with Hu there, in which Hu said the two sides should work 
together to pursue mutual benefits.
203
 On the same day, the would-be head of Taiwan’s 
National Security Council, Su Chi, said that Taiwan would try its very best to resume the 
formal talk between the chairmen of China’s A.R.A.T.S. and Taiwan’s S.E.F. within one 
year.
204
 Moreover, three weeks before the new Taiwanese president was inaugurated, on 
April 29
th
, Lien, the honorary chairman of K.M.T., met with Hu in China for the fourth 
time, and in their meeting, Hu said that the two sides should “build trusts, leave the 
disagreements behind, work to reach agreements, and pursue mutual benefits.”205 
        Ma was sworn in as the Taiwanese president on May 20
th
 and officially announced, 
in his inauguration speech, that Taiwan recognized the “1992 Consensus” (or “one China, 
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respective interpretations” as Taiwan called it). 206  Taiwan’s new position on China-
Taiwan relations, which was regarded by China as anti-independence, immediately 
brought about a positive response from China. The next day after Ma’s inauguration, 
China’s Taiwan Affairs Office commented that both sides were trying their very best to 
resume the formal cross-strait negotiation.
207
   
        On May 26
th, Taiwan’s S.E.F. sent an official message to China’s A.R.A.T.S. to ask 
for a new round of negotiation.
208
 Two days later, Wu Po-hsiung, the chairman of 
Taiwan’s ruling party, i.e. the K.M.T., met with Hu in China, and both agreed that the 
negotiation between China and Taiwan would be resumed on the basis of the “1992 
Consensus.”209  
        The negotiation between the A.R.A.T.S and the S.E.F. was officially resumed in 
June, nine years after it was stopped. From June 11
th
 to 14
th
, 2008, a meeting between the 
chairmen of the S.E.F. and the A.R.A.T.S. (i.e. Chiang Pin-kung and Chen Yunlin, 
respectively) was held in China, which was called the “Chiang-Chen Talk.”210 In the 
meeting, they negotiated over the issues of “cross-strait charter flights” and “Chinese 
tourists,” and, at the end of their talk, two agreements were signed: (1) the “Minutes of 
Talks on Cross-Strait Charter Flights,” and (2) the “Cross-Strait Agreement on Travel by 
Mainland Residents to Taiwan.” In addition, they jointly claimed that (1) the S.E.F. and 
                                                          
206
 “Ma emphasizes the ‘1992 Consensus’ in his inauguration speech,” United Daily News, May 21, 2008. 
207
 “Chen Yunlin: Each side works very hard to resume the negotiation,” Commercial Times, May 23, 2008. 
208
 “S.E.F. sends a message to A.R.A.T.S. asking to resume the negotiation as soon as possible,” China 
Times, May 27, 2008. 
209
 “The Wu-Hu Meeting: S.E.F. and A.R.A.T.S. will resume the negotiation on the basis of the ‘1992 
Consensus’ as soon as possible,” United Daily News, May 29, 2008. 
210
 See the following webpage of S.E.F.: 
<http://www.sef.org.tw/ct.asp?xItem=3962&CtNode=3803&mp=19>. 
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the A.R.A.T.S. had officially resumed their contact and negotiation; (2) arrangements 
were made for following up on the agreements negotiated; (3) a course was set for future 
cross-strait exchanges and cooperation; (4) dialogues and exchanges between the S.E.F. 
and the A.R.A.T.S. would be further strengthened; and (5) Chen agreed to visit Taiwan at 
appropriate time. It is worth noting that Chiang from Taiwan’s S.E.F. also had a meeting 
with Hu before he left China, and in the meeting, Chiang revealed that Taiwan hoped the 
two sides would stop their diplomatic competitions.
211
 
        The A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F. held another meeting on October 27
th
 to discuss 
Chen’s proposed visit to Taiwan; in addition, they exchanged views on the issues of 
cross-strait air and sea transport, postal service cooperation, and food safety.
212
 From 
November 3
rd
 to 7
th
, Chen visited Taiwan, and the second Jiang-Chen Talk was held there 
in which they negotiated over the issues discussed by the A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F. in 
October, reviewed the two agreements they signed in June, made arrangements for 
following up on the issues which had been discussed by their organizations, and 
institutionalized the way of contact between the personnel of the two organizations.
213
 At 
the end of the second Jiang-Chen Talk, four agreements were signed: (1) the “Cross-
Strait Air Transport Agreement”; (2) the “Cross-Strait Sea Transport Agreement”; (3) the 
“Cross-Strait Postal Service Agreement”; and (4) the “Cross-Strait Food Safety 
Agreement.” In addition, Chen from China’s A.R.A.T.S. had a brief meeting with Ma 
                                                          
211
 “Hu mentions the ‘1992 Consensus,’ and Chiang calls for reconciliation,” Commercial Times, June 14, 
2008. 
212
 See the following webpage of S.E.F.: 
<http://www.sef.org.tw/lp.asp?CtNode=4382&CtUnit=2567&BaseDSD=21&mp=300&nowPage=1&pages
ize=30>. 
213
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before he left Taiwan, in which Ma raised the idea of “mutual non-denial” which meant 
that the two sides should not try to de-recognize each other even if they were not willing 
to recognize each other.
214
 The meeting between Ma and Chen marked the first encounter 
in history between a Taiwanese president and a quasi-official representative of China. 
 
2-2: Discussion 
        Based on the historical review of cross-strait relations in the previous section, we 
can find that there were ups and downs in China-Taiwan relations in the period from 
1990 to 2008. Of course, in this period, given that the political conflict between China 
and Taiwan involved highly sensitive political issues, i.e. sovereignty and identity, and 
therefore neither side was willing to make a compromise that was completely acceptable 
to the other side, the conflict never stopped. Nevertheless, for a constant conflict like the 
one between China and Taiwan, there are actually different levels of confrontation at 
different times. If we define “a high level of confrontation” between two parties as a 
situation in which there are many unilateral actions against each other but few bilateral 
efforts to resolve the common problems and “a low level of confrontation” as a situation 
in which there are relatively more bilateral efforts but fewer unilateral actions, it can be 
well argued that China-Taiwan relations were highly confrontational at some times but 
relatively less confrontational at others from 1990 to 2008. 
        More specifically, if we regard a meeting between China’s A.R.A.T.S. and Taiwan’s 
S.E.F. as a sign of a bilateral effort to jointly resolve the common political or non-
                                                          
214
 “President Ma announces the idea of ‘mutual non-denial’ when meeting with Chen,” China Times, 
November 7, 2008. 
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political problems facing them, it is obvious that, based on the aforementioned discussion 
about confrontation, the level of cross-strait confrontation began to decrease in 1992 
when the A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F. held their first two meetings. Moreover, in 1993, 
although each side still had many unilateral actions (e.g. unilateral announcements or 
behavior regarding cross-strait relations) that were seen as unacceptable or even hostile 
by the other side, a prospect of China and Taiwan trying to bilaterally resolve their 
common problems emerged when the number of A.R.A.T.S.-S.E.F. meetings drastically 
increased, as indicated in Figure 2.1 below. 
 
Figure 2.1: The number of A.R.A.T.S.-S.E.F. meetings (1990-2008) 
 
 
        However, this prospect of China and Taiwan bilaterally resolving the cross-strait 
problems disappeared when the formal contact between China’s A.R.A.T.S. and 
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Taiwan’s S.E.F. was suspended in the period from 1996 to 1997 as a result of a series of 
Taiwan’s and China’s provocative unilateral actions against each other (e.g. the 
Taiwanese president’s visit to the U.S. in 1995 and China’s military exercises against 
Taiwan from 1995 to 1996). Although the formal contact between the A.R.A.T.S and the 
S.E.F. was resumed in the period from 1998 to 1999, several unilateral actions taken by 
China and Taiwan (e.g. Taiwan’s anti-unification or even pro-independence activities 
since 1999 and China’s Anti-Secession Law in 2005) nevertheless prevented any further 
positive bilateral contact between them from occurring after 1999, and the period from 
2000 to 2007 witnessed a very high level of tension between China and Taiwan with no 
bilateral effort to resolve the common problems they faced. However, as Figure 2.1 
interestingly shows, the decade-long intense confrontation between China and Taiwan 
was suddenly eased in 2008 when the A.R.A.T.S. and S.E.F. resumed their meetings and 
a prospect of China and Taiwan bilaterally resolving the common problems emerged 
again.  
        In addition to the number of the A.R.A.T.S.-S.E.F. meetings, the number of the 
formal agreements signed and the joint announcements released by these two 
organizations can also provide some clues for how less confrontational China-Taiwan 
relations have become since 2008. As Figure 2.2 shows, soon after the A.R.A.T.S. and 
S.E.F. were established in 1991, the two organizations made a historic achievement by 
signing totally six formal agreements and joint documents in the period from 1993 to 
1995.  
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Figure 2.2: The number of A.R.A.T.S.-S.E.F. agreements and documents (1990-2012) 
 
 
        However, after the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the two organizations stopped 
signing agreements or documents, and as mentioned before, they did not even contact 
each other at all since 2000. It was not until 2008 that they resumed their meetings; more 
importantly, immediately after they began to contact each other again in 2008, they 
signed 6 formal agreements in the same year, and form 2008 to 2012, the two 
organizations made another historic achievement by signing totally 25 formal agreements 
and joint documents. 
        What is even more important that should be pointed out here is that China and 
Taiwan finally reached some sort of informal agreement about the sensitive issue of “one 
China” in 2008 and regarded this agreement as the basis on which the formal contact 
between the A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F. could be resumed. More specifically, both of them 
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claimed that they accepted the so called “1992 Consensus” which was informally reached 
by them in 1992 but had never been officially recognized by both sides until 2008. There 
are two major points about this consensus: (1) both China and Taiwan agree that there is 
only one China in this world, and (2) both sides understand that their interpretations of 
“one China” are different. Although it was obvious that China emphasized the first point 
while Taiwan focused on the second one, the fact that there was something about “one 
China,”  though very equivocal, on which China and Taiwan both claimed that they could 
agree was good enough for the relations between them who had experienced a decade-
long intense conflict. 
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Chapter Three 
The Economic Dimension of China-Taiwan Relations, 1990 – 2008 
 
        Why did China-Taiwan relations become relatively less confrontational in 2008 after 
eight years of severe confrontation? Based on the liberal argument that economic ties 
between countries would lead to peace, China-Taiwan economic ties might offer some 
clues about the answer to the question. In this chapter, I conduct, from Taiwan’s 
perspective again, a historical review of the economic dimension of cross-strait relations 
in the period from 1990 to 2008. This review focusing on the economic dimension 
reveals a very different picture of China-Taiwan relations (i.e. a picture of close relations) 
compared with the political dimension I have examined in the previous chapter. 
 
3-1: A review of cross-strait economic ties from Taiwan’s perspective, 1990-2008 
 
1990 
        Starting in the late 1980s, Taiwan began to make formal laws to regulate the trade 
across the Taiwan Strait.
1
 On August 5
th
, 1988, following the lifting of currency and 
travel restrictions in 1987, the Taiwanese government officially announced that the 
indirect trade between China and Taiwan was legally allowed, making pubic the 
                                                          
1
 China unilaterally lifted its ban on cross-strait economic ties as early as 1979. For details about how China 
promoted cross-strait economic ties during the 1980s, see Boutin 1997, 86; and Dent 2001, 15. 
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Principles Governing the Indirect Import of Goods from Mainland China.
2
 On June 5
th
, 
1989, it promulgated the Regulations on the Goods in the Mainland; and on August 21
st
, 
1990, the Regulations on Indirect Export to the Mainland were introduced.
3
 In addition to 
trade, Taiwan tried to regulate Taiwanese business people’s investments in China as well. 
On October 6
th
, 1990, the Taiwanese government officially allowed Taiwanese to 
indirectly invest in China and promulgated the Regulations on Indirect Investment or 
Technological Cooperation in the Mainland Area which legalized the Taiwanese 
investment in China that did not negatively affect Taiwan’s economic development and 
national security.
4
    
 
1991 
        After cross-strait economic ties, though still “indirect,” were officially built with the 
aforementioned formal regulations made by Taiwan, the opinions that advocated or 
opposed the so called “Great Chinese Economic Zone” began to emerge in 1991.5 At the 
same time, the confrontation between China and Taiwan over their newly built formal 
economic ties loomed when the former tried to politically exploit the economic issues 
                                                          
2
 Chao & Myers 1994, 223; Boutin 1997, 79; Leng 1996, 106; and Dent 2001, 13. See also 
<http://gisapsrv01.cpami.gov.tw/cpis/cprpts/kaohsiung/depart/table/3-1-1.htm> and 
<http://www.chinareviewnews.com/crn-webapp/cbspub/secDetail.jsp?bookid=5416&secid=5455> . 
3
 Zhao 1997, 179. See also <http://gisapsrv01.cpami.gov.tw/cpis/cprpts/kaohsiung/depart/table/3-1-1.htm>. 
4
 Zhao 1997, 179; Bolt 2001, 86; and Sutter 2002, 525. See also 
<http://www.toybase.com.tw/h/n1940645.html> and 
<http://gisapsrv01.cpami.gov.tw/cpis/cprpts/kaohsiung/depart/table/3-1-1.htm>.  
5
 See “It’s not easy to realize the ‘Great Chinese Economic Zone’,” Independent Morning News, November 
26, 1991. The idea was further developed later by scholars like Shambaugh (1993) who talked about 
“Greater China” and Naughton (1997) who created the term “China Circle.” For more discussions on these 
related ideas about growing cross-strait economic ties, see Crane 1993, 706; Zhao 1997, 181; and Clark 
2002b, 757. 
100 
 
 
 
and the latter began to worry that China was using those economic issues to promote 
political negotiations in which it was not interested.
6
 Taiwan was especially anxious 
when China urged Taiwan to negotiate with it over the issue of the so called “three links” 
(i.e. the direct postal, trade, and transport links)
7
 and hoped the establishment of the links 
would serve as a foundation for the political unification of China and Taiwan.
8
  
 
1992 
        Among the “three links” that China demanded, Taiwan was highly suspicious of 
China’s enthusiasm about building the direct transport link.9  According to Taiwan’s 
Mainland Affairs Council, Taiwan was unwilling to allow any direct transport connection 
between China and Taiwan because, among other things, China was still militarily hostile 
toward Taiwan and the direct transport link would have a very great negative effect on 
                                                          
6
 See “Mainland adjusts its policy toward Taiwan,” China Times, March 23, 1991. Actually, according to 
Bolt (2001, 83), China’s attempt to use cross-strait economic ties as political tools was revealed as early as 
1985 when a Chinese official document stated, “We can definitely, step by step, lead Taiwan’s industries to 
further rely on our market as long as we adopt well-organized and well-guided measures. Continuing to 
develop these efforts would effectively lead us to control the operation of Taiwan’s economy that would 
speed up the reunification of the motherland.” 
7
 Starting in 1979, new proposals for facilitating unification were considered by China’s decision-making 
circle when it began to launch a series of “peace offensives” against Taiwan for unification after Sino-U.S. 
relations were normalized. Against this background, the term, “three links,” was raised by Ye Jianying, the 
vice chairman of China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee, on September 30th, 1981, when 
he talked about it along with the other related idea of “four exchanges” (i.e. academic, cultural, economic, 
and sports exchanges). For more discussions, see Chang 1992, 134-135; Zhao 1997, 177-178; and Zhao 
1999-2000, 496. More details about China’s position on the three links in the early 1990s can be found in 
the following newspaper articles: “Mainland suggests that Taiwan could build the one-way direct transport 
link first,” China Times, January 6, 1991; and “Mainland demands ‘three links’ and ‘party-to-party 
negotiations’ again,” Central Daily News, June 8, 1991. 
8
 While seeing unification as the major goal, China also believed that the “three links” would bring 
economic benefits to it. For more discussions about why China was enthusiastically promoting the building 
of “three links,” see Tung 2005, 356-358. 
9
 When it came to the issue of “three links,” both China and Taiwan cared about the direct transport link the 
most. It is worth noting that, in this review, when the term “three links” is mentioned, the direct transport 
link is the major focus. 
101 
 
 
 
Taiwan’s national security.10 Nevertheless, Taiwan, on the other hand, still believed that 
its new policy of economic openness that had been implemented since the late 1980s 
should continue. On May 20
th
, 1992, Siew Wan-chang, Taiwan’s Minister of Economic 
Affairs who supported the idea of “Great Chinese Economic Zone,” announced that 
cross-strait economic exchanges would continue and be regulated on the principle of 
“mutual benefits and economic complementation.”11  
        Taiwan’s new policy toward China-Taiwan economic ties, which was relatively pro-
openness compared with that before the late 1980s, did not satisfy every party involved, 
however. It was challenged by not only China which wanted nothing but the “three links” 
but so many people in Taiwan. Starting in January 1992, the Taiwanese business people 
who were still not allowed to invest in China or wanted to invest more began to urge the 
Taiwanese government to “move forward” and lift the remaining restriction on cross-
strait economic exchanges.
12
 On the other hand, there were people who began to worry 
that Taiwan’s pro-openness policy toward cross-strait economic ties would hurt Taiwan’s 
economy. These people based their views on several research findings such as one in 
August 1992 which showed that every 100 million U.S. Dollars invested by Taiwan in 
China would increase China’s export by 260 million U.S. Dollars, an ominous sign for 
Taiwan as an export-oriented economy.
13
    
                                                          
10
 “Five reasons suggested by the Mainland Affairs Council against the direct cross-strait transport link,” 
United Daily News, May 31, 1992. 
11
 “The second wave of ’Mainland fever’ is regulated on the principle of ‘mutual benefits and economic 
complementation’,” China Times, May 21, 1992. 
12
 “Business people urge the government to ‘move forward’ its policy toward Mainland,” United Daily 
News, Evening Edition, March 2, 1992. 
13
 “The effect of every 100 million U.S.D. invested in China on Taiwan’s economy,” Independent Evening 
News, August 11, 1992. 
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1993 
        Taiwanese investment in China grew so rapidly that the issue of investment 
protection agreement about it began to emerge in early 1993. In late March 1993, Taiwan 
officially expressed its hope that China and Taiwan could sign an agreement protecting 
Taiwanese investment in China at the end of the upcoming Koo-Wang Talk, and on April 
1
st, the head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, Huang Kun-huei, said that Taiwan 
would make the issue of such an agreement one of the most important in its negotiation 
with China.
14
 Worrying that signing an investment protection agreement with Taiwan 
might involve some sort of recognition of Taiwan as an independent political entity that 
China tried to avoid, the vice chairman of China’s A.R.A.T.S., Tang Shubei, explicitly 
objected to the idea and emphasized that the priority should be establishing the “three 
links.”15  
        In addition to the issue of investment protection agreement, problems about 
“hollowing out” and “dependence” gradually became hot issues in Taiwan.16 To Taiwan, 
China’s political exploitation of growing cross-strait economic ties, which might be both 
the cause and the effect of “hollowing out” and “dependence,” was one of the least 
                                                          
14
 “Taiwan wants to sign an agreement in the Koo-Wang Talk to protect Taiwanese investment in 
Mainland,” Liberty Times, March 30, 1993; and “Taiwan makes two issues its first and second most 
important ones for the cross-strait negotiation,” China Times, April 2, 1993. 
15
 “Tang Shubei: It’s impossible to sign the agreement right now,” China Times, April 24, 1993. 
16
 “Kuo Wan-jung: Taiwan’s export depends on Mainland too much,” United Daily News, May 29, 1993; 
“More and more Taiwanese business people invest in Mainland, and the crisis of economic ‘hollowing out’ 
deepens,” Central Daily News, June 21, 1993; “Large amounts of Taiwanese investment in Mainland hurt 
Taiwan’s economy and increase Mainland’s economic power,” Liberty Times, June 22, 1993; and 
“Ministry of Economic Affairs hopes that the Mainland fever won’t get overheated,” Commercial Times, 
June 23, 1993. 
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wanted side effects of the ties.
17
 As Taiwan saw it, China’s intention to play the political 
card on economic issues was very obvious when, for example, the latter stated that the 
two sides could sign the investment protection agreement only if Taiwan accepted 
China’s One-China Principle.18 
        Nevertheless, in spite of the aforementioned concern, Taiwan, at this stage, was not 
thinking to cut the ties which had been built since the late 1980s. For example, while the 
Taiwanese government tried to more effectively regulate Taiwanese investment in China 
by promulgating the Regulations Governing Investments and Technological Cooperation 
with Mainland China on March 1
st
,
19
 Huang, the head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs 
Council, said on May 24
th
 that, although the Taiwanese government did not encourage 
Taiwanese to invest in China, it allowed them to do so.
20
 Moreover, when its “go south” 
policy was implemented, which was regarded by many people as a policy to slow down 
the growth of Taiwanese investment in China by encouraging Taiwanese business people 
to do business with Southeast Asian counties,
21
 the Taiwanese government tirelessly 
clarified that its economic policy toward China would not be changed. On October 13
th
, 
in response to a question about the “go south” policy, Chiang Pin-kung, Taiwan’s 
Minister of Economic Affairs, openly said that the “go south” policy would not affect the 
                                                          
17
 For more discussions about the issues of “hollowing out” and “dependence” in the context of cross-strait 
economic ties, see Deng 2000, 971-972; Dent 2001, 22; Sutter 2002, 534; and Wong 2005, 45-47 and 49-
51. 
18
 “Zou Zhekai of A.R.A.T.S.: The two sides can sign the investment protection agreement based on the 
One-China Principle,” United Daily News, September 1, 1993. 
19
 Leng 1996, 107; Boutin 1997, 88; and Dent 2001, 14. The full text of the regulations can be accessed at 
<http://www.moeaic.gov.tw/system_external/ctlr?PRO=LawsLoad&id=12>. 
20
 “Huang Kun-huei emphasizes that Taiwanese investment in Mainland is not encouraged but allowed,” 
Liberty Times, May 25, 1993. 
21
 For more discussions on the “go south” policy, see Boutin 1997, 83 and 91; Deng 2000, 966-969; Dent 
2001, 16; and Bolt 2001, 86. 
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existing policy about cross-strait economic ties and suggested that some Southeast Asian 
countries could be used by Taiwan as economic “transfer hubs” between China and 
Taiwan in the future.
22
 
 
1994 
        From 1993 to 1994, China decided to push harder for the “three links,” and its 
A.R.A.T.S. began to persuade Taiwan’s S.E.F. to focus on nothing but the “economic 
issues” in their negotiation. As for Taiwan, it was more interested in “practical issues” 
(i.e. issues that were not politically sensitive) in the A.R.A.T.S.-S.E.F. negotiation; and 
when a discussion of “economic issues” was unavoidable, it preferred to talk about the 
issue of investment protection agreement that China did not want to deal with instead of 
the issue of “three links” that it thought was politically sensitive due to the great negative 
effect of those links on Taiwan’s national security.23 
        To respond to Taiwan’s constant call for legal protection of Taiwanese investment in 
China, on March 5
th
, China promulgated the Taiwanese Compatriots’ Investment Law 
that it claimed would effectively protect the Taiwanese business people’s interests in 
China.
24
 China’s act was however criticized by Taiwan as unilateral and unhelpful, and 
the next day, both Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council and S.E.F. urged China to work 
with Taiwan to jointly come up with an investment protection agreement that was 
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 “Chiang Pin-kung: The ‘go south’ policy won’t affect the policy on cross-strait economic ties,” Liberty 
Times, October 14, 1993. 
23
 “Taiwan places importance on practical issues while Mainland gives weight to economic ones,” United 
Daily News, February 3, 1994. 
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 Sutter 2002, 524; and “Mainland promulgates the Taiwanese Compatriots’ Investment Law,” China 
Times, March 6, 1994. 
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acceptable to both sides.
25
 In response, on March 10
th
, China stated that China’s 
relationship with Taiwan was a relationship between the central government and a local 
government rather than two sovereign states and therefore it was unnecessary for China 
to sign any “agreement” with Taiwan.26 
        As China and Taiwan conflicted over the issues related to their growing economic 
ties, there was confrontation within the Taiwanese government about the ties as well.
27
 
The confrontation was between Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council and its Council for 
Economic Planning and Development in two debates: (1) the debate on whether to go 
southward (i.e. investing in Southeast Asia) or go westward (i.e. investing in China); and 
(2) the debate on whether a plan for the direct cross-strait transport link should be 
included in a bigger project for making Taiwan the “Asia-Pacific Regional Operations 
Center.”28 In the aforementioned debates, the head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, 
Huang Kun-huei, was not particularly interested in increasing or even maintaining the 
economic ties between China and Taiwan, and he was especially worried about China’s 
political exploitation of those ties.
29
 Furthermore, in the wake of the Qiandao Lake 
Incident,
30
 Huang, who was unsatisfied with China’s response to the incident and 
thinking about teaching China a lesson, warned China that medium and big Taiwanese 
                                                          
25
 “S.E.F. and Mainland Affairs Council believe that Taiwan and Mainland should sign an agreement on 
cross-strait investment protection,” Central Daily News, March 7, 1994. 
26
 “Mainland objects to signing the investment protection agreement with an uncompromising attitude,” 
Commercial Times, March 10, 1994. 
27
 Chu 1997, 235. 
28
 Chu 1997, 243. More details about the confrontation can be found in the following newspaper article: 
“Mainland Affairs Council and Council for Economic Planning and Development hold different positions 
about the Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center,” United Daily News, June 12, 1994. 
29
 “Huang Kun-huei: Mainland exploits the common people to threaten Taiwan’s government,” Liberty 
Times, January 3, 1994. 
30
 See Chapter Two, 53-54. 
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corporations would be prohibited from investing in China if it did not deal with the 
incident properly.
31
 By contrast, the head of Council for Economic Planning and 
Development, Siew Wan-chang, argued that it was “impossible and unnecessary” to stop 
China-Taiwan economic exchanges in his response to a question about the effect of the 
Qiandao Lake Incident on cross-strait economic ties.
32
 In addition, when it came to the 
issue of direct cross-strait transport link, Siew emphasized that there should be no link 
“for now but not forever.”33   
        The confrontation ended when Siew replaced Huang as the head of Taiwan’s 
Mainland Affairs Council on December 15
th
.
34
 Expecting that Siew would make efforts to 
promote cross-strait economic exchanges, the Taiwanese business people who had 
economic interests in growing cross-strait economic ties as well as China that had 
political interests in them explicitly revealed their excitement about the coming of the 
“economic age of cross-strait relations.”35  On December 29th, Tang Shubei, the vice 
                                                          
31
 See “Huang Kun-huei: Medium and large Taiwanese corporations will be prohibited from investing in 
Mainland if Mainland doesn’t deal with the Qiandao Lake Incident properly,” Commercial Times, April 11, 
1994. It is related to what Kahler & Kastner (2006, 534) call a “conditional engagement policy” the 
Taiwanese government employed in the early 1990s to make China’s changing its policy toward Taiwan a 
precondition for more economic openness. This policy turned out to be an unsuccessful one. However, to 
some extent, Taiwan’s intention to change China’s Taiwan policy with a threat to keep the restriction or 
impose more restriction was not completely baseless because Taiwan’s investment in and trade with China 
did play some role in China’s economic development in general and its export in particular. For more 
discussions about Taiwan’s intention to politically exploit cross-strait economic ties, see Chu 1997, 234; 
and Zhao 1997, 187. For more discussions about the effect of cross-strait economic ties on China’s 
economy, see Bolt 2001, 83; Clark 2002b, 756; Tung 2003, 144; and Wu 1994. 
32
 “Siew Wan-chang: It is impossible and unnecessary to stop cross-strait economic exchanges,” United 
Daily News, April 8, 1994. 
33
 “Mainland Affairs Council objects to the direct cross-strait transport link,” Central Daily News, May 29, 
1994. 
34
 Chu 1997, 237-238. 
35
 “The economic age of cross-strait relations is coming,” United Daily News, December 13, 1994; 
“Taiwanese business people congratulate Siew Wan-chang on being the head of Mainland Affairs Council,” 
China Times, December 14, 1994; and “A.R.A.T.S. makes an official statement on Siew Wan-chang’s new 
position,” Commercial Times, December 18, 1994. 
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chairman of China’s A.R.A.T.S., announced that dealing with the issues concerning 
cross-strait economic exchanges would be China’s priority for the year of 1995.36 
 
1995 
        In the first half of 1995, both China and Taiwan did make lots of efforts to promote 
their economic ties. On January 13
th
, Chiang Pin-kung, Taiwan’s Minister of Economic 
Affairs announced that the issues concerning cross-strait economic exchanges would be 
among his ministry’s major focuses.37 In response, China’s A.R.A.T.S. said on January 
22
nd
 that China noticed Taiwan’s effort to prioritize the economic issues when it came to 
China-Taiwan relations and that China welcomed any of such efforts that would increase 
cross-strait economic ties.
38
 
        It is worth mentioning that, during this period, although Taiwan still put most of its 
focus on the issue of investment protection agreement, it began to deal with the issue of 
direct transport link seriously. In early March, based on the principles of “gradualism” 
and “sea freight first,” Taiwan decided to build “overseas transshipping zones” (which 
were also called the “offshore shipping centers” or the “temporary points for direct 
shipping”) in some Taiwanese ports and allow ships to move freely between these 
Taiwanese ports and selected Chinese ports.
39
 China’s response to Taiwan’s act was 
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 “Tang Shubei: The economic issue is a top priority for next year’s cross-strait negotiation,” Commercial 
Times, December 30, 1994. 
37
 “Chiang Pin-kung: The issue concerning cross-strait economic exchanges is a major focus,” China Times, 
January 14, 1995. 
38
 “Tang Shubei: The conditions for cross-strait negotiation over economic issues are more mature than 
before,” China Times, January 23, 1995. 
39
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however negative.
40
 On March 15
th
, it said the offshore shipping centers would not be 
helpful for the establishment of the direct cross-strait transport link and emphasized that 
it would not allow any foreign ships to get involved in the link that was regarded by it as 
a domestic one.
41
 On May 8
th
, not allowing ships to move between its ports and Taiwan’s 
offshore shipping centers, China urged Taiwan to formally negotiate with it over the issue 
of cross-strait sea transport and said it would consider allowing foreign-flagged ships 
operated by Chinese or Taiwanese to move across the Taiwan Strait on the basis of the 
One-China Principle if there was no sign of foreign intervention.
42
 Feeling that China was 
playing politics again, Taiwan refused to negotiate with it over the issue.
43
      
        Taiwan’s enthusiasm in promoting cross-strait economic ties however decreased in 
the second half of 1995 due to China’s military exercises and missile tests against Taiwan 
from July to November. Because of the growing tension between China and Taiwan, 
which resulted from the Taiwanese president’s visit to the U.S. and China’s military 
threats after the visit, 70% of China-based Taiwanese business people said their 
investment confidence about China was weakened, and some of them even began to think 
about “going southward” (i.e. moving their capital and operations from China to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
overseas transshipping zones built by the Taiwanese government can be found in the following newspaper 
article: “Taiwan’s policy toward the direct cross-strait transportation: Sea transportation and shipping first; 
air transportation and travelling later,” China Times, March 6, 1995. 
40
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Southeast Asian countries).
44
 To alleviate China-based Taiwanese business people’s 
anxiety and increase their investment confidence about China, on September 1
st, China’s 
Taiwan Affairs Office held a forum with Taiwanese business people, in which the 
Chinese officials emphasized that Taiwanese business people were welcome and 
encouraged to invest in China and promised that the tense relations between China and 
Taiwan would not have any negative effect on their rights and interests in China.
45
 
        To the Taiwanese government, China’s effort to pacify nervous Taiwanese business 
people on the one hand and make a hostile gesture toward the Taiwanese government on 
the other vindicated its suspicion that China was trying to politically exploit cross-strait 
economic ties.
46
 Starting in September, even Siew, the head of Taiwan’s Mainland 
Affairs Council who was regarded as pro-economic openness, began to accuse China of 
employing a “dual strategy” on cross-strait economic ties (i.e. a hard strategy toward the 
Taiwanese government and a soft one toward Taiwanese business people) in order to use 
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economy as a tool to force the Taiwanese government to change its cross-strait policy to 
China’s political advantage.47 
 
1996 
        On January 30
th
, 1996, Li Peng, the Chinese premier, said that the target of China’s 
military threat was nothing but “Taiwan’s independence” and emphasized that China 
would try its very best to protect the interests of China-based Taiwanese business people 
and push for the “three links” that would economically benefit them.48 China’s effort to 
resolve China-based Taiwanese business people’s confidence crisis and convince them 
that China did care about their interests seemed to pay off. In early 1996, Taiwanese 
business people had less concern about their investments in China and, moreover, began 
to advocate the things that China wanted but the Taiwanese government did not: the 
“three links.”49  
        China adopted what the Taiwanese government called the “dual strategy” again 
when it conducted another round of military exercises and missile tests against Taiwan 
from March 8
th
 to 25
th
 on the one hand and, at the same time, tried to convince China-
based Taiwanese business people that their rights and interests in China would never be 
                                                          
47
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harmed in spite of the military threats on the other.
50
 In late March, based on the 
experience learned and the achievements obtained in adopting the “dual strategy” over 
the past year, a decision was officially made by the Central Politburo of C.C.P. that China 
would keep using “trade and investment” to achieve political goals when it came to 
China-Taiwan relations.
51
    
        Having no doubt about China’s intention to politically exploit cross-strait economic 
ties to its political advantage, starting in mid-May, the Taiwanese government explicitly 
revealed its concern about the negative effects of China-Taiwan economic ties on Taiwan, 
both politically and economically, and began to plan some policy changes to reverse the 
trend of growing economic ties or at least to slow it down.
52
 In September, the Taiwanese 
government officially decided to put a break on Taiwanese investment in China after the 
Taiwanese president, Lee Teng-hui, raised the idea of “no haste, be patient” in a talk 
about China-Taiwan relations in mid-August.
53
 On September 6
th
, Lien Chan, the vice 
president as well as the prime minister of Taiwan, criticized China for “using economic 
integration to force political concession” in his report to the congress.54 The next day, 
officials from Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council reached a consensus view that the 
growing “China fever” should be put under control and urged Taiwanese business people 
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to keep national security in mind when investing in China.
55
 On September 12
th
, Chang 
Ching-yu, the head of Mainland Affairs Council, said that investing in China was highly 
risky given China’s constant hostility toward Taiwan, and Koo, the chairman of Taiwan’s 
S.E.F., openly urged Taiwanese business people to invest in counties other than China.
56
 
Then, Kao Koong-lian, a deputy head of Mainland Affairs Council, stated the next day 
that, although the door to cross-strait economic ties that had already been open since the 
late 1980s would not be closed, it would not be opened wider if China-Taiwan relations 
were tense.
57
 
        On September 14
th
, President Lee of Taiwan openly criticized China for “besieging 
politics with economy” and announced that Taiwan would regulate Taiwanese investment 
in China based on the principle of “no haste, be patient,” and on October 21st, in a 
meeting of National Unification Council, Lee urged Taiwanese business people to “leave 
their roots” in Taiwan.58  
 
1997 
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        Although the Taiwanese government decided to impose stricter restriction on 
Taiwanese investment in China, it had no intention to significantly reduce the trade 
across the Taiwan Strait. To make its plan for direct shipping (i.e. the plan about 
“offshore shipping centers” which was boycotted by China) a successful one, the 
Taiwanese government allowed the representatives of Taiwan’s shipping industry to 
negotiate with their Chinese counterpart over the issue. On January 22
nd
, 1997, the 
Agreement on Point-to-Point Direct Shipping was signed by the representatives of 
China’s and Taiwan’s shipping industries, which allowed foreign-flagged ships registered 
in neither China nor Taiwan but operated by Chinese or Taiwanese to sail between 
selected Chinese ports and Taiwan’s Offshore Shipping Centers.59 On April 19th, based 
on the agreement, a ship operated by Chinese sailed from China’s Xiamen to Taiwan’s 
Kaohsiung and became the first ship making a direct non-stop trip between China and 
Taiwan since 1949.
60
 
        As point-to-point direct shipping was achieved, a conflict between the Taiwanese 
government and business people over the “no haste, be patient” policy however began. 
From May 16
th
 to September 30
th
, China-based Taiwanese business people were required 
to voluntarily register with the Taiwanese government for their “legal” investments in 
China (i.e. the investments that were not legally prohibited), and those who had “illegal” 
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investments or failed to register the “legal” ones by the deadline would be fined.61 Two 
days after the voluntary registration began, a group of China-based Taiwanese business 
people protested against the policy in front of Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
and a survey released on May 29
th
 showed that half the China-based Taiwanese business 
people objected to the idea of “no haste, be patient” and believed that it would have a 
negative effect on China-Taiwan relations.
62
 
        The conflict reached a whole new level in October when several Taiwanese business 
leaders revealed their dissatisfaction with the restriction imposed on their investments in 
China and urged the Taiwanese government to build the “three links” as soon as 
possible.
63
 For example, Wang Yung-ching, the founder and the chairman of Formosa 
Plastics Group who was called the “God of Management” in Taiwan, stated on October 
8
th
 that the policy of “no haste, be patient” would never succeed in stopping cross-strait 
economic exchanges that he supported.
64
 In addition, starting in mid-October, Chang 
Yung-fa, the founder and the chairman of Evergreen Group which was the biggest 
shipping corporation in Taiwan, began to say that the “three links” between China and 
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Taiwan were economically necessary and that he was willing to be a negotiation agent for 
Taiwan on the issue.
65
 
 
1998 
        Starting in early 1998, the Taiwanese government began to persuade Taiwanese 
business people to move “southward” again, this time with China in its mind clearly, 
when Siew Wan-chang, the Taiwanese prime minister, stated that the policy of “go south” 
would definitely bring economic benefits to Taiwanese businesses people and urged them 
not to focus on China only.
66
 However, the re-introduction of the idea of “go south” did 
not help reduce the dissatisfaction with the policy of “no haste, be patient” among 
Taiwanese business people. In a meeting between Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Taiwan’s National Federation of Industries held on March 26th, the latter 
unwaveringly urged the former to lift the restriction on Taiwanese investment in China 
and build the “three links.”67  
        In addition, starting in 1998, major opposition parties in Taiwan began to appeal 
directly to China-based Taiwanese business people by criticizing the idea of “no haste, be 
patient” and coming up with their own pro-openness proposal for cross-strait economic 
ties. In mid-February, the D.P.P., after a series of internal debates, formally announced its 
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idea of “strengthening the foundation while advancing westward,”68 and in late April, 
some politicians from New Party (N.P.) stated that their party was the most trustworthy 
“agent of China-based Taiwanese business people.”69 
        Despite the huge backlash against the policy of “no haste, be patient” from not only 
the China-based Taiwanese business people but also the opposition parties, the 
Taiwanese government still stuck to the policy. On September 30
th
, in a forum with 
China-based Taiwanese business people, Siew, the Taiwanese prime minister, when 
asked by the participants to repeal the policy, stated that the change would be made if 
China changed its hostile attitude toward Taiwan.
70
 In a working meeting on mainland 
affairs held on November 1
st
, Siew added another condition for the policy change when 
he said that adjustments to the policy would be made only if the Chinese government 
accepted the reality of China being divided into two equal political entities.
71
 
 
1999 
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        While Taiwan tried to discourage its business people from investing in China and 
refused to build the “three links” that they wanted, China, by contrast, tried its very best 
to please Taiwanese business people and push very hard for the links. On the same day 
the Taiwanese prime minister held the aforementioned forum with some China-based 
Taiwanese business people in Taiwan and refused to lift the restriction on cross-strait 
economic ties, Qian Qichen, China’s Vice Premier, met with other Taiwanese business 
people in China and told them that China encouraged Taiwanese business people to 
invest in China and would do its best to protect their interests.
72
 On March 5
th
, 1999, in 
his first official working report as the Chinese premier, Zhu Rongji said China hoped the 
goal of “three links” could be achieved as soon as possible.73 In addition, when the 
tension between China and Taiwan drastically increased after July 9
th
 because of 
Taiwan’s “two-state theory,” which caused Taiwan’s National Federation of Industries to 
cancel its scheduled visit to China, China again made lots of efforts to promise China-
based Taiwanese business people that the tension would never harm their interests in 
China. On August 12
th
, Chen Yunlin, the head of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, ordered 
every local office of Taiwan affairs in China to do its best to alleviate Taiwanese business 
people’s anxiety about the tense cross-strait relations. 74  Moreover, in a meeting on 
August 18
th
 that was attended by the Chinese officials dealing with Taiwan affairs, a 
decision was made that the “separation of politics and economy” would be a concrete 
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element of China’s policy toward Taiwan, which meant that any political conflict 
between China and Taiwan would never affect China-based Taiwanese business people’s 
economic interests in China.
75
 
        As for Taiwan, believing that politics and economy were mutually affected when it 
came to China-Taiwan relations and that China was obviously playing the political card 
on economy, it no longer wanted to see cross-strait economic ties grow and therefore was 
unwilling to repeal its “no haste, be patient” policy and make any compromise on the 
issue of “three links.” In May, when asked whether Taiwan’s membership of the World 
Trade Organization (W.T.O.) in the near future would force Taiwan to lift its current 
restriction on the “three links,” the Taiwanese government insisted that the issue of “three 
links” had nothing to do with the issue of the W.T.O. and emphasized that there would be 
no change in the policy of “no haste, be patient” even after Taiwan became a W.T.O. 
member.
76
 On November 27
th
, Siew, the Taiwanese prime minister, stated that the “three 
links” would be built only when Taiwan’s security and dignity were guaranteed and that a 
more pro-openness policy on Taiwanese investment in China could be made only if the 
Chinese government accepted the fact that China was divided.
77
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2000 
        As mentioned before, the Taiwanese government’s anti-openness attitude toward 
cross-strait economic ties, which began to build up in 1996, was not supported by 
opposition parties. The policy of “no haste, be patient” became so unpopular that all of 
the candidates from opposition parties as well as the independent candidates for the 
upcoming Taiwanese presidential election, which would be held on March 18
th
, 2000, 
openly criticized the policy and proposed a relatively more pro-openness one.
78
 Even the 
candidate of the K.M.T., Lien Chan, also proposed to make some changes to the policy of 
“no haste, be patient” at a later stage.79 
        On March 18
th
, Chen Shui-bian, the D.P.P. candidate, won the election. Uneasy 
about the election of Chen who was an advocate of Taiwan’s independence, starting in 
April, China began to say that the China-based Taiwanese business people who supported 
Chen in and after the election were not welcome in China, and in early June, there was a 
rumor, which China denied, that Chimei Group, whose chairman Hsu Wen-lung was a 
supporter of Chen, became a target.
80
 Nevertheless, worrying that the warning as well as 
the rumor associated with it might alienate China-based Taiwanese business people too 
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much, in July, Chen Yunlin, the head of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, ordered the local 
offices of Taiwan affairs not to do any political investigation to Taiwanese business 
people without concrete evidence of law violations.
81
 
        In Taiwan, after the election, voices supporting the idea of “no haste, be patient” 
were largely silenced. Even the former ruling party, the K.M.T., changed its position on 
cross-strait economic ties. For example, on September 13
th
, Chiang Pin-kung, the former 
head of Taiwan’s Council for Economic Planning and Development, said Taiwan’s 
economic advantage would be completely lost if the direct cross-strait transport link was 
not built soon.
82
 Also, Siew Wan-chang, the former Taiwanese prime minister, began to 
advocate the idea of “cross-strait common market” in late September.83  
        As for the new Taiwanese government, although Chen was an advocate of Taiwan’s 
independence, he and his administration, at this stage, were in favor of a policy on cross-
strait economic ties that was more pro-openness than the previous government’s 
approach. The next day after he was elected, Chen stated that he was willing to negotiate 
with China over the issue of “three links.”84 Two days later, he revealed that he planned 
to build the so called “mini-three links” between China and the R.O.C.-controlled Matsu 
and Kinmen Islands before the formal three links between China and Taiwan would be 
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officially built.
85
 On May 21
st
, the next day after his inauguration, Chen announced that 
building the “three links” was a policy goal that his administration would pursue.86 China, 
however, was suspicious of Taiwan’s new position on the issue of “three links.” In June, 
China revealed that it would never negotiate with Taiwan over the issue, including the 
idea of “mini-three links,” unless Taiwan accepted the One-China Principle.87 In addition 
to the issue of “three links,” the new Taiwanese government also planned to deal with the 
infamous policy of “no haste, be patient”; on December 14th, it officially announced that 
the policy would be adjusted in the near future.
88
 
  
2001 
        Taiwan unilaterally built the so called “mini-three links” in January 2001 without 
any negotiation with China.
89
 In the beginning, China insisted that any decision about the 
“three links” should be made through negotiations on the basis of the One-China 
Principle and therefore tried to boycott the “mini-three links”; however, to avoid 
alienating China-based Taiwanese business people who supported the links, China 
informally and reluctantly accepted them later.
90
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        As China-Taiwan economic ties grew because of the successful establishment of 
“mini-three links,” another rumor however emerged on March 10th that a factory run by 
Chimei Group at Zhenjiang in China’s Jiangsu Province was forced to close by the 
Chinese government due to its chairman’s alleged pro-independence tendency. 91 
Although the Chinese government immediately clarified that the factory was not closed, 
it at the same time stated again that it did not want to see anyone making money in China 
but advocating Taiwan’s independence in Taiwan.92 This time, like what it did after its 
warning against the so called “green China-based Taiwanese business people” in April 
2000,
93
 China was still very careful not to alienate Taiwanese business people in general 
because it well understood that these people who had huge economic interests in China 
and therefore were unwilling to alienate China as well should be treated as allies instead 
of enemies in its political struggle against the new Taiwanese government that it regarded 
as anti-China. 
         The K.M.T., starting in early 2001, also began to make an effort to side with China-
based Taiwanese business people, hoping their support, which it lost in 2000 to a 
considerable degree, would help it become the ruling party again. On January 30
th
, 
Chiang Hsiao-yen, a member of K.M.T. Central Committee, founded an association to 
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promote China-based Taiwanese business people’s interests and said that the business 
people were the major factor leading to peaceful China-Taiwan relations.
94
 On March 
18
th
, Siew Wan-chang, the vice chairman of K.M.T., founded the Cross-Strait Common 
Market Foundation and said that he hoped the economic integration between China and 
Taiwan would help resolve the controversy over “one-China.”95 On May 2nd, Lin Feng-
cheng, the secretary-general of K.M.T. claimed that the K.M.T. was China-based 
Taiwanese business people’s home in Taiwan where they could get any support and help 
needed.
96
 Finally, on the eve of the Economic Development Advisory Conference that the 
Taiwanese government proposed to hold in August where the representatives of the 
government, the opposition parties, and the industries would discuss the issues 
concerning Taiwan’s economy, the K.M.T. Central Committee urged the Taiwanese 
government to immediately repeal the policy of “no haste, be patient,” lift the remaining 
restriction on cross-strait economic exchanges, and build the “three links” between China 
and Taiwan, all of which were advocated by China-based Taiwanese business people.
97
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        On August 12
th
, the participants of the cross-strait session of the Economic 
Development Advisory Conference reached a consensus on the repeal of the policy of 
“no haste, be patient” and agreed to replace the idea of “no haste, be patient” with that of 
“active opening and effective management” that was raised by President Chen of Taiwan 
in mid-February.
98
 As for the other hot topic about cross-strait economic ties, i.e. the 
“three links,” although most of the participants agreed that the links were necessary, they 
conflicted over when and how the links should be built; therefore, at the end, only an 
ambiguous conclusion was made that said the government should tried its best to promote 
the establishment of “three links.”99  
        On August 26
th
, Tsai Ing-wen, the head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, 
based on the consensus built in the Economic Development Advisory Conference, 
announced that repealing the policy of “no haste, be patient” was her top priority, and on 
November 6
th
, the policy of “no haste, be patient” was officially replaced by the policy of 
“active opening and effective management” which, though not giving a complete green 
light to Taiwanese investment in China, imposed relatively looser restriction on it.
100
 
        The repeal of the policy of “no haste, be patient” nevertheless did not resolve all of 
the controversies over the issue of cross-strait economic ties within Taiwan. After all, the 
issue of “three links” was still unresolved. In addition, a debate on whether to allow 
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Taiwanese business people to build plants that produced 8-inch wafers in China, which 
were regarded as the backbone of Taiwan’s economy then, gradually emerged in 
December 2001.
101
 
 
2002 
        The debate about 8-inch wafers severely divided Taiwan in early 2002. While some 
people including the manufacturers of wafers and the K.M.T. politicians strongly urged 
the Taiwanese government to allow the production of 8-inch wafers in China in order to 
maintain Taiwan’s economic competitiveness, others like the former Taiwanese president, 
Lee Teng-hui, and politicians from Taiwan Solidarity Union (T.S.U.), a party founded by 
Lee in August 2000, objected to the idea and emphasized that national security was much 
more important than those manufacturers’ economic interests. 102  In addition, the 
government as well as the ruling party, i.e. the D.P.P., was divided over the issue. Most 
of the governmental officials were in favor of openness to some degree. On February 15
th
, 
Tsai, the head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, revealed that the government was 
moving in the direction of openness on the issue, and on March 1
st
, Yu Shyi-kun, the 
Taiwanese prime minister, confirmed that the government was pro-openness. On March 
4
th
, Tsung Tsai-yi, Taiwan’s Minister of Economic Affairs, when asked whether 
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producing 8-inch wafers in China would negatively affect the development of 12-inch 
wafers, which were more technologically sophisticated, in Taiwan, insisted that there 
would be no effect and that 12-inch wafers would be designed and produced in Taiwan 
only.
103
 On the other hand, some D.P.P. politicians including the Taiwanese vice 
president, Lu Hsiu-lien, did not like the idea of openness. On February 22
nd
, Lu said 
openness would bring about the downfall of Hsinchu Science and Industrial Park where 
most of the Taiwanese manufacturers of wafers were located.
104
 People who did not want 
to see Taiwanese manufacturers of 8-inch wafers move their operations to China 
launched a demonstration on March 9
th
; however, 20 days later, the Taiwanese 
government made an official decision to let those manufacturers move “westward.”105 
        The issue of “three links” also divided Taiwan in 2002. Although China-based 
Taiwanese business people were satisfied to a great extent with the official decision to 
repeal the policy of “no haste, be patient” as well as the way the issue of 8-inch wafers 
was dealt with, they began to suspect that the Taiwanese government which had been 
insisting that building the “three links” was a policy goal was actually unwilling to build 
them. Starting in mid-May, Wang Yung-ching, the founder and the chairman of Formosa 
Plastics Group, began to push hard for the “three links,” asking President Chen of Taiwan 
to keep his promise and saying that he was willing to be a negotiation agent for Taiwan 
                                                          
103
 “Tsung Tsai-yi: Producing 8-inch wafers in Mainland won’t affect the development of 12-inch wafers in 
Taiwan,” Economic Daily News, March 5, 2002. 
104
 “Lu Hsiu-lien: Producing 8-inch wafers in Mainland will lead to the downfall of Hsinchu Science and 
Industrial Park,” Liberty Times, February 23, 2002. 
105
 See “A demonstration against producing 8-inch wafers in Mainland,” Liberty Times, March 10, 2002; 
and “Taiwan announces that plants producing 8-inch wafers are allowed to be moved to Mainland,” 
Commercial Times, March 29, 2002. For more discussions about the Taiwanese government’s decision on 
the issue, see Chu 2003, 978. 
127 
 
 
 
on the issue.
106
 In late May, many Taiwanese business leaders also expressed their 
support for the “three links.” For example, on May 26th, Kao Ching-yuen, the chairman 
of Uni-president, the largest food company in Taiwan, said he wanted “three links” 
because they would hugely reduce the costs of management and shipping for China-based 
Taiwanese business people.
107
 Two days later, Taiwan’s National Federation of Industries 
openly stated that it was willing to be the “bridge” between the Chinese and the 
Taiwanese governments over the issue of “three links.”108  
        In response to China-based Taiwanese business people’s demand, the Taiwanese 
government said that it was very willing to build the “three links” through a negotiation 
with China and emphasized that it was China that intentionally delayed the negotiation by 
making Taiwan’s acceptance of One-China Principle a precondition for it. 109  The 
Taiwanese government’s explanation however was not convincing to the business people. 
To them, given the facts that the Chinese government had openly expressed its 
willingness to let the “representatives of Taiwan’s industries” negotiate with it over the 
issue and that the Taiwanese government insisted on an “official” negotiation that the 
Chinese government did not like due to the controversy over “one-China,” it was the 
Taiwanese government rather than the Chinese one that was intentionally delaying the 
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establishment of “three links.”110 The Taiwanese president’s announcement on August 3rd 
about “one country on each side” which drastically increased the tension between China 
and Taiwan, arguably, made China-based Taiwanese business people more suspicious of 
their president’s promise with regard to the “three links.” On August 5th, Wang from 
Formosa Plastics Group said that he could not make sense of Chen’s announcement and 
was very worried that the announcement would make the goal of “three links” more 
difficult to achieve.
111
  
        The K.M.T. also supported the establishment of “three links.” Realizing that China-
based Taiwanese business people were especially eager for the direct transport link, the 
K.M.T. began to push hard for it in 2002. In early May, Chiang Pin-kung, a K.M.T. 
congressman, stated that the direct cross-strait transport link was very important because 
Taiwan’s economic growth would stop without it.112 In addition, starting in late October, 
another K.M.T. congressman, Chiang Hsiao-yen, began to push for non-stop charter 
passenger flights across the Taiwan Strait for the upcoming Chinese New Year.
113
 The 
conflict between the Chinese and the Taiwanese governments over the issue immediately 
emerged after it was raised by Chiang. While the former insisted that the charter flights 
should involve, first, both Taiwanese and Chinese planes, and second, direct non-stop 
trips between China and Taiwan, the latter claimed that China’s demand should be 
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discussed through official negotiations but at the same time emphasized that, although 
Chinese planes would never be allowed to fly to Taiwan without official negotiations, it 
was willing to let Taiwanese planes fly between China and Taiwan given that they 
stopped in a third place in between.
114
 To resolve the conflict, Chiang paid a private visit 
to China on November 22
nd
 to exchange views about the issue with Chinese officials and 
successfully persuaded China to make a reluctant concession that the Chinese planes 
would not be involved.
115
 On November 28
th
, Zhang Mingqing, the spokesperson of 
China’s Taiwan Affairs Office announced that China would work hard to get the job 
about the New Year charter passenger flights done.
116
 On December 30
th
, the head of the 
Taiwan affairs division of China’s Civil Aviation Administration met with the 
representatives of Taiwan’s airline industry, and they reached an agreement that allowed 
the Taiwanese charter flights to fly to China from Hong Kong or Macao.
117
 On January 
26
th
, 2003, a Taiwanese plane arrived at China for the first time since 1949 after a brief 
stop in Hong Kong.
118
   
 
2003 
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        As the issue of charter flights was resolved, another conflict over the issue of 8-inich 
wafers emerged. On January 22
nd
, 2003, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company 
(T.S.M.C.), one of Taiwan’s largest manufacturers of semiconductors, was officially 
allowed by the Taiwanese government to produce 8-inch wafers in China.
119
 While 70% 
of Taiwanese business people welcomed the decision,
120
 the Taiwanese politicians who 
objected to openness on the issue of 8-inch wafers last year criticized the decision as well 
as the business people who supported it. On the same day the decision was made, Lee, 
the former Taiwanese president, criticized China for “besieging Taiwan with China-based 
Taiwanese business people” and said that the decision would lead to a high 
unemployment rate in Taiwan and help China occupy in five years the global market of 
8-inch wafers that Taiwan had been enjoying.
121
 On February 24
th
, the Taiwanese vice 
president, Lu, when talking with the chief executive officers of some Taiwanese 
corporations, said that China was just one of the stops for investment instead of the only 
destination and that Taiwanese business people who moved westward should never forget 
about their motherland Taiwan.
122
 
        The spread of S.A.R.S. in Taiwan that began in mid-February, arguably, further 
strengthened the anti-openness position of those who did not want to see cross-strait 
economic ties grow. Implying that S.A.R.S was brought back to Taiwan by China-based 
Taiwanese business people, Lu said on May 31
st
 that the incident of S.A.R.S. taught 
                                                          
119
 “T.S.M.C. is officially allowed to produce wafers in Mainland,” Central Daily News, January 23, 2003. 
120
 “70% of Taiwanese business people support the production of wafers in Mainland by T.S.M.C.,” Liberty 
Times, February 21, 2003. 
121
 “Outraged Lee Teng-hui: Why did Chen Shui-bian do this?” United Daily News, January 23, 2003. 
122
 “Lu Hsiu-lien: Taiwanese business people who move westward should never forget about their 
motherland Taiwan,” Liberty Times, February 25, 2003. 
131 
 
 
 
Taiwanese a lesson that “going westward” should not be the only option.123 While most 
of the Taiwanese did not really blame S.A.R.S. on their fellow citizens who did business 
in China,
124
 S.A.R.S. did slow down cross-strait economic exchanges to some extent. 
After the outbreak, many Taiwanese business people cancelled or postponed their 
business trips to China or their investment projects there.
125
 In addition, the ports in 
Matsu and Kinmen for the “mini-three links” were temporarily closed on March 31st and 
May 17
th
, respectively, due to the concern about the disease.
126
 The negative effect of 
S.A.R.S. on cross-strait economic ties did not diminish until early June when the spread 
of the disease was under control. 
        As the terror of S.A.R.S. was vanishing, to reduce the criticism from China-based 
Taiwanese business people as well as the K.M.T. against his decisions about cross-strait 
economic ties, President Chen of Taiwan hired Siew Wan-chang, the founder of the 
Cross-Strait Common Market Foundation and a K.M.T. member, as his major economic 
advisor on May 23
rd
.
127
 After being hired, Siew pushed very hard for direct cross-strait 
charter cargo flights that he thought would benefit Taiwan’s economy, and on September 
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10
th
, the Taiwanese government announced its plan for facilitating air shipping across the 
Taiwan Strait accordingly.
128
  
        According to the plan, the Taiwanese government’s position on charter cargo flights 
was the same as its position on charter passenger flights last year: first, Taiwan would 
allow Taiwanese planes to fly between China and Taiwan given that they stopped in a 
third place in between, and second, the decisions about whether the Chinese planes could 
fly to Taiwan and whether the trips could be non-stop ones had to be made through 
official negotiations between China and Taiwan.
129
 Unwilling to make any concession 
this time, China insisted that the cross-strait transport link was a domestic one and 
therefore any plan that excluded Chinese planes and did not involve direct non-stop trips 
would be unacceptable.
130
 As a result, no Taiwanese charter cargo flight was allowed to 
fly to China by the Chinese government in spite of Taiwan’s plan for facilitating cross-
strait air shipping.  
        While China’s decision about the charter cargo flights might disappoint China-based 
Taiwanese business people, the disappointment was, arguably, offset by their excitement 
about China’s announcement in mid-November that China was thinking to sign with 
Taiwan a Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (C.E.P.A., which was a trade-
related arrangement like a Free Trade Agreement) that it signed with Hong Kong and 
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Macao in late June. After the announcement, Taiwan’s National Federation of Industries, 
National Association of Industry and Commerce, and the K.M.T. all expressed their 
support for the idea despite the Taiwanese government’s objection due to a concern that 
the arrangement would make a political impression on other countries that Taiwan was 
part of China like Hong Kong or Macao.
131
  
 
2004 
        Unsatisfied with the Taiwanese government’s approach toward cross-strait 
economic ties which they thought was not pro-openness enough given the remaining 
restriction on Taiwanese investment in China and the lack of a promising sign for the 
“three links,” a group of the heads of Taiwanese business associations in China jointly 
announced the “Ten Demands from China-based Taiwanese Business People” in early 
January, 2004, and many of them openly supported the K.M.T. candidate for the 
upcoming Taiwanese presidential election, i.e. Lien Chan who proposed a purely pro-
openness policy.
132
  
        To China-based Taiwanese business people’s disappointment, President Chen of 
Taiwan was reelected on March 20
th
. China was upset, too, and immediately after Chen’s 
reelection, China revealed an uncompromising attitude toward the Taiwanese government 
                                                          
131
 “Mainland Affairs Council objects to signing C.E.P.A. with Mainland,” Economic Daily News, 
November 13, 2003; and “Chinese National Federation of Industries and National Association of Industry 
and Commerce will attend the conference on C.E.P.A.,” United Daily News, November 14, 2003. 
132
 “Nearly 70% of the chairmen of Taiwanese business associations in Mainland support the Blue,” China 
Times, January 26, 2004; “Taiwanese business associations in Mainland make ten appeals to the Blue and 
the Green,” Economic Daily News, January 27, 2004; and “Taiwanese business people in Mainland 
establish a support group for the Lien-Soong ticket,” Central Daily News, January 27, 2004. 
134 
 
 
 
as well as the “green Taiwanese business people” again. On April 14th, China’s Taiwan 
Affairs Office stated that Chen’s idea of “one country on each side” was the biggest 
obstacle for the “three links” across the Taiwan Strait, and on May 12th, it expressed its 
objection to the plan for facilitating sea shipping proposed, along with the plan for 
facilitating air shipping that I have mentioned, by the Taiwanese government in 
September 2003, saying that some measures associated with the plan violated the 
principle that foreign ships could not be involved in “domestic transport.”133 Four days 
after Chen was inaugurated, on May 24
th
, while promising that the interests of China-
based Taiwanese business people would be well protected, the spokesperson of China’s 
Taiwan Affairs Office reemphasized that the Taiwanese business people who supported 
Taiwan’s independence were never welcome in China.134 Hsu Wen-lung, the chairman of 
Chimei Group, became the major target again when People’s Daily, a Chinese newspaper 
published by the C.C.P., criticized him by name on May 31
st
 for supporting Taiwan’s 
independence while making money from China.
135
 To save his business in China, Hsu 
resigned from his chairmanship in mid-June and said on July 8
th
 that Chimei Group, to its 
best interests, had no choice but to keep investing in China.
136
 
          China’s growing hostility, combined with Taiwan’s unwillingness to make any 
compromise that was acceptable to China on the issue of “one-China”, led to a collision 
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between them over the issue of charter passenger and cargo flights again in the second 
half of 2004. On July 28
th
, Wang Zaixi, the vice director of China’s Taiwan Affairs 
Office, unequivocally said that the Chinese government regarded the issue about the 
“three links” as a domestic one and the direct transport link between China and Taiwan as 
a domestic link.
137
 In response, Taiwan immediately rejected the idea about “domestic 
link” while, at the same time, expressing its willingness to name the China-Taiwan 
transport link the special “cross-strait link,” a term raised by Qian Qichen two year ago 
when he was the Chinese vice premier but not taken seriously by Taiwan then.
138
 On 
October 11
th
, the Taiwanese government urged the Chinese government to have an 
“official” negotiation with it over the issue and emphasized that Taiwan did not rule out 
the possibilities of allowing non-stop flights across the Taiwan Strait and letting Chinese 
planes fly to Taiwan.
139
 To respond to Taiwan’s demand for an official negotiation, on 
October 14
th
, China announced its official position on the issue of charter flights, which 
involved three elements: “domestic nature,” “non-stop flights,” and “mutual benefits.”140 
The conflict continued throughout the last two months of 2004. Although the Taiwanese 
government officially authorized Taipei Airlines Association to negotiate with China 
over the issue on November 13
th
, China did not take any action accordingly but 
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criticizing President Chen of Taiwan for being insincere on the issue because of what it 
perceived as Chen’s constant acts for Taiwan’s independence.141 
 
2005 
        The tension between China and Taiwan over the issue of charter flights nevertheless 
decreased in the beginning of 2005. On January 2
nd
, China, while insisting that it would 
never negotiate with any official representative from Taiwan over the issue unless 
Taiwan accepted the domestic nature of the issue, expressed its willingness to let the 
airlines from the two sides negotiate a deal.
142
 On January 15
th
, the representatives of 
Taiwanese airlines and some Taiwanese officials negotiated with a few Chinese officials 
in Macao over the issue of charter passenger flights for the upcoming Chinese New Year, 
with the Chinese and Taiwanese officials participating as “non-official” negotiators 
representing the “private” interests of the airlines on each side.143 A deal was made on the 
same day that, first, a series of non-stop New Year charter passenger flights would be 
allowed to fly across the Taiwan Strait given that they flew through the airspace of a third 
party (i.e. Hong Kong), and second, both Chinese and Taiwanese airlines would be 
involved this time.
144
 On January 29
th
, the New Year charter flights began their non-stop 
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trips across the Taiwan Strait from both China and Taiwan, and a Chinese plane arrived 
at Taiwan in the morning of that day legally for the first time since 1949.
145
       
        The deal about the New Year charter passenger flights seemed to make the prospect 
of charter cargo flights promising when China said in a forum it held with the 
representatives of Taiwanese airlines on February 22
nd
 that it would try its best to deal 
with the issue.
146 
 However, the passage of the Anti-Secession Law by China’s National 
People’s Congress on March 14th drastically increased the tension between China and 
Taiwan and therefore made any deal between them impossible at least in the short term. 
Even before the law was passed, on March 9
th
, to protest against the bill associated with 
the law that was pondered by the Chinese government, the Taiwanese government 
announced that it would temporarily stop pushing for charter cargo flights.
147
 It did not 
resume the work until August 12
th
 when Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council authorized 
Taipei Airlines Association again to negotiate with China over the issues of charter cargo 
flights and new charter passenger flights.
148
  
        The passage of the Anti-Secession Law was immediately followed by another event 
that had an impact on cross-strait economic ties. On March 26
th
, Hsu Wen-lung, the 
former chairman of Chimei Group, issued an open letter in which he explicitly supported 
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the idea of “one-China” and objected to Taiwan’s independence.149 Hsu’s letter took most 
of the Taiwanese by surprise and brought about different interpretations of his intention 
given the fact that China-based Taiwanese business people, though pushing hard for 
economic openness, had seldom openly revealed their political positions on China-
Taiwan relations before.
150
 While some like Lu Hsiu-lien and Lee Teng-hui suspected 
that Hsu was forced by the Chinese government to issue the letter against his own will, 
others like Wang Yung-ching believed that the words in the letter did reflect Hsu’s real 
thought.
151
  
        The passage of the Anti-Secession Law by China and the publication of the anti-
independence letter by Hsu, arguably, made the Taiwanese government feel that the 
growth of cross-strait economic ties and the policy of “active opening and effective 
management” that it thought was pro-openness did not benefit Taiwan at least politically. 
Therefore, on April 5
th
, it decided to significantly slow down the growth of the ties and 
announced that it would concentrate on the second part of its policy on cross-strait 
economic exchanges, i.e. “effective management.”152 Moreover, on July 26th, President 
Chen of Taiwan, while emphasizing that “active opening” and “effective management” 
were equally important, said he would rather have no former if there was no latter, and on 
November 2
nd
, he announced that the Taiwanese government would hold the second 
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Economic Development Advisory Conference to deal with the current issues concerning 
Taiwan’s economy including cross-strait economic exchanges.153 
        As the Taiwanese government tried to prevent cross-strait economic ties from 
growing, the Chinese government, on the other side of the strait, made efforts to increase 
the ties. In his meeting with the K.M.T. chairman on April 29
th
, Hu Jintao, the general 
secretary of C.C.P. and the Chinese president, revealed his support for C.E.P.A. as well 
as zero tariff on Taiwan’s fruits exported to China, saying that there should be “intensive 
economic cooperation” between China and Taiwan, to which the K.M.T. chairman 
agreed.
154
 In addition, to keep pushing for the direct cross-strait transport link, on 
November 3
rd
, China informed Taipei Airlines Association of its willingness to have a 
negotiation over the charter passenger flights for the upcoming Chinese New Year, and a 
deal was made on November 18
th
.
155
  
 
2006 
        In early January 2006, the Taiwanese government announced that the policy of 
“active opening and effective management” would soon be replaced by that of “active 
management and effective opening.” 156  The policy change was undoubtedly not 
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supported by China-based Taiwanese business people and the K.M.T. because the new 
policy was much less pro-openness compared with the previous one that they thought 
was not pro-openness enough, and the K.M.T. as well as its political allies even called the 
change the “return of the ‘no haste, be patient’ policy.”157 As for China, its negative 
attitude toward the policy change was obvious, too. On January 23
rd, China’s Taiwan 
Affairs Office criticized the Taiwanese government for blocking cross-strait economic 
exchanges with the new policy and said that President Chen of Taiwan was “moving 
against the trend as well as people’s will.”158 Amid the criticisms against the new policy, 
the Taiwanese government promulgated the new measures and regulations associated 
with it on March 22
nd
.
159
 
        The dumping of China-made washcloths to Taiwan, an issue emerging in early 
December 2005 and becoming a very hot one in early March 2006, might, arguably, give 
the new policy that regarded “management” as more important than “opening” some 
justification.
160
 Nevertheless, notwithstanding the looming anti-dumping movement, a 
majority of Taiwanese business people still pushed very hard for the lifting of the 
restriction on cross-strait economic ties. According to a survey released on March 29
th
, 
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60% of Taiwanese businesses had a negative view on the idea of “active management.”161 
On April 17
th
, Tai Sheng-tung, the head of Taiwan’s National Association of Small and 
Medium Enterprises, implied that the new policy was a policy of economic isolation and 
said that economic isolation would make Taiwan economically marginalized in global 
economy.
162
 In addition, on May 15
th, Taiwan’s National Federation of Industries openly 
demanded the Taiwanese government lift the limit on a Taiwanese company’s investment 
in China, which was 40% of that company’s total worth, a limit that had been imposed 
for a decade.
163
   
        The backlash from the Taiwanese business people was so strong that, on March 31
st
, 
President Chen of Taiwan announced that he would no longer intervene in the policy-
making process within the government, which meant that he would let the prime minister 
make final decisions on important issues.
164
 Following the announcement, the Taiwanese 
government, to appease the angry business people, made public on June 14
th
 the initiation 
of four case-specific charter flights: cargo-related, holiday-related, medical, and 
humanitarian charter flights.
165
 Chen’s announcement and the new plan for charter flights, 
however, were not followed by the repeal of the disliked policy of “active management 
and effective opening.” In addition, the second Economic Development Advisory 
Conference held from July 27
th
 to 28
th
, which was officially named the Conference on 
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Sustaining Taiwan’s Economic Development and boycotted by the K.M.T. and its 
political allies, did not produce the outcome that satisfied Taiwanese business people.
166
 
On July 4
th
, in the preliminary session of cross-strait economic ties for the conference, no 
agreement on economic openness could be reached.
167
 On July 13
th
, breaking his own 
promise of no involvement, President Chen of Taiwan, when talking about the upcoming 
Conference on Sustaining Taiwan’s Economic Development, stated that the principle of 
“active management and effective opening” should never be compromised and that 
Taiwan’s economic openness toward China would make Taiwan economically hollowed 
out by it.
168
 At the end, on July 27
th
, to the dismay of Taiwanese business people, the 
suggestions for openness proposed by them during the conference were included in the 
conclusion of the conference as the “other suggestions” rather than the “common 
suggestions,” which revealed the fact that economic openness would not be the 
Taiwanese government’s priority in the future.169  On July 30th, Su Tseng-chang, the 
Taiwanese prime minister, announced accordingly that the policy of “active management 
and effective opening” would continue.170 Two days later, he said that the “40% cap” 
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would not be lifted, and he reiterated such a position throughout the second half of 
2006.
171
 
        As for China, when the Taiwanese government and business people conflicted over 
the issue of cross-strait economic ties, it made lots of efforts to economically appeal to 
China-based Taiwanese business people with the help from the K.M.T. that tried to 
attract those business people’s votes in Taiwan. From April 14th to 15th, the C.C.P. and 
the K.M.T. held the K.M.T.-C.C.P. Economic Forum, and from October 17
th
 to 18
th
, they 
held another forum named the K.M.T.-C.C.P. Forum on Agriculture. Many China-based 
Taiwanese business people including the business leaders were invited to attend these 
two forums in which the K.M.T. and the C.C.P. jointly announced several economic 
proposals that they thought would serve the Taiwanese business people’s interests and 
therefore bring about their support for China and the K.M.T. or at least strengthen their 
dissatisfaction with the Taiwanese government.
172
 
 
2007 
        Hoping to convince China-based Taiwanese business people that it was still working 
toward the goal of “three links” that they wanted, the Taiwanese government announced 
the opening of the “mini-three links” between Penghu, an archipelago off the western 
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coast of Taiwan, and China on March 31
st
, 2007.
173
 However, it was arguably the Chinese 
government that did a better job in making good impression on those business people. On 
April 16
th, with the support of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, the Association of Taiwan 
Investment Enterprises on Mainland (A.T.I.E.M.), of which many Taiwanese business 
leaders were the members, was founded in China.
174
 The fact that Chen Yunlin, the 
director of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, accepted the offer of the honorary 
chairmanship of the association not only meant that the Chinese government could 
monitor the association more closely but also revealed China’s intention to use the 
association as a bridge between it and China-based Taiwanese business people to more 
effectively and efficiently serve the latter’s interests.175 In addition, from April 28th to 29th, 
another K.M.T.-C.C.P. Economic Forum was held in China and attended by 500 business 
people and officials from the K.M.T. and the C.C.P., in which both parties expressed 
their support for, among other things, a higher degree of direct cross-strait transport 
link.
176
 
        It is worth noting that, starting in mid-2007, the candidates for the upcoming 
Taiwanese presidential election (i.e. the D.P.P. candidate, Hsieh Chang-ting, and the 
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K.M.T. candidate, Ma Yin-jeou), which would be held on March 20
th
, 2008, began to 
focus their debates on the issue of cross-strait economic ties. At first glance, their views 
on the issue seemed very different given that while Ma was very pro-openness, Hsieh 
severely criticized Ma’s pro-openness tendency. For example, while Ma criticized the 
D.P.P. for being economically conservative, Hsieh rebuked Ma’s pro-openness proposal 
for not protecting Taiwan’s best interests. 177  Also, while Ma blamed the Taiwanese 
government for economically isolating Taiwan from the rest of the world, Hsieh warned 
that Ma’s economic proposal would lock Taiwan up in China.178 However, sensing that 
being regarded as an economic protectionist might actually made him unelectable, Hsieh 
himself gradually revealed some sort of pro-openness attitude. For example, starting in 
mid-June, Hsieh began to show his support for the direct transport link.
179
 In addition, in 
early November, he said he was willing to make a change to the “40% cap” on Taiwanese 
investment in China if elected and, in mid-November, he emphasized that the Chinese 
market was a very important one for Taiwan.
180
 
        Notwithstanding Hsieh’s election-driven pro-openness tendency, the conflict 
between the Taiwanese government and the business people continued. On November 6
th
, 
President Chen of Taiwan announced that the “40% cap” would definitely not be lifted by 
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the end of his term.
181
 Extremely unhappy about the way in which the Taiwanese 
government dealt with cross-strait economic ties, Chang Chung-mou, the chairman of 
T.S.M.C. criticized on November 20
th
 that Taiwan’s self-imposed economic isolation 
over the past 10 years was the major cause of Taiwan’s unsatisfactory economic 
performance.
182
 In response, on December 9
th
, Lu Hsiu-lien, the Taiwanese vice president, 
said that it was China-based Taiwanese business people who should be blamed for the 
bad economic situation in Taiwan because they kept moving lots of capital and job 
opportunities from Taiwan to China.
183
 
 
2008 
        The Taiwanese government however did try to make a last-minute effort to alleviate 
China-based Taiwanese business people’s negative attitude toward it by offering a pardon 
on February 27
th
, 2008, to those who failed to register with it for their businesses in 
China.
184
 Yet, the pardon was not followed by the electoral outcome the Taiwanese 
government wanted: on March 20
th
, Ma Ying-jeou, the candidate of the K.M.T., won the 
Taiwanese presidential election. One month later, Ma openly promised that he would deal 
with the disliked “40% cap” on Taiwanese investment in China after he was inaugurated, 
and he did fulfill his promise in late August by changing the limit to 40% to 60%.
185
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        In addition to easing the restriction on Taiwanese investment in China, Ma worked 
hard to build the direct cross-strait transport link. Three days after he was elected, Ma 
announced that the major focus in his administration’s negotiation with China would be 
on the economic issues, and on March 29
th
, he added that negotiating a deal for more 
charter flights was his top priority.
186
 On April 12
th
, the would-be Taiwanese vice 
president, Siew Wan-chang who was also the chairman of the Cross-Strait Common 
Market Foundation, met with the Chinese president, Hu Jintao, at the Boao Forum for 
Asia, and they agreed that the two sides should work together to build the direct cross-
strait transport link as soon as possible.
187
 On the same day, Su Chi, the would-be head of 
Taiwan’s National Security Council, revealed that the regular charter flights for the 
weekends would begin in July.
188
  
        On May 26
th
, six days after Ma was inaugurated, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs 
Council officially authorized the S.E.F. to negotiate with China over, among other things, 
the issue of weekend charter flights; and on June 3
rd, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office 
directed the A.R.A.T.S. to focus on the economic issues including that of charter flights 
in its negotiation with Taiwan’s S.E.F.189 From June 11th to 14th, Chen Yunlin and Chiang 
Pin-kung, the chairmen of China’s A.R.A.T.S. and Taiwan’s S.E.F., respectively, met in 
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China and reached a consensus on, among other things, non-stop weekend charter flights, 
which were still required to fly through Hong Kong’s airspace however.190  
        Despite the lack of a consensus on the direct cross-strait transport link in the 
aforementioned meeting, the link was eventually built when Chen and Jiang met again in 
Taiwan from November 3
rd
 to 7
th
. In the meeting, they agreed to, first, “normalize” cross-
strait charter flights which had been case-specific so far, and second, allow those flights 
to fly directly between China and Taiwan without passing through the airspace of Hong 
Kong. On December 15
th
, the agreements associated with the direct cross-strait sea and 
air transport link were officially initiated, and the Chinese and Taiwanese planes as well 
as ships were finally allowed to “normally” and “directly” move across the Taiwan Strait 
for the first time since 1949.
191
  
 
3-2: Discussion  
          Based on the review of the economic dimension of China-Taiwan relations in the 
previous section as well as the figure about cross-strait economic ties below,
192
 we can 
find that, since cross-strait economic ties were formally built in the late 1980s, they were 
never terminated in the period from 1990 to 2008.  
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Figure 3.1: The trend of growing cross-strait economic ties (1990-2008) 
 
Source: Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, P.R.C., available at 
<http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/lajm/lajm/201101/t20110121_1718210.htm> (trade: 1978-2005); 
<http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/lajm/lajm/201101/t20110121_1718251.htm> (trade: 2000-2008); 
<http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/lajm/lajm/201101/t20110121_1718208.htm> (investment: 1989-2005); 
and <http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/lajm/lajm/201101/t20110121_1718252.htm> (investment: 2000-
2008). 
 
        Although the Taiwanese government did try to reverse the trend of growing ties or at 
least slow it down by implementing the policy of “no haste, be patient” in 1996 (after the 
1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis) and that of “active management and effective opening” 
in 2006 (after the passage of the Anti-Secession Law), which did statistically decrease the 
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amount of Taiwanese investment in China to some extent, these policies faced severe 
criticisms from many Taiwanese business people, who never stopped lobbying for 
economic openness under any circumstance, and did not reduce their enthusiasm to rush 
“westward,” which in many cases was through a third country or territory.193 Actually, by 
the end of 2001, more than 80% of Taiwanese companies that invested anywhere else 
overseas had already invested in China as well.
194
 Also, although the annual amount of 
Taiwanese investment in China stop growing since the mid-1990s, if we examine 
Taiwanese investment in China as a percentage of Taiwan’s outward foreign direct 
investment (F.D.I.), China’s role as an important destination of Taiwanese foreign 
investment was increasingly obvious in the period from 1990 to 2008. While the number 
was virtually zero prior to 1987 and was only 9% by the end of 1989, it rose to 42% in 
1997, reached 50% by the end of 2000, and became as high as 53% in 2005.
195
 Moreover, 
when it comes to cross-strait trade, which is largely investment-driven,
196
 the annual 
amount constantly grew in the aforementioned period of time. Therefore, it can be well 
argued that the economic ties between China and Taiwan in general did keep growing in 
the period from 1990 to 2008, and the pressure from the Taiwanese business community 
(which consisted of its constant lobbying for less restriction and its effective 
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circumvention of existing regulation) was one of the most important reasons for the 
growth.
197
 
        Going back to the question raised in the beginning of this chapter and based on the 
discussions that I have made about the level of cross-strait confrontation in the previous 
chapter as well as the economic ties between China and Taiwan above, can we say that 
the growth of cross-strait economic ties from 1990 to 2007 played a role in the emergence 
of relatively less confrontational China-Taiwan relations in 2008? More importantly, if it 
did play a role, how did it play that role? These are the major questions I try to deal with 
in the rest of this dissertation. 
                                                          
197
 It is argued that the Taiwanese government was actually playing “institutional catch-up” when it came to 
cross-strait economic ties, trying to place rules over the economic ties that had already been significant, or 
in other words, trying to legalize what had already happened. For more discussions on this argument, see 
Chu 1997, 238-239; Sutter 2002, 523; and Steinfeld 2005, 234. 
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Chapter Four 
Taiwanese Nationalism and the Effect of Taiwan’s Identity Politics on Chinese 
Leaders’ Attitudes toward Unification, 1990 – 2008 
 
        The growth of Taiwanese nationalism was arguably one of the most important 
factors leading to tense China-Taiwan relations in the period from 1990 to 2007. It had a 
negative effect on cross-strait relations in the aforementioned period because it brought 
about, among some of the Taiwanese political elites and the general public, support for 
Taiwan’s de jure independence that China has been trying its very best to prevent in order 
to protect, domestically, the C.C.P.’s legitimacy and, internationally, China’s national 
interests.
1
 As Yu-shan Wu argues, the growth of Taiwanese nationalism, if politically 
manipulated, might eventually lead to Taiwan’s de jure independence, and a war initiated 
by the Chinese military attack on Taiwan because of Taiwan’s de jure independence 
resulting from the growth of Taiwanese nationalism would be the worst case scenario in 
cross-strait relations.
2
 
        In this and the next chapters (i.e. Chapters Four and Five), I explore the relationship 
between Taiwan’s domestic politics and China-Taiwan relations by examining the 
development of Taiwanese nationalism and the identity politics in Taiwan in the period 
from 1990 to 2008 as well as China’s response to them. The discussions in this chapter 
are focused on (1) the growth of Taiwanese nationalism and the role played by the 
Taiwanese government in it; (2) the identity politics related to Taiwanese nationalism that 
                                                 
1
 Ross 2001, 69-70; Chu 2003; Saunders 2005; Shirk 2007; Christen 2001; and Whiting 2001. 
2
 Wu 2004. 
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eventually led to a political conflict between the pro-independence political force and the 
anti-independence political force in Taiwan’s domestic politics in 2001; and (3) the effect 
of the aforementioned identity politics in Taiwan, as well as the U.S. response to it, on 
Chinese leaders’ attitudes toward unification, which arguably had an effect on China-
Taiwan relations in general. Following these discussions, I will examine in the next 
chapter (i.e. Chapter Five) the nationalistic sentiment about Taiwan revealed by the 
Taiwanese government in particular and its effect on the cessation and the resumption of 
the formal contact between China’s A.R.A.T.S. and Taiwan’s S.E.F., which arguably also 
had an effect on China-Taiwan relations.  
        In general, based on this and the next chapters combined, I try to provide a broad 
picture of the relationship between Taiwan’s domestic politics and China-Taiwan 
relations. More specifically, as I will argue, taking the growth of Taiwanese nationalism 
and the identity politics in Taiwan that originated in it into account, we can find that, in 
the period from 1990 to 2008, when the Taiwanese government was pro-independence, 
either implicitly or explicitly, cross-strait relations were confrontational (i.e. the Lee and 
Chen Administrations from 1990 to 2008); by contrast, when the Taiwanese government 
was anti-independence, the relations between China and Taiwan became less 
confrontational (i.e. the Ma Administration in 2008).  
        This finding about the effect of Taiwan’s domestic politics on China-Taiwan 
relations is important because it will serve as the foundation for my effort in this 
dissertation to build the relationship between cross-strait economic ties and China-
Taiwan relations. In other words, after demonstrating the relationship between Taiwan’s 
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domestic politics and China-Taiwan relations in this and the next chapters (i.e. the major 
goal for Chapters Four and Five), the next step will be to figure out whether and how 
cross-strait economic ties affect the Taiwanese domestic politics discussed in these two 
chapters (i.e. the major goal for Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight). By so doing, I believe 
that I will eventually find the answer to the question of whether and how cross-strait 
economic ties affect China-Taiwan relations with Taiwan’s domestic politics being the 
intervening factor linking the former to the latter. 
         
4-1: Taiwanese nationalism, 1990 – 2008 
        Taiwanese nationalism involves two psychological inclinations: a “Taiwan-first” 
sentiment and an “anti-unification” tendency. In this section, I demonstrate the growth of 
Taiwanese nationalism in the period from 1990 to 2008 by showing the growth of the 
“Taiwan-first” sentiment and the rise of the “anti-unification” tendency among the 
Taiwanese public in the aforementioned period.  
 
The “Taiwan-first” sentiment 
        A “Taiwan-first” sentiment is about “self-identity” which can be defined as the 
“quality of any collectivity that leads to its membership to identify with it.” 3  More 
specifically, in the case of Taiwan, it concerns how people in Taiwan identify themselves 
with Taiwan where they currently live and China where they or their ancestors came from. 
When it comes to self-identity, some people in Taiwan are identified with Taiwan while 
                                                 
3
 Dittmer 2004, 476. 
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others prefer to emphasize their Chinese origin. There are still others who associate 
themselves with both China and Taiwan.
4
 On the basis of what I have discussed above, it 
is obvious that, in the period from 1990 to 2008, a “Taiwan-first” sentiment did grow 
among the people in Taiwan given that more and more people in Taiwan identified 
themselves with Taiwan rather than China in the aforementioned period of time. The 
figure below which shows whether people in Taiwan call themselves Chinese or 
Taiwanese clearly reveals the trend of growing “Taiwan-first” sentiment in Taiwanese 
society. 
 
Figure 4.1: The “Taiwan-first” sentiment among the Taiwanese people 
 
                                                 
4
 For more discussions about whether people in Taiwan see themselves as “Chinese” or Taiwanese,” see 
Chao 2003, 289-291; and Wang & Liu 2004, 574-578. 
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Source: “Taiwanese / Chinese Identification Trend Distribution in Taiwan,” Election Study 
Center, National Chengchi University, Taiwan 
<http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/index.php?id=6>. 
 
        As the figure demonstrates, by 1994, there was no obvious “Taiwan-first” sentiment 
among the people in Taiwan given the fact that the Taiwanese identity was less popular 
than the Chinese identity in and before 1994.
5
 However, in 1995, the number of the 
                                                 
5
 It is worth noting that, as Wang & Liu (2004, 578-586), Wu (2004, 621), and Saunders (2005, 974-976) 
point out, the Taiwanese identity is not necessarily associated with a pro-independence attitude. As the 
discussions about the “anti-unification” tendency that follow will reveal, many Taiwanese including those 
with the Taiwanese identity actually prefer the “status quo” to either unification or independence. 
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people in Taiwan who called themselves “Taiwanese” became larger for the first time 
than the number of those who called themselves “Chinese.” Since then, while the former 
kept growing, the latter constantly decreased, and in 2005, people who called themselves 
“Taiwanese” also outnumbered those who called themselves “both Taiwanese and 
Chinese.”    
         
The “anti-unification” tendency 
        The other psychological inclination that is associated with Taiwanese nationalism is 
an “anti-unification” tendency among the Taiwanese people.6  The unification of China 
and Taiwan has been regarded as one of the most sacred national missions by the Chinese 
government,
7
 and its possibility has never been completely ruled out by the Taiwanese 
government, either. However, in the period from 1990 to 2008, a negative attitude toward 
it gradually emerged in Taiwanese society. The figure below about the support rates for 
“independence,” “unification,” and “status quo” among Taiwanese reveals this trend. 
 
Figure 4.2: The “anti-unification” tendency among the Taiwanese people 
                                                                                                                                                 
According to Wu (2004, 621-622), China’s threat to use force against Taiwan’s independence is the reason 
why a person with the Taiwanese identity might still prefer the “status quo.” 
6
 The word “Taiwanese” hereafter refers to not only those who call themselves Taiwanese but also all of the 
other people in Taiwan. 
7
 White 2004, 306. 
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Source: Adapted from “Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland Trend 
Distribution in Taiwan,” Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, Taiwan, 
<http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/index.php?id=6>. (Note: those who want to 
maintain the “status quo” now and pursue “independence” in the future are regarded as pro-
independence, while those who want to maintain the “status quo” now and pursue “unification” 
in the future are regarded as pro-unification.) 
 
        As the figure shows, throughout the period from 1994 to 2008, a majority of 
Taiwanese (i.e. one third of Taiwanese) actually supported the so called “status quo” (i.e. 
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the political reality that Taiwan is a de facto but not de jure independent country) but at 
the same time had not made up their minds about the future relationship between China 
and Taiwan. It is found by many studies that Taiwanese are actually very pragmatic when 
it comes to the issues about unification and independence and that their attitudes toward 
these issues are conditional to a very great extent.
8
 On the one hand, unification is 
acceptable to them if the political, economic, and social disparities between China and 
Taiwan will be lessened in the future; however, on the other hand, independence is also 
acceptable to them if it will not lead to war. Based on this fact, there seems to be no 
significant “anti-unification” tendency in Taiwanese society because it is hard to tell how 
many of these people who preferred “open-ended status quo” had an “anti-unification” 
tendency. However, if we examine the other three groups of people (i.e. people who 
preferred “independence,” “unification” or “permanent status quo”), the aforementioned 
trend of growing “anti-unification” tendency can be easily found. By the year of 1998, 
the “pro-unification” attitude was the second most popular attitude among Taiwanese. 
Nevertheless, starting in 1999, an “anti-unification” tendency emerged when the support 
rates for “independence” and “permanent status quo” began to catch up with the support 
rate for “unification,” and since 2003, the “pro-unification” attitude had become the least 
popular one among Taiwanese.  
 
4-2: The reasons for the growth of Taiwanese nationalism 
                                                 
8
 White 2000, 13-15; Niou 2004, 556-561; Dittmer 2004, 480-481; and White 2004, 307. For more 
discussions about Taiwanese people’s pro-status quo tendency, see also Clark 2002a, 12; Chu 2004, 501-
507; Wang & Liu 2004, 584-586; Wu 2004, 621-622; Saunders 2005, 974-976; and Keng & Schubert 2010, 
288. 
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        Studies of Taiwanese nationalism reveal that the growth of Taiwanese nationalism 
that I have discussed in the previous section can be attributed to multiple reasons. 
Generally speaking, there are both external and internal factors. Taiwan’s diplomatic 
isolation as a result of the shift in international diplomatic recognition from the R.O.C. to 
the P.R.C. that started in the early 1970s is regarded as the most important external 
reason for the growth of Taiwanese nationalism.
9
 More specifically, Taiwan’s diplomatic 
isolation, as well as China’s continuous threat to Taiwan, resulted in Taiwanese people’s 
constant psychological frustration about Taiwan’s international status, which in turn led 
to the growth of Taiwanese nationalism against China.
10
 In addition to the external factor, 
there are several internal reasons for the growth of Taiwanese nationalism. Taiwan’s 
political liberalization in the late 1980s and democratization throughout the 1990s play an 
important role here. It is found that freedom of speech brought by political liberalization 
and democratization legalized the circulation of pro-independence or anti-unification 
ideas, as well as the previously restricted Taiwan-specific knowledge such as that about 
the “228 Incident,”11 for the first time in Taiwan’s society, which in turn contributed to 
the growth of Taiwanese nationalism; also, the returning of the exiled pro-independence 
                                                 
9
 For discussions about the shift in diplomatic recognition from the R.O.C. to the P.R.C., see Luard 1971, 
731-735; Bellows 1976, 596-597; Unger 1979, 106-107; and Chang 1983, 38-40. 
10
 Dittmer 2004, 476; and Wu 2004, 618. 
11
 The 228 Incident involved a brutal crackdown by the Chinese troops on an island-wide anti-government 
protest in 1947, two years after the Chinese government replaced the Japanese government as the ruler of 
Taiwan when WWII came to an end. The R.O.C. government began to officially reinvestigate the event in 
the early 1990s, and in 1995, Lee Teng-hui, as the R.O.C. president, officially apologized to the victims of 
the event. For more discussions about the incident, see Chao & Myers 1994, 224-225; and Chu & Lin 2001, 
112-113. 
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political dissidents to Taiwan during the period of democratization also strengthened the 
aforementioned trend.
12
 
        The promotion of Taiwanese nationalism by the Taiwanese government is regarded 
as one of the most important internal factors leading to the growth of Taiwanese 
nationalism as well. There is evidence demonstrating that, in the 1990s, President Lee of 
Taiwan and his political allies, during and after the process of their power consolidation 
within the K.M.T. and the government, intentionally promoted Taiwanese identity and 
downplayed the long-lasting official ideology that advocated unification and Chinese 
identity to their own political advantages, all of which in turn contributed to the growth of 
Taiwanese nationalism among the Taiwanese public.
13
 Nevertheless, there are also other 
studies showing that it was actually the growth of Taiwanese nationalism at the mass 
level that resulted in the Taiwanese government’s effort to promote Taiwanese identity. 
According to some scholars, the Taiwanese government during the 1990s, which became 
more and more responsive to the public opinion because of democratic reform and 
electoral politics, actually had little choice but to change its official ideology in response 
to the growth of Taiwanese nationalism among the public.
14
 
 
4-3: Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese government and the politics of 
identity 
                                                 
12
 Wang & Liu 2004, 572. 
13
 Chu & Lin 2001, 121-123; Chao 2003, 295-296; Chu 2004, 498-499 and 501; and Wu 2004, 618-619. 
For some examples of the political struggle within the K.M.T. and the R.O.C. government in the early 
1990s, see Chao & Myers 1994, 223 and 226-228. 
14
 Saunders 2005, 972-973; White 2000, 17; and Yu 1999, 49-50. 
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        Although it is still debatable whether Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese 
government should be regarded as a cause or the result of the growth of Taiwanese 
nationalism at the mass level, a better argument is that the promotion of Taiwanese 
nationalism by the Taiwanese government and the growth of Taiwanese nationalism in 
Taiwan’s society in the period from 1990 to 2008 were mutually affected. More 
specifically, during that period, what we saw were two trends developing simultaneously: 
when the “Taiwan-first” sentiment and the “anti-unification” tendency in Taiwanese 
society became more and more obvious, the Taiwanese government concurrently 
revealed a ‘Taiwan-first” sentiment as well as an “anti-unification tendency” and 
promoted the idea of “Taiwanization” from 1990 to 2000 and the idea of “de-sinicization” 
from 2001 to 2008. 
 
The “Taiwan-first” sentiment within the Taiwanese government 
        In the period from 1990 to 2008, the Taiwanese government (or more specifically, 
the R.O.C. government in Taipei) gradually revealed a “Taiwan-first” inclination when it 
tried to figure out whether it should associate itself with Taiwan where it ruled in effect 
or China where it originated. The R.O.C. government, after it was forced to move to the 
island of Taiwan from the Chinese mainland in 1949, still claimed that it was the only 
legitimate Chinese government in the world and that the P.R.C. government in Beijing 
was nothing more than a rebellious group that illegally occupied the Chinese mainland. 
Under this circumstance, it insisted that Taiwan was just part of the whole R.O.C. 
territory which included both the Chinese mainland and the island of Taiwan. Such 
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insistence was largely reflected in the official documents it released and the 
announcements it made about China-Taiwan relations, in which, whenever Taiwan was 
mentioned, the island was called the “Taiwan Area,” the “Taiwan Province,” the 
“counterattack base,” etc. A “Taiwan-first” sentiment however grew within the 
Taiwanese government since 1991 when the R.O.C. government in Taipei unilaterally 
ceased the Chinese civil war and stopped competing with the P.R.C. government in 
Beijing for being the official international representative of China.
15
 The figure below 
about whether and how the word “Taiwan” was used by the R.O.C. government in its 
official announcements and documents concerning cross-strait relations reveals the 
aforementioned growth of the “Taiwan-first” sentiment within the Taiwanese government. 
 
Figure 4.3: The “Taiwan-first” sentiment within the Taiwanese government 
                                                 
15
 See Chapter Two, 41-42. 
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Source: The documents and announcements were collected from Cross-Strait Information 
Network established by Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council 
<http://csin.mac.gov.tw/maccgi/ttswebout?@0:0:1:ttskmout@@0.6022540121476737>; the 
data associated with them were created and processed by the author. 
 
        As the figure shows, from 1990 to 2008, the term, “Taiwan Area,” was less and less 
used in the official documents and announcements in which Taiwan was mentioned. 
Furthermore, starting in 2000, in some documents and announcements in which Taiwan 
was referred to, Taiwan began to be mentioned without any word that connected it to the 
Chinese mainland or even the R.O.C. (i.e. the use of such terms as “Taiwan Area,” 
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“Taiwan Province,” “Mainland China,” or “Republic of China”).16 It is worth noting that, 
in 2003, the word “Taiwan” was used in its purest form more often for the first time than 
the term “Taiwan Area” was used in the official documents released or the 
announcements made by the Taiwanese government, and since then, the percentage of the 
official documents and announcements in which the purest form of “Taiwan” was used 
had been higher than the percentage of the documents and announcements in which the 
term, “Taiwan Area,” was used. 
 
The “anti-unification” tendency within the Taiwanese government 
        In the period from 1990 to 2008, an “anti-unification” tendency also emerged within 
the Taiwanese government. From 1949 to the late 1980s, like the Chinese government, 
the Taiwanese government unequivocally regarded the unification of China and Taiwan 
as a national mission that it had to work very hard to complete. However, starting in the 
early 1990s, it began to treat it as a not-so-urgent job, and since 2000, it has seldom 
talked about unification as a policy goal when it comes to cross-strait relations although it 
has never completely ruled out the possibility of unification. The figure below about how 
frequently the issue of “unification” was talked about in the official documents released 
and the announcements made by the Taiwanese government as well as the ruling party in 
the period from 1990 to 2008 about China-Taiwan relations reveals the fact that the issue 
of “unification” did become less and less important among the ruling elites in the 
aforementioned period. 
                                                 
16
 For more discussions about how the Chen Administration made greater use of the word “Taiwan” from 
2000 to 2008, see Kan 2009, 7. 
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Figure 4.4: The “anti-unification” tendency within the Taiwanese government 
 
Source: The documents and announcements were collected from Cross-Strait Information 
Network established by Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council 
<http://csin.mac.gov.tw/maccgi/ttswebout?@0:0:1:ttskmout@@0.6022540121476737>; the 
data associated with them were created and processed by the author. 
 
        As the figure shows, in the period from 1990 to 2008, the issue of unification was 
discussed less and less frequently in the documents released and the announcements 
made by the Taiwanese government and the ruling party about cross-strait relations. 
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of the documents and announcements every year on average from 1993 to 1999. The 
number further dropped to 12.24% in the period from 2000 to 2008. Moreover, though 
not revealed in the figure above, if we examine the Taiwanese government’s and the 
ruling party’s attitudes toward unification in those documents and announcements in 
which the issue of unification was talked about, it could be found that, in the period from 
1990 to 1999, in all of the documents and announcements, the Taiwanese government 
and the ruling party treated “unification” as a “national mission” that they vowed that 
they would try their best to complete sooner or later. By contrast, in the period from 2001 
to 2008, in all of the documents and announcements, the Taiwanese government and the 
ruling party no longer saw “unification” as a national mission; instead, they treated it as 
nothing more than one of the “choices” about the future relationship between China and 
Taiwan that Taiwan might consider, and, in many cases, they actually revealed a negative 
attitude toward this choice. 
 
The Taiwanese government’s effort to “Taiwanize” Taiwan, 1990 – 2000  
        From 1990 to 2000, the Taiwanese government worked hard to make Taiwan more 
Taiwanese while maintaining its Chinese element to some extent.
17
 Starting in 1993, 
President Lee of Taiwan began to emphasize that all of the people in Taiwan were on the 
same boat, facing the same external challenges including those from China. More 
specifically, according to him, people in Taiwan should realize that they belonged to the 
                                                 
17
 For more discussions about the Taiwanization of the R.O.C., see deLisle 2010, 514-515. It is worth 
noting that Lee’s predecessor, Chiang Ching-kuo, also implemented a different kind of “Taiwanization” 
policy in the early 1970s, whose goal was to include more Taiwanese elites into the state apparatus which 
was predominately controlled by the Chinese elites then. For more details about Chiang’s policy, see Wong 
2005, 62. 
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same “community,” and, as members of that community, their fates were tangled with 
one another.
18
 In addition, at around the same time, Lee tried to “Taiwanize” the national 
title of the R.O.C., using the term, the “Republic of China on Taiwan,” when he talked 
about the R.O.C. or Taiwan. He even emphasized that the term, “the Republic of China,” 
was not associated with the Chinese mainland, at least before the unification of China and 
Taiwan was achieved, when he said in an interview in April 1994 that the issue of 
sovereignty concerning cross-strait relations was very complicated because there was 
coexistence of the “Republic of China on Taiwan” and the “People’s Republic of China 
on the Chinese mainland.”19  
        Obviously, the concept of “community” and the term, the “Republic of China on 
Taiwan,” were related to each other: Lee’s purpose of promoting them was to create what 
Benedict Anderson calls an “imagined community” in Taiwan whose name was the 
“Republic of China on Taiwan.” 20  As Lee constantly said, he hoped the idea of 
“community” would unite all of the people in Taiwan, help achieve his goal of 
“developing a great Taiwan and building a new China,” and eventually bring about a 
glorious era of the “Republic of China on Taiwan.” 21  One of the most important 
approaches Lee took to create the aforementioned Taiwan-centered “imagined 
                                                 
18
 See “Lee’s interview with China Times” (11/16/1993), available in the database created by Mainland 
Affairs Council’s Cross-Strait Information Network 
<http://csin.mac.gov.tw/maccgi/ttswebout?@0:0:1:ttskmout@@0.059598266146624335>. For more 
discussions over Lee’s idea about community, see also <http://www.minge.gov.cn/txt/2008-
09/25/content_2492481.htm>. 
19
 See “President Lee’s interview with Liberty Times” (01/14/1994), available in the database created by 
Mainland Affairs Council’s Cross-Strait Information Network 
<http://csin.mac.gov.tw/maccgi/ttswebout?@0:0:1:ttskmout@@0.059598266146624335>. 
20
 Anderson 1983; Lynch 2004, 513-514; and Saunders 2005, 974-975. 
21
 “President Lee: The Treaty of Shimonoseki affects today’s cross-strait relations,” Liberty Times, April 18, 
1995. 
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community” involved the introduction of a new high school history and social studies 
curriculum by the Taiwanese government.
22
 The new curriculum named “Knowing 
Taiwan,” which began to be discussed by related officials in 1995 and was officially 
approved in 1997, emphasized the importance of learning Taiwan-specific knowledge 
and largely played down China-centered chauvinism that had been seen in Taiwan’s 
history textbooks for long. 
        Lee put another effort into “Taiwanization” when he began to use the term, “new 
Taiwanese,” in his speeches in 1995 and the years that followed. As he saw it, the ethnic 
conflict between “Taiwanese” (i.e. those who had lived in Taiwan by the end of the 
Second World War and their descendants) and “mainlanders” (i.e. those who moved to 
Taiwan from the Chinese mainland after the war and their descendants) was unnecessary 
or even meaningless because, according to him, all of the people in Taiwan, including 
“the aborigines, the people who moved to Taiwan from the Chinese mainland four 
hundred years ago, and those who arrived at Taiwan at the end of the Second World War 
or in 1949,” were the “owners of Taiwan” who had contributed to the development of 
Taiwan in the past and would keep doing so in the future; therefore, according to him, the 
narrow definition of “Taiwanese,” which focused only on the people who had lived in 
Taiwan by the end of the Second World War and their descendants, should be discarded, 
and all of the people in Taiwan “now and in the future” were supposed to be called the 
“new Taiwanese.”23 Based on this idea, in 1998, he specifically pointed out Ma Ying-
                                                 
22
 Lynch 2004, 515-516. 
23
 See “President Lee’s speech in the 2nd National Assembly” (08/03/1995), available in the database 
created by Mainland Affairs Council’s Cross-Strait Information Network 
<http://csin.mac.gov.tw/maccgi/ttswebout?@0:0:1:ttskmout@@0.059598266146624335>. For more 
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jeou, a mainlander and the K.M.T. candidate for the Taipei Mayor election for that year, 
as one of the examples of “new Taiwanese” when he explained his support for Ma during 
the campaign period.
24
 
        It is worth noting that, throughout the 1990s when Lee promoted the aforementioned 
ideas associated with “Taiwanization,” most of the ruling elites from the K.M.T. 
supported them and mentioned them very often in public.
25
 As for the opposition elites, 
many of whom were pro-independence, although they were not satisfied with Lee’s 
intentional effort to keep Taiwan “Chinese” to some degree, they did not reveal a 
significant negative attitude toward the movement of “Taiwanization” led by Lee. 26 
Actually, the opposition elites already got some sort of veto power in the making of 
Taiwan’s China policy as early as December 1996 when the Taiwanese government 
controlled by Lee reached an agreement with the D.P.P. in the National Development 
Conference, which demanded that “the government should strengthen the mechanisms by 
which opposition parties…can fully participate in major policy decisions regarding 
relations with Chinese Mainland.” 27  Therefore, Lee’s movement of “Taiwanization” 
would have been arguably less effective than it turned out to be if the opposition elites 
had had a significant negative attitude toward it. The words of Yen Wan-chin, the head of 
                                                                                                                                                 
discussions about the idea of “new Taiwanese,” see also deLisle 2010, 516; and “President Lee calls for a 
consensus on the ‘new Taiwanese’ identity,” Central Daily News, October 25, 1998. 
24
 Chao 2003, 296. 
25
 “Hu Chih-chiang: Ministry of Foreign Affairs doesn’t avoid using the word ‘Taiwan’,” China Times, 
January 4, 1998; “Ma Ying-jeou: The term ‘new Taiwanese’ is for domestic use only,” United Daily News, 
December 12, 1998; “Chiao Jen-ho: The two sides should have ‘sovereignty’ frozen before unification,” 
China Times, September 11, 1993; “Su Chi: Mainland has been mistakenly confusing ‘Taiwanese 
consciousness’ with ‘Taiwan independence’,” China Times, April 23, 1995; and “If there are no 
sovereignty and respect, there are no peace and security,” Liberty Times, January 26, 1996. 
26
 “The crux of Taiwan’s democracy,” Liberty Times, December 12, 1994. 
27
 White 2000, 16; White 2004, 308; and Chapter Two, 60-61. 
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D.P.P.’s China Affairs Department, in his comment on Lee’s announcement of the “two-
state theory” in July 1999 do provide some clues for their attitude toward Lee’s effort to 
“Taiwanize” Taiwan: “Since President Lee was inaugurated, he has accepted many ideas 
proposed by the D.P.P….his announcement that cross-strait relations are state-to-state 
relations further shows that he obviously did accept the D.P.P.’s political position.”28 
Lee’s and the D.P.P.’s similar tones on the issues of Taiwanization during the 1990s 
however triggered many criticisms against Lee from the anti-Lee politicians inside and 
outside the K.M.T., most of whom were pro-unification mainlanders, as well as from 
China. While the anti-Lee politicians were angry about Lee’s effort to seek “ideological 
accommodation” with the D.P.P., China criticized Lee for trying to “win the support of 
the D.P.P.” by tolerating “Taiwan independence activities.”29 
 
The Taiwanese government’s effort to “de-sinicize” Taiwan, 2001 – 2008  
        The identity politics in Taiwan began to involve more political disputes after the 
2000 Taiwanese presidential election. On the one hand, the new Taiwanese president, 
Chen Shui-bian, a D.P.P. member and an advocate of Taiwan’s independence, not only 
continued to make efforts to “Taiwanize” Taiwan but also went so far as to “de-sinicize” 
it;
30
 in addition, the former Taiwanese president, Lee who had tried to keep Taiwan 
“Chinese” to some degree before 2000, began to reveal an obvious pro-independence 
attitude and founded a new party named Taiwan Solidarity Union (T.S.U.) on August 12
th
, 
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2001, whose goal was, among other things, to “rectify the country’s name” from the 
R.O.C. to Taiwan.
31
 On the other hand, a strong anti-independence political force also 
emerged after the 2000 presidential election when (1) Soong Chu-yu, a former K.M.T. 
member and an independent candidate for the 2000 election who was anti-independence, 
founded the People First Party (P.F.P.) on March 31
st
, 2000, and (2) the K.M.T. began to 
unequivocally emphasize its anti-independence position after Lee’s leaving the party.32 
        Starting in 2001, the D.P.P. and the T.S.U. formed a pro-independence political 
force, which was called the Pan-Green, while the K.M.T. and the P.F.P. formed an anti-
independence alliance, which was called the Pan-Blue.
33
 Although the Pan-Green and the 
Pan-Blue shared the “Taiwan-first” and the “anti-unification” sentiments to some degree, 
they severely conflicted with each other over the idea of “de-sinicization”: while the 
former was in favor of the idea, the latter was opposed to it. For example, in 2001, when 
Soong emphasized that “anti-Chinese communists” did not necessarily mean “anti-China” 
and that Taiwanese were also Chinese, Lee said, “Taiwan is our motherland, and 
Taiwanese have no other motherland.”34 Also, in 2002, when Lien Chan, the chairman of 
K.M.T., warned that the movement of “de-sinicization” promoted by the Chen 
Administration as well as the T.S.U. was too provocative to China and therefore would 
put Taiwan in danger, President Chen of Taiwan announced in public that his 
administration would work very hard to rectify the country’s name and that “only 
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fighting hard will bring about success.”35 The identity war between the Pan-Green and 
the Pan-Blue reached a whole new level in the 2004 presidential election when the former 
kept accusing the latter of “not loving Taiwan” due to their opposition to the movement 
of “de-sinicization” and the latter constantly justified its opposition by emphasizing that 
the “Taiwanese consciousness” which, according to it, was shared by most of the people 
in Taiwan including those from the Pan-Blue, was not necessarily associated with the 
ideas of “Taiwan’s independence,” “anti-China,” and “de-sinicization.”36  
        The movement of “de-sinicization” gained more momentum after Chen was 
reelected in 2004. Four months after his second term began, in September 2004, Chen, 
based on Lee’s idea of “Republic of China on Taiwan,” introduced his idea of “Republic 
of China is Taiwan.” According to him, the Republic of China was in the Chinese 
mainland from 1912 to 1948, arrived at Taiwan in 1949, stayed in Taiwan from 1949 to 
1999, and since 2000 when he was elected the Taiwanese president, had become nothing 
but Taiwan.
37
 On the basis of this idea, starting in 2005, the Chen Administration made a 
series of efforts to change the names of Taiwan’s governmental agencies and state-owned 
enterprises that contained a reference to China or even the Republic of China, all of 
which faced severe challenges from the Pan-Blue. Among all of the cases, two were the 
most controversial. The first one was the change of the official name of Taiwan’s 
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presidential office. On July 30
th
, 2005, the official name of the office was changed in 
both Mandarin and English from “Office of the President, Republic of China” into 
“Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)” because, according to the Chen 
Administration, many people, especially foreigners, tended to confuse the “Republic of 
China” with the “People’s Republic of China.” The second case concerned the change of 
the official name of Taiwan’s postal service. On February 12th, 2007, it was changed 
from “Chunghwa Post Company” into “Taiwan Post Company” because, as the Chen 
Administration saw it, the term “Chunghwa” meant “Chinese” in Mandarin; and since 
then, the words “Republic of China” printed on the stamps issued by Taiwan’s postal 
service were replaced by the word “Taiwan.”38  
        The movement of “de-sinicization” was officially ended in 2008 when Ma Ying-
jeou, a K.M.T. member who was strongly opposed to the ideas of “Taiwan’s 
independence” and “de-sinicization,” won the presidential election. Immediately after he 
was inaugurated on May 20
th, 2008, the official name of Taiwan’s presidential office in 
Mandarin was changed back to “Office of the President, Republic of China” while its 
English name remained “Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan).” 39  In 
addition, on August 1
st
, the official name of Taiwan’s postal service was changed back to 
“Chunghwa Post Company,” and the words “Republic of China” appeared again on the 
stamps issued by the company.
40
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4-4: The effect of Taiwan’s identity politics on Chinese leaders’ attitudes toward 
unification 
        After discussing Taiwan’s identity politics in the period from 1990 to 2008, I, in this 
section, explore the relationship between Taiwan’s identity politics and Chinese leaders’ 
attitudes toward unification in the same period of time.
41
 Here, I especially focus on how 
the political conflict between the pro-independence Pan-Green and the anti-independence 
Pan-Blue in Taiwan’s domestic politics starting in 2001, as well as the U.S. response to 
this conflict, made Hu Jintao, who became the Chinese leader in 2002, more patient about 
unification of China and Taiwan than his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, who was the Chinese 
leader from 1989 to 2002. To make this case, I first make a comparison between Jiang’s 
impatience and Hu’s patience regarding the issue of unification. Then, I discuss how, in 
theory, Taiwan’s identity politics, as well as the U.S. response to it, affects a Chinese 
leader’s attitude toward unification. Finally, I examine the effects of Taiwan’s identity 
politics and the U.S. response to it in the period from 1990 to 2008 on Jiang’s and Hu’s 
attitudes toward unification as well as the implication of their attitudes for China-Taiwan 
relations in general. 
 
Similar policies but different attitudes: Jiang’s impatience vis-à-vis Hu’s patience 
        Jiang became the General Secretary of Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) in 1989, 
but he did not have any specific Taiwan policy of his own until 1995, when he announced 
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“Jiang’s Eight Points.” 42  Two years after Jiang announced his “Eight Points,” he 
reaffirmed them and mentioned the principles of “peaceful reunification” and “one 
country, two systems” raised by his predecessor, Deng Xiaoping, in his report to the 15th 
C.C.P. National Congress in 1997.
43
 Hu replaced Jiang as the General Secretary of C.C.P. 
in 2002 and announced four suggestions concerning the Taiwan issue in 2005, which 
were called “Hu’s Four Points.” 44  In October 2007, Hu mentioned the principles of 
“peaceful reunification” and “one country, two systems” as well as “Jiang’s Eight Points” 
and his “Four Points” in his report to the 17th C.C.P. National Congress.45 
When Jiang’s and Hu’s “points” are compared, we can find that they are 
fundamentally similar. The similarity is fourfold: first, the One-China Principle is the 
premise for the unification of China and Taiwan; second, the formula of “one country, 
two systems” invented by Deng Xiaoping constitutes an important part of their Taiwan 
policies; third, “peaceful reunification” will be enthusiastically pursued; and fourth, 
Taiwan’s independence will never be tolerated. 
        Although Jiang’s and Hu’s Taiwan policies are similar, their attitudes toward 
unification are very different. When Jiang’s and Hu’s attitudes are compared, we can find 
that while Jiang was impatient with the delay of unification of China and Taiwan during 
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his last years in office, talking about timetables for unification; Hu, from 2002 to 2008, 
was patient, saying that he was not afraid of delaying unification. 
According to the Chinese political advisors on the Taiwan issue, since 1998, Jiang 
had begun to talk about timetables for unification in the inner circle.
46
 In October 1999, 
when interviewed by the British media, Jiang implicitly said that China would try to 
resolve the Taiwan issue by the middle of the 21
st
 century.
47
 He revealed his thoughts 
about timetables to the public again in February 2000 in a white paper on Taiwan (i.e. 
One China Principle and the Taiwan Problem). Some of the language in the paper caught 
people’s attention: “If Taiwan indefinitely rejects to negotiate with China on the issues 
about reunification, China will be forced to use any means, including the military force, 
to resolve the Taiwan problem.”48 According to some experts on China-Taiwan relations, 
this sentence revealed China’s impatience about the development of cross-strait relations 
during that time.
49
 Finally, in his report to the 16
th
 C.C.P. National Congress (i.e. his last 
official report in office) in November 2002, Jiang openly stated that “the Taiwan issue 
cannot be delayed indefinitely.”50 
        By contrast, in the period from 2002 to 2008, since Hu replaced Jiang as the major 
Chinese leader, he never mentioned any timetable for unification. In 2004, Hu talked 
about his instructions regarding the Taiwan issue, which were “prepare to fight, seek to 
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talk, and don’t be afraid to delay.”51 Here, Hu’s patience about unification, revealed by 
the last point (i.e. don’t be afraid to delay), vividly contrasts with Jiang’s impatience 
during his last years in office.  
        Hu’s patience became increasingly clear after 2004. Although China’s National 
People’s Congress passed the Anti-Secession Law on March 14th, 2005, it cannot be seen 
as an indicator of Hu’s impatience. First of all, it did not mention any timetable. 
Secondly, instead of forcing unification, its purpose was to thwart Taiwan’s independence 
by threatening military reprisal. Furthermore, Hu’s enthusiastic welcoming of Lien Chan, 
the chairman of K.M.T.,
52
 for Lien’s visits to China in 2005, 2006, and 2007 and his 
rhetoric in their meetings demonstrated that Hu was interested in promoting cross-strait 
relations and blocking Taiwan’s independence rather than pressing for near-term 
unification.
53
 On December 31
st
, 2008, Hu announced his six-point proposal for dealing 
with the Taiwan issue in his speech in the forum commemorating the 30
th
 anniversary of 
the issuance of the “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan.” 54  Although he kept 
mentioning the ultimate goal of unification, his words that “under the special 
circumstances where the nation has not yet been unified, the two sides could hold 
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pragmatic exploratory discussion on their political relationship” demonstrated again that 
he had no timetable for unification and that he was willing to wait.
55
      
 
Taiwan’s identity politics, the U.S. response to it, and a Chinese leader’s attitude 
toward unification 
Taiwan’s identity politics and the U.S. response to it matter when it comes to a 
Chinese leader’s attitude toward unification. More specifically, a Chinese leader’s 
perceptions of Taiwan’s identity politics and the U.S. response to it have a significant 
effect on his patience or impatience about unification with his concern about his own 
legitimacy in China as an intervening variable. In other words, how a Chinese leader 
perceives Taiwan’s identity politics and the U.S. response to it would have an effect on 
his perception of the stability of his own domestic legitimacy in China, which in turn 
affects his attitude toward unification. 
        At the core of each Chinese leader’s attitude toward the Taiwan issue seems to be his 
obsession with preventing Taiwan’s independence in the short term and unifying China 
and Taiwan in the long run. Therefore, anything that prevents the achievement of this 
goal would worry him. For example, one of the reasons why the expansion of the scope 
of the U.S.-Japan alliance in 1997 to cover “situations in the areas surrounding Japan” 
agitated the Chinese leader was because the expansion implicitly included Taiwan and 
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therefore might help Taiwan maintain its current status as a de facto independent state 
indefinitely or even increase Taiwan’s confidence in pursuing de jure independence.56  
        Why does a Chinese leader have to try his very best to prevent Taiwan’s 
independence in the short term and to pursue the goal of unification of China and Taiwan 
in the long run?
57
 In other words, why is Taiwan important to a Chinese leader? There are 
three major reasons why a Chinese leader cannot afford to give up Taiwan.
58
 Strategic 
importance is one of them. According to Alan Wachman, Taiwan is strategically 
important to China’s security because if China owns Taiwan, it can control the sea lane in 
the Taiwan Strait which is very important to international trade, increase the level of its 
national defense by deploying military forces from the Yellow Sea to the South China Sea 
without interruption, and finally break the U.S. strategic containment of Chinese 
expansion.
59
 Also, showing resolve in preventing Taiwan from becoming a de jure 
independent state is an effective way to discourage independence movements in Xingjian 
and Tibet. The third reason, which I think is the most important one, is a Chinese leader’s 
consideration of his domestic legitimacy. 
        The Chinese people believe or have been taught to believe that bringing Taiwan 
back to the motherland is one of the Chinese communist government’s most important 
national missions and that the so called “century of humiliation” will not end until there 
is a unified China.
60
 The C.C.P. has promised the Chinese people that it will complete this 
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sacred national mission since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) 
in 1949. Therefore, it can be expected that  if a Chinese leader loses Taiwan or is 
regarded by the Chinese people as one who compromises on the issue of Taiwan, not only 
will he lose power within the party, but the Chinese communist regime may be 
overthrown by the Chinese people.
61
 Furthermore, since China began its economic 
reform and abandoned communist ideas in the late 1970s, Chinese nationalism has 
become one of the most critical foundations of a Chinese leader’s legitimacy to rule 
China. As Thomas Christensen well argues, “since the Chinese Communist Party is no 
longer communist, it must be even more Chinese.” 62  An important part of such 
nationalism involves the “reunification” of mainland China and Taiwan. Simply speaking, 
to a Chinese leader, the Taiwan issue is an issue of legitimacy and regime survival.
63
  
        The issue of legitimacy associated with the unification of China and Taiwan is so 
important to a Chinese leader that if he believes that not using force against Taiwan in the 
case of preventing Taiwan’s independence or pursuing unification would harm his 
domestic legitimacy, he would use force regardless of the outcome because, under this 
circumstance, the risk of political loss to him might outweigh the risk of economic or 
military loss.
64
 Take the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis for example. Many China experts 
argue that, in order to consolidate his power within the party and his legitimacy to rule 
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China, the Chinese leader during that time had no choice but to come up with a military 
response to show the Chinese public as well as other Chinese political elites his resolve.
65
 
        Therefore, based on what I have discussed above, it is reasonable to make the 
following argument with Taiwan’s identity politics being taken into account. 
Understanding that the Taiwan issue is linked to his own domestic legitimacy, a Chinese 
leader may become impatient with the delay of unification if he perceives that Taiwan’s 
identity politics is revealing a trend of pro-independence; in contrast, a Chinese leader 
would be patient if he perceives that the political situation in Taiwan is in favor of 
China’s national goal of preventing Taiwan’s independence and promoting ultimate 
unification. 
        It is worth noting that China-Taiwan relations concern not only China and Taiwan 
but also the U.S. which has been deeply involved in the three major Taiwan Strait Crises 
(i.e. the 1954-1955 crisis, the 1958 crisis, and the 1995-1996 crisis).
66
 According to Lynn 
White, if Taiwan does not provoke China, the U.S. will protect Taiwan’s democratic 
system until China is democratized or willing to guarantee full democracy to Taiwan.
67
  
        Given the significant role the U.S. is playing in China-Taiwan relations, the U.S. 
response to Taiwan’s identity politics and its behavior regarding Taiwan in general should 
be considered important factors affecting how China handles the Taiwan issue as well. 
Here, two things about how China perceives the U.S. attitudes and behavior pertaining to 
Taiwan are worth discussing. First, a display of U.S. “resolve” to deter China from using 
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a non-peaceful way to deal with Taiwan may be perceived by China as a display of 
“aggression” and an indicator of U.S. interference in China’s domestic affairs. 68 
American support for Taiwan, among many other things, reminds Chinese leaders, as 
well as the Chinese public, of China’s “century of humiliation” imposed by Western and 
Japanese imperialists from the mid-19
th
 century to the mid-20
th
 century.
 69
 Therefore, it is 
very difficult for a Chinese leader to see the U.S. role in China-Taiwan relations as a 
positive and constructive one. Second, how to deal with Taiwan’s provocations 
originating in its identity politics (i.e. political activities that promote Taiwan’s de jure 
independence) is another source of conflict between China and the U.S. When a Chinese 
leader sees a Taiwanese provocation and, at the same time, perceives U.S. ignorance or 
even support for it, he would likely regard such U.S. behavior as aggressive and might 
not hesitate to respond in a hostile way. The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis is again a 
good example: one of the purposes of China’s military action then was to deter 
Washington from further supporting Lee Teng-hui whom China regarded as a separatist.
70
  
        Because of the two things discussed above, experts on Sino-U.S. relations suggest 
that the U.S. government should think twice before it makes any decision about Taiwan. 
According to Thomas Christensen, the U.S. should come up with a dual strategy that can, 
on the one hand, militarily deter China from attacking Taiwan, and on the other hand, 
politically deter Taiwan from declaring independence.
71
 Most importantly, as Robert Ross 
argues, the key is that the U.S. should not send the wrong messages to Taiwan (i.e. the US 
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tolerates or even supports Taiwan’s independence), which could harm China’s security 
interests.
72
  
        Therefore, based on what I have discussed, it is reasonable to make the following 
argument with the U.S. response to Taiwan’s identity politics being taken into account. 
Well understanding that the Taiwan issue is linked to his own domestic legitimacy, a 
Chinese leader may become impatient with the delay of unification if he perceives the U.S. 
supporting Taiwan’s pro-independence movements; by contrast, he would be patient if he 
does not have such perception. 
 
Explaining Jiang Zemin’s impatience and Hu Jintao’s patience about unification 
        When Taiwan’s identity politics from 1990 to 2002 is compared with that from 2002 
to 2008, a difference becomes obvious: the growth of the political strength of the pro-
independence force in the former period and the decline of the strength of that force in 
the latter period. 
        From 1989, when Jiang became the General Secretary of C.C.P., to 2002, when Hu 
took office, a series of events occurring in Taiwan’s domestic politics arguably made 
Jiang become more and more pessimistic about the prospect of unification. 
From 1991 to 1992, with President Lee’s effort and the opposition elites’ support for 
his effort, several institutional changes, which emphasized Taiwan’s autonomy and 
distinctiveness from mainland China and symbolized a rupture between the R.O.C. 
                                                 
72
 Ross 2002, 85. 
185 
 
government in Taiwan and its mainland origins, were made or proposed.
73
 In April 1991, 
Taiwan’s National Assembly abolished the “Temporary Provisions Effective During the 
Period of Communist Rebellion,” and President Lee announced accordingly the 
termination of the “Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist 
Rebellion,” both of which revealed the Taiwanese government’s intention to stop 
competing with the P.R.C. government in Beijing in the international arena for being the 
only legitimate government of China. In addition, in May 1992, the National Assembly 
changed the rule of presidential election in Taiwan; while the old rule required the 
president be elected by the representatives representing not only people in Taiwan but 
also those in China, according to the new rule, the president would be elected by the 
people in Taiwan only. 
        In March 1996, Lee became Taiwan’s first popularly elected president, winning 54% 
of the votes; moreover, the candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party (D.P.P.), who 
openly advocated Taiwan’s independence, obtained more votes than the most pro-
unification candidate, who was supported by the New Party (N.P.) and other pro-
unification politicians (i.e. 21.13% and 14.90%, respectively).
74
 Another event worth 
mentioning is that, in December 1996, President Lee and the opposition elites from the 
D.P.P. made a joint effort again in the National Development Conference to “freeze” (i.e. 
disempower) the Administration of the Taiwan Province, an act that made Taiwan a 
“province” in name only.75 
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The development of Taiwan’s domestic politics after 2000 arguably made Jiang 
much more pessimistic than before. In March 2000, Chen Shui-bian, the D.P.P. 
presidential candidate and an advocate of Taiwan’s independence, won the Taiwanese 
presidential election. In December 2001, the D.P.P. became the most powerful party, 
though not the absolute majority, in Taiwan’s congress for the first time. Moreover, the 
implicit pro-independence force led by Lee Teng-hui became a radical pro-independence 
force when the relationship between Lee and the K.M.T. completely broke up after the 
2000 presidential election. This new pro-independence force led by Lee and the 
traditional pro-independence force led by the D.P.P. eventually formed a powerful pro-
independence political coalition in Taiwan’s domestic politics, the so called Pan-Green. 
Simply speaking, from 2000 to 2002, the political force of Taiwan’s independence grew 
much faster than Jiang expected.
76
 
        Compared with the development of Taiwan’s identity politics from 1990 to 2002, 
what happened in Taiwan from 2002 when Hu became the General Secretary of C.C.P. to 
2008 arguably made Hu more optimistic about the prospect of unification than Jiang.  
Although the political force for independence in Taiwan’s domestic politics became 
stronger from 2000 to 2002, a political force which could challenge the pro-independence 
Pan-Green also emerged in the same period. After its defeat in the 2000 presidential 
election, the K.M.T. moved away from Lee’s implicit pro-independence position and 
went back to its traditional anti-independence line. Furthermore, it formed a political 
coalition, the so called Pan-Blue, with other anti-independence political forces, including 
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the People First Party (P.F.P.), a development that transformed Taiwanese domestic 
politics.
77
 
        Starting in 2004, the political strength of the anti-independence Pan-Blue began to 
steadily increase while that of the pro-independence Pan-Green gradually declined in 
Taiwan’s political arena. In March 2004, Chen Shui-bian was reelected the president. 
Although this might have disappointed Hu, the fact that the Pan-Green obtained 50.11% 
of the votes while the Pan-Blue gained 49.89% of them revealed the Pan-Blue’s potential 
to weaken the Pan-Green’s political strength.78 In December 2004, the Pan-Green, which 
had just won the presidential election in March, was unable to get enough seats in the 
congressional election to become the majority, and the Pan-Blue maintained its status as 
the majority in Taiwan’s congress. This outcome played a significant role in slowing the 
momentum of pro-independence politics in Taiwan from 2001 to 2004.
79
 The shift of 
political gravity from the Pan-Green to the Pan-Blue became obvious when the K.M.T. 
won all of the three elections in 2005 (i.e. the elections of county magistrate, county 
councilor, and township magistrate).
80
 The political strength of the Pan-Green was further 
weakened in 2006 when a series of indictments, convictions, and public charges against 
the officials in the Chen Administration as well as Chen’s family members caused Chen’s 
approval rating to drastically drop to between 18-20% and resulted in the “Million Voices 
against Corruption” campaign launched by Shih Ming-teh, a former chairman of D.P.P.81 
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According to a public opinion poll in 2006, about 50% of the respondents said that they 
hoped Chen would voluntarily resign.
82
 Since 2006, the pro-independence Pan-Green has 
never regained its previous political strength. In January 2008, the K.M.T. won the 
congressional election.
83
 In the presidential election in March 2008, the presidential 
candidate of the Pan-Blue, the K.M.T.’s Ma Ying-jeou, defeated the presidential 
candidate of the Pan-Green, the D.P.P.’s Hsieh Chang-ting, by a great margin (i.e. Ma 
gained 58.45% of the votes while Hsieh obtained 41.55% of them).
84
  
        The U.S. behavior regarding Taiwan in general and its response to Taiwan’s identity 
politics in particular in the period from 1990 to 2008 had an effect on Jiang’s and Hu’s 
attitudes toward unification as well. Several events regarding Taiwan during the period 
from 1989 when Jiang became the General Secretary of C.C.P. to 2002 when Hu took 
power had a negative effect on Sino-U.S. relations. In September 1994, the U.S. 
government modestly upgraded the status of Taiwan’s diplomatic representation in the 
U.S. after completing its Taiwan policy review.
85
 In May 1995, the U.S. President Bill 
Clinton granted a visa to Lee Teng-hui under pressure from the U.S. Congress, which 
triggered a series of live fire military exercises near Taiwan by the People’s Liberation 
Army in August. In December 1995, the American aircraft carrier Nimitz passed through 
the Taiwan Strait, which was regarded by many experts as a signal to China that the U.S. 
would help defend Taiwan if necessary.
86
 In March 1996, when China conducted another 
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series of military exercises on the eve of Taiwan’s presidential election, the U.S. 
dispatched Nimitz and another aircraft carrier Independence to the Taiwan Strait. In 1997, 
the U.S. and Japan included Taiwan in the “areas adjacent to Japan” that the two 
countries would jointly defend according to the U.S.-Japan security treaty.
87
 
        All of the events mentioned above arguably resulted in Jiang’s deep distrust of 
American intentions regarding China-Taiwan relations. Although Clinton’s public 
declaration that the U.S. did not support Taiwan’s independence in his meeting with Jiang 
in China in 1998 may have slightly decreased the level of distrust, what happened in 1999 
dramatically altered this development. In May 1999, an American B2 bomber mistakenly 
bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. This event intensely angered the 
Chinese political elites and the public as well.
88
 Thus, it is reasonable to argue that, if 
Jiang held a perception that the U.S. would use any means, including selling weapons to 
Taiwan and helping Taiwan resist unification, to contain China’s growing power, this 
perception was vindicated after the embassy bombing. The level of Jiang’s distrust of the 
U.S. further increased from 2000 to 2002 when the U.S. President George W. Bush said 
that the U.S. would do “whatever it takes” to defend Taiwan, and the military-to-military 
contact and cooperation between Taiwan and the U.S. rapidly increased.
89
 
        Compared with Jiang’s distrust of the U.S., which stemmed from the accumulation 
of the aforementioned events, interactions between Taiwan and the U.S. in the period 
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from 2002 to 2009 actually led Hu to feel less concerned about U.S. intentions regarding 
Taiwan. 
        In December 2003, President Bush of the U.S. made clear his dissatisfaction with 
the Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian’s plan to hold a referendum in order to make a 
whole new Taiwanese constitution, saying “we oppose any unilateral decision made by 
either China or Taiwan to change the status quo, and the comments and actions made by 
the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to 
change the status quo, which we oppose.”90 Then, in 2004, the Bush Administration 
clearly rejected Taiwan’s independence and opposed Chen’s efforts to change the names 
of Taiwan’s representative offices abroad and state-owned enterprises from R.O.C. or 
Taipei to Taiwan based on his proposal of “rectification of country’s name.”91 Further, in 
2006, the U.S. distrust of Taiwan’s pro-independence government was deepened after 
Chen announced that Taiwan’s National Unification Council (N.U.C.) would cease to 
function and that a revision of the constitution was being considered.
92
 The U.S. 
government was very angry about the Taiwanese government’s word games, when the 
former asked the latter to unambiguously reaffirm that Taiwan’s N.U.C. was not 
abolished. The chairman of U.S. Senate Arms Services Committee warned that “if the 
conflict were precipitated by just inappropriate and wrongful politics generated by 
Taiwanese elected officials, I am not sure that this nation would come full force to their 
rescue if they created that problem.”93 
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        Taiwan’s failed attempt at “transit diplomacy” is another example which 
demonstrated how unsatisfied the U.S. became with Taiwan’s pro-independence 
government. In May 2006, before his trip to Paraguay and Costa Rica, Chen asked for 
overnight transits in San Francisco and New York City but eventually was only offered 
brief refueling stops in Honolulu and Anchorage. Although Taiwan’s government 
attributed the U.S. decision to China’s pressure, many experts believe that it involved a 
decision made by the U.S. government to send Taiwan’s government a strong signal that 
the U.S. was discomforted by a series of Chen’s actions which increased the likelihood of 
a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
94
 
        The tense relations between the U.S. and Taiwan starting in 2003 were eventually 
alleviated following Ma’s election in March 2008. Since Ma overturned his predecessor’s 
hostile China policy, the U.S. has repeatedly claimed that it supports Taiwan’s new 
reconciliatory China policy. In December 2008, the American Institute in Taiwan (A.I.T.), 
on behalf of the U.S. government, expressed its support for Ma’s new reconciliatory 
approach to dealing with China and rebutted the rumors that the U.S. was worried 
Taiwan’s new China policy was too pro-China by saying, “We welcome the positive 
development. There is no need for the U.S. government to worry about Taiwan and 
mainland China getting too close.”95 It is worth pointing out that, during the joint press 
conference at the end of his visit to China in November 2009, the U.S. President Barack 
Obama himself also officially expressed his support for the positive development in the 
Taiwan Strait, saying that the U.S. “applauded the steps that the People’s Republic of 
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China and Taiwan have already taken to relax tensions and build ties across the Taiwan 
Strait.”96 
The events concerning Taiwan’s identity politics, as well as the U.S. response to it, 
in the period from 1990 to 2008 that I have discussed above had a great effect on Jiang’s 
and Hu’s perceptions of how China-Taiwan relations would develop in the future and 
whether that development might negatively affect their domestic legitimacy. Their 
perceptions of domestic legitimacy in turn affected their attitudes toward unification, 
leading to Jiang’s impatience during his last years in office and Hu’s patience from 2002 
to 2008. 
In the case of Jiang, since 1989 when Jiang became the General Secretary of C.C.P., 
a series of events about Taiwan’s identity politics (e.g. the abolition of the “Temporary 
Provision” and the termination of the “Period of National Mobilization,” the change of 
the rule for the Taiwanese presidential election, Lee’s winning the 1996 election, the 
disempowerment of the Taiwan Province Administration, Chen’s election as Taiwan’s 
president, the growing political strength of the Pan-Green, etc.), combined with a series 
of events concerning the U.S. behavior and attitude regarding Taiwan (e.g. the upgrading 
of the status of Taiwan’s diplomatic representation in the U.S., the issuance of a U.S. visa 
to Lee, the deployment of Nimitz and Independence to the Taiwan Strait, the expansion 
of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, Bush’s pro-Taiwan statement, etc.), arguably caused 
Jiang to perceive that there was an irresistible pro-independence trend growing in 
Taiwan’s domestic politics and that the U.S. tacitly supported this trend. This perception 
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in turn led Jiang to become less and less confident about the prospect of unification and 
feel that this situation (i.e. the growing trend of Taiwan’s independence and the U.S. 
support for it), if not dealt with properly and quickly, might lead to Taiwan’s de jure 
independence in the near future, which, as a result, would have a profound negative effect 
on his domestic legitimacy. Because of this, starting in 1998, Jiang showed eagerness in 
resolving the Taiwan problem as soon as possible and began to talk about timetables for 
unification. 
        By contrast, in the case of Hu, a series of political events in Taiwan (e.g. the Pan-
Green’s inability to become the majority in Taiwan’s congress, the growth of the Pan-
Blue’s political power and the decline in the Pan-Green’s popularity in Taiwan’s domestic 
politics, the popular anti-Chen movement, the election of Ma as Taiwan’s president, etc.), 
combined with a series of U.S. responses to Taiwan’s identity politics (e.g. the U.S. 
government’s criticism against Chen’s effort to hold a referendum about Taiwan’s new 
constitution, its opposition to Chen’s proposal to “rectify the country’s name,” its 
dissatisfaction with the N.U.C. issue, its support for Taiwan’s new reconciliatory China 
policy and the peaceful development of China-Taiwan relations, etc.), arguably led Hu to 
perceive that the strength of the pro-independence Pan-Green was drastically weakened 
by a strong internal political challenge from the anti-independence Pan-Blue as well as by 
great external pressure from the U.S. government. This perception in turn made Hu feel 
more confident about the prospect of unification and believe that time was on China’s 
side. Put simply, because the strength of the anti-independence political force was 
growing while that of the pro-independence force was declining in Taiwan’s domestic 
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politics in the period from 2000 to 2008, and because the U.S. had assisted China in 
discouraging Taiwan’s independence since 2004, Hu’s worry that Taiwan would become 
a de jure independent state in the near future was eliminated. With the shadow of a 
legitimacy crisis associated with Taiwan’s de jure independence disappearing, Hu showed 
a great deal of patience regarding unification and had a don’t-be-afraid-to-delay attitude. 
        The figure below summarizes my argument about how Jiang’s and Hu’s contrasting 
perceptions of Taiwan’s identity politics and the U.S. response to it led to their differing 
perceptions of the stability of their domestic legitimacy, which in turn resulted in their 
different attitudes toward unification. 
 
Figure 4.5: Factors leading to Jiang’s impatience and Hu’s patience about unification 
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Jiang (1990 - 2002) Hu (2002 to 2008) 
 
 
A perception that the trend of pro-independence in 
Taiwan’s domestic politics is irresistible. 
+ 
A perception that the U.S. helps Taiwan pursue 
independence. 
 
↓ 
 
A perception that Taiwan will become a de jure 
independent state in the near future and a 
legitimacy crisis is coming. 
 
↓ 
 
Less confident about the prospect of unification 
and eager to resolve the Taiwan problem quickly: 
a strong need to have timetables. 
 
 
 
A perception that the pro-independence force is 
weakened by a strong challenge from the anti-
independence force in Taiwan’s domestic 
politics. 
+ 
A perception that the U.S. rejects Taiwan’s 
independence and helps prevent Taiwan from 
becoming a de jure independent state. 
 
↓ 
 
A perception that Taiwan will not become a de 
jure independent stat and therefore there will be 
no legitimacy crisis. 
 
↓ 
 
More confident about the prospect of unification 
and not afraid of delaying unification: no need to 
have any timetable. 
 
 
 
4-5: Discussion 
        This chapter examines the growth of Taiwanese nationalism in the period from 1990 
to 2008 as well as Taiwan’s identity politics and its effect on Chinese leaders’ attitudes 
toward unification. On the basis of what I have discussed in this chapter, it can be well 
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argued that Taiwan’s domestic politics became relevant to cross-strait relations when the 
growth of Taiwanese nationalism, both within the Taiwanese government and among the 
Taiwanese general public, in the period from 1990 to 2008 complicated the essence of the 
conflict between China and Taiwan.
97
 More specifically, although the rivalry between 
China and Taiwan persist from 1949 to the present, the essence of this rivalry has 
changed since the 1990s when the “Taiwan-first” sentiment and the “anti-unification” 
tendency grew in Taiwan. Before the 1990s, the conflict between China and Taiwan was 
regarded as a “domestic affair” by both sides. During that period, the government of the 
People’s Republic of China in Beijing and the government of the Republic of China in 
Taipei fought each other over which one was the only legitimate government of China. 
Simply speaking, the conflict between China and Taiwan during that time was 
undoubtedly regarded by both sides as a domestic conflict between “the Chinese in 
mainland China” and “the Chinese in Taiwan.” 
        Nevertheless, as Taiwanese nationalism grew in the 1990s, while China still saw the 
Taiwan issue as a domestic affair, an internal political dispute over the essence of China-
Taiwan rivalry began to loom in Taiwan.
98
 While some in Taiwan still believed that the 
conflict between China and Taiwan was essentially a domestic conflict between the 
Chinese in mainland China and the Chinese in Taiwan, others began to regard the rivalry 
as a non-domestic issue. Since Taiwan’s 2000 presidential election in which Chen Shui-
bian, the D.P.P. candidate who supported Taiwan’s independence, was elected, Taiwan’s 
domestic politics had been dominated by two political forces associated with the 
                                                 
97
 For a similar argument, see Wu 2004, 615. 
98
 For a similar argument, see deLisle 2010, 514. 
197 
 
aforementioned political dispute: (1) the pro-independence Pan-Green, which consisted 
of the D.P.P. politicians as well as Lee Teng-hui and his political followers who left the 
K.M.T. and established a new political party named the T.S.U. in 2001; and (2) the anti-
independence Pan-Blue, which included the K.M.T. politicians who forced Lee to leave 
the K.M.T. in 2000 and the politicians in the P.F.P. that was established by Soong Chu-
yu immediately after the 2000 election. The core of the conflict between China and 
Taiwan since then had been seen differently by different political forces in Taiwan: while 
the Pan-Green regarded the conflict as an international conflict between Chinese and 
Taiwanese, the Pan-Blue regarded it, implicitly if not explicitly, as a domestic conflict 
between the Chinese in mainland China and the Chinese in Taiwan.  
        The conflict between the pro-independence Pan-Green and the anti-independence 
Pan-Blue did have a great impact on China-Taiwan relations. As I have discussed in the 
last section of this chapter, before such a conflict emerged, in the period of 
“Taiwanization,” the fact that very few Taiwanese political elites, including both the 
ruling and opposition ones, challenged the movement of “Taiwanization” (or more 
specifically, the voice against “Taiwanization” among the political elites was effectively 
silenced by those who supported the idea) made the Chinese leader then  (i.e. Jiang 
Zemin) perceive that there was a trend of pro-independence rapidly growing in Taiwan’s 
domestic politics and that the Taiwanese government was using “salami slicing tactics” to 
purse “creeping independence.”99 Furthermore, several events about the U.S. behavior 
regarding Taiwan during this period of time also made Jiang perceive that the U.S. was 
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actually supporting this growing trend of pro-independence in Taiwan. Because of it, he 
became very impatient about unification and revealed an I-will-fight-if-you-delay attitude 
toward unification. 
        By contrast, after the conflict between the Pan-Green and the Pan-Blue commenced, 
in the period of “de-sinicization,” the facts that (1) there was an anti-independence force 
(i.e. the Pan-Blue) challenging very hard the effort made by the pro-independence force 
(i.e. the Pan-Green) to get rid of anything about China in Taiwan and (2) the U.S. 
government clearly opposed the Pan-Green’s attempt to pursue Taiwan’s independence 
made the Chinese leader then (i.e. Hu Jintao), though still worrying about the Pan-
Green’s effort and attempt, perceive that the momentum of Taiwan’s independence in 
Taiwan’s domestic politics was actually being balanced off by the growing strength of 
the anti-independence Pan-Blue as well as by the pressure from the U.S. government. 
Because of it, he became relatively patient about unification and revealed a don’t-be-
afraid-to-delay attitude toward unification. 
        Based on the aforementioned findings about Jiang’s and Hu’s attitudes toward 
unification, the level of tension between China and Taiwan in the period from 1990 to 
2002 is supposed to be higher than that in the period from 2002 to 2008 given the 
former’s I-will-fight-if-you-delay attitude and the latter’s don’t-be-afraid-to-delay attitude. 
This point is valid to some extent if we measure the level of tension between China and 
Taiwan in the aforementioned periods by seeing whether China took any military action 
against Taiwan in the same periods. As we can see, in the period from 1990 to 2002, 
China not only threatened to use force verbally but also took some sort of military action 
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from 1995 to 1996 when it conducted military exercises and live missile tests around 
Taiwan, which led to the so called 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. By contrast, in the 
period from 2002 to 2008, although there were still verbal threats, no military action 
against Taiwan was taken and no Taiwan Strait Crisis occurred. As I see it, Jiang’s 
impatient attitude toward unification did play a very big role in his decision to take the 
aforementioned military action although there is no doubt that the level of hostility 
associated with the action he took which involved exercises instead of real attacks was 
relatively low. 
        That being said, if we want to have a more comprehensive picture of the tension 
between China and Taiwan in the period from 1990 to 2008, we have to take more factors 
into account. For example, the rhetoric in the public statements about Taiwan made by 
the Chinese government and the statements about China made by the Taiwanese 
government might reveal how tense China-Taiwan relations are. Also, whether both sides 
are willing to make a joint effort to resolve the common problems they face through the 
formal contact between China’s A.R.A.T.S. and Taiwan’s S.E.F. might also be an ideal 
measure for the tension between China and Taiwan. I will deal with these factors in the 
next chapter. More specifically, in the next chapter, I will discuss the nationalistic 
sentiment about Taiwan revealed by the Taiwanese government in the period from 1990 
to 2008 as well as China’s response to this sentiment and see whether the decrease and 
the increase in the level of such a sentiment have any effect on the cessation and the 
resumption of the formal contact between China’s A.R.A.T.S. and Taiwan’s S.E.F. As I 
will demonstrate later, if we take all of these factors into account, we would find that the 
200 
 
tension between China and Taiwan was mostly high during the Lee and Chen 
Administrations (from 1990 to 2008) and became low in the Ma Administration (in 2008).   
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Chapter Five 
Taiwanese Nationalism within the Taiwanese Government and Its Effect on Cross-
Strait Relations, 1990 – 2008 
 
        This Chapter examines the relationship between the nationalistic sentiment about 
Taiwan revealed by the Taiwanese government on the one hand and China-Taiwan 
relations in general on the other by exploring whether the changes in the Taiwanese 
government’s “Taiwan-first” sentiment as well as its “anti-unification” tendency in the 
period from 1990 to 2008 had any effect on the cessation and resumption of the formal 
contact between China’s A.R.A.T.S. and Taiwan’s S.E.F during the same period of time. 
It is found that, when the level of Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese 
government grew, China became hostile, and China’s A.R.A.T.S.’s willingness to have 
formal contact with Taiwan’s S.E.F. decreased. By contrast, when the level decreased, 
the Chinese response was nonaggressive or even conciliatory, and the A.R.A.T.S.’s 
willingness to have formal contact with the S.E.F. increased. 
 
5-1: Taiwan’s China policy as a measure for Taiwanese nationalism 
        Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese government can be well measured by 
Taiwan’s China policy. There are certainly many ideal measures for the nationalistic 
sentiment about Taiwan revealed by the Taiwanese government; however, Taiwan’s 
China policy is undoubtedly one of the best. According to Yun-han Chu, Taiwan’s China 
policy is “three things in one”: it is not only a “bargaining chip” for cross-strait 
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negotiation and a “control valve” for cross-strait exchanges but also, most importantly, a 
“policy instrument in a state-orchestrated nation-building process.”1 More specifically, an 
important part of Taiwan’s China policy actually concerns the Taiwanese government’s 
stance on Taiwan’s status vis-à-vis China, which consists of two dimensions: first, the 
Taiwanese government’s interpretation of “one-China,” and second, its attitude toward 
unification of China and Taiwan. This part of Taiwan’s China policy could be a good 
measure for Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese government because the two 
aforementioned dimensions about it do reflect well the two psychological inclinations 
associated with Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese government that I have 
discussed in Chapter Four: the “Taiwan-first” sentiment and the “anti-unification” 
tendency, respectively.  
        In the period from 1949, when the rivalry between China and Taiwan emerged and 
Chiang Kai-shek employed the policy of “recovering the mainland by force,” to 1980, 
when Chiang Ching-kuo replaced his father’s policy with the policy of “reunification on 
the basis of the Three Principles of the People,” this part of Taiwan’s China policy never 
changed, consisting of two Chiangs’  interpretation of “one-China” as nothing but the 
R.O.C. (i.e. there is only one China in the world, which is the R.O.C.) as well as their 
insistence on unification, either by force or a peaceful means. However, starting in the 
early 1990s, the Taiwanese government began to reveal a “Taiwan-first” sentiment as 
well as an “anti-unification” tendency and move away from this 40-year-old position on 
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Taiwan’s status toward a position like “two Chinas” or even something close to 
“Taiwan’s de jure independence.” 
        To further explain what I have discussed above, I make two spectrums below based 
on the two dimensions of Taiwan’s status. The first spectrum is about various 
interpretations of one-China (Figure 5.1), with China’s most favored position (i.e. one-
China as nothing but the P.R.C.) at the left end, the idea of “two Chinas” at the middle, 
what China dislikes the most (i.e. independent Taiwan, an idea which suggests that 
Taiwan or, in some cases, the R.O.C. has nothing to do with “China” in any way) at the 
right end, and two Chiangs’ position (i.e. one-China as nothing but the R.O.C.) located 
between China’s most favored position and “two Chinas.” This spectrum can be used as a 
measure for the level of the Taiwanese government’s “Taiwan-first” sentiment with its 
emphasis on “one-China as nothing but the R.O.C.” indicating no “Taiwan-first” 
sentiment within the Taiwanese government and its support for the idea of “independent 
Taiwan” indicating the highest level of “Taiwan-first” sentiment the Taiwanese 
government could possibly have.   
        The second spectrum concerns various stances on unification of China and Taiwan 
(Figure 5.2), with China’s most favored position and two Chiangs’ position (i.e. 
unification) at the left end, the position supporting neither unification nor independence 
at the middle, and China’s least favored position (i.e. Taiwan’s de jure independence) at 
the right end.
2
 This spectrum can be used to measure the level of the Taiwanese 
government’s “anti-unification” tendency with its support for “unification” indicating no 
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“anti-unification” tendency within the Taiwanese government and its inclination toward 
“Taiwan’s independence” indicating the highest level of “anti-unification” tendency the 
Taiwanese government could possibly have.    
 
Figure 5.1: Various interpretations of one-China 
(A measure for the “Taiwan-first” sentiment within the Taiwanese government) 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Various stances on unification 
(A measure for the “anti-unification” tendency within the Taiwanese government) 
 
 
         
 
5-2: China’s response to Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese government 
        Since the early 1990s, Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese government 
(measured in this chapter by the Taiwanese government’s stance on Taiwan’s status) has 
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had an effect on China’s A.R.A.T.S.’s willingness to have formal contact with Taiwan’s 
S.E.F. First of all, a policy change by the Taiwanese government from two Chiangs’ 
“unification” to something close to “Taiwan’s de jure independence” (i.e. the growth of 
the “anti-unification” tendency within the Taiwanese government) and a policy change 
from two Chiangs’ “one-China as nothing but the R.O.C.” to something close to 
“independent Taiwan”  (i.e. the growth of the “Taiwan-first” sentiment within the 
Taiwanese government) were likely to bring about a hostile Chinese response and 
decrease the A.R.A.T.S.’s willingness to have formal contact with the S.E.F. By contrast, 
the Taiwanese government’s effort to move its stance on Taiwan’s status back toward 
two Chiangs’ stance (i.e. the decline of Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese 
government) was likely to result in a reconciliatory Chinese response and increase the 
A.R.A.T.S.’s willingness to have formal contact with the S.E.F. In other words, referring 
to Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2, after the Taiwanese government began to give up two 
Chiangs’ position and move rightward on both spectrums in the early 1990s, while a 
further move in the direction of China’s least favored position was likely to make China’s 
A.R.A.T.S. stop formally interacting with Taiwan’s S.E.F., a pullback leftward in the 
direction of China’s most favored position was likely to increase the former’s willingness 
to have formal contact with the latter.  
        To make a clearer argument, I combine Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 into a figure about 
various stances on Taiwan’s status below (Figure 5.3), with the horizontal axis 
representing Figure 5.1 and the vertical axis representing Figure 5.2. On this figure, the 
origin (Point X) refers to China’s most favored position on Taiwan’s status (i.e. “one-
206 
 
China as nothing but the P.R.C.” and “unification”). The point on the right side of Point 
X (Point Y) represents two Chiangs’ position (i.e. “one-China as nothing but the R.O.C.” 
and “unification”), which is also the point indicating no Taiwanese nationalism within the 
Taiwanese government. The point at the upper right corner represents the position that is 
least acceptable to China (i.e. “independent Taiwan” and “Taiwan’s de jure 
independence”), which is also the point indicating the highest level of Taiwanese 
nationalism the Taiwanese government could possibly have. In other words, the closer to 
Point Z a Taiwanese government’s position on Taiwan’s status is, the higher the level of 
Taiwanese nationalism within that Taiwanese government is.  
 
Figure 5.3: Various positions on Taiwan’s status 
(A measure for Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese government) 
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        Referring to Figure 5.3 and based on what I have discussed about the relationship 
among Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese government, China’s response to it, 
and China’s A.R.A.T.S.’s willingness to have formal contact with Taiwan’s S.E.F., my 
argument can be summarized as follows, which I will examine in more detail in the next 
two sections of this chapter: 
 
Starting in the early 1990s when Taiwanese nationalism began to grow within the 
Taiwanese government (i.e. when the Taiwanese government’s stance on Taiwan’s status 
began to depart from two Chiangs’ position, Point Y, and move in the direction of 
China’s least favored position, Point Z), (1) when the level of nationalism increased (i.e. 
when the Taiwanese government’s stance on Taiwan’s status was moved in the direction 
of Point Z), China responded with a warning or even a threat to use force against Taiwan, 
and China’s A.R.A.T.S.’s willingness to have formal contact with Taiwan’s S.E.F. 
decreased; and (2) when the level of nationalism decreased (i.e. the stance was pulled 
away from Point Z), China’s response was nonaggressive or even reconciliatory, and the 
A.R.A.T.S’s willingness to formally interact with the S.E.F. increased.  
 
5-3: Taiwan’s China policy, 1990 – 2008  
        In this section, I discuss Taiwan’s China policy with regard to the Taiwanese 
government’s stance on Taiwan’s status vis-à-vis China in the period from 1990 to 2008 
during which there were three administrations with various kinds of stances on Taiwan’s 
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status located between two Chiangs’ position and China’s least favored position. I 
examine a certain stance by locating it on Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. To do so, I address 
two questions about it. First, what does “one-China” mean according to the Taiwanese 
government (i.e. a certain stance’s location on Figure 5.1 and the horizontal axis of 
Figure 5.3)? Second, what is the Taiwanese government’s attitude toward unification (i.e. 
a certain stance’s location on Figure 5.2 and the vertical axis of Figure 5.3)? The figure 
below indicates the locations of the seven different Taiwanese government’s stances on 
Taiwan’s status in the period from 1990 to 2008 (Points A, B, C, D, E, F, and G). As 
argued, these stances reflect different levels of Taiwanese nationalism within the 
Taiwanese government. 
 
Figure 5.4: Taiwan’s China policy (1990 – 2008) 
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Part One 
 
Part Two 
 
Part Three 
 
 
 
 
The Lee Teng-hui Administration from 1990 to 2000 
        In his inaugural speech in May 1990, Taiwan’s president Lee Teng-hui officially 
included his idea of “one country, two governments” (Point A in Figure 5.4) into 
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Taiwan’s China policy. 3  The idea, which was first raised several days before the 
inauguration day, suggested that while there was only one China which consisted of both 
the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, there were two Chinese governments (i.e. the R.O.C. 
government in Taipei and the P.R.C. government in Beijing). On the basis of this stance, 
the Taiwanese government established the National Unification Council (N.U.C.) in 
October 1990, announced the so called Guidelines for National Unification (G.N.U.) in 
February 1991, which divided the process of achieving unification into the short-term, 
middle-term, and long-term stages, and published a white paper called The Meaning of 
One-China in August 1992, which defined the relations between the R.O.C. and the 
P.R.C. as those between two equal political entities.
4
 On the spectrum of one-China vs. 
independent Taiwan (see Part One of Figure 5.4), the position of “one country, two 
governments” is on the right of two Chiangs’ idea of “one-China as nothing but the 
R.O.C.” because the idea of “one country, two governments” was more unacceptable to 
China than two Chiangs’ idea was. More specifically, “one country, two governments,” 
which emphasized that the P.R.C. and the R.O.C. were two equal political entities, could 
be interpreted as “one-China as the coexistence of the R.O.C. and the P.R.C.”; and to 
China, a policy change from “one-China as nothing but the R.O.C.” to “one-China as the 
coexistence of the R.O.C. and the P.R.C.” meant the Taiwanese government was moving 
its position toward the idea of “two Chinas.” Ironically, the Taiwanese government then 
regarded the change as a concession because, based on the idea of “one country, two 
governments,” Lee renounced two Chiangs’ position that the R.O.C. government was the 
                                                 
3
 Lee 1991, 192 and 196. 
4
 Kan 2009, 43. 
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only legitimate Chinese government and the P.R.C. government was a rebellious group; 
in other words, on the basis of this idea, the existence of the P.R.C. government was no 
longer ignored, if not completely recognized. On the spectrum of unification vs. Taiwan’s 
independence (see Part Two of Figure 5.4), while the new stance was undoubtedly pro-
unification, Lee’s eagerness for unification based on the G.N.U., whose purpose to some 
extent was to delay unification, seemed not as great as two Chiangs’; therefore, it is on 
the right of both two Chiangs’ position and China’s most favored position. 
        In November 1993, the Lee Administration came up with a new stance on Taiwan’s 
status. In the 1993 meeting of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (A.P.E.C.), Taiwan’s 
representative, Chiang Pin-kung, claimed that each side of the Taiwan Strait was 
independent of the other side and raised the idea of “temporary two Chins on the basis of 
one-China” (Point B in Figure 5.4).5 Based on this stance, the Taiwanese government 
published another white paper called Relations Across the Taiwan Straits in 1994 to urge 
China to “realize the fact that China is a divided country under two separate 
governments.”6 On the spectrum of one-China vs. independent Taiwan (see Part One of 
Figure 5.4), this new stance is on the right of “one country, two governments” and is very 
close to the idea of “two Chinas.” Simply speaking, from 1990 to 1993, Taiwan’s stance 
on “one-China” was moved from the idea of “one-China as the coexistence of the R.O.C. 
and the P.R.C.” to an idea very close to “two Chinas” (i.e. temporary two Chinas). As for 
                                                 
5
 Zhao 1997, 192. More details about Chiang’s words can be found in the following newspaper articles: 
“Chiang Pin-kung: Each side of the Taiwan Strait is a sovereign state,” United Daily News, November 22, 
1993; and “Chiang Pin-kung: The government will adopt the policy of contemporary two Chinas on the 
basis of one-China,” China Times, November 22, 1993. See also Chapter Two, 51-52. 
6
 For the full text of the white paper, see 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/lp.asp?CtNode=5913&CtUnit=4135&BaseDSD=7&mp=3&xq_xCat=1994>. See 
also Kan 2009, 47; and Chapter Two, 54-55. 
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the plan for unification associated with this new stance (see Part Two of Figure 5.4), it 
was the same as that associated with the previous stance, which was to pursue unification 
at a gradual and indefinite pace. It is worth noting that Lee’s response to the Chinese 
president Jiang Zemin’s 1995 statement about cross-strait relations (i.e. Jiang’s Eight 
Points) also reflected this new position.
7
 While Jiang enthusiastically focused on the 
prospect of unification and unequivocally insisted on the One-China Principle, Lee urged 
China to face the reality about the separation of China and Taiwan and emphasized that 
the issue of “one-China” could not be effectively resolved unless China accepted that 
reality. 
        Starting in February 1997, the Lee Administration, though still rejecting China’s 
One-China Principle, began to stress that it actually never denied that there was only one 
China in this world; however, it at the same time emphasized that the so called “one-
China” was composed of two equal political entities: Taiwan and the Chinese mainland.8 
This definition of “one-China” as the coexistence of two equal political entities was 
similar to the definition of “one-China” associated with the idea of “one country, two 
governments”; therefore, given that the Lee Administration still officially followed the 
G.N.U. in 1997, it could be argued that the Lee Administration in 1997 began to move its 
stance on Taiwan’s status back to a point where the idea of “one country, two 
governments” is located with its new idea of “one-China consisting of two equal political 
entities” (Point C in Figure 5.4). 
                                                 
7
 For the full text of Jiang’s Eight Points, see 
<http://english.people.com.cn/200501/26/eng20050126_172025.html>. For the full text of Lee’s Six Points, 
see <http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=47407&ctNode=5841&mp=4&xq_xCat=01>. See also Kan 
2009, 49-50; and Chapter Two, 56-57. 
8
 See Chapter Two, 62-63. 
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        In July 1999, the Lee Administration had a new stance again when Lee made public 
his so called “two-state theory” (Point D in Figure 5.4), which pointed out the following 
two things: first, the R.O.C. had already been an independent state since 1912 and 
therefore it was unnecessary for Taiwan as the R.O.C. to declare independence; and 
second, the relations between China and Taiwan were special “state-to-state” relations.9 
This stance on Taiwan’s status, compared with the previous three stances of the Lee 
Administration’s, is much further away from two Chiangs’ position, and is very close to 
China’s least favored position. On the spectrum of one-China vs. independent Taiwan 
(see Part One of Figure 5.4), if there had been no such phrase as “special state-to-state 
relations,” this theory could have been interpreted as a pure theory of “independent 
Taiwan.”10 Similarly, on the spectrum of unification vs. Taiwan’s independence (see Part 
Two of Figure 5.4), if there had been no such sentence as “it is not necessary for Taiwan 
to declare independence,” this theory would have been regarded as one advocating 
Taiwan’s independence. 
 
The Chen Shui-bian Administration from 2000 to 2008 
        In his inaugural speech in May 2000, President Chen Shui-bian announced his 
policy of “five no’s” (Point E in Figure 5.4), which included, first, no Taiwan’s 
independence, second, no change to the national title of R.O.C., third, no inclusion of the 
“two-state theory” in Taiwan’s constitution, fourth, no referendum concerning 
                                                 
9
 See “President Lee’s Deutsche Welle Interview” (07/09/1999), posted on the following webpage of 
Taiwan Security Research: <http://taiwansecurity.org/TS/SS-990709-Deutsche-Welle-Interview.htm>. For 
more discussions about Lee’s “two-state theory,” see Sutter 2011, 7; Kan 2009, 59-60; Langdon 2001, 177; 
Bolt 2001, 81; and Chapter Two, 67-68. 
10
 Clark 2002b, 753. 
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independence or unification, and fifth, no abolishment of the N.U.C. and the G.N.U.
11
 
The stance on Taiwan’s status associated with this new China policy is located between 
Lee’s “two-state theory” and his administration’s first three stances (i.e. “one country, 
two governments,” “temporary two Chinas on the basis of one-China,” and “one-China as 
the coexistence of two equal political entities”). Actually, it is at the middle point on both 
the spectrum of one-China vs. independent Taiwan and the spectrum of unification vs. 
Taiwan’s independence (see Part One and Part Two of Figure 5.4). First, Chen’s stance 
on Taiwan’s status based on the policy of “five no’s” was similar to the idea of “two 
Chinas” because while rejecting Lee’s “two-state theory” and promising to keep the 
national title of R.O.C., Chen was not interested in the idea of “one-China.” Second, it 
supported neither independence nor unification: while Chen explicitly claimed that 
Taiwan would not declare independence and the N.U.C. and the G.N.U. would not be 
abolished, he did not provide any specific plan for unification; actually he did not even 
say that unification was the goal. However, it is worth noting that, compared with Lee’s 
“two-state theory,” Chen’s announcement of the “five no’s” policy in 2000 significantly 
moved the Taiwanese government’s stance on Taiwan’s status away from China’s least 
favored position. That being said, compared with Lee’s first three stances, it was still far 
away from two Chiangs’ position, not to mention China’s most favored position.  
        In August 2002, the Chen Administration changed its stance on Taiwan’s status. In 
his speech in the 2002 World Taiwanese Congress (W.T.C.) where overseas Taiwanese 
                                                 
11
 The full text of his speech is available on following webpage of Taiwan’s presidential office: 
<http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=18907&rmid=2355&sd=2000/5/1&ed=2
000/6/1>. See also Kan 2009, 62; and Chapter Two, 70-71. 
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advocates of Taiwan’s de jure independence met to discuss the issues about Taiwan, 
Chen introduced his idea of “one country on each side” (Point F in Figure 5.4).12 There 
are two major points involved in this idea: first, Taiwan is an independent sovereign state 
instead of a province of any other state; and second, Taiwan and China are two different 
states. Chen’s talks about “one country on each side” significantly moved the Taiwanese 
government’s stance on Taiwan’s status in the direction of China’s least favored position 
again. Actually, this new stance is closer to China’s least favored position than Lee’s 
“two-state theory” is. On the spectrum of one-China vs. independent Taiwan (see Part 
One of Figure 5.4), it is on the right of Lee’s “two-state theory” because while Lee 
explicitly linked Taiwan to the R.O.C., Chen tried to equivocate about such a linkage by 
not mentioning the R.O.C. at all. Therefore, from China’s point of view, on the spectrum 
of one-China vs. independent Taiwan, the idea of “one country on each side” can actually 
be regarded as its least favored position (i.e. independent Taiwan). As for its location on 
the spectrum of unification vs. Taiwan’s de jure independence (see Part Two of Figure 
5.4), it is located between Lee’s “two-state theory” and China’s least favored position (i.e. 
Taiwan’s independence). It is on the right of the “two-state theory” because while Lee 
pointed out that China-Taiwan relations were “special” state-to-state relations, Chen 
insisted that they were the relations between two independent sovereign states. 
Nevertheless, it is not at the right end because Chen stopped short of formally declaring 
Taiwan’s de jure independence. It is worth noting that, in 2007, Chen raised the idea of 
                                                 
12
 The full text of his speech is available on the following webpage of Taiwan’s presidential office: 
<http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=16749&rmid=2355&sd=2002/8/2&ed=2
002/8/3>. See also Kan 2009, 65-66; and Chapter Two, 76. 
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“one country on each side” again and more unequivocally in his speech to Formosan 
Association for Public Affairs (F.A.P.A.), an U.S.-based organization advocating 
Taiwan’s de jure independence, when he said that Taiwan wanted, among other things, 
“independence,” the “rectification of its name,” and a “new constitution.”13 
 
The Ma Ying-jeou Administration in 2008 
        In May 2008, the newly elected Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou announced in 
his inaugural speech that, on the basis of the so called “1992 Consensus,” 14  the 
Taiwanese government would adopt the policy of “one-China, respective interpretations” 
(Point G in Figure 5.4), which meant that first, the Taiwanese government accepted the 
idea of one-China, second, the Taiwanese government realized that Taiwan’s and China’s 
interpretations of one-China were different, and third, the Taiwanese government defined 
“one-China” as the R.O.C.15 Associated with this announcement was the introduction of 
the idea of “three no’s”: “no unification,” “no independence,” and “no use of force.”  
        Ma’s announcement of “one-China, respective interpretations” as well as “three no’s” 
significantly pulled the Taiwanese government’s stance on Taiwan’s status away from a 
point that is very close to China’s least favored position again, which was, in this case, 
Chen’s “one country on each side.” On the spectrum of one-China vs. independent 
Taiwan (see Part One of Figure 5.4), the position of “one-China, respective 
                                                 
13
 “Four wants and one no: Chen says Taiwan wants independence,” Liberty Times, March 4, 2007; and 
Chapter Two, 86-87. 
14
 For more details about the consensus, see Kan 2009, 44; and Chapter Two, 46-47. It is worth mentioning 
that both Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian insisted that there was no such thing as the 1992 Consensus.  
15
 The full text of his speech is available on the following webpage of Taiwan’s presidential office: 
<http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=16304&rmid=2355&sd=2008/5/1&ed=2
008/6/1>. See also Kan 2009, 76; and Chapter Two, 90-91. 
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interpretations” is located between two Chiangs’ position and “one country, two 
governments.” Different from two Chiangs’ position, although the idea of “one-China, 
respective interpretations” defined “one-China” as the R.O.C., first, it treated China’s 
interpretation of one-China as a different opinion instead of ignoring it at all like two 
Chiangs did, and second, it regarded the P.R.C. government as a political entity equal to 
the R.O.C. government instead of a rebellious group. Again, similar to the case of “one 
country, two governments,” while the Taiwanese government might believe that the new 
stance involved a concession, China would be worried about a possibility of “two Chinas” 
embedded in it. However, because the Ma Administration interpreted “one-China” as the 
R.O.C. instead of the coexistence of two Chinese governments, it was more acceptable to 
China than “one-China, two governments” was. On the spectrum of unification vs. 
Taiwan’s independence (see Part Two of Figure 5.4), it is nevertheless on the right of 
“one-China, two governments” because it supported neither unification nor independence; 
in this respect, its location is the same as that of Chen’s “five no’s” policy. Overall, Ma’s 
stance on Taiwan’s status in 2008 is closer to China’s most favored position than Chen’s 
“five no’s” but farer from it than Lee’s “one-China, two governments.” Actually, 
although the idea of “one-China, respective interpretations” and that of “temporary two 
Chinas on the basis of one-China” are different, the distances between them and China’s 
most favored position are almost the same with the latter being a little bit closer to 
China’s most favored position. 
        To sum up, starting in 1990, the Taiwanese government began to move its stance on 
Taiwan’s status away from two Chiangs’ position which had lasted for 40 years. In the 
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period from 1990 to 1999, President Lee moved the stance back and forth between two 
Chiangs’ position and China’s least favored position and, at the end, stopped it at a point 
very close to the latter (i.e. from two Chiangs’ position to “one country, two governments” 
to “temporary two Chinas on the basis of one-China” to “one-China as the coexistence of 
two equal political entities” to the “two-state theory”). In 2000, President Chen’s policy 
of “five no’s” pulled the stance away from China’s least favored position. Nevertheless, 
in 2002, his idea of “one country on each side” significantly moved the stance to a point 
that is closer to China’s least favored position than Lee’s “two-state theory” is, and Chen 
stuck to that idea until his term ended in 2008. In 2008, President Ma embraced the idea 
of “one-China, respective interpretations” which moved the Taiwanese government’s 
stance on Taiwan’s status away from China’s least favored position again.  
 
5-4: China’s responses and the formal contact between the A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F. 
        Based on the changes in the Taiwanese government’s stance on Taiwan’s status that 
I have discussed in the previous section, which is used in this chapter as a measure for 
Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese government, it can be found that, from 1990 
to 2008, there are seven cases of changes in the level of Taiwanese nationalism within the 
Taiwanese government: the level of nationalism increased in May 1990 and further 
increased in November 1993; it then decreased in February 1997 but increased again in 
July 1999; it decreased again in May 2000 but increased in August 2002; and in May 
2008, it decreased again. In this section, I examine China’s responses to the 
aforementioned growth and decline of Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese 
government and the effect of Taiwanese nationalism on China’s A.R.A.T.S.’s willingness 
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to have formal contact with Taiwan’s S.E.F. To do so, I address two questions. First, in 
the period from 1990 to 2008, what was China’s response to the growth or the decline of 
Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese government, which is measured by its 
response to a change in the Taiwanese government’s stance on Taiwan’s status? More 
specifically, was the response aggressive? Or, was it relatively reconciliatory? Second, in 
the period from 1990 to 2008, did the growth or the decline of Taiwanese nationalism 
within the Taiwanese government have any effect on the formal contact between China’s 
A.R.A.T.S. and Taiwan’s S.E.F.? More specifically, were the growth and the decline of 
nationalism followed by the cessation of the formal contact and the resumption of it, 
respectively? Based on the answers to these two questions that I will discuss in detail 
later, the major finding is as follows. When Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese 
government grew, China became hostile, and China’s A.R.A.T.S. was inclined to cease 
its formal contact with Taiwan’s S.E.F. By contrast, when the level of Taiwanese 
nationalism decreased, the Chinese response was nonaggressive or even reconciliatory, 
and the A.R.A.T.S.’s willingness to formally interact with the S.E.F. increased. 
 
The growth of Taiwanese nationalism in May 1990 
        In this case (the move from Point Y to Point A in Figure 5.4), responding to the idea 
of “one country, two governments,” China warned the Taiwanese government neither to 
resist unification nor to move its stance on Taiwan’s status further toward “two Chinas” 
or even “independent Taiwan.” In a white paper on the Taiwan issue, The Taiwan 
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Question and Reunification of China, which was published in August 1993,
16
 China 
clearly explained its idea of “one-China as nothing but the P.R.C.”: 
There is only one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and the seat 
of China’s central government is in Beijing; this is a universally recognized fact as well 
as the premise for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question. 
 
Furthermore, it explicitly said that it would never accept the idea of “one country, two 
governments.” 
The Chinese Government is firmly against any words or deeds designed to split China’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. It opposes “two Chinas,” “one China, one Taiwan,” 
“one country, two governments” or any attempt or act that could lead to the 
“independence of Taiwan.” 
 
Also, it criticized the Taiwanese government for being equivocal when it came to the 
issue of unification. 
It should be pointed out that notwithstanding a certain measure of easing up by the 
Taiwan authorities, their current policy vis-à-vis the mainland still seriously impedes the 
development of relations across the Straits as well as the reunification of the country. 
They talk about the necessity of a reunified China, but their deeds are always a far cry 
from the principle of one China. They try to prolong Taiwan’s separation from the 
mainland and refuse to hold talks on peaceful reunification. 
 
        As for the formal contact between the A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F., this case of the 
growth of Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese government did not have the 
negative effect on the contact as expected. In spite of an increase in the level of 
Taiwanese nationalism, in March 1992, the two organizations had their first formal 
meeting since their foundation and began their formal contact with each other.
17
 
 
                                                 
16
 For the full text of the white paper, see <http://news.xinhuanet.com/tai_gang_ao/2006-
04/03/content_4378157.htm>. For more discussions about it, see Chu 1997, 252; Kan 2009, 46-47; and 
Chapter Two, 50. 
17
 See Chapter Two, 45-46. 
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The growth of Taiwanese nationalism in November 1993 
        In this case (the move from Point A to Point B in Figure 5.4), China’s response to 
the idea of “temporary two Chinas on the basis of one-China” could be found in the 
Chinese president Jiang Zemin’s eight-point proposal about cross-strait relations, which 
was announced in January 1995.
18
 In his proposal, President Jiang explicitly said that 
both “one country, two governments” and “temporary two Chinas on the basis of one-
China” violated China’s One-China Principle: 
China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity must never be allowed to suffer division. We 
must resolutely oppose any statement and action for creating the “independence of 
Taiwan”; and we must also resolutely oppose the “propositions to split the country and 
rule under separate regimes,” “two Chinas over a certain period of time,” etc., which are 
contrary to the principle of one China. 
 
Jiang kept on criticizing that Taiwan’s China policy based on the idea of “temporary two 
Chinas on the basis of one-China” was not helpful for achieving the goal of unification, 
and he even believed that such a policy would set conditions for Taiwan’s de jure 
independence:  
We oppose Taiwan’s activities in “expanding its living space internationally,” aimed at 
creating “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” All patriotic compatriots in Taiwan 
and other people of insight understand that instead of solving problems, such activities 
can only help the forces working for the “independence of Taiwan,” and undermine the 
progress of peaceful reunification. Only after peaceful reunification is accomplished can 
our Taiwan compatriots and other Chinese truly and fully share the international dignity 
and honor attained by our great motherland. 
 
        In addition to verbal criticisms, China took some sort of military action against the 
growth of Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese government in this case. 
Following Lee’s response to Jiang’s Eight Points in April 1995, which emphasized the 
                                                 
18
 See Note 7. For other responses from China, see Zhao 1997, 192. 
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separation of China and Taiwan,
19
 and his speech in the U.S. in June, in which he talked 
about the so called “Taiwan experience” on economic development and democratization, 
China conducted a series of missile tests and military exercises around Taiwan from July 
to November and did the same things again in March 1996.
20
 It is also worth noting that 
this case of the growth of Taiwanese nationalism did have a negative effect on the formal 
contact between the A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F. After Lee’s visit to the U.S., on June 16th, 
1995, the A.R.A.T.S. cancelled a scheduled meeting with the S.E.F. and ceased all kinds 
of formal contact with it.
21
 
 
The decline of Taiwanese nationalism in February 1997 
        This case of the decline of Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese government 
(the move from Point B to Point C in Figure 5.4) brought about some reconciliatory 
responses from China. For example, in July 1997, an official from the A.R.A.T.S. 
implicitly admitted the separation of China and Taiwan that had been pointed out several 
times before by the Taiwanese government when he said that “although China has not 
been unified yet, its sovereignty has never been divided”; also, in August, some Chinese 
officials began to express their satisfaction with the Taiwanese government’s embracing 
the idea of “one-China” although they knew very well that the Taiwanese government’s 
interpretation of “one-China” was in conflict with China’s One-China Principle.22 
                                                 
19
 See Note 7. 
20
 Wang & Liu 2004, 569; and Tung 2003, 158.  
21
 See Chapter Two, 57-58. 
22
 Ibid., 63. 
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        In addition, the decline of Taiwanese nationalism in this case did have a positive 
effect on the formal contact between the A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F. In November 1997, 
the A.R.A.T.S. contacted the S.E.F. for the first time since the formal contact between the 
two organizations was ceased in 1995 to invite the vice chairman of the latter to visit 
China, and the formal contact between the two organizations was officially resumed in 
April 1998 although the aforementioned invitation was not accepted by the S.E.F. in the 
first place.
23
 
         
The growth of Taiwanese nationalism in July 1999 
        The growth of Taiwanese nationalism in this case (the move from Point C to Point D 
in Figure 5.4) resulted in a hostile response from China.
24
 In addition to the military 
exercises near Taiwan from July to September 1999,
25
 China published another white 
paper on the issue of Taiwan in February 2000, One-China Principle and the Taiwan 
Problem, in its response to the “two-state theory,” which is very close to China’s least 
favored position.
26
 In this white paper, the Chinese government pointed out that Taiwan’s 
position on one-China had gradually become farer and farer away from China’s since the 
early 1990s: 
Separatist forces in Taiwan are bent on violating the One-China Principle… Since the 
early 1990s, Lee Teng-hui has gradually deviated from the One-China Principle, 
trumpeting “two governments,” “two reciprocal political entities,” “Taiwan is already a 
state with independent sovereignty,” and “at the present stage the Republic of China is on 
                                                 
23
 Ibid., 63-64. 
24
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Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China is on the mainland”…Under the direction of 
Lee Teng-hui, the Taiwan authorities have adopted a series of measures towards actual 
separation. In matters of Taiwan’s form of government, the Taiwan authorities are 
seeking to transform Taiwan into an “independent political entity” through a 
“constitutional reform,” so as to suit the needs of creating “two Chinas.” 
 
It kept on saying that the “two-state theory” would never be accepted:  
On July 9, he (Lee Teng-hui) went so far as to publicly distort inter-Straits relations as 
“state to state relations, or at least special state to state relations,” in an attempt to 
fundamentally change the status of Taiwan as a part of China, sabotage the relations 
between both sides of the Taiwan Straits, especially the basis for cross-Straits political 
dialogues and negotiations, and wreck the foundation for peaceful reunification. 
 
Feeling that the Taiwanese government’s China policy based on the “two-state theory” 
was not pro-unification, the Chinese government threatened in the white paper that if the 
Taiwanese government had no plan for unification, China would use force against 
Taiwan:   
If a grave turn of events occurs leading to the separation of Taiwan from China in any 
name, or if Taiwan is invaded and occupied by foreign countries, or if the Taiwan 
authorities refuse, sine die, the peaceful settlement of cross-Straits reunification through 
negotiations, then the Chinese Government will only be forced to adopt all drastic 
measures possible, including the use of force, to safeguard China’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity and fulfill the great cause of reunification. 
 
Also, in January 2000, China’s Vice Premier Qian Qichen publicly criticized Taiwan’s 
president Lee Teng-hui, who created the “two-state theory,” as a “trouble maker” and 
explicitly said that Taiwan’s de jure independence would trigger a Chinese military 
response:
27
 
“Taiwan independence” absolutely will not mean peace but a war between the two sides 
of the straits and compatriots both in Taiwan and the mainland must make concerted 
efforts to fight against it… Over the past decade, the Chinese government has had to put 
up heated and repeated struggles against Taiwan’s separatist force led by Lee Teng-hui… 
China’s anti-separatist campaign has won widespread support around the world. There is 
no country in the world that supports or chimes in with Lee’s “two-state” remarks. Lee 
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has failed to overturn the one China principle, but instead, has turned himself a “trouble 
maker” for the international community. 
 
        As for the formal contact between the A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F., this case of the 
growth of Taiwanese nationalism did have a negative effect on the contact. Starting in 
mid-July 1999, the A.R.A.T.S. began to reveal its dissatisfaction with the S.E.F.’s 
support for the “two-state theory,” and in August, the former officially cancelled the 
scheduled meetings with the latter and ceased all kinds of formal contact between the two 
organizations.
28
  
 
The decline of Taiwanese nationalism in May 2000 
        Compared to its response to the growth of Taiwanese nationalism in the previous 
case, China’s response to the decline of Taiwanese nationalism in this case (the move 
from Point D to Point E in Figure 5.4) was nonaggressive.
29
 In July 2000, when meeting 
with Taiwanese lawmakers and journalists, China’s Vice Premier Qian Qichen talked 
about a more flexible idea of one-China. Different from China’s conventional 
formulation about one-China on the basis of its One-China Principle, which emphasized 
that Taiwan was part of the P.R.C., the new formulation stated that both the Chinese 
mainland and Taiwan were part of one-China (i.e. a change from “one-China as nothing 
but the P.R.C.” to “one-China as the coexistence of the Chinese mainland and Taiwan):30 
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With regard to cross-strait relations, the one China principle we stand for is that there is 
only one China in the world; the mainland and Taiwan all belong to one China; and 
China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are indivisible. 
 
Qian mentioned this new formulation again at a state conference on the Taiwan issue in 
August 2000 and in two media interviews in September 2000 and January 2001.
31
 
Moreover, the Chinese premier Zhu Rongji, the Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan, 
and the Chinese president Jiang Zemin all reaffirmed Qian’s new idea of one-China in 
March, September, and November 2002, respectively.
32
  
        However, the decline of Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese government in 
this case did not have a positive effect on the formal contact between the A.R.A.T.S. and 
the S.E.F. as expected. For one thing, China was actually not satisfied with the policy of 
“five no’s” which, according to China, involved an idea of Taiwan’s independence with 
“sophisticated decoration” on it.33 For another thing, China had been very skeptical about 
Chen’s intention toward China-Taiwan relations since he was elected because of his 
background as an advocate of Taiwan’s independence.34 China’s suspicion would only 
get deeper and deeper because of the negative attitude toward unification Chen had 
revealed at times since his announcement of the “five no’s” policy. For example, in mid-
August 2000, three months after his inauguration, Chen, during his visit to the Dominican 
Republic, openly stated that Taiwan as a democracy would never accept unification as the 
“only option.”35 China’s distrust of Chen derived from his behavior or words like those 
mentioned above explains well why the decline of Taiwanese nationalism in this case did 
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not bring about the resumption of the formal contact between the A.R.A.T.S. and the 
S.E.F. that was ceased in 1999. 
 
The growth of Taiwanese nationalism in August 2002 
        In this case (the move from Point E to Point F in Figure 5.4), the growth of 
Taiwanese nationalism resulted in a Chinese threat to use force against Taiwan. In 2003, 
a People’s Liberation Army major general warned that any “open promotion of Taiwan 
independence” would be met with force. 36  In May 2004, the Chinese government 
released a statement about its thoughts on the development of cross-strait relations from 
2000 to 2004.
37
 In this statement, the Chinese government criticized President Chen of 
Taiwan for violating his own promises about the five no’s, and called his idea of “one 
country on each side” a “separatist” idea:  
Four years ago, Chen Shui-bian pledged himself to the so called “five no’s” policy. His 
track record, however, was one of broken promises and bad faith…He said he would not 
push for the inclusion of the so-called “state-to-state” description in the “constitution,” 
but he has dished out a separatist proposition of “one country on each side.”  
 
It also explicitly pointed out that Taiwan’s de jure independence would be followed by a 
Chinese military action: 
“Taiwan independence” does not lead to peace, nor dismemberment to stability. We will 
never compromise on the one-China principle, never give up our efforts for peace 
negotiations, never falter in our sincere pursuit of peace and development on sides of the 
Straits with our Taiwan compatriots, never waver in our resolve to safeguard China’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and never put up with “Taiwan’s independence.”  
 
On March 4
th
, 2005, the Chinese president Hu Jintao announced his four-point guidelines 
on cross-strait relations: first, never sway in adhering to the One-China Principle; second, 
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never give up efforts to seek peaceful reunification; third, never change the principle of 
placing hope on the Taiwanese people; and fourth, never compromise in opposing the 
“Taiwan independence” secessionist activities. 38  Ten days later, based on these four 
points, China’s National People’s Congress passed the so called Anti-Secession Law. The 
eighth article of this law explicitly stated that China would use force against Taiwan if 
the Taiwanese government officially declared Taiwan’s independence:39 
In the event that the “Taiwan independence” secessionist forces should act under any 
name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major 
incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a 
peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-
peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. 
 
        In addition, the growth of Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese government 
in this case had a negative effect on the formal contact between the A.R.A.T.S. and the 
S.E.F. Immediately after Chen raised the idea of “one country on each side,” the Chinese 
government unequivocally labeled Chen as a separatist.
40
 Under this circumstance, given 
that the A.R.A.T.S. had made the Chen Administration’s embracing the idea of “one-
China” a precondition for the resumption of its contact with the S.E.F. since Chen was 
inaugurated, any possibility of the resumption of the formal contact between the two 
organizations completely vanished in August 2002 when Taiwanese nationalism within 
the Taiwanese government reached an unprecedented high level (i.e. the announcement 
of “one country on each side”). 
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The decline of Taiwanese nationalism in May 2008           
        In this case (the move from Point F to Point G in Figure 5.4), China’s response to 
the decline of Taiwanese nationalism was very reconciliatory. Two days after President 
Ma’s inaugural speech which unveiled the change in the Taiwanese government’s stance 
on Taiwan’s status from the policy of “one country on each side” to that of “one-China, 
respective interpretations,” the director of the Chinese Communist Party’s Taiwan Work 
Office who was also the director of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, Chen Yunlin, 
jubilantly welcomed the change and revealed that China was willing to resume the formal 
contact between the A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F. on the basis of the 1992 Consensus:
 41
   
The peaceful development of cross-Strait relations has become the common wish and 
mutual benefits of people both in China’s mainland and Taiwan…There are major 
positive changes in the situation in Taiwan with the joint efforts of compatriots across the 
Strait…It provides a precious opportunity for both sides of the Taiwan Strait…We hope 
that people on both sides bear in mind the well-being of compatriots across the Strait and 
the interests of Chinese nation as a whole…Both sides of the Taiwan Strait are working 
hard to resume the negotiations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus. 
 
Furthermore, when talking about Taiwan’s de jure independence, he tried to persuade the 
advocates of Taiwan’s independence to give up their cause in nonaggressive or even 
friendly rhetoric:
42
 
We warmly welcome those who used to have the illusion of “Taiwan independence,” 
those who used to advocate “Taiwan independence” and even those who used to be 
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engaged in such activities to return to the correct path of peaceful development of cross-
straits relations. 
 
In June 2008, the chairman of the national committee of China’s Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference, Jia Qinglin, reaffirmed that China did accept the 1992 
Consensus and revealed that China no longer regarded a political negotiation about 
unification as a top priority:
43
   
The Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (A.R.A.T.S.) had the important 
task of promoting the peaceful development of relations across the Taiwan Strait under a 
new situation…The A.R.A.T.S. should resume talks with Taiwan’s Straits Exchange 
Foundation (S.E.F.) on the basis of the 1992 Consensus to build mutual trust, shelve 
differences and seek common ground for mutual benefits…The current priority of the 
talks should be given to economic issues, and then politics…Efforts should be made to 
tackle easy problems and leave the thorny issues for later negotiation. 
 
In December 2008, the Chinese president Hu Jintao announced his six-point proposal for 
the development of cross-strait relations, whose optimistic rhetoric was very obvious:
44
 
First, abide by the “one China” principle and enhance political mutual trust…Second, 
advance economic cooperation and common development…Third, promote Chinese 
culture and strengthen the spiritual bond…Fourth, strengthen people-to-people 
exchanges…Fifth, safeguard national sovereignty…Sixth, end the state of hostility and 
reach a peace agreement, including exploring the establishment of a mechanism of 
mutual trust for military security. 
 
Moreover, in his announcement, Hu expressed that China would be willing to positively 
deal with the issue about Taiwan’s participation in international organizations by saying 
“the mainland is willing to discuss with Taiwan proper and reasonable arrangements for 
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Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, as long as this does not create a 
scenario of ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China and one Taiwan.’” 
        As for the formal contact between the A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F., the decline of 
Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese government in this case did have a positive 
effect on the contact. In less than one month after President Ma’s inauguration, the formal 
contact between the A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F. that had been ceased for nine years was 
officially resumed.
45
 
        The table below summarizes the findings of this section. 
 
Table 5.1: Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese government and its effect on 
China-Taiwan relations 
 
 A 
(May 1990) 
B 
(Nov 1993) 
C 
(Feb 1997) 
D 
(Jul 1999) 
E 
(May 2000) 
F 
(Aug 2002) 
G 
(May 2008) 
Taiwanese 
nationalism 
within the 
Taiwanese 
government 
Grew Grew Declined Grew Declined Grew Declined 
China’s 
responses 
Hostile Hostile Reconciliatory Hostile Reconciliatory Hostile Reconciliatory 
The effect 
on the 
formal 
contact 
between the 
A.R.A.T.S. 
and the 
S.E.F. 
No effect 
Negative: 
contact was 
ceased 
starting in 
Jun 1995 
Positive: 
contact was 
resumed in 
Apr 1998 
Negative: 
contact was 
ceased 
starting in 
Aug 1999 
No effect 
Negative: 
contact was 
not resumed 
Positive: 
contact was 
resumed in 
Jun 2008 
 
 
5-5: Discussion 
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        This chapter, focusing on Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese government 
in the period from 1990 to 2008, shows that there is a relationship among the growth or 
the decline of Taiwanese nationalism within the Taiwanese government (measured by the 
change in the Taiwanese government’s stance on Taiwan’s status vis-à-vis China), 
China’s response to it, and the cessation or the resumption of the formal contact between 
China’s A.R.A.T.S. and Taiwan’s S.E.F. When Taiwanese nationalism grew, China 
became hostile, and the A.R.A.T.S tended not to have any formal contact with the S.E.F. 
By contrast, when Taiwanese nationalism declined, China became nonaggressive or even 
reconciliatory, and the A.R.A.T.S.’s willingness to formally interact with the S.E.F. 
increased.  
        Based on the findings of this chapter as well as the pervious chapter, I make the 
table below that shows the levels of tension between China and Taiwan during the Lee, 
Chen, and Ma Administrations, which are measured by Chinese leaders’ attitudes toward 
unification, China’s public statements about Taiwan in general, and the formal contact 
between the A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F., combined. 
 
Table 5.2: The level of tension between China and Taiwan (1990 – 2008) 
 
Lee (1990 – 2000) Chen (2000 – 2008) Ma (2008) 
Chinese leaders’ attitudes 
toward unification 
Impatient Mostly patient Patient 
China’s public statements 
about Taiwan 
Mostly hostile Mostly hostile Reconciliatory 
The formal contact between 
the A.R.A.T.S. and the S.E.F. 
Partially normal No contact at all Normal 
The tension between China 
and Taiwan 
High High Low 
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        Generally speaking, the Lee Administration’s partially pro-independence attitude 
(given its ambiguous attitude toward the idea of “one-China” and a very high level of 
Taiwanese nationalism within it at a later stage) was the reason why China was mostly 
hostile toward Taiwan and ceased the formal contact between its A.R.A.T.S. and 
Taiwan’s S.E.F. twice in the 1990s. The Chinese leader’s impatient attitude toward 
unification also played a role in increasing the level of tension between China and 
Taiwan during this period, resulting in a series of China’s military exercises and live 
missile tests against Taiwan from 1995 to 1996. 
        In the case of the Chen Administration, although the Chinese leader during this 
period was mostly patient about unification due to the emergence of the anti-
independence Pan-Blue in Taiwan’s domestic politics, the Chen Administration’s pro-
independence attitude (given its unwillingness to accept any idea of “one-China” and a 
very high level of Taiwanese nationalism within it from 2002 to 2008) resulted in China’s 
unwillingness to allow its A.R.A.T.S. to have any formal contact with Taiwan’s S.E.F. 
and China’s hostility toward Taiwan, both of which led to high tension between China 
and Taiwan in the period from 2000 to 2008.  
        By contrast, the Ma Administration’s anti-independence attitude (given its 
embracing the idea of “one-China” and a relatively low level of Taiwanese nationalism 
within it) brought about the resumption of the formal contact between the A.R.A.T.S. and 
the S.E.F. as well as China’s reconciliatory attitude toward Taiwan after Ma’s 
inauguration and suddenly eased the tension between China and Taiwan that had lasted 
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for almost two decades.
46
 This anti-independence attitude also encouraged the Chinese 
leader to continue his patient attitude toward unification which, in turn, played an 
important role in keeping the tension between China and Taiwan low. 
        Given the fact that Taiwan’s president has huge constitutional power to deal with 
issues concerning national security, foreign affairs and cross-strait relations, whether a 
Taiwanese president has a pro-independence attitude or anti-independence attitude 
matters a great deal when it comes to China-Taiwan relations. As Zhongqi Pan observes, 
since the Taiwanese government was no longer committed itself to the idea of “one-
China” in the early 1990s, the decision made by Taiwanese leaders with regard to China-
Taiwan relations has had potential to trigger a war on the Taiwan Strait.
47
 Similarly, Scott 
Kastner argues that “the danger of war in the Taiwan Strait arises primarily from a 
willingness of Taiwan’s leaders to test Beijing’s ‘redline,’ the point at which Mainland 
leaders would rather fight a war than accept a certain level of Taiwanese sovereignty.”48 
As we can see, my analysis above supports Pan’s and Kastner’s arguments. When there 
was a pro-independence president in Taiwan, the likelihood of the aforementioned danger 
did increase, as Pan and Kastner predicts (i.e. the cases of Lee and Chen). By contrast, 
the likelihood greatly decreased when there was an anti-independence president in 
Taiwan (i.e. the case of Ma). 
        Moreover, taking into account the political conflict over identity in Taiwan’s 
domestic politics that I have discussed in Chapter Four, and based on the analysis so far 
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in this section, it could be also argued that, since 2001 when Taiwan’s domestic politics 
began to be dominated by the conflict between the pro-independence Pan-Green and the 
anti-independence Pan-Blue, the outcome of the competition between them for Taiwan’s 
presidency did have a critical effect on China-Taiwan relations. More specifically, from 
2001 to 2008, which political force won Taiwan’s presidential elections mattered a great 
deal: when the Pan-Green won and the Taiwanese president was pro-independence 
accordingly, cross-strait relations became very confrontational (i.e. the case of the 2004 
election which was won by Chen); by contrast, when the Pan-Blue won and the 
Taiwanese president was anti-independence accordingly, the relations between China and 
Taiwan became less confrontational (i.e. the case of the 2008 election which was won by 
Ma). This finding regarding the relationship between Taiwan’s domestic politics and 
China-Taiwan relations since 2001 can be summarized in the figure below. 
 
Figure 5.5: Taiwan’s domestic politics and China-Taiwan relations (2001-2008) 
 
 
Political competitions between the pro-independence Pan-Green and the anti-independence Pan-Blue 
in Taiwan’s presidential elections 
 
↓                                        ↓ 
 
A pro-independence Pan-Green president      An anti-independence Pan-Blue president 
 
↓                                        ↓ 
 
Very confrontational cross-strait relations     Less confrontational cross-strait relations 
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        Therefore, going back to the major theme of my dissertation which is about the 
relationship between cross-strait economic ties and China-Taiwan relations, if we try to 
make an argument that the growing cross-strait economic ties from 1990 to 2007 did play 
a role in the emergence of relatively less confrontational China-Taiwan relations in 2008, 
we have to find evidence demonstrating that the growing economic ties from 1990 to 
2007 did play an important role in helping the Pan-Blue win the 2008 presidential 
election. This is the work I will do in the next three chapters. 
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Chapter Six 
The Beginning of the Domestic Conflict over Cross-Strait Economic Ties: 
The Emergence of Economic Winners and Their Conflict with the Taiwanese 
Government, 1990 – 2000 
 
        In the previous two chapters, I have demonstrated that there is a relationship 
between Taiwan’s domestic politics and China-Taiwan relations. More specifically, I 
have shown that the reason why China-Taiwan relations became less confrontational in 
2008 compared with their tense relations over the past 18 years concerns the emergence 
of an anti-independence president in Taiwan in 2008, which was the result of the Pan-
Blue’s victory in the 2008 presidential election. In the next three chapters (i.e. Chapters 
Six, Seven, and Eight), I shift the focus to the relationship between China-Taiwan 
economic ties and Taiwan’s domestic politics to examine how the growing economic ties 
between China and Taiwan from 1990 to 2007 affected Taiwan’s domestic politics and, 
in turn, played a role in the winning of the Pan-Blue over the Pan-Green in the 2008 
presidential election.  
        Simply speaking, I argue that, in the period from 1990 to 2008, (1) growing cross-
strait economic ties brought about a cleavage between the Taiwanese who economically 
benefited from the ties (i.e. the economic winners) and those who were economically 
harmed by the ties (i.e. the economic losers); (2) starting in 2001 when the political 
conflict between the anti-independence Pan-Blue and the pro-independence Pan-Green 
unfolded, the Pan-Blue and the Pan-Green began to exploit the aforementioned cleavage 
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to their political advantages in Taiwan’s domestic politics: while the former formed a 
pro-openness coalition with the economic winners, the latter (or, more specifically, the 
Pan-Green politicians who were anti-openness given the fact that, as I will argue, not all 
of the Pan-Green politicians were against openness at least in the beginning) formed an 
anti-openness coalition with the losers; and (3) in the period from 2007 to 2008, while the 
political strength and popularity of the pro-openness coalition significantly grew, the anti-
openness force became less politically attractive among the Taiwanese general public and 
had a contradiction with the Pan-Green presidential candidate, who revealed an election-
driven pro-openness tendency, all of which in turn resulted in the winning of the pro-
openness coalition (or, more specifically, the Pan-Blue) in the 2008 Taiwanese 
presidential election.  
        In this chapter, I first discuss the cleavage between the economic winners and losers; 
then, I examine the emergence of the economic winners in Taiwan’s domestic politics 
and their conflict with the Taiwanese government over the issues concerning cross-strait 
economic ties in the period from 1990 to 2000. In Chapter Seven, focusing on the period 
from 2001 to 2006, I explore the conflict between the pro-openness and the anti-openness 
coalitions as well as how the Taiwanese government, which was controlled by a group of 
Pan-Green politicians, many of whom were not completely against openness in the 
beginning, interacted with the two coalitions. Finally, in Chapter Eight, I examine the 
growing contradiction between the anti-openness coalition and the Pan-Green 
presidential candidate during his campaign for presidency from 2007 to 2008, which, as I 
will argue, played a role in his defeat by the Pan-Blue candidate. 
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6-1: The cleavage between the economic winners and losers in Taiwan 
        China-Taiwan economic ties did not economically benefit all of the people in 
Taiwan in the period from 1990 to 2008. In other words, while some Taiwanese became 
economic winners in growing cross-strait economic ties, others were turned into 
economic losers. In this section, I explore who these winners and losers were by 
examining whether and how the Taiwanese capital and labor in the manufacturing sector 
were economically affected by China-Taiwan economic ties. Of course, there were 
winners and losers outside the manufacturing sector. However, I think the cleavage in the 
manufacturing sector would serve as a good example that can help us better understand 
the whole cleavage. In general, the manufacturing sector is the economic sector that is 
most directly affected by trade and foreign direct investment (F.D.I.). Also, in the case of 
Taiwan specifically, (1) the manufacturing sector has been playing one of the most 
important roles in Taiwan’s economy which is largely an export-oriented one, and (2) 
compared with other sectors, it has been the most economically active in China in terms 
of the Taiwanese manufacturers’ investment in China. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue 
that, if China-Taiwan economic ties do have any impact on the livelihoods of the 
Taiwanese people, the capital and the labor in the Taiwanese manufacturing sector should 
be among the most affected. 
        As the table below shows, in the period from 1990 to 2008, in terms of its share of 
Taiwan’s gross domestic product (G.D.P.) and the percentage of the Taiwanese workers 
employed by it, Taiwan’s manufacturing sector was inferior to Taiwan’s largest 
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economic sector, i.e. the services sector; however, when it comes to its contribution to 
Taiwan’s annual G.D.P. growth, the manufacturing sector was as economically important 
as the services one, especially after 2000. 
 
Table 6.1: The services and the manufacturing sectors in Taiwan’s economy 
 
Share of GDP (%) Share of labor force (%) Contribution to GDP growth 
Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Services GDP growth Manufacturing Services 
1990 27.84 60.67 32.03 46.32 6.87 -0.83 6.32 
1991 25.27 62.68 30.79 47.12 7.88 1.33 5.74 
1992 24.66 63.43 29.95 48.06 7.56 0.71 5.99 
1993 23.58 64.54 28.40 49.43 6.73 0.43 5.52 
1994 22.50 65.64 27.80 49.86 7.59 1.26 5.71 
1995 22.09 66.32 27.08 50.71 6.38 1.17 5.21 
1996 21.86 67.24 26.71 52.39 5.54 1.02 4.75 
1997 21.68 68.20 28.00 52.26 5.48 1.37 4.36 
1998 21.85 68.79 28.11 53.23 3.47 0.53 3.60 
1999 21.63 69.96 27.74 54.54 5.97 1.58 4.46 
2000 21.90 70.23 27.97 54.99 5.80 1.79 4.15 
2001 22.40 70.30 27.65 55.90 -1.65 -1.55 -0.09 
2002 21.20 71.39 27.20 56.66 5.26 2.49 2.07 
2003 22.50 69.79 27.16 59.24 3.67 2.27 1.79 
2004 23.89 69.05 27.40 57.54 6.19 2.47 3.57 
2005 24.82 68.38 27.47 57.67 4.70 1.96 2.65 
2006 25.58 67.84 27.46 57.92 5.44 2.31 2.86 
2007 26.46 67.06 27.61 57.92 5.98 2.60 2.97 
2008 27.41 66.07 27.74 58.02 0.73 0.27 0.70 
Source: Taiwan’s Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics 
<http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=1>. Note: Contribution to GDP growth (M or S) for Year X = 
(growth rate of M or S for Year X) * (M or S/GDP for Year X-1). 
 
Furthermore, as another table below reveals, in the period from 1991 to 2008, the 
investment made in China by Taiwan’s manufacturing sector constituted around 90% of 
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the whole Taiwanese investment in China while the services sector, the second largest 
contributor to the investment, contributed only 10% of the investment. 
 
Table 6.2: The share of Taiwanese investment in China by Taiwan’s economic sectors 
 
Agriculture, 
Forestry, and 
Fishing 
Mining and 
Quarrying 
Electricity and 
gas supply, 
Water supply 
and 
remediation 
services, and 
Construction 
Services Manufacturing 
1991 -1995 0.74% 0.19% 0.37% 5.52% 93.18% 
1996 0.58% 0.60% 0.54% 7.51% 90.78% 
1997 1.12% 0.15% 0.76% 7.93% 90.04% 
1998 1.04% 0.15% 0.17% 8.67% 89.97% 
1999 0.37% 0.18% 0.22% 6.15% 93.08% 
2000 0.22% 0.01% 0.82% 7.50% 91.45% 
2001 0.37% 0.04% 1.08% 8.21% 90.30% 
2002 0.43% 0.17% 1.14% 7.87% 90.40% 
2003 0.48% 0.28% 0.77% 10.05% 88.42% 
2004 0.05% 0.44% 1.15% 7.80% 90.55% 
2005 0.13% 0.54% 0.55% 10.85% 87.93% 
2006 0.12% 0.02% 0.85% 12.01% 87.01% 
2007 0.17% 0.03% 0.86% 11.01% 87.92% 
2008 0.15% 0.08% 0.57% 17.25% 81.95% 
Average 0.43% 0.21% 0.70% 9.17% 89.50% 
Source: Chen, Yang & Li 2008, 42; and Investment Commission of Taiwan's Ministry of Economic 
Affairs <http://www.moeaic.gov.tw>.   
 
        In the Taiwanese manufacturing sector, among owners of capital, some are winning 
in China-Taiwan economic ties while others are not. China has cheap labor, rich raw 
materials, and a big market. In addition, it is very close to Taiwan not only 
geographically but also culturally, ethnically, and linguistically.
1
 Therefore, when the 
                                                 
1
 Boutin 1997, 86; Chu 1997, 240; Steinfeld 2005, 230; and Deng 2000, 964. 
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economic conditions for investment and manufacturing in Taiwan turned bad in the late 
1980s due to (1) the dramatic appreciation of the New Taiwan Dollars against the U.S. 
Dollars, (2) the increase in wages, (3) the growing conflict between the capital and labor, 
and (4) the emergence of strict anti-pollution regulations, many Taiwanese export-
oriented manufacturers, especially those small and medium-sized ones in labor-intensive 
industries, began to move their operations to China, which eventually led to the 
emergence of a cross-strait “commodity chain.”2 Here, Taiwan’s distinctive industrial 
structure which involves an “extensive and dense net of subcontracting relationships” 
among small and medium-sized firms in export-oriented labor-intensive sectors greatly 
facilitated this trend when a few manufacturers’ moving to China was followed by groups 
of connected manufacturers.
3
 In addition, China, whose level of development was still 
relatively low during that period, also provided an ideal market for those Taiwanese small 
manufacturers whose low-quality products were not marketable in most of the other 
markets including Taiwan.
4
 Finally, western countries’ economic sanctions against China 
in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Incident further gave Taiwanese manufacturers a 
good opportunity to fill the economic vacuum by offering capital and technologies that 
China eagerly needed during that time.
5
  
        Following the small and medium export-oriented manufacturers, in the mid- to late 
1990s, larger Taiwanese manufacturers in more capital-intensive or high-tech based 
                                                 
2
 For more discussions about the economic factors leading to Taiwanese investment in China, see Crane 
1993, 711; Dent 2001, 11; Sutter 2002, 525 and 527; Clark 2002b, 754; Deng 2000, 962; and Wu 1997, 329. 
For more details about the cross-strait commodity chain, see Clark 2002b, 756. 
3
 Chu 1997, 240-241; and Fuller 2008, 261. 
4
 Boutin 1997, 77.  
5
 Zhao 1997, 180; and White 2004, 315. 
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industries, also began to move parts of their operations to China.
6
 While some of them 
were export-oriented manufacturers,
7
 others were large upstream manufacturers who 
wanted to narrow the geographical distance between them and their downstream 
Taiwanese customers in China (i.e. the small and medium-sized Taiwanese 
manufacturers in China) or simply sought to penetrate the Chinese market.
8
 
        In general, for the Taiwanese capitalists who produce goods for export and compete 
with foreign manufacturers in the global market, China-Taiwan economic ties would 
economically benefit them by making them more internationally competitive.
9
 Simply 
speaking, a closer cross-strait economic relationship would make it easier for them to (1) 
move their productive operations from Taiwan to China and thus reduce the production 
costs and/or (2) gain access to one of the biggest markets of the world.
10
 However, by 
contrast, China-Taiwan economic ties might not necessarily benefit the Taiwanese 
capitalists who produce goods for domestic consumption and whose products have to 
compete in Taiwan’s domestic market with imported products. Unlike the Taiwanese 
manufacturers producing for export, a closer cross-strait relationship makes the 
Taiwanese manufacturers producing for the domestic market less domestically 
competitive because it brings to Taiwan a huge number of cheap goods produced in 
China. To deal with this problem, some domestic manufacturers might choose to move 
                                                 
6
 Steinfeld 2005, 235. 
7
 For example, many Taiwanese manufacturers of information technology (I.T.) components began to move 
their operations to China in the mid-1990s. For more details, see Sutter 2002, 527. 
8
 Chu 1997, 240-241; Zhao 1997, 186; Dent 2001, 12; and Clark 2002b, 756. 
9
 By the end of 2000, 75% of Taiwanese investment in China had already been export-oriented. For more 
discussions about the exported-oriented Taiwanese investment in China, see Sutter 2002, 530; and Tung 
2003, 143. 
10
 Mastel 2001, 48. 
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their operations to China as well and sell the products they produce there back to Taiwan. 
However, to the manufacturers staying in Taiwan and facing the imported goods made by 
China-based Taiwanese manufacturers, this situation actually made them even more 
uncompetitive in Taiwan’s domestic market.  
        China-Taiwan economic ties have different effects on different groups of Taiwanese 
workers in the manufacturing sector as well. According to a study conducted for 
Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, China-Taiwan economic ties have a negative effect 
on the demand of low-skilled or unskilled workers (i.e. those who do not have company-
specific or any other special skills and therefore are highly replaceable in the production 
process) but have a positive effect on the demand of skilled workers or professionals (i.e. 
those who have company-specific or special skills such as managers or technicians) in 
Taiwan’s manufacturing sector in general. 11  More specifically, the low-skilled or 
unskilled workers would easily lose their jobs when a closer cross-strait economic 
relationship (1) leads the Taiwanese manufacturers, including those who produce for 
export and some of those who produce for the domestic market, to move their jobs from 
Taiwan to China in order to become more competitive internationally or in some cases 
domestically, and (2) forces the Taiwanese manufacturers operating in Taiwan to lay off 
workers in order to reduce production costs and therefore become more domestically 
competitive, or in some cases, when they close down their businesses due to their 
uncompetitiveness. By contrast, the Taiwanese skilled workers or professionals in the 
manufacturing sector would be less likely to be harmed by a closer China-Taiwan 
                                                 
11
 Chen, Yang & Li 2008. 
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economic relationship. When the Taiwanese manufacturers, including those who produce 
for export and some of those who produce for the domestic market, move their 
productive operations to China, many of them leave in Taiwan their Research and 
Development (R&D) centers where most of their skilled workers or professionals work. 
At the same time, the job opportunities for the skilled workers or professionals might 
actually increase when the China-based Taiwanese capitalists need Taiwanese skilled 
workers or professionals to help them manage their businesses in China or when they 
expand their R&D centers in Taiwan due to the growth of their businesses in China. 
        Based on what I have discussed above, it can be reasonably argued that, in Taiwan’s 
manufacturing sector, the manufacturers who produced for export were the major 
economic winners in the growing China-Taiwan economic ties in the period from 1990 to 
2008, and the skilled workers or professionals also slightly benefited from the growing 
ties. By contrast, the low-skilled or unskilled workers were the major losers, and many 
manufacturers producing for the domestic market were also negatively affected by a 
closer cross-strait economic relationship. Table 6.3 demonstrates the emerging cleavage 
between the economic winners (i.e. the China-based Taiwanese capital) and the economic 
losers (i.e. the low-skilled or unskilled Taiwanese labor) in general as well as in Taiwan’s 
manufacturing sector in particular when cross-strait economic ties grew in the period 
from 1990 to 2008. As it reveals, on the one hand, there were more and more Taiwanese 
business associations founded in China and the scale of Taiwanese investment in China 
in general as well as by the manufacturing sector in particular significantly increased; on 
the other hand, the jobs for the low-skilled or unskilled Taiwanese workers in general and 
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the jobs for unskilled workers in the manufacturing sector in particular gradually 
decreased over time.  
 
Table 6.3: The cleavage between the economic winners and losers (1990 – 2008) 
 
No. of Taiwanese 
business associations 
in China 
(accumulated) 
Average amount of 
investment per case by 
all sectors / unit: USD 
1,000 (approved by the 
Taiwanese 
government) 
Average amount of 
investment per case by 
the manufacturing 
sector / unite: USD 
1,000 (approved by the 
Taiwanese 
government) 
Percentage of low-
skilled and unskilled 
workers in all sectors 
(%) 
Percentage of 
unskilled workers in 
the manufacturing 
sector (%) 
1990 3 - - - - 
1991 5 734.18 
386.77 
- - 
1992 8 935.61 - - 
1993 14 339.59 46.72 - 
1994 24 1,029.98 1,167.40 46.59 37.08 
1995 39 2,230.61 2,585.55 45.67 36.10 
1996 46 3,208.88 3,474.63 43.87 35.37 
1997 49 496.85 503.18 43.84 34.62 
1998 54 1,584.11 1,628.73 42.90 33.38 
1999 60 2,567.62 2,763.27 41.58 34.04 
2000 64 3,103.57 3,445.44 41.28 31.56 
2001 67 2,347.39 2,860.02 39.81 31.18 
2002 70 2,157.61 2,414.62 38.43 31.47 
2003 79 1,986.78 2,207.37 37.87 30.11 
2004 87 3,463.40 4,894.84 37.50 29.91 
2005 94 4,631.42 5,862.29 36.85 29.31 
2006 100 7,011.32 8,590.82 36.01 29.98 
2007 103 10,010.59 13,444.78 35.73 - 
2008 103 16,627.36 21,848.34 34.94 21.79 
Source: (1) Data for investment provided by Yeh 2005, 33; Chen, Yang & Li 2008, 43; Investment 
Commission of Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs <http://www.moeaic.gov.tw>; and Taiwan's 
Mainland Affairs Council <http://www.mac.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=1>; (2) Data for Taiwanese business 
associations in China provided by Taiwan Businessman Association, Dongguan 
<http://www.dgtba.org/Consortium/area_list.aspx>; and (3) Data for labor provided by Chen, Yang & Li 
2008, 72; and Taiwan's Council of Labor Affairs <http://statdb.cla.gov.tw/html/com/statinvest.htm>. 
 
Another two tables below, which reveal the trend of Taiwanese laptop and liquid crystal 
display (L.C.D.) manufacturers’ moving their operations to China, also vividly reflect a 
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significant decline in the number of Taiwanese jobs in what used to be two of Taiwan’s 
flagship industries. 
 
Table 6.4: The global manufacture share of laptops (2002 – 2005) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Taiwan 56.7% 24.7% 20.0% 5.2% 
China 38.3% 54.3% 77.8% 92.8% 
Others 5.0% 2.0% 2.3% 1.7% 
Source: Wu 2007, 996. 
Table 6.5: The global manufacture share of L.C.D. (2000 – 2005) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Taiwan 97.0% 67.0% 22.6% 13.4% 10.0% 8.3% 
China 1.0% 29.0% 69.2% 79.1% 84.5% 88.7% 
Others 2.0% 4.0% 8.4% 7.4% 5.5% 3.0% 
Source: Wu 2007, 997. 
 
        However, it is worth noting that the cleavage between those who benefited from 
cross-strait economic ties and those who were harmed by them did not appear as a 
political or economic problem in Taiwan’s domestic politics immediately after the 
economic ties were formally established in the late 1980s. Actually, it was not until the 
early 2000s that a conflict between the economic winners and losers became significant. 
Instead, in the decade before an obvious cleavage-related conflict appeared, what we saw 
was a different kind of conflict: an increasing tension between the economic winners who 
became more and more politically articulate in asking for economic openness and the 
Taiwanese government that became more and more wary of China-Taiwan economic ties 
due to a concern about national security. As for the economic losers, they were mostly 
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silent in this period for two possible reasons: (1) the negative effect of cross-strait 
economic ties on their livelihoods might be still insignificant, which made them have 
little incentive to be as politically articulate as the economic winners on the issue or not 
even realize that they were losers; and (2) the Taiwanese government, as mentioned, was 
actually not in favor of the economic winners’ idea of economic openness, which made 
the losers have little need to confront the economic winners by themselves even if they 
did realize that they were losers. In addition, the Taiwanese “developmental” state’s 
suppressing the labor for rapid economic growth during the authoritarian era might also 
play a role in discouraging Taiwanese low-skilled or unskilled workers from taking any 
collective action in the 1990s against the emerging economic situation that did not benefit 
their interests despite the fact that the power of the state was actually decreasing during 
that period of time when Taiwan experienced full-scale democratization.
12
  
 
6-2: The growing friction between the economic winners and the Taiwanese 
government, 1990 – 1996 
        The friction between the economic winners and the Taiwanese government over the 
issues of cross-strait economic ties appeared shortly after the ties were formally 
established in the late 1980s. In general, their friction concerned two of the most 
important issues about cross-strait economic ties that I will focus on not only in this 
chapter but also in the next two chapters: first, the prohibited direct cross-strait transport 
                                                 
12
 For more discussions about the Taiwanese developmental state, see Johnson 1987; Chang 1999; 
Vartiainen 1999; Wade 2003, 73-112; and Wu 2007. 
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link, and second, the restriction on Taiwanese investment in China.
13
 While the economic 
winners asked the government to build the link and lift the restriction, the government 
emphasized that the prohibition against the link and the restriction on the investment 
were necessary when national security was taken into account. 
        However, it is worth noting that the level of conflict between them was actually not 
very high before 1996 in spite of their different opinions on the aforementioned issues of 
cross-strait economic ties. Starting in the early 1990s, the economic winners did begin to 
reveal their dissatisfaction about their government’s unwillingness to build the link and 
lift the restriction. They argued that Taiwanese manufacturers could survive and become 
internationally competitive only if they were able to access the Chinese market and 
labor.
14
 Also, they urged the Taiwanese government to build the direct cross-strait 
transport link as soon as possible in order to create the “Great Chinese Economic Zone” 
and make Taiwan the “Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center.”15 However, although 
they criticized the Taiwanese government for being “a big stone on the track” when it 
came to cross-strait economic ties,
16
 their relations with the Taiwanese government were 
not particularly tense at this stage. One important reason for the not-so-tense relations 
concerns the Taiwanese government’s equivocal attitude toward cross-strait economic 
                                                 
13
 Taiwanese policy makers have also regarded these two issues as the two most important ones on cross-
strait economic ties since the very beginning. For more discussions, see Dent 2001, 16. 
14
 “Business people urge the government to move its Mainland policy ‘forward’,” United Daily News, 
Evening Edition, March 2, 1992; and “Lin Chang-sheng says the government should not hold businesses 
back with politics,” United Daily News, June 7, 1993. 
15
 “Business people urge the government to move its Mainland policy ‘forward’,” United Daily News, 
Evening Edition, March 2, 1992; “Taiwan has to build the three links in order to become the Asia-Pacific 
Regional Operations Center,” Commercial Times, September 27, 1993; and “Taiwan has to regard 
Mainland as a hinterland in its project of the Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center,” Commercial Times, 
December 21, 1994. For more discussions about the Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center, see Chu 
1997, 243. 
16
 “Business people criticize the Mainland policy for being too strict,” China Times, February 26, 1995. 
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ties before the mid-1990s, which made the economic winners feel that the government 
was not completely opposing them.
17
 Although the Taiwanese government kept avoiding 
making any concrete promises on building the direct transport link and lifting the 
restriction, it constantly told the economic winners that it understood what they wanted 
and was not completely opposed to their pro-openness ideas. For example, the Taiwanese 
officials revealed on many occasions that they knew the economic importance of the 
Chinese market and labor to the Taiwanese manufacturers who wanted to increase their 
international competiveness.
18
 Also, starting in 1994, an increasing number of officials 
began to agree that the direct cross-strait transport link should be regarded as an 
important part of the government’s plan for the “Asia-Pacific Regional Operations 
Center,” and in March 1995, the Taiwanese government even made a decision to build 
the “overseas transshipping zones” to allow direct point-to-point shipping across the 
Taiwan Strait.
19
 Overall, the Taiwanese government’s attitudes toward cross-strait 
economic ties before 1996 were as follows: (1) although it understood very well that the 
issues concerning cross-strait economic ties were not only economic issues but also 
political ones that involved Taiwan’s national security, it believed that the ties would 
economically benefit Taiwan to some extent; and (2) therefore, keeping both of the 
                                                 
17
 This equivocal attitude was arguably the result of an internal conflict within the Taiwanese government 
between the pro-openness and anti-openness officials about the policy on cross-strait economic ties. This 
conflict revealed the Taiwanese government’s inability to find an effective way during that time to satisfy 
both of its “politico-military” and “economic security” concerns about growing cross-strait economic ties. 
For more discussions, see Boutin 1997, 80-81; and Chapter Three, 105-106. 
18
 “Business people urge the government to move its Mainland policy ‘forward’,” United Daily News, 
Evening Edition, March 2, 1992. 
19
 “Business people criticize the Mainland policy for being too strict,” China Times, February 26, 1995. See 
also Chapter Three, 105 and 107. 
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economic interests and national security in mind, it decided to move toward the direction 
of openness at a slow but cautiously steady pace.
20
 
        The conflict that was not very intense since the early 1990s between the economic 
winners and the Taiwanese government however turned severe after the Taiwan Strait 
Crisis that lasted from July 1995 to March 1996. During and after the crisis, the 
Taiwanese government was convinced that national security was much more important 
than economic interests and that it should therefore take the negative political effect of 
China-Taiwan economic relations on national security more seriously when making any 
policy about cross-strait economic ties.
21
 As for the economic winners, although some of 
them lost their investment confidence about China to some degree during the crisis, many 
economic winners still believed that doing business in China was a right economic 
decision to make. According to a survey conducted by Taiwan’s National Federation of 
Industries, more than 50% of China-based Taiwanese business people decided to keep 
investing or even increase their investment in China during the crisis.
22
 In addition to 
their belief that cross-strait economic ties would bring them economic benefits under 
whatever circumstance they faced, economic winners also believed that the economic ties 
could even serve as the foundation of peaceful China-Taiwan relations, arguing that 
China and Taiwan should put their political disputes aside and focus on the economic 
                                                 
20
 “Business people urge the government to move its Mainland policy ‘forward’,” United Daily News, 
Evening Edition, March 2, 1992; “Industries and businesses urge the government to improve the investment 
environment to cool down the ‘Mainland fever’,” Liberty Times, May 16, 1993; “Mainland Affairs Council 
will integrate all Mainland-related policies,” Economic Daily News, April 8, 1995; and “Business people 
criticize the Mainland policy for being too strict,” China Times, February 26, 1995. 
21
 According to the Taiwanese government, while the main theme of cross-strait relations was “economic 
integration” before the crisis, the focus was shifted to “stability” afterwards. For more discussions, see Chu 
1997, 244; Leng 1998, 498-499; and Sutter 2002, 525. 
22
 “Decisions on investments are not supposed to be guided by non-economic factors,” China Times, 
September 14, 1996. 
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exchanges and cooperation because economy was the “common language” across the 
Taiwan Strait.
23
 Therefore, to serve their personal economic interests and to protect what 
they believed were national interests, they kept urging the Taiwanese government to 
build the direct cross-strait transport link and lift the restriction on Taiwanese investment 
in China after the Taiwan Strait Crisis.
24
 
        Among the economic winners who expressed their support for more economic ties at 
this stage, the most influential ones were the chairman of Taiwan’s General Chamber of 
Commerce, Wang Yu-tseng, and the chairman of Taiwan’s National Federation of 
Industries, Kao Ching-yuan. According to Wang, cross-strait economic exchanges would 
bring about “peaceful competitions” between China and Taiwan, which in turn would 
both politically and economically benefit the people on each side of the Taiwan Strait.
25
 
As for Kao who took a business trip to China in late August 1996 and met with the 
Chinese president, Jiang Zemin, there, he thought that there should be a “separation of 
politics and economy” and that cross-strait economic issues should be first discussed 
nonpolitically by the economic groups from China and Taiwan before any official 
negotiations about these issues were attempted.
26
 
                                                 
23
 “Chao Yao-dong: The two sides should focus on economic exchanges and leave political disputes aside,” 
Commercial Times, March 25. 1996. 
24
 “The two sides will resolve differences peacefully,” Wen Wei Po, May 25, 1996; and “Cruise companies 
call for the direct cross-strait transport link,” Wen Wei Po, September 16, 1996. Taiwanese business 
people’s pushing for a more reconciliatory China policy and more cross-strait economic ties after the 1995-
1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis is understandable. As Bolt (2001, 100) argues well, the “economic theory 
suggests that firms will do what they can to reduce political risk and maximize economic potential for their 
foreign investments.” 
25
 The increase of cross-strait economic exchanges and cooperation will benefit both Taiwan and 
Mainland,” Central Daily News, April 1, 1996. 
26
 Chu 1997, 245. More details about Kao’s trip to China can be found in the following newspaper article: 
“Kao Ching-yuan: Uni-President Enterprises Corporation won’t give up the Mainland market,” Economic 
Daily News, September 6, 1996. 
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6-3: The implementation of the “no haste, be patient” policy and a period of severe 
conflict, 1996 – 1999 
        The growing conflict between the economic winners and the Taiwanese government 
in the wake of the Taiwan Strait Crisis finally turned into a rivalry between them in mid-
September 1996 when President Lee of Taiwan blamed the economic winners’ 
investment in China for facilitating China’s effort to “besiege the Taiwanese government 
with the Taiwanese business people” in an attempt to force the Taiwanese government to 
change its China policy to China’s political advantage.27 Believing that China-Taiwan 
economic ties were causing damage to Taiwan’s national security, the Taiwanese 
government implemented the policy of “no haste, be patient” to curb the trend of growing 
cross-strait economic ties. The most important restrictive regulation imposed by this 
policy was the prohibition against any individual investment in China that was over 50 
million U.S. Dollars.
28
 In addition, any company’s total investment in China was not 
allowed to exceed 40% of its net worth.
29
 The policy also made stricter several restrictive 
regulations that had already been in place before. For example, while investment was still 
distinguished into three categories (i.e. first, the permitted case: the investment that could 
be made in China without the government’s permission; second, the special case: the 
investment that could be made in China only with the government’s permission; and third, 
                                                 
27
 “Taiwanese industries and businesses are dissatisfied with Lee Teng-hui’s talk,” Wen Wei Po, September 
19, 1996. 
28
 Boutin 1997, 89; Leng 1998, 500; Yu 1999, 44; Deng 2000, 965-966; Dent 2001, 17; Bolt 2001, 87; 
Sutter 2002, 526; and Fuller 2008, 241. 
29
 Dent 2001, 17; Sutter 2002, 526; and Bolt 2001, 87. 
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the prohibited case: the investment that could not be made in China no matter what),
30
 the 
number of prohibited investment cases was expanded which eventually included all kinds 
of investment involving advanced technology and infrastructure.
31
 
        It is worth noting that although there had been several restrictive regulations on 
Taiwanese investment in China before the policy of “no haste, be patient,” no effective 
control mechanisms had been in place to support these regulations because, before 1997, 
what the Taiwanese government really tried to do about the growing Taiwanese 
investment in China was to provide incentives encouraging Taiwanese business people to 
leave their capital in Taiwan (e.g. tax incentives, loose pollution regulations, cheap 
industrial lands, etc.) instead of imposing harsh punishments to discourage the investment 
in China.
32
 As a result, though having been able to effectively restrict the inbound flows 
of capital from China, the Taiwanese government had failed to stop the outbound flows.
33
 
Obviously, with the policy of “no haste, be patient,” the Taiwanese government finally 
decided to change its strategy from providing incentives to giving those restrictive 
regulations real teeth by imposing punishments that it hoped could effectively discourage 
Taiwanese business people from investing in China. As for the direct cross-strait 
transport link, although the Taiwanese government had no intention to terminate its plan 
for the “overseas transshipping zones” after the implementation of the “no haste, be 
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 This categorization of investment had already existed since 1991. For more details, see Zhao 1997, 186-
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31
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patient” policy, it pointed out that the real direct cross-strait transport link was impossible 
given the complicated issues of “security” and “jurisdiction” involved.34 
          The Taiwanese government’s negative attitude toward the economic winners and 
cross-strait economic ties in general that was revealed by its policy of “no haste, be 
patient” was immediately challenged by the economic winners in a harsh tone which was 
a vivid contrast with the relatively compromising rhetoric involved in their lobbying for 
more economic openness before. After hearing President Lee talk about the Taiwanese 
business people besieging the Taiwanese government, both Wang and Kao from 
Taiwan’s General Chamber of Commerce and Taiwan’s National Federation of Industries, 
respectively, rebutted the charge. Wang, arguing that the business people like him would 
never besiege the government, pointed out that the reason why Taiwanese business 
people invested in China was that the investment environment in Taiwan was no longer 
as good as it was before.
35
 Kao also rejected the accusation against the business people, 
saying that the accusation was “hurting Taiwan’s industries and businesses very 
seriously.” 36  In addition, he reemphasized that “politics should not interfere with 
economy” and that his National Federation of Industries was “100% supportive” of the 
building of the direct cross-strait transport link.
37
 
        The economic winners’ dissatisfaction with the Taiwanese government’s policy of 
“no haste, be patient” and its unwavering objection to the building of the direct cross-
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 “Kao Ching-yuan criticizes the words about ‘besieging politics with economy,” Ta Kung Pao, October 1, 
1996. 
35
 “Taiwanese industries and businesses are dissatisfied with Lee Teng-hui’s talk,” Wen Wei Po, September 
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 Ibid.; and “Kao Ching-yuan criticizes the words about ‘besieging politics with economy,” Ta Kung Pao, 
October 1, 1996. 
37
 “To business people, business is nothing but business,” Wen Wei Po, October 3, 1996. 
256 
 
strait transport link only grew stronger and stronger after the dissatisfaction erupted in 
1996. The conflict between the economic winners and the Taiwanese government 
eventually reached a point of no return when more and more influential Taiwanese 
business associations and leaders expressed their support for economic openness and 
criticized the restraint on cross-strait economic ties imposed by the Taiwanese 
government for causing damage to Taiwan’s economy.38 In the first half of 1997, in 
addition to the General Chamber of Commerce and the National Federation of Industries, 
many business associations that had a close relationship with the government such as the 
National Association of Industry and Commerce, Taiwan External Trade Development 
Council, Taiwan Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association, and Taiwan 
Federation of Industry and Commerce also made public their dissatisfaction with the 
Taiwanese government’s policy toward cross-strait economic ties, arguing that, while 
some degree of restriction might be necessary, the new restriction imposed by the 
Taiwanese government was undoubtedly not helpful.
39
 The level of conflict between the 
economic winners and the Taiwanese government further increased on May 19
th
, 1997, 
when about 100 China-based Taiwanese business people demonstrated against the policy 
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of “no haste, be patient” in front of Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs and asked the 
minister of economic affairs to step down.
40
 
        In the second half of 1997, the conflict reached a whole new level when many 
influential business leaders openly challenged the Taiwanese government’s policy and 
criticized President Lee’s anti-openness attitude.41 The highly intense conflict between 
these business leaders and the Taiwanese government was not eased until 2000 when 
Lee’s term was over. Among the business leaders confronting the Taiwanese government 
during this period, two of them attracted the most attention: Wang Yung-ching, the 
founder and the chairman of Formosa Plastics Group who was the richest entrepreneur in 
Taiwan, and Chang Yung-fa, the founder and the chairman of Evergreen Group who was 
the most influential shipping tycoon in Taiwan, both of whom had frequent and close 
interactions with President Lee in private.  
        In the case of Wang, he began to be interested in building a power plant in the city 
of Zhangzhou located in China’s Fujian Province in mid-1996.42 However, from the very 
beginning, his plan for the so called Zhangzhou Power Plant was disapproved by the 
Taiwanese government that began to develop a negative feeling toward cross-strait 
economic ties during and after the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis.
43
 Suspecting that 
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Wang illegally moved the capital needed for his Zhangzhou Power Plant to China from a 
third country, in April 1997, the Taiwanese government audited his company’s accounts 
but found no evidence of any illegal financial activities.
44
 One month later, in late May, 
the Taiwanese government officially included all cases of investment associated with 
power plants in the category of prohibited investment.
45
 Unsatisfied with the Taiwanese 
government’s decision, Wang changed his cooperative attitude that he had been showing 
and openly criticized the policy of “no haste, be patient” in public for the first time on 
October 6
th
, saying that cross-strait economic exchanges were not stoppable despite the 
government-imposed restriction.
46
  
        One week after Wang expressed his dissatisfaction with the Taiwanese 
government’s anti-openness policy toward cross-strait economic ties, on October 14th, 
Chang, who had kept silent about the restriction on cross-strait economic ties most of the 
time, openly criticized the government’s objection to the building of the direct cross-strait 
transport link for the first time in an interview. In that interview, he urged the Taiwanese 
government to negotiate with the Chinese government over the issue of the three links as 
soon as possible, blaming President Lee for using national security as an excuse for not 
building the three links and saying that the lack of the direct transport link was 
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economically hurting Taiwan.
47
 Chang’s words against the Taiwanese government’s 
negative attitude toward cross-strait economic ties were supported by many other 
business leaders including Kao who said Chang’s thoughts were completely the same as 
all of the other business people’s.48 However, despite the growing challenge from the 
economic winners against its effort to curb the trend of growing cross-strait economic ties, 
from 1997 to 1999, the Taiwanese government showed no sign of retreating from its anti-
openness position, constantly emphasizing that Taiwan’s national interests were more 
important than business people’s interests and that national security outweighed 
economic benefits.
49
 
 
6-4: The public dissatisfaction with the Taiwanese government’s anti-openness 
tendency and the victory of economic winners in 2000 
        Although the economic winners’ nonstop effort since 1996 to press the Lee 
Administration to repeal the policy of “no haste, be patient” and build the direct transport 
link was unsuccessful, a political opportunity for the change they were eager for however 
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loomed in the late 1990s when the Taiwanese public revealed a negative attitude toward 
the policy of “no haste, be patient” and the politicians from the opposition parties, 
including the D.P.P., began to criticize the policy accordingly.
50
 
        As cross-strait economic ties grew in the 1990s, Taiwanese people began to develop 
an ambivalent feeling toward the ties. On the one hand, they were worried that the 
growing economic ties might make China, which was regarded as a military threat to 
Taiwan, grow much faster than Taiwan and could even lead Taiwan to become 
economically dependent on China.
51
 On the other hand, they felt that the growing 
economic ties would give Taiwan easy access to China’s huge market and its abundant 
cheap labor and therefore might economically benefit Taiwan. This ambivalent feeling 
might originate in Taiwanese political elites’ long-lasting tendency to regard economic 
development as a priority for Taiwan.
52
 Arguably, this enduring pro-economic growth 
tendency at the elite level had affected the public attitude toward economic development 
at the mass level, making the general public in Taiwan inclined to see economic growth 
as one of the most crucial national goals and one of the most important sources of 
national pride.
53
 Under this circumstance, it is very difficult for the people in Taiwan to 
ignore the economic benefits brought to Taiwan by cross-strait economic ties. 
        Take Taiwanese people’s attitude toward the direct cross-strait transport link for 
example. While there were people opposing the link due to a concern about Taiwan’s 
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national defense or national security in general, not everyone who had such a concern 
denied the economic benefits the link might bring to Taiwan. For instance, while a survey 
conducted in July 1995 showed that 40.5% of Taiwanese did not support any effort to 
build the link because of the danger the link might pose to Taiwan’s national security 
(44.2% of the respondents said they wanted the link), another survey conducted in the 
same month however revealed that only 28.9% of Taiwanese thought that the link would 
cause significant damage to Taiwan’s economy (47.28% of the respondents thought the 
economic benefits would outweigh the costs).
54
 Furthermore, Taiwanese who believed 
the link would pose a danger to Taiwan’s national security were not necessarily opposed 
to the building of the link. A survey conducted in June 1998 showed that while 50.4% of 
Taiwanese thought that the direct cross-strait air transport link would negatively affect 
Taiwan’s national security (40.7% of the respondents did not think so), only 26.7% of 
Taiwanese were opposed to the building of the link (66.4% of the respondents had a 
favorable opinion).
55
 Similarly, another survey conducted in November 1999 also 
demonstrated that while 68% of Taiwanese believed that there would be a negative effect 
of the direct transport link on Taiwan’s national security (22% of the respondent did not 
think so), only 42% of Taiwanese did not support the building of the link (46% of the 
respondents had a favorable opinion).
56
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        The aforementioned ambivalent feeling would arguably lead to an ambivalent 
response to the Taiwanese government’s policy on cross-strait economic ties. More 
specifically, while Taiwanese people might be well aware of the costs of growing China-
Taiwan economic ties (i.e. the negative effect of those ties on national security), because 
of their positive attitude toward cross-strait economic ties when it comes to the economic 
benefits brought by those ties, they feel upset when the government tries to significantly 
reverse the trend of growing ties. This explains well why the Taiwanese government’s 
policy of “no haste, be patient” became unpopular in the late 1990s. As the table below 
shows, which concerns a series of public polls conducted by United Daily News about the 
policy of “no haste, be patient,” the support rate for the policy was low from 1997 to 
1999. Even though China’s verbal criticisms against the Taiwanese government’s two-
state theory since July 1999
57
 and its attempt to politicize the international aids to Taiwan 
in the wake of the devastating earthquake two months later
58
 angered most of the 
Taiwanese people and therefore significantly boosted the support rate for the policy of 
“no haste, be patient” in November 1999, the percentage of the people who supported the 
policy was still lower than that of the people who disliked it.  
 
Table 6.6: The public attitude toward the policy of “no haste, be patient” (1997 – 1999) 
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 Oct. 1997 Dec. 1997 Apr. 1998 Apr. 1999 Nov. 1999 
Policy should be continued 13.80% 12.50% 19.00% 22.60% 39.30% 
Policy should be adjusted 50.40% 57.90% 60.00% 56.60% 43.30% 
Source: United Daily News; data compiled by Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, available at 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=67601&ctNode=6153&mp=1>; 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/97712212063.htm>; and 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/9771116413.htm>. 
 
        As the policy of “no haste, be patient” became unpopular among the Taiwanese 
general public, in order to be politically attractive, Taiwanese politicians had to, either 
voluntarily or involuntarily, reveal a negative attitude toward the policy as well.
59
 This is 
one of the major reasons why all of the major candidates in the 2000 Taiwanese 
presidential election proposed a relatively pro-openness policy on cross-strait economic 
ties during their campaigns.
60
 By mid-January 2000, two months before the Election Day, 
two of the three major candidates (i.e. Soong Chu-yu, an independent candidate, and 
Chen Shui-bian, the D.P.P. candidate) had already proposed a policy on cross-strait 
economic ties that was pro-openness compared with the policy of “no haste, be patient.” 
In the case of Soong, he proposed to replace the policy of “no haste, be patient” with his 
policy of “be positive and be active”; as for Chen, he stated that he preferred the idea of 
“strengthening the foundation while advancing westward” to the idea of “no haste, be 
patient” that he thought was too passive.61 As for the issue of the direct cross-strait 
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transport link, both of them promised to work hard to build the link if elected.
62
 The 
Taiwanese government’s approach toward cross-strait economic ties was so unpopular 
that even the ruling party’s candidate, Lien Chan from the K.M.T. who was also the vice 
president at that time, revealed in public on January 19
th
, 2000, that the policy of “no 
haste, be patient” and the way the government dealt with the issue of the direct transport 
link could be changed if necessary.
63
 Lien’s moving away from Lee’s position was 
welcomed by the economic winners, and some of them including Wang Yung-ching, who 
said his ideal president was the one who could build the three links, repeal the policy of 
“no haste, be patient,” and bring peace to the Taiwan Strait, endorsed Lien at the last 
stage of the campaign period.
64
 
        At the end, Chen won the election on March 18
th
, 2000. Although Chen was not 
generally supported by the economic winners in the election, it was evident that, to the 
economic winners in general, the electoral outcome would more or less usher in a new 
era of cross-strait economic relationship for which they had been waiting for almost a 
decade. To the economic winners who did not support Chen in the election like Wang, 
although they were worried that Chen’s pro-independence attitude would lead to tense 
China-Taiwan relations that might in turn cause damage to cross-strait economic relations, 
Chen’s proposal for cross-strait economic ties was much more acceptable than Lee’s anti-
openness approach at least. As for those who supported Chen like Chang Yung-fa, they 
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definitely could see Chen’s election as their political victory against the former 
Taiwanese government that kept asking them to be patient when it came to cross-strait 
economic exchanges. Their open endorsement and financial support for Chen during the 
campaign period, which to a very great extent was derived from Chen’s promises that he 
would build the three links and repeal the policy of “no haste, be patient” if elected,65 did 
play some role in Chen’s election, and therefore it would be no exaggeration for them to 
believe that Chen would compensate their endorsement and support with the fulfillment 
of his promises about cross-strait economic ties. 
        Expecting that the new era of cross-strait economic relationship would come very 
soon, the economic winners began to make public their suggestions about how the new 
government should deal with the issues of cross-strait economic ties even before Chen 
was officially inaugurated.
66
 On May 19
th
, 2000, one day before Chen was inaugurated, 
the National Federation of Industries published a survey it conducted which showed that 
81.8% of Taiwanese business people hoped the new Taiwanese government could 
gradually lift the existing restriction on cross-strait economic exchanges; in addition, the 
Federation made a series of suggestions to the new government about cross-strait 
economic ties, among which the first two most important were signing the investment 
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protection agreement with the Chinese government and building the three links across the 
Taiwan Strait.
67
 
        After Chen was inaugurated, the economic winners moved on to press the Chen 
Administration, in a relatively cooperative tone compared with the harsh rhetoric in 
which they criticized the Lee Administration’s anti-openness attitude, to fulfill Chen’s 
promises about building the direct transport link and lifting the restriction on Taiwanese 
investment in China.
68
 It is worth noting that, starting in the second half of 2000, many 
influential Taiwanese manufacturers in the computer and information technology 
industries, which were the backbone of Taiwan’s economy, also began to raise their voice 
for openness.
69
 Two of the most important examples were Shih Chen-jung, the founder 
and the chairman of Acer Incorporated which was one of the biggest P.C. manufacturers 
in Taiwan, and Chang Chung-mou, the founder and the chairman of Taiwan 
Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, one of the biggest Taiwanese semiconductor 
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manufacturers. According to Chang, in order to make Taiwanese semiconductor 
manufacturers internationally competitive, the Taiwanese government had to let them 
make good use of China’s resources and allow them to produce wafers in China.70 Shih 
also urged the Taiwanese government to let the Taiwanese P.C. manufacturers invest in 
China, arguing that they needed a convenient access to the “Chinese labor, brains, and 
market” in order to effectively and efficiently compete with foreign manufacturers.71  
        Unlike the Lee Administration that had an obvious negative attitude toward the 
economic winners from 1996 to 2000, the Chen Administration responded to the 
economic winners’ demand in compromising and friendly rhetoric.72  In mid-October 
2000, Tsai Ing-wen, the head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council revealed in a cabinet 
meeting that the policy of “no haste, be patient” would be adjusted gradually; and in early 
November, she said in an interview that the building of the three links would not be 
delayed for too long.
73
 In mid-November, Chang Chun-hsiung, Taiwan’s Prime Minister, 
said that the Taiwanese government was in favor of the building of the three links and the 
repeal of the policy of “no haste, be patient” as long as Taiwan’s national security could 
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be guaranteed, and on December 14
th
, the Taiwanese government officially announced 
that the policy of “no haste, be patient” would be changed in the near future.74 
 
6-5: Discussion 
        This chapter examines the cleavage between the Taiwanese economic winners and 
losers in cross-strait economic ties as well as the emergence of the former in the period 
from 1990 to 2000. Based on the discussions that I have made in this chapter, it could be 
found that, from 1990 to 2000, while the economic losers were mostly out of the political 
scene, the economic winners developed strong pro-openness consciousness and emerged 
as a group making a joint effort to demand more economic openness in their conflict with 
the Taiwanese government over the issues of cross-strait economic ties.
75
  
        As argued, a contradiction between the economic winners and the Taiwanese 
government appeared immediately after the economic ties were officially built in the late 
1980s given the fact that, while the former was in favor of more ties and openness, the 
latter was unwilling to pursue a completely pro-openness policy due to a concern about 
national security associated with those ties, and this contradiction whose level was 
actually not very high in the first place continued to the early 1990s. The tension between 
them however became very severe in 1996 when the Taiwanese government 
unequivocally turned against the idea of openness after the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait 
Crisis. This severe conflict between the economic winners and the Taiwanese 
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government finally ended with the victory of the former in 2000 when (1) the public 
dissatisfaction with the Taiwanese government’s anti-openness attitude and policy due to 
what I call the “Taiwanese people’s ambivalent feeling toward cross-strait economic ties” 
led all of the major candidates in the Taiwanese presidential election of that year, 
including the one who won the election, to propose a relatively pro-openness policy 
during the campaign period, and (2) the new Taiwanese government that took office in 
May 2000 promised to adjust the anti-openness policy made by the previous government. 
        However, as I will argue later, the story about the conflict over the issues of cross-
strait economic ties in Taiwan’s domestic politics did not stop there. The conflict 
continued and became more complicated when more actors were involved in the conflict 
as a new political landscape appeared in Taiwan in 2001 when the Pan-Green and the 
Pan-Blue political forces emerged. Beginning in 2001, the actors joining in the debate 
about cross-strait economic ties in Taiwan’s domestic politics included not only the 
Taiwanese government and the economic winners but also the economic losers, the pro-
independence Pan-Green politicians and the anti-independence Pan-Blue politicians.  In 
the next chapter, I discuss the continuous conflict over the issues of cross-strait economic 
ties in Taiwan’s domestic politics in the period from 2000 to 2006, especially focusing on 
the interactions among the aforementioned actors in the conflict.   
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Chapter Seven 
The Politicization of Cross-Strait Economic Ties: 
The Emergence of Economic Losers and the Conflict between the Pro-openness and 
Anti-openness Political Coalitions, 2000 – 2006 
 
        In this chapter, I explore the conflict over the issues of cross-strait economic ties in 
Taiwan’s domestic politics in the period from 2000 to 2006. During this period, unlike 
the period that I have examined in the previous chapter, the conflict involved more actors 
fighting against each other for their own political or economic interests. The discussions 
in this chapter are focused on four aspects of the conflict from 2000 to 2006: (1) the 
emergence of the economic losers; (2) the formation of the pro-openness and anti-
openness coalitions as a result of the Pan-Blue and the Pan-Green politically exploiting 
the cleavage between the economic winners and losers; (3) the clash between the two 
aforementioned coalitions; and (4) the position of the Taiwanese government on cross-
strait economic ties in general.  
        As this chapter will show, throughout the period from 2000 to 2006, (1) the pro-
openness and the anti-openness coalitions not only conflicted with each other but also 
tried their best to influence the policy-making of the Taiwanese government on the issues 
of cross-strait economic ties; and (2) the Taiwanese government was relatively pro-
openness in the beginning, but, because of the pressure from the anti-openness coalition, 
it gradually revealed an anti-openness tendency and became completely against openness 
by the end of 2006. 
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7-1: The emergence of economic losers and the formation of pro-openness and anti-
openness coalitions 
      As the economic winners seemed to triumph in the second half of 2000 after its 
decade-long conflict with the Taiwanese government over the issues concerning cross-
strait economic ties, another force against them appeared. Part of this force was ironically 
from within the new Taiwanese government that promised to build the direct cross-strait 
transport link and repeal the policy of “no haste, be patient.” For example, in early June 
2000, Chen Shih-meng, the would-be deputy governor of Taiwan’s Central Bank, 
suggested the new government collect the so called “national security taxes” from China-
based Taiwanese business people, an idea that was not adopted by the Chen 
Administration.
1
 Also, in early October, Chen Po-chih, the minister of Taiwan’s Council 
for Economic Planning and Development, expressed his worry about China-based 
Taiwanese business people moving job opportunities that used to belong to Taiwanese 
workers to China.
2
 
        However, the major part of the new force against the economic winners was in fact 
composed of the economic losers who were mostly silent on the issues of cross-strait 
economic ties before 2000. After ten years of the growth of China-Taiwan economic ties, 
some of the economic losers finally began to realize that the ties would not economically 
                                                 
1
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benefit them or would even hurt them.
3
 Under this circumstance, the increasing pro-
openness attitude revealed in the second half of 2000 by the Taiwanese government that 
used to be the economic losers’ shield against the economic winners would only make the 
losers even more insecure. Therefore, starting in mid-October 2000, pro-labor 
organizations began to hold forums in which they expressed their objection to the 
building of the three links and the lifting of the restriction on Taiwanese investment in 
China, both of which, according to them, would increase the unemployment rate in 
Taiwan.
4
 On November 12
th
, in a demonstration that was launched to promote labor 
rights, an organization named Legislative Movement Committee for Workers announced 
its “pro-labor version of the ‘no haste, be patient’ policy,” which asked President Chen of 
Taiwan to (1) stick to Lee’s policy of “no haste, be patient”; (2) require Taiwanese 
manufacturers who moved their operations to China not to lay off Taiwanese workers and 
close their factories in Taiwan; and (3) collect the “job security taxes” from China-based 
Taiwanese business people.
5
 Arguably, the emerging voice of the economic losers was as 
politically noticeable as the voice of the winners which had already been very loud: while 
the winners were influential given their importance to Taiwan’s international 
competitiveness and Taiwan’s economy in general, the electoral strength of the losers 
could hardly be ignored given the size of their population.
6
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        As the cleavage and conflict between the economic winners and losers loomed, 
starting in 2001, Taiwanese politicians who were in the process of being divided by 
identity politics into two groups (i.e. the pro-independence Pan-Green and the anti-
independence Pan-Blue) also began to take sides on the issues of cross-strait economic 
ties, and two cleavage-related political coalitions emerged accordingly. One coalition 
consisted of the economic winners and the Pan-Blue politicians (i.e. politicians from the 
K.M.T. as well as the P.F.P.) who asked for more economic openness, arguing that the 
direct cross-strait transport link and less restriction on Taiwanese investment in China, 
among other things, would economically benefit Taiwan. The other coalition was 
composed of the economic losers and the Pan-Green politicians (i.e. politicians from the 
D.P.P. as well as the T.S.U.) who demanded less economic openness, believing the direct 
cross-strait transport link and Taiwanese investment in China would increase the 
unemployment rate in Taiwan and cause huge damage to Taiwan’s national security. It is 
worth noting that the catalyst for the formation of these two coalitions concerned not only 
attitudes toward cross-strait economic ties but also political positions on China-Taiwan 
relations in general. As studies show, while pro-independence people tended to be anti-
openness and anti-independence people pro-openness, anti-openness people were 
inclined to be pro-independence and pro-openness people anti-independence.
7
 Therefore, 
it can be argued that the aforementioned anti-openness and pro-openness coalitions were 
largely pro-independence and anti-independence, respectively. 
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        A clarification about the relationship between the D.P.P.-controlled Taiwanese 
government and the anti-openness coalition of the economic losers and the Pan-Green in 
the period from 2001 to 2008 is worth pointing out. The D.P.P.-controlled Taiwanese 
government should be regarded as an independent actor in the debate over the issues of 
cross-strait economic ties because not every official in it was completely anti-openness 
from the beginning. Some of the officials including President Chen actually had a 
relatively neutral attitude toward the economic ties in the very beginning, trying to take a 
middle-of-the-road approach and come up with a policy that could satisfy as many people 
as possible. Their neutral attitudes were understandable given the political and economic 
situation they faced. As a new president in 2000 who won the election by a small margin 
in a three-way contest, Chen arguably realized that, to increase his chance of winning the 
reelection four years later, he had to try to appeal to not only his political allies and the 
voters who supported him in 2000 but also as many of those who did not as possible.
8
 
Because of it, he had a very strong incentive to reveal in public a neutral attitude toward 
cross-strait economic ties and press as many officials as possible in his administration to 
employ a neutral approach to those ties. In addition, there is evidence showing that the 
tense cross-strait relations resulting from his predecessor’s “two-state theory” as well as 
his election as the Taiwanese president did encourage Chen to take promoting cross-strait 
economic ties into account as one of the possible ways to ease the tension.
9
 Finally, the 
stagnation of Taiwan’s economy in the early 2000s, due to the weak economy in the U.S. 
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and Japan as well as the lack of effective economic reform in Taiwan, was also an 
important factor that forced Chen to consider a pro-openness approach.
10
 
        Therefore, given the fact that, from 2000 to 2004, some D.P.P. politicians and 
governmental officials, including President Chen Shui-bian, were not completely anti-
openness while others, including Vice President Lu Hsiu-lien,
11
 worked with the T.S.U. 
and the economic losers to prevent any pro-openness policy from being made, (1) the role 
played by the D.P.P. in the anti-openness coalition was ambiguous until 2005, and (2) 
while we can regard the anti-openness politicians and governmental officials from the 
D.P.P. as members of the anti-openness coalition, it would not be appropriate to see the 
Taiwanese government controlled by the D.P.P. as part of the anti-openness coalition at 
least before 2005. As I will argue later, the Chen Administration’s attitude toward cross-
strait economic ties actually changed from time to time: it was slightly pro-openness from 
2000 to 2002, gradually revealed an anti-openness attitude from 2003 to 2005, and was 
unequivocally anti-openness from 2006 to 2008. As the evidence will show, these 
changes of position were related to the political pressure from and the political conflict 
between the pro-openness and anti-openness coalitions. In the rest of this chapter, I will 
examine how the economic winners, the economic losers, the pro-openness Pan-Blue 
politicians, the anti-openness Pan-Green politicians, and the Taiwanese government 
interacted with each other on the issues of the direct cross-strait transport link and the 
restriction on Taiwanese investment in China from 2001 to 2006. 
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7-2: The replacement of the “no haste, be patient” policy with the “active opening 
and effective management” policy, 2001 – 2002   
 
The beginning of the conflict among the pro-openness coalition, the anti-openness 
coalition, and the Taiwanese government  
        Although the new Taiwanese government had promised by the end of 2000 that 
economic openness was its policy goal, the economic winners who wanted to see the goal 
achieved as soon as possible still kept pressing the Chen Administration in the first half 
of 2001 to speed up the pace of economic openness. Among all of the issues concerning 
economic openness toward China, they still cared about the two things they had been 
fighting for: (1) repealing the policy of “no haste, be patient” that imposed restriction that 
they regarded as unreasonable on Taiwanese investment in China, and (2) building the 
direct cross-strait transport link that they thought would greatly reduce the shipping costs 
in the production process. On January 3
rd
, 2001, Wang Yung-ching published a “10,000-
word letter” in which he criticized the policy of “no haste, be patient,” urged the 
Taiwanese government to pursue economic openness, and warned that anyone who 
intended to move against the trend of economic openness would be doomed to failure.
12
 
Throughout the first half of 2001, many economic winners followed suit, arguing that the 
later the policy of “no haste, be patient” was repealed, the less economically competitive 
their businesses as well as Taiwan’s economy as a whole would be.13 As for the direct 
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transport link, although the Taiwanese government officially built the mini-three links in 
February 2001, the economic winners were not pleased by them and kept saying that 
what was really needed was the building of the “big three links.”14 According to a survey 
conducted in June 2001, four months after the mini-three links were built, nearly 70% of 
Taiwanese exporters revealed that they hoped the “big three links” could be built as soon 
as possible.
15
 
        As the economic winners demanded more openness, starting in the first half of 2001, 
politicians from the K.M.T. and the P.F.P. began to make concrete efforts to appeal to the 
economic winners. Many organizations (e.g. the Cross-Strait Common Market 
Foundation) promoting economic openness and protecting the interests of the economic 
winners were founded by the K.M.T. politicians.
16
 In addition, in the K.M.T. party 
congress, new seats for the representatives of China-based Taiwanese business people 
were created for the first time in the K.M.T. history.
17
 Obviously, the effort made by the 
K.M.T., as well as the P.F.P., to side with the economic winners was appreciated by the 
latter, and they began to work closely with each other on the issues concerning cross-
strait economic ties. For example, Chang Chung-mou openly expressed his support for 
the idea of “cross-strait common market” after the idea was raised by Siew Wan-chang, 
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the former prime minister and a K.M.T. member.
18
 Similarly, in defense of the economic 
winners, Chiang Pin-kung, the former minister of Taiwan’s Council for Economic 
Planning and Development and a K.M.T. member, rebutted the argument that capital 
outflows to China would cause damage to Taiwan’s economy, saying that those who 
made such an argument were “confusing the cause with the effect” because, according to 
him, it was the bad domestic investment environment that forced the Taiwanese 
businesses people to move their businesses to China, an idea that was raised by many 
economic winners before.
19
 
        As the economic winners and the politicians from what would be later called the 
Pan-Blue political camp began to work together to press for more economic openness, the 
economic losers, the anti-openness D.P.P. politicians, and some governmental officials 
fought back.
20
 Throughout the first half of 2001, many pro-labor organizations such as 
Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions began to urge the Taiwanese government not to 
lift the existing restriction on Taiwanese investment in China; according to them, many 
Taiwanese workers had already lost their jobs due to their former employers’ moving 
their jobs to China, and it was not hard to imagine that more Taiwanese businesses would 
move their operations to China and more Taiwanese workers would be laid off if there 
was no restriction at all.
21
 Many D.P.P. politicians, including some of the governmental 
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officials, also revealed their worry about the new government’s pro-openness tendency. 
For example, Lu Hsiu-lien, the vice president, argued that the “China fever” would lead 
to six negative economic outcomes for Taiwan, among which the decline in domestic 
investment and the slowing down of economic growth were the most significant ones.
22
 
Some other officials such as Chen Po-chih, the minister of Taiwan’s Council for 
Economic Planning and Development, even warned that the repeal of the policy of “no 
haste, be patient” and the building of the direct cross-strait transport link would not only 
increase the unemployment rate but also hollow out Taiwan’s economy as a whole.23 
There were also D.P.P. politicians like Chai Trong-rong, a congressman and an 
influential advocate of Taiwan’s independence, who opposed economic openness due to a 
political concern that the increasingly close cross-strait economic relationship would be 
used by China as a tool to promote unification that they did not want to see.
24
  
        Facing the pressure from the fledgling pro-openness coalition on the one hand and 
the emerging anti-openness coalition on the other, in the first half of 2001, the Taiwanese 
government’s attitude toward cross-strait economic ties, which had been relatively pro-
openness since 2000, became more cautious when it began to emphasize that, on the 
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issues of cross-strait economic ties, both of “opening” and “management” and both of 
“positive effects” and “negative effects” should be taken into account.25 That being said, 
in spite of the cautious attitude mentioned above, the Taiwanese government in general 
still revealed a slightly pro-openness tendency at this stage although it kept saying that it 
had no timetable for economic openness. On March 26
th
, 2001, President Chen of Taiwan 
showed his support in public for the Cross-Strait Common Market Foundation, founded 
by an influential K.M.T. politician Siew Wan-chang, in the inauguration ceremony of the 
foundation.
26
 In addition, Lin Hsin-i, the minister of Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, said in March that his ministry believed that the policy of “no haste, be patient” 
should be repealed.
27
 Chang Chun-hsiung, the Taiwanese prime minister, also revealed in 
April that adjusting the policy of “no haste, be patient” was a policy goal of the new 
government.
28
  On May 7
th
, in the National Industrial Development Conference, a 
meeting where the representatives of the Taiwanese government and the Taiwanese 
industries discussed the issues concerning industrial developments, the Industrial 
Development Bureau of Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs and Taiwan’s National 
Federation of Industries reached a conclusion at the end of the conference that suggested 
the Taiwanese government build the direct cross-strait transport link and repeal the policy 
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of “no haste, be patient.”29 Two days later, Tsai Ing-wen, the head of Taiwan’s Mainland 
Affairs Council, though not mentioning any timetable, said that she believed economic 
openness was necessary in her meeting with China-based Taiwanese business people.
30
 
 
The Economic Development Advisory Conference and the repeal of the “no haste, 
be patient” policy 
        The pro-openness coalition, the anti-openness coalition, and the Taiwanese 
government that had different preferences on the issues of cross-strait economic ties 
formally engaged one another for the first time in the Economic Development Advisory 
Conference, a national conference chaired by President Chen himself and held from July 
to August 2001, where the representatives of capital, labor, parties, and academia were 
invited to discuss with the governmental officials the most important economic issues 
facing Taiwan.
31
 The conflict appeared immediately among the representatives of the 
pro-openness coalition, the anti-openness coalition, and the Taiwanese government even 
before the conference was formally held when the conference agenda about cross-strait 
economic ties was discussed. In the first preparatory meeting for the conference held on 
July 8
th
, 2001, protesting against the agenda set by the Taiwanese government that they 
thought was too obscure and irrelevant, the representatives of the economic winners, the 
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K.M.T., and the P.F.P. insisted that the issues about the building of the three links and the 
repeal of the policy of “no haste, be patient” should be specifically included in the agenda, 
a suggestion that was not supported by the representatives of the economic losers and the 
anti-openness D.P.P. politicians.
32
  
        In spite of the anti-openness coalition’s opposition, the aforementioned issues were 
eventually included in the agenda, and in mid-July, several days before the formal 
sessions were held, the six largest business associations in Taiwan (i.e. Chinese National 
Association of Industry and Commerce; Chinese National Federation of Industries; 
General Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of China; National Association of Small 
and Medium Enterprises; Taiwan Federation of Industry; and Taiwan Electrical and 
Electronic Manufacturers’ Association) jointly announced their 43 suggestions for 
Taiwan’s economic development that they planned to raise in the conference, among 
which building the direct transport link and repealing the policy of “no haste, be patient” 
were two of the most important ones.
33
  
        The Economic Development Advisory Conference was officially held from July 
22
nd
 to August 26
th
, 2001, and the issues concerning the direct transport link and the 
policy of “no haste, be patient” became the major sources of controversies in the sessions 
of cross-strait economic ties. In those sessions, the pro-openness coalition argued for 
economic openness and expressed their support for the repeal of the policy of “no haste, 
be patient” and the building of the direct cross-strait transport link. According to them, 
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globalization and economic liberalization were the irresistible trends that Taiwan should 
follow, and therefore the Taiwanese government had to stop pressing the Taiwanese 
business people to keep away from China in the name of national security.
34
 By contrast, 
the anti-openness coalition argued against economic openness and refused to allow the 
Taiwanese government to build the direct cross-strait transport link and lift the restriction 
on Taiwanese investment in China. According to them, from a political perspective, it 
was very dangerous to move too much capital from Taiwan to a country like China that 
was very hostile toward Taiwan, and from an economic perspective, repealing the policy 
of “no haste, be patient” and building the direct transport link would definitely increase 
the unemployment rate in Taiwan.
35
 
        Amid the conflict between the pro-openness coalition and the anti-openness 
coalition, the Taiwanese government, which was slightly pro-openness, tried to find a 
way to please the former on the one hand and avoid alienating itself from the latter on the 
other. Therefore, on August 12
th
, 2001, it reached a preliminary consensus with the 
economic winners in a session of cross-strait economic ties, agreeing to repeal the policy 
of “no haste, be patient” and promising to try its very best to build the three links with no 
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timetable mentioned.
36
 Two days later, President Chen of Taiwan confirmed that the 
policy of “no haste, be patient” would soon be replaced by the policy of “active opening 
and effective management” and said that the replacement was a wise and necessary thing 
for the government to do.
37
 To the pro-openness coalition, although it failed to press the 
Chen Administration to guarantee a timetable for the direct transport link, Chen’s 
announcement about the repeal of the policy of “no haste, be patient” was undoubtedly a 
huge victory for it.  
        The aforementioned consensus however led to friction between the Taiwanese 
government and the anti-openness coalition. Although the Chen Administration’s 
successful effort to delay the issue of the direct cross-strait transport link might, arguably, 
please the anti-openness coalition, it was obvious that, in the anti-openness coalition, the 
angry wave about the repeal of the policy of “no haste, be patient” inundated any relief 
brought by the delay of the building of the three links. The anti-openness politicians from 
the D.P.P., as well as the newly founded T.S.U., and some governmental officials 
including the vice president explicitly expressed their dissatisfaction after the 
aforementioned consensus was reached.
38
 To alleviate the backlash from the anti-
openness coalition, the key officials in the Chen Administration including the president 
himself met with people from the anti-openness coalition and promised them that no 
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other decision in favor of the economic winners would be made in the rest of the 
conference.
39
 
        President Chen’s effort to appease the upset economic losers and the angry anti-
openness politicians from the arising Pan-Green political camp composed of the D.P.P. 
and the T.S.U. did pay off to some extent when many of them expressed their willingness 
to respect the president’s decision. Nevertheless, although they had no intention to 
declare total war against the Chen Administration on the issues of cross-strait economic 
ties, their complaints about its decision to repeal the policy of “no haste, be patient” never 
stopped. For example, Huang Ching-hsien, the chairman of Taiwan Confederation of 
Trade Unions said in late August that workers like him did not understand any 
sophisticated economic theories but they were pretty sure that it was not the right time to 
pursue cross-strait economic openness.
40
 It is worth noting that, starting in early 
September 2001, Lee Teng-hui, the former Taiwanese president and the “spiritual leader” 
of the T.S.U., also began to raise his voice against the decision to repeal the policy of “no 
haste, be patient” that he implemented when he was in office, saying that doing business 
with China was like committing suicide.
41
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        The “no haste, be patient” policy was officially replaced by the policy of “active 
opening and effective management” on November 7th, 2001.42Although the new policy 
still imposed restriction on Taiwanese investment in China, it lifted some of the most 
unpopular restrictive regulations imposed by the policy of “no haste, be patient.” First, 
while the investment limit set at 40% of a company’s net worth was upheld, the infamous 
“$50 million cap” on Taiwanese investment in China was removed; second, investment 
less than 20 million U.S. Dollars no longer required any official permission; and third, 
the list of the prohibited cases of investment was shortened.
43
 In general, this policy 
change revealed a shift from “firm-specific, micro-controls” to “macro-controls” over 
cross-strait economic ties by the Taiwanese government.
44
 
 
The conflict over the issue of 8-inch wafers 
        Immediately after the policy of “active opening and effective management” was 
implemented, Taiwanese manufacturers of semiconductors began to urge the Taiwanese 
government to pursue “active opening” and allow them to produce 8-inch wafers in 
China, which were still regarded as high-tech products by the Taiwanese government and 
therefore were prohibited from being produced in China. Actually, given the fact that 
many downstream Taiwanese information technology (I.T.) companies had already 
moved their operations to China by the end of the 1990s, Taiwanese semiconductor 
manufacturers, as the upstream actors in Taiwan’s I.T. industry, began to show their 
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interests in moving their operations to China as well in mid-2000 in order to get 
geographically closer to their Taiwanese downstream buyers in China and to become 
more internationally competitive as their foreign competitors were rushing to China.
45
 
Obviously, the repeal of the “no haste, be patient” policy and the implementation of the 
“active opening and effective management” policy provided them with a perfect chance 
to effectively articulate their interests. In January 2002, Chang Chung-mou, one of the 
most influential I.T. tycoons in Taiwan, said in public that, in order to make Taiwan’s 
semiconductor industry become much more internationally competitive, he hoped that the 
Taiwanese government could allow the Taiwanese manufacturers to build plants 
producing 8-inch wafers in China.
46
 Chang’s words were echoed by his fellow 
semiconductor manufacturers, and on March 17
th
, Taiwan Electrical and Electronic 
Manufacturers’ Association made a public statement that urged the Taiwanese 
government to take only “professional suggestions and economy” into account and allow 
Taiwanese manufacturers to produce 8-inch wafers in China in order to increase the 
international competitiveness of Taiwan’s Integrated Circuit (I.C.) industry.47 Many Pan-
Blue politicians also expressed their support for the semiconductor manufacturers’ 
demand and claimed that how the Taiwanese government dealt with their demand would 
demonstrate how serious it was about its promise on “active opening.”48 In addition, the 
pro-openness consciousness shared by the economic winners led the leaders of the six 
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largest business associations in Taiwan, who had worked closely with one another in the 
Economic Development Advisory Conference, to make a joint effort again to press 
Taiwan’s Prime Minister, Yu Shyi-kun, to give a green light to Taiwanese semiconductor 
manufacturers on the issue of 8-inch wafers as quickly as possible in their meeting with 
the prime minister on March 19
th
, 2002.
49
  
        The anti-openness coalition on the other hand was outraged by the semiconductor 
manufacturers’ demand, especially after its defeat by the pro-openness coalition in the 
Economic Development Advisory Conference. Hung Chi-chang, a congressman and a 
founder of one of the most influential factions in the D.P.P. (i.e. the New Tide faction), 
argued that if the plants of 8-inch wafers in Taiwan were moved to China, many 
associated businesses, such as those for wafer testing and packaging, would be forced to 
move from Taiwan to China as well; and, according to him, if this really happened, it 
would mark the first step toward the doom of Taiwan’s high-tech industry and, later, 
Taiwan’s economy as a whole because the former was the backbone of the latter.50 Hung 
also criticized the pro-openness coalition’s attempt to treat the way the Taiwanese 
government dealt with the issue of 8-inch wafers as an indicator for its sincerity on 
“active opening,” arguing that the policy of “active opening and effective management” 
was not a policy of “total opening.”51 Chen Shih-meng, the deputy governor of Taiwan’s 
Central Bank, also publicly expressed his opposition and said that the issue of Taiwanese 
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investment in China was not a purely economic issue but a political one.
52
 Among those 
who were opposed to the semiconductor manufacturers’ demand, the members of Taiwan 
Association of University Professors, an anti-China organization, and the T.S.U. 
politicians as well as their “spiritual leader,” Lee Teng-hui, were the most active.53 On 
March 9
th
, 2002, they jointly launched a demonstration to urge the Taiwanese 
government not to allow the semiconductor manufacturers to produce 8-inch wafers in 
China and ask the economic winners to “leave their roots in Taiwan” and help reduce the 
unemployment rate.
54
  
        Facing the pressures from both sides again, the Taiwanese government still decided 
to stick to the strategy it had been adopting: pleasing the pro-openness coalition while 
trying to avoid alienating itself from the anti-openness coalition. On the one hand, it 
announced on March 29
th
, 2002, that the investment associated with 8-inch wafers would 
be removed from the category of prohibited investment and the semiconductor 
manufacturers would be allowed to produce 8-inch wafers in China if their investment 
plans submitted to the government for review were deemed appropriate.
55
 On the other 
hand, it promised the anti-openness coalition that it would examine the applications for 
investment submitted by the 8-inch wafer manufacturers very carefully and “actively 
manage” their “technology, human resources, capital and equipment” if the applications 
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were accepted.
56
 The outcome was barely acceptable to the anti-openness coalition. 
While the pro-openness coalition celebrated their second victory, the anti-openness 
coalition was extremely unsatisfied with the Taiwanese government’s decision on the 
issue of 8-inch wafers and complained that the Chen Administration paid too much 
attention to the part of “active opening” in its new policy toward cross-strait economic 
ties.
57
 
 
7-3: The controversy over the direct cross-strait transport link, 2002 – 2004  
 
The issue of the direct cross-strait transport link becoming a hot issue 
        The replacement of the policy of “no haste, be patient” with the policy of “active 
opening and effective management” and the official green light for the semiconductor 
manufacturers to produce 8-inch wafers in China however did not fully satisfy the pro-
openness coalition’s appetite for economic openness. After all, they had not obtained the 
other important thing they had been eager for: the direct cross-strait transport link. 
Actually, immediately after the policy of “no haste, be patient” was officially repealed, 
many economic winners shifted their attention away from the restriction on Taiwanese 
investment in China and began to press the Taiwanese government to build the direct 
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transport link very hard.
58
 In December 2001, one month after the policy of “no haste, be 
patient” was repealed, according to a survey conducted by Taiwan’s National Federation 
of Industries, as many as 90% of China-based Taiwanese business people thought that the 
Taiwanese government should negotiate with the Chinese government over the issue of 
the three links as soon as possible.
59
 The issue of the direct cross-strait transport link 
eventually became the major battleground in the conflict between the pro-openness 
coalition and the anti-openness coalition as the issue of 8-inch wafers faded away. 
Starting in mid-May 2002, Wang Yung-ching, who had put most of his focus on fighting 
against the restriction on Taiwanese investment in China since 1997, began to push hard 
on the issue as well, publicly asking President Chen of Taiwan to keep his promise about 
the direct cross-strait transport link.
60
 The Pan-Blue politicians also made specific 
demands for the direct transport link. For example, in late October 2002, Chiang Hsiao-
yen, a congressman and a K.M.T. member, began to press the Taiwanese government to 
permit the non-stop cross-strait charter passenger flights for Chinese New Year.
61
 It is 
worth noting that, becoming the major focus of the Taiwanese business leaders and the 
Pan-Blue politicians, the issue of the direct transport link was the single most important 
issue concerning cross-strait economic ties in Taiwan’s domestic politics until 2005 when 
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the pro-openness coalition set its eye on the restriction on Taiwanese investment in China 
again. 
        In general, from 2002 to 2004, while the pro-openness coalition urged the 
Taiwanese government to build the direct cross-strait transport link as soon as it could, 
the anti-openness coalition asked it not to do so. According to the pro-openness coalition, 
the direct transport link would not only reduce the production costs for China-based 
Taiwanese business people but also benefit Taiwan’s economy as a whole because it 
would give Taiwan easy access to the biggest “factory and market of our world,” leading 
to a clear division of labor across the Taiwan Strait and providing more incentives for the 
Taiwanese companies that sold raw materials to China-based Taiwanese manufacturers to 
stay in Taiwan.
62
 Nevertheless, to the anti-openness coalition, the economic problems 
caused by the direct transport link undoubtedly outweighed the economic benefits it 
might bring; according to it, the link would not only encourage more Taiwanese 
companies to move their capital and operations to China and therefore drastically 
increase the unemployment rate in Taiwan but also make Taiwan’s economy as a whole 
marginalized in the global economy.
63
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The Taiwanese government’s wary attitude toward the direct cross-strait transport 
link 
        While the pro-openness coalition’s and the anti-openness coalition’s positions on the 
direct cross-strait transport link still vividly contrasted with each other like all of their 
positions on the other issues concerning cross-strait economic ties, the slightly pro-
openness tendency the Taiwanese government had been revealed since 2000 was 
however changed into a slightly anti-openness one in the debate over the issue of the 
direct transport link. Although many Taiwanese officials like President Chen, who had 
supported the repeal of the policy of “no haste, be patient,” kept promising the pro-
openness coalition that the plan for the direct transport link was still on the table and that 
the Taiwanese government would try to negotiate with the Chinese government over the 
issue as soon as possible, they at the same time revealed an implicit unwillingness to 
resolve the issue quickly. They pointed out that the negative effect of the link on 
Taiwan’s economy had to be carefully considered before any decision about it was made, 
emphasizing that the government had no timetable for the building of the link and 
rejecting the economic winners’ suggestion that the issue could be resolved through a 
private negotiation between the Taiwanese business leaders and the Chinese 
government.
64
 Obviously, the Chen Administration’s attitude toward the building of the 
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direct transport link, which was passive if not negative, was very different from their 
positive attitude toward the repeal of the policy of “no haste, be patient” that was seen in 
2001.  
        In other words, the way the Taiwanese government dealt with the issue of the direct 
transport link since 2002 was different from the way it handled the issue of the restriction 
on Taiwanese investment in China in 2001. More specifically, while it tried to please the 
pro-openness coalition and avoid alienating itself from the anti-openness coalition on the 
issue of Taiwanese investment in China in 2001, it tried to please the latter and avoid 
alienating itself from the former on the issue of the direct transport link since 2002. This 
change was a result of (1) the Chen Administration’s concern about the damage the direct 
transport link might cause to Taiwan’s national defense, and (2) its worry about a total 
loss of support from its political base consisting of the Pan-Green politicians, many of 
whom had been very unsatisfied with its “leaning toward capitalists.”65 
        The development of the issue of the direct cross-strait transport link in 2003 and the 
way the Taiwanese government dealt with it well reflect what I have discussed above. 
Throughout 2003, although the spread of S.A.R.S. in the first half of the year raised a 
concern about the negative effect of the direct transport link on Taiwan’s public health, 
the pro-openness coalition kept pushing hard for the building of the link.
66
 In late June, 
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feeling that the Taiwanese government had only paid lip service to the issue, Wang 
Yung-ching and his younger brother Wang Yung-tsai, the vice chairman of Formosa 
Plastics Group, jointly asked Prime Minister Yu Shyi-kun in their private meeting to 
come up with a clear and concrete policy on the direct transport link as soon as 
possible.
67
 In addition to the effort made by the economic winners, the Pan-Blue 
politicians also worked hard to advocate the building of the link. In the second half of 
2003, the Pan-Blue candidate for the 2004 Taiwanese presidential election, Lien Chan 
who was the chairman of K.M.T., and his electoral partner, Soong Chu-yu who was the 
chairman of P.F.P., formally announced that they would definitely build the direct 
transport link if they won the election and urged the economic winners to support them in 
order to have their common goal about the direct transport link achieved.
68
 The anti-
openness coalition on the other hand criticized the pro-openness coalition’s demand for 
the direct transport link and asked the Chen Administration not to compromise on the 
issue; according to it, the direct transport link would not only cause damage to Taiwan’s 
public health as the case of S.A.R.S. demonstrated but also force more Taiwanese 
factories to close down, worsen the problem about unemployment, lower the Taiwanese 
workers’ wages, decrease Taiwan’s economic growth rate, encourage the Taiwanese 
consumers to shop in China rather than Taiwan, etc.
69
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        Facing the pressures from both sides, the Taiwanese government, as I have argued, 
tried to please the anti-openness coalition by not making any specific promise and 
timetable for the direct transport link while avoiding alienating the pro-openness coalition 
too much by keeping the issue on the table. In August 2003, the Chen Administration 
published its first official evaluation report on the direct cross-strait transport link which 
examined the effect of the link on Taiwan’s national defense, politics, foreign relations, 
society, and economy. The conclusion of the report to a great extent reflected the anti-
openness coalition’s concern about the link: the damage caused by the link outweighed 
the benefits brought by it. According to the report, while the link might both positively 
and negatively affect Taiwan’s economy, it would have only negative effects on all of the 
other dimensions examined.
70
 Nevertheless, to prevent the economic winners from 
turning against it completely on the issue, in September 2003, the Taiwanese government, 
though still refusing to make any timetable for the direct transport link, began to 
unilaterally “facilitate air and sea shipping” across the Taiwan Strait without any 
negotiation with its Chinese counterpart, an act that was boycotted by the Chinese 
government.
71
  
 
The campaigns for the 2004 Taiwanese presidential election 
        The Chen Administration’s slightly anti-openness attitude toward the issue of the 
direct transport link did help President Chen gain the support from the anti-openness 
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coalition in his campaign for the 2004 presidential election. To keep the coalition on his 
side more tightly, Chen made the “Six Great Promises” to Taiwanese workers which 
included a promise not to open Taiwan’s labor market to Chinese workers.72 Furthermore, 
unlike what he did in the 2000 election, Chen did not propose any new pro-openness 
measure for cross-strait economic ties this time; instead, he just pointed out that he would 
keep implementing his policy of “active opening and effective management” if 
reelected.
73
 
        Successfully improving his relationship with the anti-openness coalition with his no-
more-openness attitude, Chen went on to build a firewall to prevent a sense of 
dissatisfaction with him among the economic winners on the issue of the direct transport 
link from growing. Chen explained to the economic winners that the issue of cross-strait 
economic ties was not only an economic issue but also a political one; he further argued 
that the Chinese government undoubtedly dealt with this issue that the economic winners 
thought was an economic one in a political manner by imposing a political constraint (e.g. 
China’s One-China Principle) on cross-strait economic ties and had been trying its very 
best not to let the Chen Administration, which was regarded by China as a separatist 
group, get any political credits in Taiwan’s domestic politics for improving cross-strait 
economic relations.
74
 Therefore, according to him, although there was little doubt that 
normalizing cross-strait economic ties might help stabilize cross-strait relations, the 
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Taiwanese government should deal with this issue very carefully, taking both economic 
and political factors into account.
75
 Finally, he concluded that his policy that pursued 
“active opening” on the basis of “effective management” was the best one; and, based on 
this policy, he made a “three-phase” proposal for building the direct air transport link 
between China and Taiwan in response to the economic winners’ demand for the direct 
cross-strait transport link.
76
 
        The Chen Administration’s effort to avoid alienating the economic winners was 
actually not very successful. Starting in early 2004, many business leaders, including 
those who supported Chen in the 2000 election, began to lose their patience on the issue 
of the direct cross-strait transport link and demand a timetable for the link.
77
 In January 
2004, two months before the presidential election, Wang Yung-ching complained that, if 
the Chen Administration had really regarded the building of the direct transport link as a 
policy goal, it should have actively pursued the goal.
78
 In February, Chang Yung-fa’s 
Evergreen Group expressed in public its support for the link, citing the importance of the 
direct transport link to Taiwan’s economy; and on March 18th, 2004, two days before the 
election, Chang himself exchanged views on the direct transport link with Wang in their 
first meeting ever, and the two influential business leaders agreed with each other that the 
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Taiwanese government’s unwillingness to build the direct transport link was causing 
damage to Taiwan’s economy.79  
        Obviously, to the economic winners, the candidate from their own pro-openness 
coalition, the K.M.T. chairman Lien Chan, was undoubtedly more politically attractive 
than Chen. Lien unequivocally proposed a pro-openness policy in his platform 
concerning cross-strait economic ties. To make his economic plan even more appealing 
to the economic winners, he proposed to not only build the direct cross-strait transport 
link but also lift the remaining restriction on Taiwanese investment in China imposed by 
the policy of “active opening and effective management,” arguing that it should be the 
corporations, instead of the government, that made a decision on whether or not to do 
business with China.
80
 In general, he believed that growing cross-strait economic ties 
would have a great positive effect on Taiwan’s economy if Taiwan could employ a “win-
win” strategy to develop Taiwan’s economy with the ties, i.e. exploiting its own 
economic advantage which was knowledge economy and working, through cross-strait 
economic ties, with China which was experiencing rapid economic growth.
81
 Moreover, 
he thought close cross-strait economic ties could make Taiwan the door to the huge 
Chinese market for foreign investors, a status that would economically benefit Taiwan.
82
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        In addition to selling his own ideas, Lien criticized the Chen Administration’s policy 
on cross-strait economic ties for causing damage to Taiwan’s economy.83  He claimed 
that Chen had done nothing but lip service when it came to the issue of three links since 
he was inaugurated in 2000.
84
 Furthermore, he said Chen mistakenly focused more on 
“effective management” than on “active opening” in his dealing with the issues of cross-
strait economic ties; according to Lien, “active opening” should be a precondition for 
“effective management” instead of the other way around.85 He also pointed out that the 
Pan-Blue’s strategy with regard to China-Taiwan economic relations was to create “a 
Taiwan that is open to the outside world” while the Chen Administration’s was to create 
“an isolated Taiwan.”86 Finally, he vowed to replace Chen’s policy of “confrontation and 
isolation,” which, according to him, had a negative effect on Taiwan’s economy, with his 
policy of “competition and openness,” which would benefit Taiwan’s economy.87 
        Some of the most important proposals Lien made are as follows: first, softening the 
limit on Taiwanese investment in China to let a Taiwanese company invest 50% of its 
total capital maximum in China; second, signing a Free Trade Agreement (F.T.A.) with 
China; third, building the direct cross-strait transport link; and fourth, allowing Chinese 
tourists and business people to visit Taiwan.
88
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        Overall, Lien got significant support from the economic winners.
89
 On March 19
th
, 
2004, one day before the Election Day, Chang Yung-fa, who supported Chen in the 2000 
election, issued a press release advocating the direct cross-strait transport link; 
furthermore, he said in the release that a peaceful cross-strait relationship was the 
foundation for Taiwan’s economic growth and therefore he supported the candidate who 
could bring peace to the Taiwan Strait, implying that he would vote for Lien.
90
 
        Nevertheless, to the economic winners’ and the Pan-Blue politicians’ 
disappointment, Chen was reelected. After the election, the conflict between the pro-
openness and the anti-openness coalitions continued, and each of them carried on with 
their pressure on the Chen Administration, trying to force it to move in their favored 
direction on the issues concerning cross-strait economic ties. Throughout the second half 
of 2004, while the pro-openness coalition continued to press the Taiwanese government 
to come up with a timetable for the direct cross-strait transport link, the anti-openness 
coalition, thinking of the Taiwanese government’s attitude toward the restriction on 
Taiwanese investment in China in the period from 2001 to 2002, complained that the 
Chen Administration paid too much more attention on “active opening” than “effective 
management” over the past four years and urged it to change its current policy of “active 
opening and effective management” to the policy of “no more opening and active 
management.”91 
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7-4: The replacement of the “active opening and effective management” policy with 
the “active management and effective opening” policy, 2005 – 2006  
 
The growing pressure from the anti-openness coalition 
        The anti-openness coalition, though supporting Chen in the 2004 election, began to 
increase their pressure on the Chen Administration in early 2005 to force it to change its 
policy on cross-strait economic ties that the anti-openness coalition thought was too “pro-
capitalists.” In late February 2005, Lee Teng-hui urged the Taiwanese government in 
rough rhetoric to protect Taiwan’s national interests and stop “listening to business 
people”; he at the same time criticized the policy of “active opening and effective 
management” by complaining that the management on cross-strait economic ties that had 
been done by the Taiwanese government was actually not effective at all.
92
 The pressure 
from the anti-openness coalition reached a whole new level when the Anti-Secession Law 
was officially passed by China’s National People’s Congress on March 14th and an open 
letter, which was in favor of the idea of one-China and against Taiwan’s independence, 
was issued by Hsu Wen-lung, one of the most influential Taiwanese business leaders and 
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the former chairman of Chimei Group who was regarded by the Chinese government as 
the most significant “green businessman,” on March 26th.93 The next day after Hsu issued 
the open letter, Lee required the Chen Administration in a harsh tone to “immediately” 
and “completely” stop its policy of “active opening and effective management,” warning 
that the economic openness toward China had already created a condition that allowed 
China to “besiege the Taiwanese government with the Taiwanese business people.”94 At 
the same time, the politicians from the T.S.U. also urged the Taiwanese government to 
unequivocally reject the pro-openness coalition’s demand for the direct cross-strait 
transport link that they thought would endanger Taiwan’s national security and 
sovereignty.
95
 The pressure the anti-openness coalition put on the Taiwanese government 
further grew in early December 2005 when the Taiwanese manufacturers who produced 
washcloths for the domestic market joined the anti-openness force to protest against the 
dumping of Chinese washcloths, many of which were actually made or imported by 
China-based Taiwanese business people.
96
 
 
The Taiwanese government turning against economic openness 
        Because of the passage of China’s Anti-Secession Law and the issuance of Hsu’s 
open letter as well as the strong political pressure from its Pan-Green political allies in 
the anti-openness coalition that followed, the Taiwanese government, that had become 
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slightly anti-openness since 2002 on the issue of the direct transport link, turned anti-
openness on the issue of Taiwanese investment in China as well in 2005. This change 
was politically comprehensible. To President Chen, his relatively pro-openness attitude 
toward Taiwanese investment in China since 2000, which was revealed by his decision to 
replace the policy of “no haste, be patient” with his policy of “active opening and 
effective management” in 2001, had actually brought himself more political problems 
than benefits. For one thing, this attitude had significantly alienated himself from many 
of his Pan-Green political allies not only from the T.S.U. but also within his own party 
and government, and as I have argued, this partially explains his effort in 2002 to please 
the anti-openness Pan-Green politicians as well as the economic losers by revealing a 
slightly anti-openness tendency on the issue of the direct cross-strait transport link. For 
another thing, the attitude did not reduce the pro-openness coalition’s criticism against 
and its pressure on him as he expected when it came to the issues of cross-strait economic 
ties. As mentioned, the pro-openness coalition shifted its focus to the direct cross-strait 
transport link immediately after the restriction on Taiwanese investment in China became 
less strict in late 2001 and then became more and more critical of Chen on the issue of the 
direct transport link as if he were a pure protectionist, despite his willingness and effort to 
repeal the policy of “no haste, be patient.” Arguably, these two sets of gravity, one from 
the anti-openness coalition and the other from the pro-openness coalition, worked jointly 
to push Chen toward the anti-openness coalition’s position on cross-strait economic ties 
when he (1) faced strong pressure from the anti-openness coalition following the passage 
of China’s Anti-Secession Law and the issuance of Hsu’s open letter and (2) saw at the 
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same time the pro-openness coalition’s continuous push for the direct transport link 
unchanged even in the wake of what he regarded as China’s extremely hostile gesture 
toward Taiwan. 
        On April 5
th
, 2005, the Taiwanese government officially announced that it would 
reconsider its current policy on cross-strait economic ties and pay more attention to 
“management” than to “opening.”97 The announcement significantly increased the level 
of the pro-openness coalition’s discontent with the Taiwanese government, which had 
already been high because of the controversy over the direct transport link.
98
 Sensing that 
the Taiwanese government might impose new restriction on Taiwanese investment in 
China, the economic winners, starting in mid-2005, began to argue against the restriction 
on Taiwanese investment in China again in addition to demanding the direct cross-strait 
transport link. For example, on May 16
th
, 2005, in their meeting with Taiwan’s Prime 
Minister, Hsieh Chang-ting, the representatives of Taiwan’s I.T. industry, including the 
chairman of T.S.M.U. Chang Chung-mou, pressed the prime minister to permit the export 
of the 0.18um (micrometer) manufacturing technology to China immediately; also, they 
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urged the Taiwanese government to allow them to export 90nm (nanometer) 
manufacturing technology to China and produce 12-inch wafers there by 2007 in order to 
effectively compete with other foreign manufacturers operating in China.
99
 At the same 
time, some economic winners began to reveal their dissatisfaction with the “40% 
investment cap” upheld by the policy of “active opening and effective management.”100 
On November 25
th
, 2005, around three weeks after President Chen revealed his intention 
to hold the second Economic Development Advisory Conference in the near future, the 
six largest Taiwanese business associations that worked closely with one another in the 
first conference four years ago, made a joint announcement to name the issues that they 
hoped would be discussed in the conference, among which the issue of Taiwanese 
investment in China as well as that of the direct transport link was their major focus once 
again.
101
 As for the Pan-Blue politicians, to further strengthen their cooperative 
relationship with the economic winners, which was consolidated in the 2004 presidential 
election, they kept pushing for the building of the direct transport link and the lifting of 
the existing restriction on Taiwanese investment in China throughout 2005 alongside the 
economic winners; also, in August 2005, the two major Pan-Blue parties, i.e. the K.M.T. 
and the P.F.P., began to make plans to (1) establish service centers in Taiwan for China-
                                                 
99
 “Chang Chung-mou urges Hsieh Chang-ting to allow him to export the 0.18um manufacturing 
technology to Mainland,” Economic Daily News, May 17, 2005. 
100
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based Taiwanese business people and (2) run service offices in China to provide instant 
aids for them.
102
 
        The pro-openness coalition’s discontent with the Taiwanese government further 
grew when President Chen revealed in his New Year Speech for the year of 2006 that the 
policy of “active opening and effective management” would be replaced by the policy of 
“active management and effective opening” very soon.103 Three days after the speech, on 
January 4
th
, 2006, members of Taiwan Federation of Industry and Commerce passed a 
resolution urging the Taiwanese government to lift the 40% cap on Taiwanese investment 
in China.
104
 In mid-February, Wang Jin-pyng, the speaker of Taiwan’s congress and a 
K.M.T. member, held a public hearing with China-based Taiwanese business people, in 
which they criticized the Chen Administration’s intention to slow down the growth of 
cross-strait economic ties and then introduced the “Statement by China-based Taiwanese 
Business People” which demanded, among other things, the lifting of the restriction on 
Taiwanese investment in China and the building of the direct cross-strait transport link.
105
 
        As for the anti-openness coalition, after President Chen’s announcement about the 
policy change on the first day of 2006, it urged the Chen Administration to take 
“management” as seriously as it claimed that it would instead of just paying lip service. 
Starting in early March 2006, the Taiwanese manufacturers producing soap, sweaters, 
shoes, construction materials, pottery ware, furniture, etc. for the domestic market began 
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to join the washcloth makers to protest against the import of products from China and ask 
the Taiwanese government to deal with the problem about the dumping of Chinese 
products more actively.
106
 As for the anti-openness Pan-Green politicians, worrying that 
the Taiwanese government would chang its mind about the policy change due to the 
pressure from the pro-openness coalition, they kept warning the Chen Administration on 
many occasions not to yield to the pro-openness coalition’s demand for the lifting of the 
restriction on Taiwanese investment in China and the building of the direct transport link 
which, according to them, would hollow out Taiwan’s economy and increase the 
unemployment rate.
107
  
 
The implementation of the “active management and effective opening” policy and 
the Conference on Sustaining Taiwan’s Economic Development 
        Notwithstanding the pro-openness coalition’s effort to prevent any anti-openness 
policy from being made, on March 22
nd
, 2006, the Taiwanese government officially 
introduced the policy of “active management and effective opening.”108 While this new 
policy did not impose any new restriction on cross-strait economic ties, it was 
undoubtedly an anti-openness policy because its major objective was to discourage 
Taiwanese investment in China by actively enforcing the restrictive regulations set by the 
previous policy of “active opening and effective management.” Some of the most 
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important measures associated with the new policy of “active management and effective 
opening” are as follows: first, the Taiwanese government would diligently search for the 
cases of illegal investment; second, the government would carefully review the 
applications for sensitive investment (e.g. the investment involving a huge amount of 
money or advanced technology) and follow up on it after it was approved; and third, the 
government would make public the information about a certain company’s investment in 
China if necessary.
109
 
        The new policy, which was regarded by the pro-openness coalition as nothing but 
anti-openness, was immediately challenged. On March 23
rd
, 2006, Taiwan’s National 
Federation of Industries complained that the Taiwanese government had not consulted 
with the business people before the policy was made, that the new policy was ambiguous, 
and that there was only “management” but no “opening” in the new policy.110 The Pan-
Blue politicians like Speaker Wang also publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
policy change, arguing that “active management” would reduce Taiwanese 
manufacturers’ global competitiveness and made Taiwan economically marginalized in 
the global economy.
111
 
        In spite of the pro-openness coalition’s challenge to the new policy, no sign of 
change in favor of the pro-openness coalition appeared. Moreover, the Chen 
Administration further revealed another explicit anti-openness tendency in the 
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Conference on Sustaining Taiwan’s Economic Development, the official name of the 
second Economic Development Advisory Conference, which was held from July 27
th
 to 
28
th
, 2006. Unsatisfied with the Taiwanese government’s anti-openness attitude that had 
been unveiled since 2005, the K.M.T. and the P.F.P. both announced that they would be 
absent from the conference.
112
 As for the economic winners, they decided to attend the 
conference and formed the Society of Industries and Commerce for the Conference on 
Sustaining Taiwan’s Economic Development to make a joint effort to have their voice 
heard in the conference, hoping the Taiwanese government would work with them again 
like it did five years ago in the Economic Development Advisory Conference.
113
 To their 
disappointment, the Chen Administration, which reached a consensus with them on the 
issues of cross-strait economic ties in the 2001 conference, did not endorse their demands 
that the direct link be built and the 40% cap be lifted this time, and their demands were 
finally included in the official conclusion of the conference as the “other suggestions” 
rather than “common suggestions” at the end of the conference.114  
        The result of the conference, as well as the implementation of the “active 
management and effective opening” policy that I have discussed, demonstrates two 
important new developments in the political conflict over cross-strait economic ties in 
Taiwan’s domestic politics since 2000 when the confrontation between the economic 
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winners and losers began. First, the Taiwanese government, which was not completely 
anti-openness from 2000 to 2004, did officially turn against openness by the end of 2006. 
Second, although the anti-openness coalition was not satisfied with the treatment of the 
economic winners’ demands as the “other suggestions” (obviously, it wanted their 
demands to be completely excluded from the conclusion),
115
 compared with its fiasco in 
the 2001 conference whose result was in favor of the pro-openness coalition, the 
conclusion of the Conference on Sustaining Taiwan’s Economic Development along with 
the introduction of the policy of “active management and effective opening” four months 
ago, both of which were not in favor of the pro-openness coalition, could be regarded as 
its first clear-cut victory over the pro-openness coalition since 2001. 
 
7-5: Discussion 
        The economic losers, who were mostly out of the scene in Taiwan’s domestic 
politics before mid-2000, began to conflict with the economic winners over the issues of 
cross-strait economic ties starting in the second half of 2000. In addition, when 
Taiwanese politicians were divided by identity politics in 2001 into two political groups, 
i.e. the pro-independence Pan-Green and the anti-independence Pan-Blue, they at the 
same time began to exploit the cleavage between the economic winners and losers to their 
political advantages: while the Pan-Blue formed a pro-openness coalition with the 
economic winners, the Pan-Green (or, more specifically, the Pan-Green politicians who 
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were anti-openness) formed an anti-openness coalition with the losers. Throughout the 
period from 2001 to 2006, the conflict over cross-strait economic ties in Taiwan’s 
domestic politics involved the anti-openness coalition and the pro-openness coalition 
fighting each other and trying to influence the Taiwanese government’s policy-making on 
the issues of cross-strait economic ties. 
        When the conflict over the issues of cross-strait economic ties in Taiwan’s domestic 
politics in the period from 1990 to 2000 that I have examined in the previous chapter is 
compared with the conflict in the period from 2000 to 2006 that I examine in this chapter, 
two differences between them are obvious. First, the number of the major actors involved 
in the conflict in the second case is larger than that in the first case. More specifically, 
while the conflict in the period from 1990 to 2000 was mostly about the clash between 
the Taiwanese government and the economic winners, in the period from 2000 to 2006, 
the conflict involved not only the Taiwanese government and the economic winners but 
also the economic losers, the pro-independence Pan-Green politicians, and the anti-
independence Pan-Blue politicians. Second, the outcomes of the conflicts are different. 
While the conflict in the period from 1990 to 2000 ended with, to a certain degree, the 
victory of the economic winners when the new Taiwanese government that took office in 
May 2000 promised to pursue economic openness that was opposed by the previous 
administration the economic winners had been conflicting with for a decade; the conflict 
in the period from 2000 to 2006 ended with the victory of the economic losers, or more 
specifically the anti-openness coalition, when the Taiwanese government explicitly 
changed its attitude toward cross-strait economic ties from a relatively pro-openness 
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attitude in 2000 to an anti-openness attitude in 2005, a change that, to a great extent, was 
a result of the pressure from the anti-openness coalition. 
        However, although the anti-openness coalition seemed to finally get what it wanted 
by the end of 2006, i.e. an anti-openness Taiwanese government that implemented an 
anti-openness policy, the explicit anti-openness attitude toward cross-strait economic ties 
the Taiwanese government revealed in the period from 2005 to 2006 ironically sowed the 
seed for the winning of the pro-openness coalition in the 2008 presidential election. I will 
discuss this point in the next chapter.         
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Chapter Eight 
The Anti-openness Coalition’s Conflict with the Pan-Green Presidential Candidate 
and the Victory of the Pro-openness Coalition in the Presidential Election, 2007 – 
2008 
 
        In this chapter, I discuss the conflict over cross-strait economic ties in Taiwan’s 
domestic politics in the period from 2007 to 2008 and explain why the pro-openness 
coalition won the 2008 Taiwanese presidential election. As I will argue in this chapter, 
due to the ambivalent feeling toward cross-strait economic ties among the Taiwanese 
public that I have discussed in Chapter Six, the Taiwanese government’s effort to 
decelerate the growth of cross-strait economic ties since 2005 resulted in a pro-openness 
tendency among the Taiwanese public, which in turn forced the Pan-Green candidate for 
the 2008 presidential election to come up with several pro-openness proposals in order to 
become politically attractive to the pro-openness Taiwanese public. The Pan-Green 
candidate’s election-driven pro-openness tendency however brought about a 
contradiction between him on the one side and the Pan-Green politicians and the Chen 
Administration which had turned completely against openness by the end of 2006 on the 
other. This contradiction as well as the pro-openness attitude among the Taiwanese 
public, as I will argue, played an important role in the winning of the pro-openness 
coalition in the 2008 Taiwanese presidential election. 
 
8-1: The Taiwanese government’s siding with the anti-openness coalition  
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        As argued in Chapter Seven, by the end of 2006, the Taiwanese government had 
completely turned against economic openness. In the period from 2007 to mid-2008 
when a new Taiwanese president was inaugurated, the Chen Administration obviously 
sided with the anti-openness coalition, explicitly refusing to lift the restriction on 
Taiwanese investment in China and build the direct cross-strait transport link, and 
criticizing alongside the anti-openness coalition the pro-openness coalition’s demand for 
economic openness as well as the economic proposals made by the Pan-Blue candidate 
for the 2008 presidential election, Ma Ying-jeou from the K.M.T.
1
  
        On January 1
st
, 2007, in his New Year Speech, President Chen blamed China-based 
Taiwanese business people’s investment in China for the “hollowing out of industries,” 
the “income stagnation,” and the “growth of institutional unemployment” in Taiwan; he 
also emphasized that his administration’s new policy on cross-strait economic ties (i.e. 
the policy of “active management and effective opening”) was treating nothing but 
Taiwan as a priority in order to “increase investment in Taiwan,” “create jobs,” “narrow 
the gap between the urban and rural areas,” and “close the gap between the rich and 
poor.”2 In October, facing the pressure from the Taiwanese textile manufacturers and 
anti-openness Pan-Green politicians, the Chen Administration decided to postpone the 
scheduled opening of Taiwan’s market to 54 types of textile products made in China, 
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316 
 
citing its negative effect on Taiwan’s textile industry.3 President Chen continued to have 
an anti-openness tone in his New Year Speech for the year of 2008, saying that 
“economic growth was not the only objective for national development”; in addition, he 
criticized Taiwanese investment in China for making Taiwanese society become an “M-
shaped society” in which there was no middle class and the gap between the rich and 
poor was unreasonably wide.
4
 
        While the Taiwanese government joined the anti-openness coalition in the debate 
about cross-strait economic ties, the economic winners, seeing the Chen Administration 
as a major obstacle for economic openness without any doubt, began to criticize its anti-
openness tendency in harsh rhetoric. For example, Chang Chung-mou, the founder and 
the chairman of T.S.M.C., complained in April 2007 that the restriction on Taiwanese 
semiconductor manufacturers’ investment in China that prohibited them from producing 
their most advanced products in China had already made them very internationally 
uncompetitive compared with other foreign companies like Intel whose products in China, 
according to Chang, had been superior to T.S.M.C.’s there by two technological 
generations.
5
 In November, he went so far as to criticize the Taiwanese government for 
ruining Taiwan’s economy with economic isolationism.6 In January 2008, Chang Yung-
fa, the founder and the chairman of Evergreen Group, claimed that economic openness 
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and the direct cross-strait transport link were the two most important things for Taiwan’s 
economic growth and said that the Taiwanese government was bullying Taiwanese 
people by denying them the direct transport link that would significantly save their time 
and money on their travel between China and Taiwan.
7
 As for the Pan-Blue, it kept 
arguing for economic openness and made efforts to appeal to the economic winners in its 
campaign for the 2008 presidential election. The presidential candidate it endorsed, Ma 
from the K.M.T., proposed several pro-openness measures which included loosening the 
restriction on Taiwanese investment in China and building the direct transport link. In 
general, his proposals were supported by the economic winners, and the pro-openness 
coalition in the 2008 presidential election was as solid as it was in the 2004 election.
8
 
        Based on what I have discussed above, it could be expected that the 2008 
presidential election would soon become a major battleground for the conflict between 
the pro-openness coalition, which endorsed the Pan-Blue candidate, Ma, on the one side, 
and the anti-openness coalition with the Chen Administration by its side, which endorsed 
the Pan-Green candidate, Hsieh Chang-ting, on the other. Nevertheless, although there 
was surely a conflict between these two forces during the campaign period for the 2008 
presidential election, it was worth noting that while the pro-openness force was stable and 
solid throughout the campaign period, the anti-openness force was becoming more and 
more unstable due to an internal contradiction originating in Hsieh’s economic proposals 
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that were regarded as unacceptably pro-openness by many of his Pan-Green political 
allies. I discuss his proposals in the following section by comparing his proposals with 
not only the proposals made by his opponent in 2008 (i.e. Ma) but also those made by his 
predecessor in 2004 (i.e. Chen). 
 
8-2: Ma’s and Hsieh’s proposals for cross-strait economic ties in the 2008 election 
        Like his predecessor, the Pan-Blue candidate in 2008, Ma Ying-jeou, proposed a 
pro-openness policy on cross-strait economic ties and criticized the Chen 
Administration’s policies over the past seven years as policies of isolation.9 Similarly, he 
claimed that Taiwan should exploit its economic ties with China to not only be a door to 
the Chinese market for foreign investors but also become more competitive in the global 
economy.
10
 
        Some of his most important proposals are as follows: first, lifting all of the 
inappropriate restrictive regulations on Taiwanese investment in China; second, creating 
a “cross-strait common market” by establishing a free trade area and a customs union; 
third, building the three links; fourth, allowing more Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan; and 
fifth, not importing the Chinese labor and agricultural products to Taiwan.
11
 
        As for the Pan-Green candidate, Hsieh Chang-ting, he tried to come up with a 
platform about cross-strait economic ties that was relatively pro-openness compared with 
the Chen Administration’s policies (including both of the policy of “active opening and 
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effective management” and the policy of “active management and effective opening”) but 
at the same time could prevent Taiwan from being overly dependent on China 
economically.
12
 
        There are two major points in his economic plan, which seem to contradict each 
other at first glance: economic openness and economic independence.
13
 On the one hand, 
he claimed that (1) opening the Taiwanese market to China and lifting the restriction on 
Taiwanese investment in China would economically benefit Taiwan only in the short 
term and (2) Ma’s idea about the cross-strait common market would not economically 
benefit domestic workers as well as small and medium sized Taiwanese companies.
14
 On 
the other hand, he believed growing cross-strait economic ties, if appropriately dealt with 
in a “global context,” would have a positive effect on Taiwan’s macro economy.15  
        However, a closer look at his plan does clarify the aforementioned contradiction. 
Actually, what he tried to do was to find a balance between economic openness and 
economic independence. According to him, Taiwan should adopt a policy of economic 
openness, regarding the Chinese market as an important part of the whole global market 
from which Taiwan could get abundant economic benefits; at the same time, as he argued, 
Taiwan should strengthen its own economic power, upgrading its ability of research and 
development (R&D) and pursuing industrial transformation.
16
  
        Some of the most important proposals made by Hsieh with regard to cross-strait 
economic ties are as follows: first, dealing with the restriction on Taiwanese investment 
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in China on a case-by-case basis; second, improving Taiwan’s investment environment, 
helping manufacturers that produced for the domestic market upgrade their technologies, 
and encouraging China-based Taiwanese business people to make investment in Taiwan; 
third, opening the cross-strait financial market to allow Taiwanese banks to set up 
branches in China and Chinese banks in Taiwan; fourth, allowing Chinese to tour and 
invest in Taiwan; and fifth, building the direct cross-strait air transport link at a gradual 
pace.
17
  
        When the Pan-Blue candidates’ and the Pan-Green candidates’ platforms with 
regard to cross-strait economic ties in the 2004 and the 2008 presidential elections are 
compared with one another, we can find the following three things. First, the Pan-Blue 
candidates’ platforms in both 2004 and 2008 were very pro-openness. For one thing, both 
of the candidates criticized the Chen Administration’s policy as a policy of economic 
isolation. For another thing, they emphasized the huge benefits brought to Taiwan’s 
economy by cross-strait economic ties. Second, the Pan-Green candidates’ platforms in 
both 2004 and 2008 pointed out that a policy that was too pro-openness like the one 
proposed by their Pan-Blue opponents would make Taiwan sucked into the Chinese 
economic orbit and therefore have a negative effect on Taiwan’s national security. 
        Third and most importantly, while the Pan-Blue candidates’ platforms in the 2004 
and 2008 elections were very similar, the Pan-Green candidate’s platform in 2008 looked 
different from his predecessor’s in 2004 although both of them criticized the Pan-Blue 
candidates’ pro-openness proposals. Specifically speaking, while Chen in 2004 believed 
                                                 
17
 Ibid., 166-169 and 171. 
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that the political threat brought by cross-strait economic ties outweighed the economic 
opportunity those ties would provide and therefore emphasized the importance of 
“effective management” (i.e. tackling the political threat by pursuing economic 
independence), Hsieh in 2008 was willing to take both the threat and opportunity into 
account in his proposals and tried to come up with a solution that kept economic 
openness and independence in balance. In other words, Hsieh, compared with Chen who 
argued that national security was more important than economic gains, admitted that the 
economic opportunity and benefits that would be brought by cross-strait economic ties 
should not be ignored. Simply speaking, Hsieh’s proposals in 2008 were comparatively 
more pro-openness than Chen’s in 2004. I explain why this is the case in the following 
section. 
 
8-3: Explaining Hsieh’s pro-openness proposals in 2008 
        Hsieh’s pro-openness proposals for cross-strait economic ties could be explained by 
what I call “Taiwanese people’s ambivalent feeling toward cross-strait economic ties” 
that I have discussed in Chapter Six.
18
 As argued in the previous chapter, the Chen 
Administration began to explicitly turn against economic openness in 2005, trying to put 
a brake on the growth of cross-strait economic ties, and in 2006, it went so far as to 
officially replace the pro-openness policy of “active opening and effective management” 
with the anti-openness policy of “active management and effective opening.” Here, due 
to the ambivalent feeling toward cross-strait economic ties among the Taiwanese public, 
                                                 
18
 See Chapter Six, 260-262. 
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like the policy of “no haste, be patient” in 1996 that tried to decelerate the growth of 
cross-strait economic ties, the policy of “active management and effective opening” in 
2006 that served the same purpose was not popular.
19
 After President Chen announced on 
the first day of 2006 that he would replace the policy of “active opening and effective 
management” with the policy of “active management and effective opening,” a public 
poll conducted the next day showed that only 24% of the Taiwanese public supported the 
proposed policy change.
20
 Furthermore, the policy change caused the Taiwanese public to 
demand more openness and less restriction when it came to cross-strait economic ties. 
Therefore, facing such a public demand, the Pan-Green candidate, Hsieh, had no choice 
but to come up with a platform on cross-strait economic ties that was relatively pro-
openness compared with not only the policy of “active management and effective 
opening” but also the policy of “active opening and effective management” in order to 
show the Taiwanese voters that he was different from his predecessor (i.e. the incumbent, 
Chen) who by the end of 2006 had been regarded by the Taiwanese public as an 
unpopular protectionalist.  
        In the remaining part of this section, I examine public opinions with regard to cross-
strait economic ties in the period from 2001 to 2007 to find evidence for my argument 
                                                 
19
 This ambivalent feeling was still significant after 2000. For example, according to a survey conducted in 
August 2001, while 48.4% of the respondents said they were worried that the economic tie as well as the 
direct transport link between China and Taiwan would have a negative effect on Taiwan’s national security, 
only 29.5% of the respondents believed the aforementioned tie and link would negatively affect Taiwan’s 
economy (the survey was conducted by the Polling Center of CTi News, available at 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/97710131541.htm>). Here is another example. A public poll 
in January 2006 revealed that while 49.0% of the respondents thought that the direct transport link would 
negatively affect Taiwan’s national security, only 23.0% of the respondents said that the link would cause 
damage to Taiwan’s economy (the survey was conducted by United Daily News, available at 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/977128026.pdf>). 
20
 The survey was conducted by the Polling Center of TVBS, available at 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/9771273862.pdf>. 
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above, i.e. Chen’s policy change in his second term was not popular. In general, the 
public opinions I examine reveal that a trend of anti-restriction and pro-openness 
gradually emerged among the public from 2004 to 2007 while such a trend was not 
significant from 2001 to 2004. In other words, from 2004 to 2007, like in the period after 
the anti-openness policy of “no haste, be patient” was implemented, the Taiwanese public 
began to demand a pro-openness policy that could put cross-strait economic ties back on 
track. Because of this, while Chen in 2004 had no political incentive to introduce a new 
economic plan to further reduce the restriction on cross-strait economic ties, Hsieh in 
2008 had a strong incentive to come up with a platform on cross-strait economic ties that 
was relatively pro-openness. 
 
The opinions about the speed of the growth of cross-strait economic ties, 2001 – 2007  
        Taiwanese opinions about the speed of the growth of cross-strait economic ties 
reflect whether the Taiwanese public wants the Taiwanese government to promote or 
reverse the trend of growing cross-strait economic ties. People who believe that the speed 
is unreasonably high are those who want the government to decelerate the growth of 
cross-strait economic ties; by contrast, people who think that the speed is too low are 
those who want the government to accelerate the growth.  
        In the period from 2001 to 2007, as Figure 8.1 shows, while the percentage of the 
people who thought that the speed was too high increased only a little bit from 17.3% to 
18.6%, the percentage of those who believed the speed was too low significantly 
increased from 20.3% to 32.2%. If we divide the aforementioned period into two periods: 
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Chen’s first term (May 2000 – May 2004) and Chen’s second term (May 2004 – May 
2008), we can find that, in the former period, the percentage of the people who thought 
the speed was unreasonably low actually decreased from 20.3% in July 2001 to 17.5% in 
November 2003. However, the percentage significantly grew to 27.8 % in December 
2004 and then increased to 32.2% in December 2007. By contrast, the percentage of the 
people who thought the speed was too high significantly decreased in Chen’s second term 
from 24.9% in December 2004 to 18.6% in December 2007. 
 
Figure 8.1: Opinions about the speed of the growth of economic ties 
 
Source: Surveys conducted for Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council by (1) Public Opinions 
Research Center at National Chung Cheng University (July 2001) 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/9771011515.htm>; (2) e-Society Research Group 
(December 2002) <http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=44219&ctNode=5652&mp=1>; (3) 
Election Study Center at National Chengchi University (November 2003) 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/977947545.htm>; (4) Mainland Affairs Council 
itself (December 2004) <http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/9779394814.pdf>; (5) 
Mainland Affairs Council itself (November 2005) 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/977133198.pdf>; (6) Election Study Center at 
National Chengchi University (December 2006) 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/9771272658.pdf>; and (7) Burke Marketing 
Research (December 2007) <http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/9771145243.pdf>. 
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The support rates for the restriction on Taiwanese investment in China,  2001 – 
2007  
        Taiwanese opinions about whether more restrictive regulations on Taiwanese 
investment in China are needed also reflect their attitudes toward the Taiwanese 
government’s policy on cross-strait economic relations. Simply speaking, when a person 
says that fewer restrictive regulations are needed, this person reveals a negative attitude 
toward the existing policy that he or she thinks is too restrictive.  
        From 2001 to 2007, as Figure 8.2 shows, while the support rate for more restrictive 
regulations decreased from 56.8% to 44.3%, the support rate for fewer regulations 
increased from 23.8 to 37.7%. If we divide the period into Chen’s first term (May 2000 – 
May 2004) and Chen’s second term (May 2004 – May 2008), we can find that while the 
support rate for more restrictive regulations increased in Chen’s first term from 56.8% in 
July 2001 to 61.5% in November 2003, it decreased to 50.3% in December 2004 and 
further went down to 44.3% in December 2007. By contrast, while the support rate for 
fewer regulations decreased from 23.8% in July 2001 to 18.1% in November 2003, it 
grew to 21.4% in December 2004 and significantly increased to 37.7% in December 2007.  
 
Figure 8.2: Opinions about restriction on Taiwanese investment in China 
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Source: Surveys conducted for Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council by (1) Mainland Affairs 
Council itself (July 2001) <http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/97710133767.htm>; (2) 
Mainland Affairs Council itself (December 2002) 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=44245&ctNode=5652&mp=1>; (3) Election Study 
Center at National Chengchi University (November 2003) 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/9779502762.htm>; (4) Mainland Affairs Council 
itself (December 2004) <http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/9779394814.pdf>; (5) 
Mainland Affairs Council itself (November 2005) 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/9771344570.pdf>; (6) Election Study Center at 
National Chengchi University (December 2006) 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/9771273862.pdf>; and (7) Burke Marketing 
Research (December 2007) <http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/977115451.pdf>. 
 
The support rates for the direct cross-strait transport link, 2001 – 2007  
        Taiwanese opinions about the direct cross-strait transport link directly reveal their 
attitudes toward cross-strait economic ties. People who have a negative attitude toward 
cross-strait economic ties tend to oppose the direct transport link between China and 
Taiwan, thinking that the link would not only accelerate the growth of the ties but also 
have a great negative effect on Taiwan’s national defense. In contrast, those who have a 
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positive feeling toward cross-strait economic ties are inclined to support the link because 
they believe it would benefit Taiwan’s economy. 
        In the period from 2001 to 2007, as Figure 8.3 shows, there was an obvious increase 
in the support rate for the direct cross-strait transport link. In general, the support rate 
increased from 52.2% in 2001 to 65.5% in 2007. Most importantly, while the support rate 
did not change very much in Chen’s first term (May 2000 – May 2004), it increased 
significantly from 51.0% in February 2004 to 59.7% in May 2005 and further grew to 
65.5% in November 2007.  
 
Figure 8.3: The support rate for the direct cross-strait transport link 
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Source: Surveys conducted by (1) Polling Center of CTi News (October 2001) 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/97710131541.htm>; (2) Research, Development 
and Evaluation Commission (November 2002) 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=44246&ctNode=5652&mp=1>; (3) Research, 
Development and Evaluation Commission (October 2003) 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/9779504779.htm>; (4) Polling Center of United 
Daily News (February 2004) <http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/977939588.pdf>; (5) 
Polling Center of Era TV (May 2005) 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/9771351122.pdf>; (6) Polling Center of United 
Daily News (January 2006) <http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/977128026.pdf>; and 
(7) Global Views Survey Research Center (November 2007) 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/977115451.pdf>. 
 
8-4: The conflict between Hsieh and his political allies and the winning of the pro-
openness coalition in the 2008 presidential election 
        Hsieh’s pro-openness proposals, which, as I have argued, were election-driven, 
however brought about a conflict between him on the one side and the Pan-Green 
politicians and the Chen Administration on the other. In order to be electable under the 
political circumstance where the pro-openness ideas had already become mainstream 
ideas, in less than one month after he was nominated as the presidential candidate on May 
29
th
, 2007, Hsieh began to show, among other things, his support for the direct cross-
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strait transport link and, though criticizing Ma for being too pro-openness, said that his 
position on cross-strait economic ties was not fundamentally different from Ma’s.21 On 
October 19
th
, he even revealed that he would allow Chinese companies to invest in 
Taiwan if elected because, according to him, Taiwan was economically open to every 
country in the world including China.
22
 Hsieh’s growing pro-openness tendency after his 
nomination was immediately challenged by the Chen Administration as well as many 
Pan-Green politicians. Responding to questions about Hsieh’s willingness to give a green 
light to Chinese investment in Taiwan, Chen Ming-tung, the head of Taiwan’s Mainland 
Affairs Council, said that Hsieh’s suggestion was nothing more than a presidential 
candidate’s suggestion which did not represent the official position on the issue. 23 
Unsatisfied with Hsieh’s pro-openness tendency, on October 23rd, Lee Teng-hui publicly 
said that he supported none of the two candidates (i.e. Ma and Hsieh) and commented 
that “it will not benefit Taiwan if either of the candidates is elected.”24  
        The contradiction between Hsieh and his political allies deteriorated into a severe 
conflict in early November 2007 when Hsieh revealed that he would be willing to adjust 
the regulation that imposed the 40% cap on Taiwanese investment in China if elected and 
began to introduce his economic proposals that I have discussed in the second section of 
this chapter. Starting from that moment, the Liberty Times, one of the most influential 
Taiwanese newspapers that was anti-economic openness toward China and pro-Taiwan’s 
                                                 
21
 “Ma’s campaign office: Hsieh also calls for the direct transport link, and he had better mean what he 
says,” China Daily News, June 19, 2007. 
22
 “The Executive Yuan doesn’t agree to Hsieh Chang-ting’s position on cross-strait relations,” China Daily 
News, October 20, 2007. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 “Lee Teng-hui: It won’t benefit Taiwan if either Hsieh or Ma is elected,” Commons Daily, October 23, 
2007. 
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independence, began to publish special reports and editorials to specifically criticize 
Hsieh, arguing that there was no significant difference between Ma’s and Hsieh’s 
proposals for cross-strait economic ties, both of which, according to those reports and 
editorials, were unacceptably pro-openness.
25
 Many of Hsieh’s political allies also began 
to reveal their dissatisfaction with Hsieh’s pro-openness tendency in a blunt way. On 
November 6
th
, 2007, President Chen openly announced that he definitely would not make 
any adjustment to the 40% cap before his term ended.
26
 Two days later, Hsieh’s 
suggestion that the 40% cap be lifted was severely challenged in a meeting attended by 
the D.P.P.’s central standing committee members who urged Hsieh to make “protecting 
‘Taiwanese subjectivity’ (Taiwan zhutixing)” a priority; 27  at the end of the meeting, 
President Chen, who was also the chairman of D.P.P., called on the party to unite, but at 
the same time he himself also implicitly criticized Hsieh by saying that playing the 
economic card would not necessarily be a good strategy for winning the election.
28
 On 
November 13
th
, Ku Kuan-min, one of the most influential advocates of Taiwan’s 
independence and a D.P.P. member, said Hsieh’s plan to win the election by pleasing 
                                                 
25
 “Hsieh and Ma are providing wrong solutions for Taiwan’s economy,” Liberty Times, November 6, 2007; 
“Hsieh will probably lose the substance by grasping at the shadow,” Liberty Times, November 7, 2007; 
“Hsieh and Ma are rushing westward, and Taiwan’s economy will sink into a hopeless situation,” Liberty 
Times, November 26, 2007; “Hsieh’s and Ma’s economic proposals are for no one but a few capitalists,” 
Liberty Times, November 26, 2007; “How can Hsieh Chang-ting face the voters with his pro-openness 
statement about 12-inch wafers?” Liberty Times, December 27, 2007; and “Neither of the presidential 
candidates is providing an effective remedy for Taiwan’s prolonged economic illness,” Liberty Times, 
March 10, 2008. 
26
 See Chapter Three, 145-146. 
27
 The idea of “Taiwanese subjectivity” is largely associated with the idea of “de-sinicization.” It 
emphasizes Taiwan’s independence from China’s influence of any kind. Those who promote the idea insist 
that (1) Taiwan, as well as Taiwanese people, is a “Subject in History” instead of an appendage to any other 
state or nation, and (2) the history about Taiwan should be rewritten from a purely Taiwanese perspective. 
For more discussions about the idea of “Taiwanese subjectivity,” see Lynch 2004, 516-519; Dittmer 2004, 
480; and deLisle 2010, 516. 
28
 “President Chen and Hsieh are not on the same page,” United Daily News, November 8, 2007. 
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business people was “very stupid” because, according to him, business people who 
demanded economic openness were the minority.
29
  
        The conflict finally reached a point of no return when Hsieh began to openly 
criticize President Chen’s anti-openness policy as well as other Pan-Green politicians’ 
anti-openness position in mid-November 2007. In his response to the Pan-Green 
politicians’ and the Chen Administration’s criticism against him, Hsieh questioned their 
anti-openness tendency by asking, “How can you say you love Taiwan if you make it 
uncompetitive?”30 In addition, he criticized their exaggerated argument that economic 
openness toward China would make Taiwan lose everything by making a counter-
argument that Taiwan would lose everything if the Taiwanese government kept 
interfering with the issues of cross-strait economic ties.
31
 Also, he directly appealed to the 
general public as well as the economic winners by saying that he would do whatever 
President Chen was supposed to do but did not do and make adjustments to whatever 
President Chen was not supposed to do but did.
32
 Hsieh’s election-driven pro-openness 
tendency became so obvious that, on November 16
th
, 2007, an editorial published by the 
Liberty Times openly criticized Hsieh for betraying the people who “protected Taiwan’s 
                                                 
29
 “Koo Kuan-min: Hsieh is very stupid because he tries to please a very small group of business people,” 
Liberty Times, November 13, 2007. 
30
 “Voters are very surprised at the tit-for-tat between Chen and Hsieh,” Commons Daily, November 15, 
2007. 
31
 “The tit-for-tat between Chen and Hsieh reveals their disagreement on policies,” China Times, November 
15, 2007. 
32
 “Voters are very surprised at the tit-for-tat between Chen and Hsieh,” Commons Daily, November 15, 
2007. 
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subjectivity against China” and argued that it would be impossible for those people to 
vote for Hsieh.
33
 
        The aforementioned conflict between Hsieh and the anti-openness camp continued 
until the end of the election, and this conflict did have a very big negative effect on 
Hsieh’s running for presidency. First of all, because of his pro-openness proposals, he 
lost support from not only the economic losers but also the Pan-Green politicians from 
the D.P.P. and the T.S.U. who were supposed to constitute the major proportion of his 
political base. In addition, the Chen Administration’s anti-openness attitude toward the 
direct cross-strait transport link since 2002, its anti-openness attitude toward Taiwanese 
investment in China since 2005, and Hsieh’s incapability to silence the anti-openness 
politicians’ voice against economic openness during the campaign period, arguably, made 
Hsieh not as politically attractive as he wanted to be to the economic winners because all 
of the aforementioned things led the economic winners to suspect that Hsieh, like Chen, 
would be vulnerable to the pressure from the anti-openness force if elected. Finally, the 
Chen Administration’s unwillingness to support and, in many cases, criticism against 
Hsieh’s pro-openness proposals during the campaign period strengthened the general 
public’s dissatisfaction with the Chen Administration’s effort to significantly decelerate 
the growth of cross-strait economic ties by implementing the anti-openness policy of 
“active management and effective opening” in 2006; this growing dissatisfaction among 
the general public with the Chen Administration’s anti-openness tendency, arguably, led 
                                                 
33
 “Don’t want to vote for Hsieh no matter what!” Liberty Times, November 16, 2007. 
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many independent voters to punish the incumbent and the ruling party in the Election 
Day by voting for the K.M.T.’s Ma. 
        Based on the discussions I have made above, it could be well argued that the conflict 
between Hsieh and the anti-openness camp as well as the public dissatisfaction with the 
Chen Administration’s anti-openness policy, among other things, eventually led to the 
election of Ma who was endorsed by the solidified pro-openness coalition. After Ma’s 
election, though having no doubt that Ma as a Pan-Blue politician would definitely 
pursue a pro-openness policy, the economic winners still put some degree of pressure on 
him, urging him to lift the restriction on Taiwanese investment in China and build the 
direct cross-strait transport link as soon as possible.
34
 
        The economic winners’ pressure did successfully force the Ma Administration to 
deliver the things they had been demanding for long at a rapid pace. In late August 2008, 
the investment limit on a Taiwanese company’s investment in China was raised from 
40% to 60% of that company’s total worth.35 In mid-December 2008, the direct cross-
strait transport link was officially built.
36
 Two years later, on June 26
th
, 2010, the 
Taiwanese government signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
(E.C.F.A.), an economic agreement similar to a free trade agreement, with the Chinese 
                                                 
34
 “Tsao Hsing-cheng: Hope the new government will build the ‘three links’ as soon as possible,” Apple 
Daily, March 23, 2008; “Ho Chao-yang: Hope the government will lift the 40% cap as soon as possible,” 
Commercial Times, March 23, 2008; “Ma: I’ll push for an agreement on economic cooperation,” China 
Times, April 24, 2008; “Chairman Gou: Hope to see the direct cross-strait transport link very soon,” United 
Daily News, September 23, 2008; “Four largest sea shipping companies call for the direct transport link,” 
Economic Daily News, October 29, 2008; and “Large sea and air shipping corporations make suggestions to 
Ma,” Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News, October 31, 2008. 
35
 See Chapter Three: 146. 
36
 Ibid., 148. 
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government.
37
 With very loose restriction on Taiwanese investment in China, the direct 
cross-strait transport link, and the E.C.F.A., by the end of 2010, there had been very few 
obstacles left in cross-strait economic ties for the Taiwanese business people who wanted 
to go “westward.” 
 
8-5: Discussion 
        While the Pan-Green candidate in 2004, Chen Shui-bian, and its candidate in 2008, 
Hsieh Chang-ting, both criticized their Pan-Blue opponents’ proposals for being too pro-
openness, their proposals actually looked different from each other’s: Hsieh’s platform 
with regard to cross-strait economic ties in 2008 was relatively pro-openness compared 
with Chen’s in 2004. This chapter demonstrates that an emerging pro-openness attitude 
among the Taiwanese public in the period from 2005 to 2007 played a role in forcing the 
Pan-Green candidate for the 2008 election to come up with a pro-openness platform. 
Specifically, due to the ambivalent feeling toward cross-strait economic ties among the 
Taiwanese public that I have discussed in Chapter Six, the Chen Administration’s explicit 
effort in the period from 2005 to 2006 to decelerate the growth of cross-strait economic 
ties, like the similar effort of the Lee Administration’s in 1996, backfired, resulting in a 
popular pro-openness tendency among the Taiwanese public. Therefore, to be electable, 
the Pan-Green candidate for the 2008 election had no choice but to propose a pro-
openness policy in order to effectively compete with the Pan-Blue candidate, who was 
deemed with no doubt by the Taiwanese public as pro-openness. 
                                                 
37
 “Chiang and Chen sign the E.C.F.A. today,” China Times, June 29, 2010; and “The era of unrestricted 
cross-strait economic exchanges is coming,” Commercial Times, June 30, 2010. 
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        However, as argued, the Pan-Green candidate’s election-driven pro-openness 
tendency not only failed to attract a significant number of votes from the economic 
winners and the general public but also led to a severe conflict between him on the one 
side and the Pan-Green politicians and the Chen Administration that had become 
completely anti-openness by the end of 2006 on the other. At the end, the Pan-Blue 
candidate who supported by the economic winners as well as the majority of the 
Taiwanese public who had revealed a significant pro-openness tendency since 2005 
defeated the Pan-Green candidate who lost support from the anti-openness coalition. 
        Based on the findings of this chapter and the previous two chapters, it could be 
reasonably argued that, in the period from 1990 to 2008, there is a relationship between 
cross-strait economic ties and Taiwan’s domestic politics. More specifically, (1) the 
growing cross-strait economic ties in the aforementioned period led to a cleavage 
between the economic winners and the economic losers; (2) starting in the second half of 
2000, the economic winners and losers began to have a conflict with each other over the 
issues of cross-strait economic ties, in which, while the former was in favor of economic 
openness, the latter argued against it; and (3) starting in 2001, the pro-independence Pan-
Green (or, more specifically, the Pan-Green politicians who were anti-openness) and the 
anti-independence Pan-Blue began to exploit the aforementioned cleavage to their 
political advantages when the former formed the anti-openness coalition with the 
economic losers and the latter formed the pro-openness coalition with the economic 
winners. 
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        Obviously, the Pan-Blue’s decision to side with the economic winners since 2001 
was proved to be a correct one, given the facts that (1) the growth of cross-strait 
economic ties in general had led to an ambivalent feeling toward cross-strait economic 
ties among the Taiwanese people which caused them to become unsatisfied with the 
Taiwanese government when it tried to significantly slow down the growth of the ties, 
and (2) the growth of cross-strait economic ties since 2001 would sooner or later lead the 
Taiwanese government which was controlled by one of the major Pan-Green political 
parties (i.e. the D.P.P.) to turn completely against openness when the pressure from the 
anti-openness coalition largely composed of its Pan-Green political allies grew due to the 
growth of the ties. As we can see, although the Pan-Blue did not win the 2004 
presidential election, a political opportunity for it to win the 2008 election emerged in 
2005 when (1) the Taiwanese government explicitly turned against economic openness 
due to the pressure from the anti-openness coalition and (2) the Taiwanese pubic began to 
reveal a significant pro-openness tendency accordingly. As I have argued, this 
opportunity that originated in growing cross-strait economic ties eventually led to the 
victory of the pro-openness coalition of the economic winners and the Pan-Blue in the 
2008 presidential election and, as a result, the election of an anti-independence president 
in Taiwan.    
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Conclusion 
Discussions of Findings and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
        In conclusion, there are two major findings of my dissertation. First, there is a 
relationship between economic interdependence and peace in the case of China-Taiwan 
relations: the growth of cross-strait economic ties in the period from 1990 to 2007 did 
play a role in the emergence of relatively less confrontational China-Taiwan relations in 
2008. Second, domestic politics matters: Taiwan’s domestic politics is the key 
intervening variable that links the growth of cross-strait economic ties to less 
confrontational relations between China and Taiwan. These findings derived from the 
case of China-Taiwan relations have provided a good example of how international 
economic ties affect international relations through domestic political economy. However, 
they at the same time reveal the complexity of the case of China-Taiwan relations in the 
study of the relationship between international economic ties and international relations. 
On the one hand, the first major finding seems to demonstrate that the liberal argument 
about the relationship between economic interdependence and peace is a valid one, and 
therefore, the prospects for China-Taiwan relations will be good if the economic ties 
between them keep growing. However, on the other hand, the second major finding, 
which involves complicated domestic politics, seems to show that such a relationship, at 
least in the case of China-Taiwan relations, is more volatile than it appears to be at first 
glance, and therefore, brings cautious optimism, if not pessimism, to any prediction about 
future China-Taiwan relations in the context of growing cross-strait economic ties. 
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Discussions of findings 
        As my research has revealed, all of the four arguments I made about the relationship 
among cross-strait economic ties, Taiwan’s domestic politics, and China-Taiwan 
relations are valid. In general, in the period from 1990 to 2008, the growth of cross-strait 
economic ties significantly affected Taiwan’s domestic politics which in turn had a 
profound effect on China-Taiwan relations. Specifically, (1) from 1990 to 2000, cross-
strait economic ties resulted in a political cleavage and eventually a conflict in Taiwan’s 
domestic politics between the Taiwanese who benefited from the ties (the economic 
winners, such as China-based Taiwanese business people) and those who were harmed by 
the ties (the economic losers, such as unskilled or low-skilled Taiwanese workers): while 
the economic winners demanded more ties and economic openness toward China, the 
economic losers argued against them; (2) starting in 2001, Taiwanese politicians began to 
exploit the aforementioned cleavage originating in cross-strait economic ties to their 
political advantages: while the politicians who were pro-Taiwan’s independence (pro-
independence politicians constituting the Pan-Green political force) formed an anti-
openness coalition with the economic losers, those who were anti-independence (anti-
independence politicians making up the Pan-Blue political force) formed a pro-openness 
coalition with the winners; (3) in the process of the domestic conflict over cross-strait 
economic ties, the Taiwanese general public was convinced that the benefits of cross-
strait economic ties outweighed the costs and became supportive of the ties, and the 
public support for cross-strait economic ties politically benefited the pro-openness 
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coalition in Taiwan’s domestic politics and eventually led to the election of an anti-
independence politician as Taiwan’s president in 2008; and (4) the emergence of an anti-
independence Taiwanese president in 2008 significantly decreased the level of 
confrontation between China and Taiwan which was very high most of the time 
throughout the period from 1990 to 2007. 
        Four points related to my findings are worth noting. First of all, like many scholars 
have already found, identity politics is an important source of the political conflict over 
China-Taiwan relations in Taiwan’s domestic politics, and the outcome of this conflict 
has a great effect on China-Taiwan relations. As my analysis has shown, in the period 
from 1990 to 2008, when the pro-independence force promoting Taiwanese nationalism 
was strong in Taiwan’s domestic politics or even controlled the Taiwanese government, 
China became hostile toward Taiwan and its willingness to work with Taiwan to resolve 
the common problems they faced in a bilateral way decreased; by contrast, when the anti-
independence force opposing the idea of “de-sinicization” was powerful and controlled 
the Taiwanese government, China became relatively conciliatory and its willingness to 
resolve the cross-strait problems in a bilateral way increased.  
        Second, despite the first point, the political conflict over China-Taiwan relations in 
Taiwan’s domestic politics is not only about identity politics but also getting more and 
more associated with the debate over cross-strait economic ties. More specifically, the 
politicization of the issues about cross-strait economic ties in Taiwan’s domestic politics 
has laid the foundation for the domestic conflict over cross-strait economic ties in Taiwan 
to affect China-Taiwan relations. While the identity politics has been a major source of 
340 
 
 
 
the domestic conflict over China-Taiwan relations in Taiwan from the very beginning 
(and it still matters today), the debate on cross-strait economic ties began to play a 
significant role in such a conflict in 2001 when the Taiwanese politicians politicized 
cross-strait economic ties by merging their political conflict over identity with the 
cleavage between economic winners and losers. Starting from that point of time, as my 
analysis has demonstrated, pro-independence politicians began to not only advocate 
Taiwan’s independence but also oppose cross-strait economic exchanges, trying to 
convince the Taiwanese general public that the political and economic negative effects of 
cross-strait economic ties were too huge for Taiwan to bear. By contrast, anti-
independence politicians began to not only oppose Taiwan’s independence but also 
advocate cross-strait economic exchanges, emphasizing the positive effects of cross-strait 
economic ties on Taiwan’s economy.  
        Third, public opinions in Taiwan have an effect on China-Taiwan relations. 
Although the Taiwanese people’s “Taiwan-first” sentiment and “anti-unification” 
tendency might agitate China and therefore increase the level of confrontation between 
China and Taiwan, their positive attitude toward cross-strait economic ties did play a role 
in bringing about a less confrontational relationship between China and Taiwan in 2008. 
As my analysis has revealed, Taiwanese people had an ambivalent feeling toward China-
Taiwan economic ties. While they were aware of the negative effects of the economic ties 
on Taiwan’s national security, they at the same time were convinced that the prospects 
for Taiwan’s economy depended on economic openness toward China. Therefore, the 
Taiwanese public tended to have a negative attitude toward efforts made by the 
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Taiwanese government to significantly slow down or even reverse the trend of growing 
cross-strait economic ties because they thought such efforts would cause damage to 
Taiwan’s economy. This ambivalent feeling eventually led to the election of an anti-
independence politician as Taiwan’s president in 2008, who, in the context of the 
politicization of cross-strait economic ties, advocated more cross-strait economic ties and 
economic openness toward China. 
        Last but not least, following the previous points, the domestic conflict over China-
Taiwan relations in Taiwan has already become not only a political conflict but also an 
economic one. In other words, in today’s Taiwan, there are two mutually affected 
dimensions in the aforementioned conflict: the political dimension which involves 
identity and the economic dimension which involves cross-strait economic ties. It is 
worth noting that the two political coalitions that I have discussed in my dissertation (i.e. 
the pro-openness coalition and the anti-openness coalition) are still the two major 
political forces competing with each other in Taiwan’s political arena today, vividly 
distinguished from each other by their positions on the political and economic issues of 
China-Taiwan relations: while the former is unwaveringly opposed to Taiwan’s 
independence and advocates cross-strait economic ties, the latter is in general pro-
Taiwan’s independence and reveals a cautious attitude toward cross-strait economic ties. 
My dissertation has already provided a clear picture of how this political landscape 
emerged in the first place due to the growth of cross-strait economic ties and how it 
affected China-Taiwan relations. On the basis of the findings of my dissertation, more 
studies need to be done in the future to further explore the relationship among cross-strait 
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economic ties, Taiwan’s domestic politics, and China-Taiwan relations. I will discuss my 
suggestions for future research about China-Taiwan relations in the next section. 
        Before I provide my suggestions for future research, it is worth pointing out that my 
dissertation which focuses on Taiwan’s domestic politics does not and has no intention to 
unveil the complete picture about cross-strait economic ties, China-Taiwan relations, and 
their relationship but only part of it. There are of course more factors in addition to 
Taiwan’s domestic politics that matter. For example, China’s policy on cross-strait 
economic ties and its policy on Taiwan in general as well as Chinese nationalism, among 
other things, do play important roles in how China-Taiwan political and economic 
relations evolve. The U.S. policy on China and how the U.S. keeps its quasi-official 
relations with Taiwan matter a great deal, too. Nevertheless, my dissertation does clearly 
demonstrate how the variable of “Taiwan’s domestic politics” plays a significant role and 
therefore why this variable should be taken into account when studying China-Taiwan 
relations. More importantly, the findings of my dissertation, which center on Taiwan’s 
domestic politics, pave the way for developing an analytical framework for the study of 
China-Taiwan relations with Taiwan’s domestic politics at its core. The factors 
concerning China and those about the U.S. mentioned above as well as other variables 
that are relevant to China-Taiwan relations can all be included in this framework with 
Taiwan’s domestic politics serving as a core variable that links all of the other variables 
to each other. For example, to examine how China’s Taiwan policy affects China-Taiwan 
relations, we can examine how China’s Taiwan policy influences Taiwanese people’s 
attitudes toward China as well as its effect on Taiwan’s China policy, all of which in turn 
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have a great impact on China-Taiwan relations. The figure below shows the proposed 
framework. 
 
Figure 9.1: A framework for the study of China-Taiwan relations on the basis of 
Taiwan’s domestic politics 
 
 
 
                                                                                
 
                                                                                   
 
The relationships examined in my dissertation (          )  /  Other possible relationships (          ) 
 
 
Suggestions for future research 
        Based on the discussions about the findings of my dissertation in the previous 
section, China-Taiwan relations in the future seem to be promising because, according to 
my dissertation, growing cross-strait economic ties did lead to some degree of peace in 
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the Taiwan Strait. Nevertheless, given the key role played by Taiwan’s domestic politics 
in the relationship between cross-strait economic ties and China-Taiwan relations as I 
have demonstrated in my dissertation, whether China-Taiwan relations in the future will 
keep as less confrontational as we currently see in the context of growing cross-strait 
economic ties is largely contingent on how Taiwan’s domestic politics related to cross-
strait economic ties will evolve and in turn affect China-Taiwan relations.  
        Obviously, since 2008, the pro-openness coalition has been more politically 
influential in Taiwan’s domestic politics than the anti-openness coalition. Given the fact 
that the former defeated the latter again in the 2012 Taiwanese presidential election, it is 
reasonable to predict that the political momentum the pro-openness coalition has obtained 
since 2008 will continue at least in the next few years, and therefore the level of 
confrontation between China and Taiwan will, arguably, still be relatively low. However, 
although there is little doubt that the anti-openness coalition is powerless now, some 
hypothetical questions about it are worth pondering. Will it resurge in the future, 
becoming as politically influential as the pro-openness coalition in Taiwan’s domestic 
politics? Or, will it remain relatively powerless for years to come? More specifically, if it 
has any chance to resurge, under what circumstance will it resurge? In other words, what 
political opportunity will grant a comeback of the anti-openness coalition? Also, will its 
resurgence, if it really happens, have any effect on the pro-openness policy implemented 
by the current Taiwanese government? By contrast, if it continues to be politically 
powerless in the foreseeable future, will the alliance between the economic losers and the 
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Pan-Green (or, more specifically, the D.P.P.)
1
 break up? In other words, will the 
economic losers work with other political forces in order to get their voices heard more 
effectively? Or, will the Pan-Green (or the D.P.P.) loosen its anti-openness stance and 
work with other economic and social actors other than the economic losers in order to 
regain the political momentum it has lost since 2008?  
        The aforementioned hypothetical questions about Taiwan’s domestic politics bring 
more hypothetical questions relevant to China-Taiwan relations that are worth examining. 
If the anti-openness coalition resurges in Taiwan’s domestic politics for any reason, how 
will China respond to it? Or, if the Pan-Green (or the D.P.P.) loosens its anti-openness 
stance or even its pro-independence position in order to more effectively appeal to the 
majority of Taiwanese people who are in favor of cross-strait economic ties and political 
status quo (i.e. neither unification nor independence), how will this change affect China-
Taiwan relations? In addition, how the Pan-Blue’s position (or, more specifically, the 
K.M.T.’s position) on China-Taiwan relations evolves in the context of growing cross-
strait economic ties will have a great impact on China-Taiwan relations as well. If the 
pro-openness coalition’s political momentum continues to be stronger than the anti-
openness coalition’s for a long period of time, will the Pan-Blue (or the K.M.T.) become 
politically confident enough to change its position on China-Taiwan relations from “anti-
independence” to “pro-unification”? If there is such a change, what will its effect be on 
                                                          
1
 According to Clark (2002a, 9), the high intensity of bipolar political competition in the 2004 presidential 
election created “pressures for alliances and mergers” within the Pan-Blue and the Pan-Green. More 
specifically, the political influence of the P.F.P. and the T.S.U. in the Pan-Blue and the Pan-Green, 
respectively, had reduced since the mid-2000s as a result of the political resurge of the K.M.T. and the 
intense conflict between it and the D.P.P., which in turn led to the political marginalization of the P.F.P. 
and the T.S.U. in Taiwan’s domestic politics.  
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China-Taiwan relations as well as Taiwan’s domestic politics? By contrast, if it keeps 
upholding its anti-independence position and putting the issue of unification aside in 
order to satisfy the Taiwanese people’s pro-status quo tendency, how will China respond 
to it? More specifically, given the fact that China’s ultimate goal is nothing but 
unification, will a promise by Taiwan not to pursue independence be enough in the long 
run to prevent a conflict between China and Taiwan from emerging if China can no 
longer be satisfied by only an “anti-independence” position of Taiwan’s and begins to 
demand an unequivocal “pro-unification” policy?2 
        I believe the aforementioned questions are worth addressing in future research when 
new developments in Taiwan’s domestic politics as well as cross-strait economic ties and 
China-Taiwan relations associated with these questions appear.  Also, in addition to these 
questions, there are four unfulfilled issues of this dissertation that are worth addressing in 
other separate research: (1) a more comprehensive analysis of China’s reactions to 
Taiwan’s domestic politics and Taiwan’s China policy as well as the role played by 
China’s domestic politics in these reactions; (2) a theoretical and empirical analysis of 
intraparty politics in Taiwan’s ruling and opposition parties; (3) an institutional and 
network analysis of the role and nature of Taiwanese business, labor, and professional 
associations in private sectors as well as their ties with political parties; and (4) an 
examination of the role of the legislature and an analysis of whether divided or unitary 
government has any effect on party debates and actual policy. Future research about the 
questions and issues mentioned above will undoubtedly expand the findings of my 
                                                          
2
 For more discussions about this question, see Tsang 2012, 393. 
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dissertation and provide more contributions to the study of the relationship between 
cross-strait economic ties and China-Taiwan relations. 
        In addition, more research on the case of China-Taiwan relations based on the 
questions and issues I have proposed above will further contribute to the study of the 
relationship between economic interdependence and international relations in general 
given the fact that, as I have argued, the case of China-Taiwan relations is a “least-likely” 
case for such a study. My dissertation examining this case has already shown how it can 
contribute to the general debate over the effect of economic interdependence on peace. 
First of all, it has demonstrated that even the economic ties between two highly 
antagonistic rivals, like China and Taiwan, who hardly compromise with each other can 
decrease, partially if not completely, the level of confrontation between them. Most 
importantly, by studying how cross-strait economic ties affect China-Taiwan relations 
through a lens of Taiwan’s domestic politics, my dissertation has clarified the importance 
of taking both of the international and domestic levels into account when studying the 
relationship between economic interdependence and international relations. The finding 
that the economic ties between two countries would affect the relations between them 
through their domestic politics, as well as the detailed analysis of how domestic politics 
matters, is the most important contribution of my dissertation to the general literature on 
economic interdependence, and this finding is worth more examination in future research 
dealing with more other cases, either in a large-N analysis or a case study like mine. 
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Epilogue 
The Domestic Conflict after 2008 and the 2012 Presidential Election 
 
        The conflict between the pro-openness and anti-openness coalitions in Taiwan’s 
domestic politics was not terminated with the end of the 2008 presidential election and 
the changes of the Taiwanese government’s policy on cross-strait economic ties that 
followed in the same year. After the “40% cap” on Taiwanese investment in China was 
replaced with the “60% cap” and the direct cross-strait transport link was officially built 
in August and December, 2008, respectively, another issue concerning cross-strait 
economic ties immediately emerged as the major source of conflict between these two 
coalitions: the debate about whether Taiwan should sign an F.T.A.-like economic 
agreement with China.  
        The origin of such a debate can be traced back to 2003 when China made public its 
interest in signing with Taiwan a Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (C.E.P.A.) 
that it had signed with Hong Kong and Macau.
1
 Following China’s announcement, in 
2004, the K.M.T. candidate for the Taiwanese presidential election of that year, Lien 
Chan who eventually lost the election, also revealed his interest in signing an F.T.A. with 
China.
2
 Four years later, in his 2008 presidential campaign, the K.M.T. candidate, Ma 
Yin-jeou who won the election at the end, raised a similar idea, saying that he would sign 
what he called a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (C.E.C.A.) with 
                                                          
1
 See Chapter Three, 132-133. 
2
 Lien 2004, 167. 
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China if elected.
3
 On February 27
th
, 2009, the agreement proposed by Ma was officially 
named the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (E.C.F.A.) by the Taiwanese 
government, which was finally signed by China’s A.R.A.T.S. and Taiwan’s S.E.F. and 
passed by Taiwan’s congress on June 29th and August 17th, 2010, respectively.4 
        In this epilogue to my dissertation, I will examine the political cleavage between the 
pro-openness and anti-openness coalitions on cross-strait economic ties throughout the 
period from 2009 to 2012, especially focusing on their conflict over the issue of the 
C.E.C.A./F.C.F.A. and the effect of such a conflict on the result of the 2012 Taiwanese 
presidential election.
5
  As the evidence will show, (1) the cleavage between the pro-
openness and anti-openness coalitions was still obvious after the 2008 presidential 
election: despite the political fiasco in the 2008 election, the anti-openness coalition still 
tried very hard to confront the pro-openness coalition on the issue of the 
C.E.C.A./E.C.F.A.;
 
(2) the general public’s attitude still mattered when it came to the 
issues concerning cross-strait economic ties: again in this case, the growth of the general 
public’s positive attitude toward a cross-strait economic agreement played a role in the 
change of some Pan-Green politicians’ position on it from uncompromising objection to 
                                                          
3
 “Ma: Hsieh misunderstood my idea about the cross-strait common market,” United Daily News, March 4, 
2008; “Ma fights back, saying that Hsieh used to raise the idea of “one-China in terms of the constitution’,” 
United Daily News, March 6, 2008; “There is a severe verbal duel in the second presidential debate,” 
United Daily News, March 8, 2008; “A negotiation over C.E.C.A., which is similar to C.E.P.A. between 
China and Hong Kong, will be held by the end of the year,” Commercial Times, November 9, 2008; and 
“Mainland responds friendly to Ma’s idea of C.E.C.A.,” United Daily News, December 21, 2008. 
4
 “Ma defines C.E.C.A. as an agreement on the framework of cross-strait economic cooperation,” China 
Times, February 28, 2009;  “Chiang and Chen will sign E.C.F.A. in their fifth meeting this afternoon,” 
United Daily News, June 29, 2010; and “The bill about E.C.F.A. is passed,” China Times, August 18, 2010. 
5
 Although the P.F.P. in the Pan-Blue and the T.S.U. in the Pan-Green had been largely marginalized in 
Taiwan’s domestic politics by 2008, they still allied with the K.M.T. and the D.P.P., respectively, in the 
political conflict over the issue of the C.E.C.A./E.C.F.A. and revealed very different attitudes toward the 
issue. 
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cautious acceptance; and (3) the pro-openness coalition’s political momentum was still 
relatively stronger than the anti-openness coalition’s at the end of the 2012 election: 
although the aforementioned change of position did not significantly destabilize the anti-
openness coalition this time in the 2012 presidential election, the political situation in 
general during the campaign period was still in favor of the incumbent associated with 
the pro-openness coalition, President Ma, who eventually won the election again in 2012. 
 
The conflict over the C.E.C.A./E.C.F.A. 
        The conflict between the pro-openness and anti-openness coalitions over whether 
Taiwan should sign an F.T.A.-like economic agreement with China became obvious after 
the Taiwanese government, now associated with the pro-openness coalition, effectively 
resolved in the second half of 2008 two of the most important issues of cross-strait 
economic ties (i.e. the restriction on Taiwanese investment in China and the direct cross-
strait transport link) and then shifted its focus in the beginning of 2009 to negotiating the 
C.E.C.A. with China.
6
 While the pro-openness coalition advocated signing the C.E.C.A. 
with China, which was officially named E.C.F.A. in February 2009, the anti-openness 
coalition was opposed to the C.E.C.A./E.C.F.A. or any other similar cross-strait 
economic agreement. Specifically, their conflict over the issue was concentrated on three 
fronts: (1) the effects of the aforementioned agreement on Taiwan’s economy; (2) the 
                                                          
6
 “Taiwan and Mainland speed up their negotiation over C.E.C.A. to fight the recession,” Commercial 
Times, February 2, 2009. 
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political consequences resulting from it with regard to China-Taiwan relations; and (3) 
the domestic processes of policy-making and consensus-building associated with it. 
        When it comes to the effects of the C.E.C.A./E.C.F.A. on Taiwan’s economy, the 
debate was similar to many of those previous debates over cross-strait economic ties they 
had already had: while the pro-openness coalition emphasized the positive effects of the 
C.E.C.A./E.C.F.A. on the economic development and the international economic 
competitiveness of Taiwan in general, the anti-openness coalition pointed out its negative 
effects on the livelihood of the unskilled or low-skilled Taiwanese workers as well as the 
prospects for those Taiwanese domestic manufacturers producing goods for the domestic 
market.
7
  
        According to President Ma of Taiwan and his administration as well as many Pan-
Blue politicians, the aforementioned agreement was necessary in preventing Taiwan from 
being “marginalized” in the trend of economic regionalization in East Asia revealed by 
the so called “A.S.E.A.N. plus Three” (i.e. the economic integration among the countries 
in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, China, Japan, and South Korea).
8
 The 
                                                          
7
 They also conflicted over the effect of the C.E.C.A./E.C.F.A. on Taiwanese farmers. However, in order to 
make the arguments here in this epilogue consistent with those I have made in the previous chapters, I will 
only focus on the issues concerning the Taiwanese business people who have economic interests in China, 
Taiwanese workers, and the Taiwanese manufacturers who produce goods for the domestic market.  
8
 The “A.S.E.A.N. plus Three” summit was first held in 1997. For more discussions about it, see Dent 2001, 
29. More details about the Pan-Blue officials’ and politicians’ arguments can be found in the following 
newspaper articles: “Mainland Affairs Council: We will sign C.E.C.A. with Mainland,” Liberty Times, 
February 17, 2009; “Yin Chi-ming: Cross-strait economic cooperation can prevent Taiwan from being 
economically marginalized,” China Times, March 2, 2009; “Siew Wan-chang: E.C.F.A. opens a door to 
F.T.A., leading Taiwan to the world,” China Times, April 16, 2009; “Chiang Pin-kung: The government 
will convene a special research committee on C.E.C.A.,” Central News Agency, February 18, 2009; “Siew 
says E.C.F.A. can help Taiwan get out of difficulties,” United Daily News, January 12, 2010; “President 
Ma: We must sign E.C.F.A.,” Want Daily, January 19, 2010; and “Premier Wu: Taiwan will sink 
immediately if we don’t sign E.C.F.A.,” China Times, February 27, 2010. 
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officials in the Ma Administration was especially worried about the impact of the 
“A.S.E.A.N. plus One” (i.e. the free trade arrangement between the A.S.E.A.N. and 
China)
9
 on Taiwan’s export of petrochemicals and machineries to China, which were 
among the major products Taiwan exported to China and would soon become less 
competitive in the Chinese market if facing the zero-tariff export of such products from 
the A.S.E.A.N. countries to China.
10
 In addition, they claimed that an economic 
agreement with China could clear the “political obstacle” to Taiwan’s effort to negotiate 
an F.T.A. with other countries because, according to Chiang Pin-kung, the chairman of 
Taiwan’s S.E.F., China would become more open-minded about the issue if Taiwan 
agreed to sign a similar agreement with it first.
11
  
        The economic winners (consisting of China-based Taiwanese business people, 
export-oriented Taiwanese manufacturers, and all of the other Taiwanese capitalists who 
had economic interests in China) also made a similar argument about economic 
marginalization when advocating the C.E.C.A./E.C.F.A. One of the first advocates 
among the economic winners was Wang Wen-yuan, the chairman of Formosa Plastics 
Group and a nephew of its founder Wang Yung-ching’s, who, since the beginning of 
2009, had been openly expressing to the Taiwanese government his worry about the 
negative effect of the “A.S.E.A.N. plus One” on the export of the petrochemicals and 
                                                          
9
 For more discussions about “A.S.E.A.N. plus One,” see Dent 2001, 31; and Ba 2003, 638-644. 
10
 “The two sides will sign an agreement on economic cooperation under the framework of W.T.O.,” 
Economic Daily News, February 23, 2009; and “Officials: We will lose the whole game without C.E.C.A.,” 
China Times, February 22, 2009. 
11
 Sutter 2011, 17. More details can be found in the following newspaper articles: “Chiang Pin-kung: 
C.E.C.A. prevents Taiwan from being economically marginalized,” Commercial Times, January 16, 2009; 
and “Chiang Pin-kung: The two sides should sign C.E.C.A. as soon as possible,” Economic Daily News, 
January 22, 2009. 
353 
 
 
 
chemical fabrics produced by his corporation to China.
12
 In mid-February 2009, the 
economic winners’ advocacy of an F.T.A.-like cross-strait economic agreement became 
even more obvious when the six largest business associations in Taiwan made a joint 
announcement urging the Taiwanese government to sign the proposed C.E.C.A. with 
China as soon as possible in order to prevent the economic marginalization of Taiwan 
and increase Taiwanese businesses’ international economic competitiveness.13 After the 
announcement, more and more Taiwanese business people and business associations, 
including the Taiwan Synthetic Resins Manufacturers Association and the Taiwan 
Association of Machinery Industry whose members would be negatively affected by the 
“A.S.E.A.N. plus One,” followed suit and worked with one another as well as the Pan-
Blue politicians to get their voices heard in the debate.
14
 
        In contrast to the pro-openness coalition’s warning that Taiwan would become 
economically marginalized and uncompetitive in the regional or even global economy 
without the C.E.C.A./E.C.F.A., the anti-openness coalition’s argument against the 
agreement was largely based on its concerns about Taiwan being too economically 
dependent on China. According to many Pan-Green politicians including Tsai Ing-wen, 
the chairwoman of D.P.P., and Huang Kun-huei, the chairman of T.S.U., the 
                                                          
12
 “Wang Wen-yuan: Taiwan and Mainland have to sign C.E.C.A. as soon as possible,” Economic Daily 
News, February 12, 2009. 
13
 “The six largest business associations urge the government to sign C.E.C.A. as soon as possible,” 
Commercial Times, February 13, 2009. 
14
 “Plastic and chemical industries urge the two sides to sign C.E.C.A.,” China Times, February 18, 2009; 
“Wang Wen-yuan works with different industries to urge the government to sign C.E.C.A.,” Commercial 
Times, February 23, 2009; “Eight suggestions made by industrial and business associations,” Economic 
Daily News, February 24, 2009; “Wang Wen-yuan: When it comes to the signing of E.C.F.A., the sooner 
the better,” Commercial Times, August 5, 2009; and “The machinery industry supports E.C.F.A.,” China 
Times, October 22, 2009. 
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C.E.C.A./E.C.F.A. advocated by the pro-openness coalition would only “hollow out 
Taiwan’s industries” and “lock Taiwan’s economy up in China.”15 In addition, these Pan-
Green politicians argued that the agreement which, as they believed, would result in more 
and more outflows of Taiwanese capital and jobs to China and, on the other hand, more 
and more imports of Chinese products and labor to Taiwan, would sooner or later cause 
economic damage to Taiwan at the individual level, leading the unemployment rate to 
rise and many domestic manufacturers producing goods for the domestic market to close 
down, which in turn would worsen the unemployment crisis.
16
 According to a study 
conducted by the D.P.P.’s Policy Research and Coordinating Committee in October 2009, 
the livelihood of 1.6 million Taiwanese workers would be negatively affected by the 
E.C.F.A.
17
 Also, it warned in another announcement made in April 2010 that the 3.2 
                                                          
15
 “Taiwan will be locked up in China if E.C.F.A. is signed,” Liberty Times, March 2, 2009; “T.S.U. makes 
public its official anti-E.C.F.A. statement,” Liberty Times, June 10, 2009; “Huang Kun-huei: Taiwan will 
kill itself with E.C.F.A.,” Liberty Times, July 31, 2009; “Lee Teng-hui: Taiwan can’t rely solely on China 
when it comes to economy,” Liberty Times, February 15, 2010; and “Su: Taiwan should not put everything 
in China,” United Daily News, March 6, 2010. 
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Times, March 3, 2009; “Will Taiwan be economically marginalized without E.C.F.A.? Hsieh Chang-ting 
rebuts Ma’s words,” Liberty Times, March 4, 2009; “Will E.C.F.A. benefit Taiwan? Lee Teng-hui: Don’t 
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China, will acquiesce to China’s One-China Principle,” Liberty Times, March 5, 2009; “Lee Teng-hui: The 
common market will make Taiwan lose everything,” Liberty Times, March 13, 2009; “Tsai Ing-wen: 
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24, 2009; “Huang Kun-huei: E.C.F.A. will kill conventional industries,” Liberty Times, October 19, 2009; 
“Huang Kun-huei urges Ma to promise not to import Mainland labor and agricultural products forever,” 
Liberty Times, January 26, 2010; and “Tsai: Let’s help farmers and workers find their way out before 
discussing E.C.F.A.,” Liberty Times, March 16, 2010. 
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 “The Green estimates that 1.63 million workers will be harmed by E.C.F.A.,” Liberty Times, October 26, 
2009. 
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million white-collar workers in Taiwan would feel the pain as well if the E.C.F.A. forced 
Taiwan to open its services sector to China.
18
  
        The Pan-Green’s worry about the negative effects of the C.E.C.A./E.C.F.A. on 
Taiwan’s economy was shared by many Taiwanese workers and Taiwanese 
manufacturers producing goods for the domestic market.
19
 In late March 2009, the 
representatives of Taiwan Labor Front, Taiwan Vocational Association, and Taiwan 
Confederation of Trade Unions as well as several pro-labor organizations including the 
T.S.U. gathered for a forum on the E.C.F.A. where they had discussions with an official 
from Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions about the damage caused to the workers in 
Hong Kong by the C.E.P.A. between China and Hong Kong. At the end of the forum, 
they urged the Taiwanese government to take the Taiwanese workers’ concerns about the 
E.C.F.A. seriously, warning that a “bloody revolution” would be inevitable if the Ma 
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 “The Green directs the attention of 3.21 million white-collar workers to the impact of E.C.F.A.,” Liberty 
Times, April 7, 2010. 
19
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Liberty Times, September 14, 2009; “The ceramic tiles industry is facing unfair competition,” Liberty 
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industry who focus on the domestic market,” Liberty Times, September 15, 2009; “Over 80% of 
manufacturers in the towel industry will be harmed by E.C.F.A.,” Liberty Times, September 15, 2009; “The 
bedding industry will be crushed by the dumping of China-made products,” Liberty Times, September 15, 
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“Farmers, fishermen and workers: We will be forced to commit suicide if E.C.F.A. is signed,” Liberty 
Times, December 17, 2009; “Sun Yu-lien, Secretary General of the Taiwan Labor Front: Taiwan will face a 
much more serious problem about capital outflows after the signing of E.C.F.A.,” Liberty Times, March 15, 
2010; and “Labor organizations want to make sure that labor rights will be protected,” Liberty Times, April 
19, 2010. 
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Administration did not listen to them.
20
 The Taiwanese workers’ worry about the damage 
the E.C.F.A., if signed, might cause to their economic interests continued throughout 
2009, and in mid-April 2010, Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions along with several 
labor unions in privet and public sectors held a press conference in front of Taiwan’s 
Executive Yuan, where the Taiwanese prime minister’s office is located, to formally 
require the Taiwanese government to bring the issue of labor rights into its negotiation 
with China over the E.C.F.A.
21
 In addition to the labor, the Taiwanese manufacturers 
producing goods for the domestic market also tried very hard to have their worry about 
the E.C.F.A. heard by their government. In mid-April 2009, around 100 representatives 
of the manufacturers producing shoes, washcloth, leather, pottery, tea, underwear, socks, 
bedroom furniture, clothes, swimming suits, etc. paid a joint visit to Taiwan’s Mainland 
Affairs Council and met with its head, Lai Shin-yuan, there to express their concerns 
about the E.C.F.A. and urge the Taiwanese government to save what they called the 
“conventional industries.”22 After this joint effort, these manufacturers continued to work 
closely with one another as well as the Pan-Green politicians to prevent their interests 
from being compromised in the debate over the E.C.F.A. and ask the Taiwanese 
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 “Workers threaten that a bloody revolution will be unavoidable if the government forces E.C.F.A. down 
their throats,” Liberty Times, March 28, 2009. 
21
 “Labor organizations will demonstrate against President Ma on May 1,” Liberty Times, April 16, 2010. 
22
 “Local industries ask Lai Shin-yuan to help promote products made in Taiwan,” Liberty Times, April 11, 
2009. 
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government to protect their “conventional industries” from the “black-hearted” Chinese 
products (i.e. cheap and low-quality products from China).
23
 
        As the pro-openness coalition saw it, the aforementioned concerns about and the 
criticisms against the C.E.C.A./E.C.F.A. the anti-openness coalition had were flawed, if 
not completely baseless. To alleviate their worries and let them know what the “facts” 
were, the officials in the Ma Administration emphasized that the option of allowing the 
import of Chinese labor was never on the table and provided official statistical evidence 
demonstrating that the economic benefits of signing the C.E.C.A./E.C.F.A. with China 
outweighed the costs.
24
 In late July 2009, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs made 
public its evaluation of the E.C.F.A. which revealed that the agreement would increase 
Taiwan’s Gross Domestic Product (G.D.P.) by 1.65% - 1.72% and create 263 thousand - 
273 thousand jobs.
25
 In late October 2009, Taiwan’s Council of Labor Affairs published 
its official assessment of the E.C.F.A. which, though not as optimistic as the evaluation 
made by the Ministry of Economic Affair, also revealed that the benefits of signing the 
E.C.F.A. with China were significant. According to it, the E.C.F.A. would create 105 
thousand - 125 thousand jobs; on the contrary, without the E.C.F.A., 47 thousand jobs 
would be lost and Taiwan’s G.D.P. would drop by 0.179%.26 In addition to providing the 
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 “Conventional industries: E.C.F.A. will kill people,” Liberty Times, December 2, 2009; and 
“Conventional industries criticize the government for treating people like idiots,” Liberty Times, December 
11, 2009. 
24
 “Chairwoman Tsai is misunderstanding!” United Daily News, February 19, 2009; “Kao Koong-lian 
criticizes Tsai: She is a bastard making people lose their jobs,” China Times, February 24, 2009; “Yin Chi-
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 “Ministry of Economic Affairs: E.C.F.A. will create at least 260,000 jobs,” China Times, July 30, 2009. 
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 “Council of Labor Affairs: 47,000 jobs will be lost if E.C.F.A. is not signed,” Economic Daily News, 
October 22, 2009. 
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official evaluation of the E.C.F.A. in an attempt to rebut the Pan-Green’s criticisms 
which, according to President Ma, involved nothing but “nonsense,” 27  the Ma 
Administration, admitting the E.C.F.A. was not perfect, promised to try its very best to 
delay the opening of the Taiwanese markets dominated by domestic businesses for as 
long as possible and spend 36.4 billion and 95 billion New Taiwan Dollars on helping the 
Taiwanese workers and domestic manufacturers, respectively, who might be negatively 
affected by the E.C.F.A.
28
 Although the economic winners were not supportive of the 
Taiwanese government’s proposal to save some of the domestic industries that they 
believed had no prospects, they did not object to the idea that the government should help 
upgrade those that were worth saving and make them become more competitive before 
the domestic markets they occupied were fully opened.
29
 In general, the pro-openness 
coalition tried to persuade the anti-openness coalition that, on the issue of the E.C.F.A., it 
would stick to the principle of what the head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council 
called “four protections”: the protection of employment, export, conventional industries, 
and China-based Taiwanese business people.
30
  
        The other two things about the C.E.C.A./E.C.F.A. over which the pro-openness and 
anti-openness coalitions, especially the Pan-Green and the Pan-Blue, conflicted with each 
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 “Will E.C.F.A. make 3 million people unemployed? Ma: Nonsense,” United Daily News, April 13, 2010. 
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 “The Ministry of Economic Affairs: There will be a buffer zone for vulnerable industries after E.C.F.A. 
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May 16, 2010. 
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other are (1) whether the agreement would lead to any undesirable political consequence 
with regard to China-Taiwan relations and (2) how to reach a domestic consensus on the 
agreement given the severe social and political conflicts resulting from it. As the Pan-
Green politicians saw it, the controversy over the C.E.C.A./E.C.F.A. was not only an 
economic issue but also a political one due to the politically sensitive nature of China-
Taiwan relations. In general, they believed that China’s enthusiastic effort to promote the 
aforementioned agreement originated in its intention to “besiege the Taiwanese 
government with the Taiwanese business people” and its strategy to “promote unification 
with economy.”31 In other words, to the Pan-Green politicians, the C.E.C.A./E.F.C.A. or 
any other similar agreement or arrangement was nothing but what Chairwoman Tsai of 
D.P.P. called “sugar-coated poison,” which would first lead to the economic integration 
of China and Taiwan and then, sooner or later, result in the political outcome they had 
been fighting against, i.e. the loss of Taiwan’s sovereignty to China. 32  Therefore, 
according to them, given that Taiwan’s signing the E.C.F.A. with China would have a 
huge political impact on China-Taiwan relations, there had to be a referendum on the 
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 “Scholars are worried that C.E.C.A. will lead Taiwan to de jure unification,” Liberty Times, January 23, 
2009. 
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 “The government convenes a committee on C.E.C.A., and the Green makes an anti-C.E.C.A. statement,” 
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E.C.F.A. before or after the Taiwanese government made any final decision on the 
issue.
33
 
        By contrast, the Pan-Blue politicians including the officials in the Ma 
Administration insisted that the issue of the C.E.C.A./E.C.F.A. was purely economic and 
had nothing to do with politics.
34
 They constantly emphasized that the official negotiation 
on the agreement would never involve any political issues including those about 
unification and Taiwan’s sovereignty.35 As for the Pan-Green’s demand for a referendum, 
the Pan-Blue politicians criticized it as unnecessary given the non-political nature of the 
agreement, pointing out that there had never been any referendum associated with the 
economy-related agreements or F.T.A.s Taiwan had signed with China and other 
countries and there should be no exception this time.
36
 Nevertheless, though opposing a 
referendum, the Ma Administration promised that the agreement would definitely be 
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reviewed by the congress after it was signed and that it would never be implemented if 
not passed by the congress.
37
  
        The Table below summarizes the pro-openness and anti-openness coalitions’ 
positions on the C.E.C.A./E.C.F.A. that I have discussed above. 
 
Table 10.1: The debate over the C.E.C.A./E.C.F.A. 
 Economic debate Political debate 
General effects on 
Taiwan’s economy 
Effects on 
Taiwanese workers 
and “conventional 
industries” 
Political 
consequences with 
regard to China-
Taiwan relations 
Policy-making and 
consensus-building 
processes 
Pro-openness 
coalition 
Preventing 
economic 
marginalization; 
increasing economic 
competitiveness 
Decreasing the 
unemployment rate; 
impacts on workers 
and “conventional 
industries” 
manageable 
Purely economic; 
having nothing to do 
with politics 
Referendum 
unnecessary 
Anti-openness 
coalition 
Hollowing out; 
economic 
dependence; locking 
Taiwan’s economy 
up in China 
Increasing the 
unemployment rate; 
destroying the 
“conventional 
industries” 
Facilitating 
unification; losing 
sovereignty  
Referendum 
necessary  
 
 
The pro-openness coalition’s winning the debate 
        The pro-openness and anti-openness coalitions made the arguments against and for 
the C.E.C.A./E.C.F.A., respectively, in order to persuade not only the people on the other 
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 “Lai Shin-yuan: The agreement will be reviewed by Legislative Yuan,” Economic Daily News, February 
23, 2009; “Ma: The agreement on cross-strait economic cooperation will be reviewed by Legislative Yuan 
after it is signed,” United Daily News, February 26, 2009; and “Ma defines C.E.C.A. as an agreement on 
the framework of cross-strait economic cooperation,” China Times, February 28, 2009. 
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side to change their minds about the agreement but also the Taiwanese general public to 
side with it on the issue. Obviously, while both sides did a very bad job in changing the 
other side’s position, the pro-openness coalition gradually got the upper hand in the 
competition for public support. As a series of public polls below reveal, which were 
conducted from February 2009 to May 2010, 
 
the public support for the 
C.E.C.A./E.C.F.A. did gradually increase in Taiwan despite the fact that a significant 
proportion of the Taiwanese public actually did not know what it was really about in 
detail.
38
 
 
Table 10.2: The public support for the C.E.C.A./E.C.F.A. 
 
February 
2009 
March 
2009 
October 
2009 
March 
2010 
April 
2010* 
April 
2010** 
May 
2010 
Favorable 29% 29% 46% 35% 38% 41% 41% 
Opposing 32% 31% 33% 32% 36% 33% 34% 
Neutral 39% 41% 20% 33% 26% 26% 25% 
Agreement-
savvy 
35% 29% 29% - 25% - 34% 
Not agreement-
savvy 
64% 71% 69% - 72% - 64% 
*survey conducted from April 20th to 21st (before the televised debate between Ma and Tsai over the E.C.F.A. on 
April 25th) 
**survey conducted on April 25th (after the debate) 
Source: Polling Center of TVBS; data available at 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/0125173087.pdf> and 
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/13291755064.pdf>. 
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 The surveys were conducted by TVBS, one of the most influential news media in Taiwan, whose 
prediction of the result of the 2008 Taiwanese presidential election based on its public polls was, according 
to the Center for Prediction Markets at National Chengchi University in Taiwan, the most precise among all 
of the Taiwanese news media’s. For more details, see <http://nccupm.wordpress.com/2011/11/23/>. 
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        The pro-openness coalition’s argument that the economic damage caused by the 
E.C.F.A. to the Taiwanese workers and the Taiwanese manufacturers producing goods 
for the domestic market would be manageable became more convincing to the Taiwanese 
general public than the contrasting argument made by the anti-openness coalition after 
the second round of formal negotiation over the E.C.F.A. between China and Taiwan, 
which was held from March 31
st
 to April 1
st
, 2010, when China promised at the end of 
the negotiation that it would not export its labor to Taiwan and would try its best to 
reduce the negative impacts of the E.C.F.A. on Taiwan’s domestic industries as much as 
possible.
39
 On April 25
th
, 2010, the pro-openness coalition secured another victory over 
the anti-openness coalition after Ma and Tsai had the long-awaited televised debate on 
the E.C.F.A., in which, while the former emphasized that it was urgent for Taiwan to 
break through economic marginalization with the E.C.F.A., the latter criticized the 
Taiwanese government’s effort to sign the E.C.F.A. with China as “miscalculated and 
reckless.”40 According to most of the surveys conducted after the debate (see Table 9.3), 
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 See “Lai Shin-yuan: Mission impossible accomplished,” China Times, April 3, 2010. Arguably, China 
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News, March 6, 2010; and “Wen Jiabao: Interests can be yielded to Taiwan because we are brothers,” 
United Daily News, March 15, 2010. For more discussions about China’s effort to create economic 
incentives that could effectively encourage Taiwan to deepen cross-strait interactions, see Sutter 2011, 12. 
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 “The debate between Ma and Tsai will be held by the end of this month,” United Daily News, April 2, 
2010; “Ma: E.C.F.A. will initiate the ‘golden decade’,” Commercial Times, April 26, 2010; and “Tsai: It is 
reckless to lean toward China,” Liberty Times, April 26, 2010. 
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Ma “won” the debate given the fact that most of those who watched the debate thought 
that Ma did a better job than Tsai in the debate. 
 
Table 10.3: The polling about the E.C.F.A. televised debate conducted by the four largest 
Taiwanese newspapers 
 
 The Apple Daily The United Daily News The China Times The Liberty Times* 
Ma is better 53.26% 42% 41.2% 28.02% 
Tsai is better 41.74% 30% 28.1% 35.77% 
*The figures reflect the support rate for the E.C.F.A. after the debate; the Liberty Times did not ask the “who-is-
better” question. 
Source: Data available at <http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/13291755064.pdf>. 
 
        On June 25
th, 2010, the so called “early harvest lists” associated with the E.C.F.A. 
(i.e. lists that specified the Chinese and Taiwanese goods that would enjoy zero tariff) 
were published, and many of the Chinese products, whose export to Taiwan with zero 
tariff would negatively affect the Taiwanese manufacturers producing similar products 
for Taiwan’s domestic market, were not included in China’s early harvest list, a 
development that alleviated those manufacturers’ concerns about the E.C.F.A. to a great 
extent.
41
 Four days later, on June 29
th
, the E.C.F.A. was officially signed by Chen Yunlin 
and Chiang Pin-kung, the chairmen of China’s A.R.A.T.S. and Taiwan’s S.E.F., 
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 “Council of Labor Affairs: The number of workers who might be affected by E.C.F.A. will be lower than 
we estimated,” China Times, June 25, 2010; and “Premier Wu: E.C.F.A. will create 260,000 jobs,” China 
Times, June 26, 2010. 
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respectively, and on August 17
th
, it was passed by Taiwan’s congress dominated by the 
Pan-Blue.
42
  
 
The change of the D.P.P.’s rhetoric on the E.C.F.A. 
        The growing public support for the E.C.F.A., similar to the public support for cross-
strait economic ties during the campaign period for the 2008 presidential election that led 
to an election-driven change of the D.P.P. presidential candidate’s position on the 
economic ties, softened the harsh rhetoric against the E.C.F.A. among some politicians in 
the D.P.P., including its chairwoman, Tsai, who later became the D.P.P. candidate for the 
2012 presidential election. In an interview received in late July 2010, Tsai made public 
what she called a “more active view” on the issue of the E.C.F.A.43 First of all, she 
revealed that the D.P.P. would begin to focus more on the upcoming elections including 
the 2012 presidential election than on the protest against the Taiwanese government’s 
decision to sign the E.C.F.A. with China, which, according to her, had been as futile as “a 
dog’s barking against a train.” Second, though still having a negative attitude toward the 
E.C.F.A., she said that the D.P.P., if becoming the ruling party in 2012, would not 
unilaterally initiate a referendum on the E.C.F.A. but would instead let the “people” 
decide whether they wanted a referendum or not by themselves. Moreover, in another 
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interview in mid-September, Tsai went so far as to say that the D.P.P. would continue the 
policies made by the Ma Administration after winning the presidency and that any 
change of Ma’s policies, including those that the D.P.P. did not like, should be made only 
through a democratic procedure instead of an unilateral action.
44
 
        Her new tone on the E.C.F.A. continued even after the results of the municipal 
elections for the five biggest cities in Taiwan, which were held on November 27
th
, 2010, 
revealed an increase in the D.P.P.’s political momentum.45 In late August 2011, when 
introducing her “10-year platform,” Tsai, as the D.P.P. candidate for the 2012 
presidential election, pointed out that the E.C.F.A. as an “international agreement” had 
already been “signed into reality,” and therefore, any change of it could only be made 
through a democratic process and in accordance with international norms.
46
 Here, 
regarding the E.C.F.A. as an international agreement that had already been officially 
signed, Tsai obviously tried to reassure the people that the D.P.P., if winning the election, 
would not abolish the agreement unilaterally. Furthermore, in mid-September 2011, 
though emphasizing that she would make regular reexaminations of the E.C.F.A. after 
becoming the president, Tsai, in a speech delivered in Washington D.C., said that the 
“intensity of the economic ties” between China and Taiwan had already “evolved to the 
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extent where continuing interactions cannot be stopped by either side” and that “turning a 
blind eye” to this fact was “impractical.”47  Finally, in an interview received in late 
November 2011, Tsai clearly said that she, if elected, would not abolish the E.C.F.A. that 
had already been officially signed and promised that she would carefully deal with the 
follow-up negotiations associated with it to protect Taiwan’s interests.48 
        It is worth noting that, unlike the change of the D.P.P. presidential candidate Hsieh 
Chang-ting’s attitude toward cross-strait economic ties in the 2008 campaign, the change 
of Tsai’s tone about the E.C.F.A. however did not significantly destabilize the anti-
openness coalition, or more specifically, the Pan-Green political camp, during the 
campaign period for the 2012 election. There are two reasons for the difference. First, the 
Pan-Green politicians did learn a bitter lesson from their internal conflict in the 2008 
presidential election, knowing pretty well this time that another internal conflict would 
only politically benefit the pro-openness coalition again. Obviously, although the T.S.U. 
firmly stuck to its anti-E.C.F.A. position throughout the campaign period for the 2012 
election, it did not significantly challenge the “more active view” of Tsai’s on the 
E.C.F.A. For example, though emphasizing his objection to the E.C.F.A. and his position 
that the E.C.F.A. should be abolished, Chairman Huang of the T.S.U. did lend his support 
to Tsai’s idea that the issue of the E.C.F.A. had to be dealt with through a democratic 
procedure and in accordance with international norms.
49
 Also, three days before the 
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Election Day, on January 11
th
, 2012, Huang, in a press conference, urged the people who 
“really cared about China-based Taiwanese business people” to vote for Tsai because, 
according to him, Taiwanese business people in China would not be treated well by the 
Chinese government if the Taiwanese government was soft toward it.
50
 In general, the 
T.S.U. as well as the D.P.P. politicians who had a strong negative attitude toward the 
E.C.F.A. realized that they had no choice but to rally around Tsai in order to achieve their 
goal in what Lee Teng-hui, the “spiritual leader” of the T.S.U., called the movement of 
“dumping Ma to save Taiwan.”51 
        The second reason involves Tsai’s unequivocal refusal to accept the so called “1992 
Consensus” that was regarded by pro-independence and anti-openness Pan-Green 
politicians as a “scam” to facilitate “ultimate unification,” a “one-China consensus” with 
no room for the “respective interpretations” of one-China, or a tool the Ma 
Administration used to “rule Taiwan with communists.”52 In general, they argued that the 
negotiation between China’s A.R.A.T.S. and Taiwan’s S.E.F. in 1992 ended with a 
stalemate after the former raised the issue of one-China and the latter refused to discuss it, 
and therefore, there was no such thing as the “1992 Consensus” or what Ma called a 
cross-strait consensus on “one-China, respective interpretations” derived from the 
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aforementioned negotiation.
53
 Tsai, as the chairwoman of D.P.P. and, later, the D.P.P. 
presidential candidate, had the same position on the “1992 Consensus.” 54  In late 
December 2010, responding to Ma’s criticism against her refusal to accept the “1992 
Consensus,” Tsai argued that the key issue about the “1992 Consensus” was not whether 
it should be accepted or not but whether it existed or not in the first place and that it was 
very difficult for her to accept or recognize “something that did not exist.”55 In late 
August 2011, when she made public her “10-year platform,” Tsai, while pointing out that 
the E.C.F.A. had already been “signed into reality,” emphasized that the “1992 
Consensus” had “never existed.”56 Furthermore, criticizing the “1992 Consensus,” Tsai 
claimed that what Taiwan really needed was the so called “Taiwan Consensus,” an idea 
raised by one of her opponents in the D.P.P. presidential primary, Su Tseng-chang, a 
former Taiwanese prime minister under Chen Shui-bian who ended up in second place in 
the primary. Explaining the “Taiwan Consensus,” Tsai stated that she, if elected, would 
encourage people in Taiwan who had different opinions about China-Taiwan relations to 
exchange their views and then reach a consensus in a democratic way and that this 
consensus, instead of the “1992 Consensus,” would be the foundation of her 
administration’s interactions and negotiations with China.57 
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The victory of the pro-openness coalition in the 2012 presidential election 
        The change of Tsai’s attitude toward the E.C.F.A. from uncompromising objection 
to cautious acceptance as well as the solidarity of the anti-openness coalition despite of 
the change however did not bring too many political advantages to Tsai in the 2012 
presidential election which was eventually won by the incumbent, President Ma. There 
are two major reasons for it. First of all, the general public was still skeptical about the 
“more active view” of Tsai’s on the E.C.F.A. Although Tsai promised that she would 
neither abolish the E.C.F.A. nor initiate a referendum on it if elected, the constant 
criticisms against the E.C.F.A. from her political allies in the D.P.P. as well as the T.S.U. 
throughout the campaign period arguably made the Taiwanese general public that was 
supportive of the E.C.F.A., or at least not anti-E.C.F.A., feel suspicious about her 
sincerity on the issue.
58
 In addition, Ma’s and his allies’ continuous attack on Tsai for her 
“flip-flops” on the E.C.F.A. since her change did also cause damage to Tsai’s credibility 
on the issue among the voters.
59
 
        The other factor that played a role in Ma’s winning the reelection involves the 
debate on the “1992 Consensus.”60 In general, the Pan-Green’s diligent attack on Ma’s 
support for the “1992 Consensus” was in vain at best and backfired at worst. As 
mentioned, Tsai as well as her Pan-Green allies had tried very hard from the beginning to 
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depict the “1992 Consensus” as a dangerous thing that could cause damage to Taiwan’s 
sovereignty, arguing that Ma’s accepting the consensus demonstrated the fact that Ma 
was pursuing with China the goal of unification and had already accepted China’s One-
China Principle. Obviously, the purpose of the Pan-Green’s accusation against Ma for 
being “pro-China” was to distance Ma from the majority of Taiwanese people who, 
though not interested in the idea of Taiwan’s independence, did not like the idea of 
unification, either. However, their effort did not pay off, and it is arguably Ma who won 
the battle on the “1992 Consensus,” successfully appealing to the majority of Taiwanese 
people on the issue.  
        Facing the Pan-Green’s criticism against its pro-unification tendency, the Ma 
Administration constantly reminded the Taiwanese people that its China policy had been, 
since the very beginning, based on the principle of “three no’s”, i.e. no unification, no 
independence, and no use of force; in addition, responding to the Pan-Green’s accusation 
against Ma’s accepting China’s One-China Principle, it continuously emphasized that it 
regarded “one-China” as nothing but the Republic of China. 61  Furthermore, the Ma 
Administration argued that, given the numerous agreements China had signed with 
Taiwan since 2008, China did implicitly, if not explicitly, accepted the aforementioned 
positions the Taiwanese government held as well as the ideas of “one-China, respective 
interpretations” and “mutual non-denial” it promoted, which, according to the Ma 
                                                          
61
 “Lai Shin-yuan: One-China refers to nothing but the Republic of China,” China Times, July 8, 2011; and 
“Ma: Our relations with Mainland involve unique cross-strait interactions,” United Daily News, November 
4, 2011. 
372 
 
 
 
Administration, constituted the foundation of the “1992 Consensus.”62 Last but not least, 
on the basis of the aforementioned arguments, the Ma Administration warned that, if Tsai 
became the Taiwanese president, her refusal to accept the “1992 Consensus” would 
definitely put cross-strait relations into a “situation of uncertainty,” causing the current 
interactions and negotiations between China and Taiwan to cease and, as a result, taking 
away the peace on the Taiwan Strait that had been enjoyed since 2008.
63
 
        China’s official statements about the “1992 Consensus” during the campaign period 
of the 2012 Taiwanese presidential election, most of which were made with a non-
provocative tone to avoid igniting an “anti-China” sentiment among the Taiwanese voters, 
echoed the Ma Administration’s argument about the connection between the “1992 
Consensus” and peaceful cross-strait relations, although they did not mention anything 
about the ideas of “one-China, respective interpretations” and “mutual non-denial” 
promoted by the Taiwanese government.
64
 For example, Wang Yi, the director of China’s 
Taiwan Affairs Office, described the “peaceful development of cross-strait relations” 
since 2008 as a “mansion the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have been 
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working hard to build jointly,” emphasizing that the foundation of that “mansion” was the 
“1992 Consensus” and that it was impossible to keep on building it without its 
foundation.
65
 In addition, many Chinese officials implied that the implementation of the 
E.C.F.A. and the follow-up negotiations associated with it would turn out to be not as 
smooth as they were supposed to be if the new Taiwanese government did not accept the 
“1992 Consensus” in the future.66 Take the words said by Chairman Chen of China’s 
A.R.A.T.S. about the “1992 Consensus” for example. Emphasizing that the “1992 
Consensus” was the necessary condition for any cross-strait talk and the foundation of 
peaceful cross-strait relations, he said that, without the consensus, there would be no 
more negotiation between his association and Taiwan’s S.E.F. and all of the cross-strait 
agreements that had been signed could not be effectively implemented in the future, all of 
which in turn would “directly harm the interests of the compatriots on both sides, 
especially those in Taiwan.”67 
        Because of China’s attaching the E.C.F.A to the “1992 Consensus,” many influential 
business associations and prestigious business leaders in Taiwan began to openly endorse 
the “1992 Consensus” after Tsai, as a presidential candidate, officially rejected the 
consensus in her “10-year platform,” 68  a development that arguably increased the 
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credibility of Ma’s position on the consensus among the Taiwanese general public.69 The 
next day after Tsai’s official presidential platform was released, the chairman of the 
Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland openly criticized Tsai’s 
refusal to accept the “1992 Consensus” for causing damage to the “foundation of cross-
strait mutual trust,” warned that Tsai’s election might make many cross-strait agreements 
overturned, and urged China-based Taiwanese business people to vote for the candidate 
who was able to “keep cross-strait relations stable.”70 After that, more and more business 
associations and leaders also made public their support for the “1992 Consensus” and 
their concerns that Tsai’s negative attitude toward the consensus would cause damage to 
cross-strait economic ties. 
        In late November 2011, the six largest business associations in Taiwan jointly held 
an economic forum where Ma and Tsai were invited to deliver a speech and took 
questions from the representatives of those associations. It is obvious that Ma’s “1992 
Consensus” was much more popular than Tsai’s “Taiwan Consensus” in the forum: when 
exchanging views on cross-strait relations with Tsai, the participants unambiguously 
expressed their concerns about Tsai’s ability to stabilize Taiwan’s relations with China in 
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the absence of the “1992 Consensus.”71 Chairman Wang of Formosa Plastics Group also 
revealed his support for the “1992 Consensus” in late December when he had a meeting 
with the labor union leaders of his corporation, in which he said that the “1992 Consensus” 
was the foundation to “move the E.C.F.A. forward” and implied that the best way to 
serve Taiwan’s interests at both the national and individual levels was to support the 
consensus as well as Ma.
72
 On January 3
rd
, 2012, eleven days before the Election Day, 
Chang Yung-fa, the founder and the chairman of Evergreen Group, openly criticized the 
“Taiwan Consensus” as an idea associated with Taiwan’s independence and praised the 
“1992 Consensus” as the foundation of cross-strait talks that would bring stability and 
prosperity to Taiwan, saying that “without the ‘1992 Consensus,’ Taiwan’s economy will 
be doomed to recession.”73 The next day, Liao Chin-hsiang, the chairman of Chimei 
Group and the successor of its founder and former chairman Hsu Wen-lung, made a 
similar pubic statement, emphasizing that the “1992 Consensus” played a very important 
role in facilitating the positive cross-strait interactions over the past three and a half years 
and that these positive interactions had to be continued.
74
 The last blow cast to Tsai by 
the economic winners on the issue of the “1992 Consensus,” which, according to the 
former Taiwanese vice president Lu Hsiu-lien, caused “huge damage” to Tsai’s campaign, 
was from Wang Hsueh-hung, Wang Yung-ching’s daughter as well the founder and the 
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chairwoman of HTC Corporation, one of the best-known and most profitable 
manufacturers of smartphones and tablets in the world.
75
 One day before the election, on 
January 13
th
, 2012, Wang held a press conference where she made public her support for 
the “1992 Consensus.” First of all, talking about the importance of cross-strait economic 
ties to her business, she emphasized that “peaceful and stable cross-strait relations are 
necessary for innovation.” Then, she said that although she did not know what the “1992 
Conesus” really was, she was pretty sure that, after the “1992 Consensus” was regarded 
by both sides as a cross-strait consensus, cross-strait relations became unprecedentedly 
peaceful. Finally, she pointed out that, as a “real Taiwanese,” she could not imagine any 
kind of positive cross-strait relationship without the “1992 Consensus” and she could not 
believe that there were people who thought that the absence of the “1992 Consensus” 
would make no difference.  
        The aforementioned political situation in favor of Ma (i.e. the Taiwanese general 
public’s distrust of Tsai on the issues of the E.C.F.A. and the “1992 Consensus”) was not 
overturned even after an internal conflict within the Pan-Blue resulted in the P.F.P. 
chairman Soong Chu-yu’s decision to run for the presidency. On September 20th, 2011, 
Soong officially announced his candidacy and began to attack both Ma and Tsai. On the 
one hand, he blamed Ma for not taking unification seriously and not caring about the 
middle-class and poor people.
76
 On the other hand, he accused Tsai of pursuing Taiwan’s 
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independence and criticized her for her refusal to accept the “1992 Consensus” as well as 
her inability to stabilize cross-strait relations.
77
 However, despite his tireless attack on Ma 
and Tsai, his attack was intentionally ignored by the two major candidates by and large. 
In the case of Ma, he was not willing to fight back in fear of alienating Soong’s 
sympathizers who were not necessarily anti-Ma. As for Tsai, similarly, she was unwilling 
to launch any counterattack in fear of alienating Soong’s sympathizers who were anti-Ma. 
At the end, Soong did not attract any significant number of votes, earning only 2.8% of 
the total votes, while Ma and Tsai obtained 51.6% and 45.6% of them, respectively.
78
 
 
Concluding Comments 
        Three implications of Ma’s reelection for cross-strait economic ties, Taiwan’s 
domestic politics, and China-Taiwan relations are worth pointing out. First of all, given 
President Ma’s insistence on a pro-openness policy, the close cross-strait economic ties 
that have been seen since 2008 will be largely kept in place with the E.C.F.A. and the 
follow-up negotiations about it making those ties more and more institutionalized. 
Secondly, given the Ma Administration’s sticking to the “1992 Consensus,” the relatively 
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less confrontational China-Taiwan relations that have appeared since 2008 when Ma was 
first elected will still be maintained at least for a certain period of time, if not forever. 
        As we can see, the official and quasi-official channels of contact between China and 
Taiwan are still functioning normally, if not perfectly. At present, there are three major 
channels of cross-strait contact through which the two sides are trying to work together to 
deal with the common problems they face and to resolve the disagreements between them: 
(1) the A.R.A.T.S.-S.E.F. formal meetings, which are held regularly; (2) the exchanges 
between the leaders of the C.C.P. and those of the K.M.T., which are made very often 
either in China or in some special occasions like an A.P.E.C. meeting; and (3) the 
government-to-government coordination and cooperation, which are gradually increasing 
especially on the issues of cross-strait economic ties.
79
 
        Last but not least, how the major force on the other side of the political spectrum (i.e. 
the D.P.P.) will respond to the two aforementioned situations about cross-strait economic 
ties and China-Taiwan relations would undoubtedly determine how Taiwan’s domestic 
politics and China-Taiwan relations evolve in the future. Obviously, the Taiwanese 
general public’s support for close cross-strait economic ties and peaceful China-Taiwan 
relations, as revealed in the last two presidential elections, has already triggered several 
informal but severe debates within the D.P.P. over its position on cross-strait economic 
ties and China-Taiwan relations since the end of the 2012 election.
80
 How this internal 
conflict will turn out in the near future matters a great deal. If it eventually results in any 
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significant change in the D.P.P.’s anti-China position in general or its negative attitude 
toward the idea of one-China in particular, this change will arguably usher in not only a 
new era of Taiwan’s domestic politics but also a whole new landscape of China-Taiwan 
relations. 
380 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
Books and articles: 
 
Adams, Greg D. 1997. “Abortion: Evidence of an Issue Evolution.” American Journal of 
Political Science 41(3): 718-737. 
 
Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism, London, U.K.: Verso. 
 
Angell, Norman. 1909 (republished in 2007). The Great Illusion. New York, NY: 
Cosimo, Inc. 
 
Ba, Alice D. 2003. “China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st- Century Asia.” 
Asian Survey 43(4): 622-647. 
 
Barbieri, Katherine. 1996. “Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of 
Interstate Conflict?” Journal of Peace Research 33(1): 29-49. 
 
Bellows, Thomas J. 1976. “Taiwan’s Foreign Policy in the 1970s: A Case Study of 
Adaptation and Viability.” Asian Survey 16(7): 593-610. 
 
Bernstein, Richard and Ross H. Munro. 1997. “The Coming Conflict with America.” 
Foreign Affairs 76(2): 18-32. 
 
Bolt, Paul J. 2001. “Economic Ties Across the Taiwan Strait: Buying Time for 
Compromise.” Issues & Studies 37(2): 80-105. 
 
Boutin, J. D. Kenneth. 1997. “Cross-Strait Trade and Investment: Economic and Security 
Implications for the Republic of China.” Issues & Studies 33(12): 70-93. 
 
Carmines, Edward G. and James A. Stimson. 1986. “On the Structure and Sequence of 
Issue Evolution.” American Political Science Review 80(3): 901-920. 
 
Carr, Edward Hallett. 1964 (republished in 2001). The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: 
An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. New York, NY: Palgrave.  
 
Chai, Winberg. 2004. “Blueprints for War or Peace in Future China-Taiwan Relations: 
Two Important Documents.” Asian Affairs 31(3): 152-165. 
 
381 
 
 
Chang, Ha-Joon. 1999. “The Economic Theory of the Developmental State” in The 
Developmental State, edited by Meredith Woo-Cumings, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 182-199. 
 
Chang, Parris. 1983. “Taiwan in 1982: Diplomatic Setback Abroad and Demands for 
Reforms at Home.” Asian Survey 23(1): 38-46. 
 
Chang, Parris H. 1992. “China’s Relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan.” Annals of 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 519: 127-139. 
 
Chao, Chien-Min. 2003. “Will Economic Integration between Mainland China and 
Taiwan Lead to a Congenital Political Culture?” Asian Survey 43(2): 280-304. 
 
Chao, Linda and Ramon H. Myers. 1994. “The First Chinese Democracy: Political 
Development of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1986-1994.” Asian Survey 34(3): 213-
230. 
 
Charney, Jonathan I. and J. R. V. Prescott. 2000. “Resolving Cross-Strait Relations 
between China and Taiwan.” American Journal of International Law 94(3): 453-477. 
 
Chen, Chien-Kai. 2011. “The State-Society Interaction in the Process of Taiwan’s 
Democratization from 1990 to 1992.” East Asia 28(2): 115-134. 
 
Chen, Chien-Kai. 2012. “Comparing Jiang Zemin’s Impatience and Hu Jintao’s Patience 
Regarding the Taiwan Issue, 1989-2012.” Journal of Contemporary China 21(78): 955-
972. 
 
Chen, Shui-Bian. 2004. Believing in Taiwan: President Chen’s Report to the Public, 
Taipei, Taiwan: Eurasian Press (in Chinese). 
 
Chen, Ya-Chin, Chia-Yen Yang, and Hui-Ping Li. 2008. “The Effect of Cross-Strait 
Economic Ties on Income and Employment in Taiwan.” Technical Report for Mainland 
Affairs Council <http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Data/991011365071.pdf> (in Chinese). 
 
Christensen, Thomas. 1996. “Chinese Realpolitik.” Foreign Affairs 75(5): 37-52. 
 
Christensen, Thomas. 2001. “Posing Problems without Catching Up: China’s Rise and 
Challenges for the U.S. Security Policy.” International Security 25(4): 5-40. 
 
Christensen, Thomas. 2002a. “Beijing’s Views of Taiwan and the United States in Early 
2002: The Renaissance of Pessimism.” China Leadership Monitor 3: 1-12 
<http://media.hoover.org/documents/clm3_TC.pdf>. 
 
382 
 
 
Christensen, Thomas. 2002b. “The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan 
Conflict.” Washington Quarterly 25(4): 7-21. 
 
Christensen, Thomas. 2003. “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma” 
in International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, edited by John Ikenberry and 
Michael Mastanduno, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 25-56.  
 
Christensen, Thomas. 2005. “Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan Elections and Cross-Strait 
Security Relations: Reduced Tensions and Remaining Challenges.” China Leadership 
Monitor 13: 1-13 <http://media.hoover.org/documents/clm13_tc.pdf>. 
 
Chu, Yun-Han. 1997. “The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Mainland Policy.” Journal of 
Contemporary China 6(15): 229-257.  
 
Chu, Yun-Han. 2003. “Power Transition and the Making of Beijing’s Policy towards 
Taiwan.” China Quarterly 176: 960-980. 
 
Chu, Yun-Han. 2004. “Taiwan’s National Identity Politics and the Prospect of Cross-
Strait Relations.” Asian Survey 44(4): 497-503. 
 
Chu, Yun-Han and Jih-Wen Lin. 2001. “Political Development in 20th-Century Taiwan: 
State-Building, Regime Transformation and the Construction of National Identity.” 
China Quarterly 165: 102-129. 
 
Clark, Cal. 2002a. “Lee Teng-Hui and the Emergence of a Competitive Party System in 
Taiwan.” American Asian Review 20(2): 1-27. 
 
Clark, Cal. 2002b. “The China-Taiwan Relationship: Growing Cross-Strait Economic 
Integration.” Orbis 46(4): 753-766. 
 
Copeland, Dale. 1996. “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade 
Expectations.” International Security 20(4): 5-41. 
 
Copper, John. 1999. “The Origins of Conflict Across the Taiwan Strait: the Problem of 
Differences in Perceptions” in Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and 
the 1995-1996 Crisis, edited by Suisheng Zhao, New York, NY: Routledge, 41-74. 
 
Crane, George T. 1993. “China and Taiwan: Not Yet ‘Great China’.” International 
Affairs 69(4): 705-723. 
 
deLisle, Jacques. 2010. “Soft Power in a Hard Place: China, Taiwan, Cross-Strait 
Relations and U.S. Policy.” Orbis 54(4): 493-524. 
 
383 
 
 
Deng, Ping. 2000. “Taiwan’s Restriction of Investment in China in the 1990s: A Relative 
Gains Approach.” Asian Survey 40(6): 958-980. 
 
Dent, Christopher M. 2001. “Being Pulled into China’s Orbit? Navigating Taiwan’s 
Foreign Economic Policy.” Issues & Studies 37(5): 1-34. 
 
Dittmer, Lowell. 2004. “Taiwan and the Issue of National Identity.” Asian Survey 44(4): 
475-483. 
 
Dumbaugh, Kerry. 2006. “Taiwan: Recent Developments and the U.S. Policy Choices.” 
CRS Report for Congress (July 1, 2006): 1-18 
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/70328.pdf>. 
 
Dumbaugh, Kerry. 2008. “Taiwan: Overall Developments and Policy Issues in the 109th 
Congress.” CRS Report for Congress (Updated September 17, 2008): 1-27 
<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl33510.pdf>. 
 
Eckstein, Harry. 1975. “Case Studies and Theory in Political Science” in Handbook of 
Political Science Vol. 7: Political Science: Scope and Theory, edited by Fred I. 
Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 94-137. 
 
Farnham, Barbara. 2004. “Impact of the Political Context on Foreign Policy Decision-
Making.” Political Psychology 25(3): 441-463. 
 
Fewsmith, Joseph and Stanley Rosen. 2001. “The Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign 
Policy: Does ‘Public Opinion’ Matter?” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security 
Policy in the Era of Reform, edited by David Lampton, Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 151-187. 
 
Freeman, Chas W. 1998. “Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait: Restricting Taiwan – and 
Beijing.” Foreign Affairs 77(4):  6-11. 
 
Frieden, Jeffry and Ronald Rogowski. 1996. “The Impact of the International Economy 
on National Policies: An Analytical Overview” in Internationalization and Domestic 
Politics, edited by Robert Keohane and Helen Milner, New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 25-47. 
 
Friedman, Edward. 1999. “The Prospects of a Larger War: Chinese Nationalism and the 
Taiwan Strait Conflict” in Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 
1995-1996 Crisis, edited by Suisheng Zhao, New York, NY: Routledge, 243-276. 
 
Fuller, Douglas B. 2008. “The Cross-Strait Economic Relationship’s Impact on 
Development in Taiwan and China: Adversaries and Partners.” Asia Survey 48(2): 239-
264. 
384 
 
 
 
Garrett, Geoffrey and Peter Lange. 1996. “Internationalization, Institutions and Political 
Change” in Internationalization and Domestic Politics, edited by Robert Keohane and 
Helen Milner, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 48-75. 
 
George, Alexander. 1979. “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of 
Structured, Focused Comparison” in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, 
and Policy, edited by Paul Gordon Lauren, New York, NY: The Free Press, 43-68. 
 
Gerring, John. 2007. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Gilpin, Robert. 2003. “Sources of American-Japanese Economic Conflict” in 
International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, edited by John Ikenberry and 
Michael Mastanduno, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 299-322. 
 
Grieco, Joseph. 1988. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the 
Newest Liberal Institutionalism.” International Organization 42(3): 485-507. 
 
Gries, Peter Hays. 2001. “Correspondence: Power and Resolve in U.S. China Policy.” 
International Security 26(2): 155-160. 
 
Gries, Peter Hays. 2004. China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
 
Hirschman, Albert. 1945. National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press. 
 
Hsieh, Chang-Ting. 2008. Viva Taiwan. Taipei, Taiwan: Sowers Publishers (in Chinese). 
 
Ji, You. 1991. “Changing Leadership Consensus: the Domestic Context of War Games” 
in Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis, edited 
by Suisheng Zhao, New York, NY: Routledge, 77-98. 
 
Johnson, Chalmers. 1987. “Political Institutions and Economic Performance: the 
Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan” in The Political 
Economy of the New Asian Industrialism, edited by Frederic C. Deyo, Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 136-164. 
 
Kahler, Miles and Scott Kastner. 2006. “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: 
Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait.” Journal of 
Peace Research 43(5): 523-541. 
 
385 
 
 
Kan, Shirley A. 2009. “China/Taiwan: Evolution of the ‘One China’ Policy - Key 
Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.” CRS Report for Congress (August 17, 
2009): 1-77 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30341.pdf>. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. 1795 (republished in 1970). Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. 
Reprinted in Kant’s Political Writings, edited by Hans Reiss, Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kastner, Scott. 2006a. “Does Economic Integration Across the Taiwan Strait Make 
Military Conflict Less Likely?” Journal of East Asian Studies 6: 319-346. 
 
Kastner, Scott. 2006b. “The Economics of Cross-Strait Relations: A Reply to Ming Wan.” 
Journal of East Asian Studies 6: 350-351. 
 
Kastner, Scott. 2007. “When Do Conflicting Political Relations Affect International 
Trade?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(4): 664-688. 
 
Kastner, Scott. 2009. Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence Across the 
Taiwan Strait and Beyond. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
 
Kemenade, Willem van. 2001. “Taiwan: Domestic Gridlock, Cross-Strait Deadlock.” 
Washington Quarterly 24(4): 55-70. 
 
Keng, Shu and Gunter Schubert. 2010. “Agents of Taiwan-China Unification? The 
Political Roles of Taiwanese Business People in the Process of Cross-Strait Integration.” 
Asian Survey 50(2): 287-310. 
 
Kennedy, Andrew Bingham. 2007. “China’s Perceptions of U.S. Intentions toward 
Taiwan: How Hostile a Hegemon?” Asian Survey 47(2): 268-287. 
 
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: 
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Langdon, Frank. 2001. “American Northeast Asian Strategy.” Pacific Affairs 74(2): 167-
184. 
 
Lee, Lai To. 1991. “Taiwan and the Reunification Question,” in China in the Nineties: 
Crisis Management and Beyond, edited by David Goodman and Gerald Segal, New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 183-198. 
 
Leng, Tse-Kang. 1996. The Taiwan-China Connection: Democracy and Development 
Across the Taiwan Straits. Taipei, Taiwan: SMC Publishing Inc. 
 
386 
 
 
Leng, Tse-Kang. 1998. “Dynamics of Taiwan-Mainland China Economic Relations: The 
Role of Private Firms.” Asian Survey 38(5): 494-509. 
 
Leng, Tse-Kang. 2005. “State and Business in the Era of Globalization: the Case of 
Cross-Strait Linkages in the Computer Industry.” The China Journal 53: 63-79. 
 
Lieberthal, Kenneth. 2005. “Preventing a War over Taiwan.” Foreign Affairs 82(4): 53-
63. 
 
Lien, Chan. 2004. Change Brings Hope. Taipei, Taiwan: Commonwealth and Global 
Views Publishers (in Chinese). 
 
Lijphart, Arend. 1971. “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method.” American 
Political Science Review 65(3): 682-693. 
 
Luard, Evan. 1971. “China and the United Nations.” International Affairs 47(4): 729-744. 
 
Lynch, Daniel C. 2004. “Taiwan’s Self-Conscious Nation-Building Project.” Asian 
Survey 44(4): 513-533. 
 
Ma, Ying-Jeou and Wan-Chang Siew. 2007. Governance: A Winning Strategy for Taiwan. 
Taipei, Taiwan: Business Weekly Publications (in Chinese). 
 
Mastel, Greg. 2001. “China, Taiwan, and the World Trade Organization.” Washington 
Quarterly 24(3): 45-56.  
 
Moody, Peter R. 2007. “The Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China: Some 
Recent Relations” in China in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges and Opportunities, 
edited by Shiping Hua and Sujian Guo, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 215-235. 
 
Moore, Gregory J. 2007. “The Roles of Misperceptions and Perceptual Gaps in the 
Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996” in China in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges 
and Opportunities, edited by Shiping Hua and Sujian Guo, New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 171-194. 
 
Naughton, Barry. 1997. “The Emergence of the China Circle,” in The China Circle: 
Economics and Technology in the P.R.C., Taiwan, and Hong Kong, edited by Barry 
Naughton, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 3-37. 
 
Niou, Emerson M. S. 2004. “Understanding Taiwan Independence and Its Policy 
Implications.” Asian Survey 44(4): 555-567. 
 
Niu, Jun. 2006. “Chinese Decision Making in Three Military Actions Across the Taiwan 
Strait” in Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis, edited by Michael 
387 
 
 
Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng with Danielle Cohen, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 293-326. 
 
Oneal, John, Frances H. Oneal, Zeev Maoz, and Bruce Russett. 1996. “The Liberal Peace: 
Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-85.” Journal of Peace 
Research 33(1): 11-28. 
 
Oneal, John and Bruce Russett. 1999. “Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative 
Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 36(4): 423-442. 
 
Pan, Zhongqi. 2003. “U.S. Taiwan Policy of Strategic Ambiguity: A Dilemma of 
Deterrence.” Journal of Contemporary China 12(35): 387-407. 
 
Putnam, Robert. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games.” International Organization 42(3): 427-460. 
 
Rogowski, Ronald. 1989. Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic 
Political Alignments. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Romberg, Alan D. 2003. Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy Toward 
Taiwan and U.S.-P.R.C. Relations, Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center. 
 
Romberg, Alan D. 2006a. “The Taiwan Tangle.” China Leadership Monitor 18: 1-28 
<http://media.hoover.org/documents/clm18_ar.pdf>. 
 
Romberg, Alan D. 2006b. “Taiwan: All Politics, All the Time.” China Leadership 
Monitor 19: 1-31 <http://media.hoover.org/documents/clm19_adr.pdf>. 
 
Romberg, Alan D. 2008. “Taiwan Elections: Foundation for the Future.” China 
Leadership Monitor 24: 1-28 <http://media.hoover.org/documents/CLM24AR.pdf>. 
 
Romberg, Alan D. 2009a. “Cross-Strait Relations: Ascend the Heights and Take a Long-
Term Perspective.” China Leadership Monitor 27: 1-46 
<http://media.hoover.org/documents/CLM27AR.pdf>. 
 
Romberg, Alan D. 2009b. “Cross-Strait Relations: First the Easy, Now the Hard.” China 
Leadership Monitor 28: 1-34 <http://media.hoover.org/documents/CLM28AR.pdf>. 
 
Romberg, Alan D. 2010. “2010: The Winter of P.R.C. Discontent.” China Leadership 
Monitor 31: 1-23 <http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM31AR.pdf>. 
 
Romberg, Alan D. 2011. “The 2012 Taiwan Election: Off and Running.” China 
Leadership Monitor 35: 1-44 
<http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM35AR.pdf>. 
388 
 
 
 
Ross, Robert S. 1997. “Beijing as a Conservative Power.” Foreign Affair 76(2): 33-44. 
 
Ross, Robert S. 2001. “The Stability of Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.” The 
International Interest 65: 67-76. 
 
Ross, Robert S. 2002. “Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, 
and U.S.-China Relations.” International Security 27(2): 48-85. 
 
Russett, Bruce and John Oneal. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, 
and International Organizations. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company. 
 
Saunders, Phillip C. 2005. “Long-Term Trends in China-Taiwan Relations: Implications 
for U.S. Taiwan Policy.” Asian Survey 45(6): 970-991. 
 
Shambaugh, David. 1993. “Introduction: The Emergence of ‘Greater China’.” China 
Quarterly 136: 653-659. 
 
Shirk, Susan. 2007. China: Fragile Superpower. New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Steinfeld, Edward S. 2005. “Cross-Straits Integration and Industrial Catch-Up: How 
Vulnerable Is the Taiwan Miracle to an Ascendant Mainland?” in Global Taiwan: 
Building Competitive Strengths in a New International Economy, edited by Suzanne 
Berger and Richard K. Lester, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp, 228-279. 
 
Suettinger, Robert L. 2004. “Leadership Policy toward Taiwan and the United States in 
the Wake of Chen Shui-bian’s Reelection.” China Leadership Monitor 11: 1-10 
<http://media.hoover.org/documents/clm11_rs.pdf>. 
 
Suettinger, Robert L. 2006. “U.S. ‘Management’ of Three Taiwan Strait ‘Crises’” in 
Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis, edited by Michael D. 
Swaine, Zhang Tuosheng, and Danielle F. S. Cohen, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 251-292. 
 
Sutter, Karen M. 2002. “Business Dynamism across the Taiwan Strait: The Implications 
for Cross-Strait Relations.” Asian Survey 42(3): 522-540. 
 
Sutter, Robert. 2011. “Taiwan’s Future: Narrowing Straits.” NBR Analysis (May 2011): 
1-22 <http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/Free/02112012/A11_Taiwan.pdf>. 
 
Tsang, Steve. 2012. “Ma Ying-jeou’s Re-election: Implications for Taiwan and East 
Asia.” The Pacific Review 25(3): 387-401. 
 
389 
 
 
Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. 2002. “If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United 
States Care?” Washington Quarterly 25(3): 15-28. 
 
Tung, Chen-Yuan. 2003. “Cross-Strait Economic Relations: China’s Leverage and 
Taiwan’s Vulnerability.” Issues & Studies 39(3): 137-175. 
 
Tung, Chen-Yuan. 2005. “An Assessment of China’s Taiwan Policy under the Third 
Generation Leadership.” Asia Survey 45(3): 343-361. 
 
Unger, Leonard. 1979. “Derecognition Worked.” Foreign Policy 36: 105-121. 
 
Vartiainen, Juhana. 1999. “The Economics of Successful State Intervention in Industrial 
Transformation” in The Developmental State, edited by Meredith Woo-Cumings, Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 200-234. 
 
Wade, Robert. 2003. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of 
Government in East Asian Industrialization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Wan, Ming. 2006. “Economics Versus Security in Cross-Strait Relations: A Comment on 
Kastner.” Journal of East Asian Studies 6: 347-349. 
 
Wang, Qingxin Ken. 2000. “Taiwan in Japan’s Relations with China and the United 
States after the Cold War.” Pacific Affairs 73(3): 353-373. 
 
Wang, T. Y. and I-Chou Liu. 2004. “Contending Identities in Taiwan: Implications for 
Cross-Strait Relations.” Asian Survey 44(4): 568-590. 
 
Wachman, Alan. 2007. Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial 
Integrity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
 
Wei, Ai. 2006. “The Prospect of Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Relation after CSTED 
(Conference on Sustaining Taiwan’s Economic Development).” Prospect and Discovery 
4(9): 10-14 <http://www.mjib.gov.tw/d3/9509/1-3.pdf> (in Chinese). 
 
White, Lynn T. 2000. “War or Peace Over Taiwan?” China Information 14(1): 1-31. 
 
White, Lynn T. 2004. “Taiwan’s External Relations: Identity versus Security” in The 
International Relations of Northeast Asia, edited by Samuel S. Kim, Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 301-327.  
 
Whiting, Allen. 2001. “China’s Use of Force, 1950-96, and Taiwan.” International 
Security 26(2): 103-131. 
 
390 
 
 
Wong, S. Seanon. 2005. “Economic Statecraft across the Strait: Business Influence in 
Taiwan’s Mainland Policy.” Asian Perspective 29(2): 41-72. 
 
Wu, Jieh-Min. 1997. “Strange Bedfellows: Dynamics of Government-Business Relations 
between Chinese Local Authorities and Taiwanese Investors.” Journal of Contemporary 
China 6(15): 319-346.  
 
Wu, Yu-Shan. 1994. “Mainland China’s Economic Policy toward Taiwan: Economic 
Needs or Unification Scheme?” Issues & Studies 30(9): 29-49. 
 
Wu, Yu-Shan. 2004. “Taiwanese Nationalism and Its Implications: Testing the Worst-
Case Scenario.” Asian Survey 44(4): 614-625. 
 
Wu, Yu-Shan. 2007. “Taiwan’s Developmental State: After the Economic and Political 
Turmoil.” Asian Survey 47(6): 977-1001. 
 
Yeh, Hsiu-Feng. 2005. Research on Taiwan’s Business Investments in Mainland China: 
A Comparative Analysis of the Development in Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Policy, M.A. 
Thesis, Feng Chia University (in Chinese). 
 
Yu, Taifa. 1999. “Relations between Taiwan and China after the Missile Crisis: Toward 
Reconciliation?” Pacific Affairs 72(1): 39-55. 
 
Zhao, Suisheng. 1997. “Economic Interdependence and Political Divergence: The 
Emerging Pattern of Relations across the Taiwan Strait.” Journal of Contemporary China 
6(15): 177-197. 
 
Zhao, Suisheng. 1999-2000. “Military Coercion and Peaceful Offence: Beijing’s Strategy 
of National Reunification with Taiwan.” Pacific Affairs 72(4): 495-512. 
 
 
 
News media: 
 
Apple Daily (pingguo ribao), published in Taiwan. 
 
Central Daily News (zhongyang ribao), published in Taiwan. 
 
Central News Agency (zhongyang she), based in Taiwan. 
 
China Daily News (zhonghua ribao), published in Taiwan. 
 
China Times (zhongguo shibao), published in Taiwan. 
 
391 
 
 
China Times, Evening Edition (zhongshi wanbao), published in Taiwan. 
 
Commercial Times (gongshang shibao), published in Taiwan. 
 
Commons Daily (minzhong ribao), published in Taiwan. 
 
Economic Daily News (jingji ribao), published in Taiwan. 
 
Independent Evening News (zili wanbao), published in Taiwan. 
 
Liberty Times (ziyou shibao), published in Taiwan. 
 
NewsTaiwan (taiwan xinwenbao), published in Taiwan. 
 
People’s Daily (renmin ribao), published in China. 
 
Ta Kung Pao (dagong bao), published in Hong Kong. 
 
Taiwan Daily (taiwan ribao), published in Taiwan. 
 
Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News (taiwanxinsheng bao), published in Taiwan. 
 
Taiwan Times (taiwan shibao), published in Taiwan. 
 
United Daily News (lianhe bao), published in Taiwan. 
 
United Daily News, Evening Edition (lianhe wanbao), published in Taiwan. 
 
Want Daily (wang bao), published in Taiwan. 
 
Wen Wei Po (wenhui bao), published in Hong Kong.      
 
Xinhua News Agency (xinhua she), based in China. 
 
Youth Daily News (qingnian ribao), published in Taiwan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
392 
 
Curriculum Vitae 
 
393 
 
394 
395 
396 
 
